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—By T.V. Sathyamurthy

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
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
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New Delhi
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TANZANIA'S NON-ALIGNED ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By T. V. SATHYAMURTHY*

TANGANYIKA'S emergence in 1961 as an independent state took place in an international ambience in which non-alignment had already taken firm root among a number of countries of Asia and Africa. However, by 1961, the non-aligned bloc was already divided over the question of how imperialism and neo-colonialism ought to be resisted. There was, as yet, no clear strategy on the horizon for forging links between foreign relations and domestic socio-economic policy. Of special interest to us is Tanzania's¹ evolution over the years as a stable and important member of the non-aligned group; at the same time, it must be noted that its expanding role in the context of political developments within East and Southern Africa has helped shape its international role over the last fifteen years or so. In this article we shall attempt to delineate Tanzania's role in international relations in the context of

- (a) the development of the "bloc" of non-aligned countries as a new force in international relations, and
- (b) the gathering storm of anti-imperialist and anti-racist national liberation in Southern Africa.

NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE THREE MAJOR CONTRADICTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS

The power shifts that occurred during the period between the Bandung Conference (1955) and the Lusaka Conference of Non-aligned Powers (1970) gave added emphasis to the three major contradictions affecting post-war international relations: viz., the contradiction between the Super Powers the contradiction between the forces of imperialism (and neo-colonialism) and the forces of national liberation in many parts of the Third World; and, the contradictions within the "Socialist camp".

Soviet policy after Stalin concentrated on achieving three objectives: bridging the nuclear gap between the Super Powers; extending aid and friendship to Third World countries including carefully selected national liberation movements; and extending Soviet long-term strategic interests to distant parts of the world (e. g., the Indian Ocean flank). The policy of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition begun under Khrushchev brought rich political dividends to the Soviet Union within a decade. American policy under Kennedy was marked by a shift in favour of "flexible

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response." This meant that while pursuing *Detente* with the Soviet Union, the United States could engage in a military offensive against national liberation movements (chiefly in Indo-China). After the Camp David Summit the contradiction between the Super Powers began to lose its ideological vitality and conflictual force.² A potentially explosive contradiction between the Super Powers was thus overshadowed by a quickening of the other two major contradictions.

In different parts of the world (e. g., Indo-China, North Africa, and the Portuguese colonies of Africa) anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles rapidly assumed the form of national liberation. In the post-Stalin era the Soviet bloc was not prepared to attach greater importance to supporting national liberation movements in general than to promote *Detente*. Each national liberation movement was thus left to struggle against imperialism on its own terms.³ The attitude adopted by non-aligned states to the developing contradiction between the forces of national liberation and the forces of imperialism was characteristically ambiguous.⁴ The state structures in a number of these countries reflect the interests of tiny but powerful classes more or less closely related to the forces of imperialism.⁵ Their commitment to national liberation and socialist construction anywhere in the world has seldom risen above the level of rhetoric.

The net effect of the contradiction between the forces of national liberation and the forces of imperialism was to polarize the non-aligned movement between those who stressed the importance of anti-imperialism to non-alignment (e. g., Nkrumah,⁶ Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita) and those who were prepared to temporise on that score.⁷ By the mid-1960s, however, anti-imperialist leaders of non-aligned countries such as Nkrumah and Sukarno fell from power; at the same time countries which had themselves fought successful wars of national liberation (e. g., Algeria) became directly involved in the "non-aligned movement". Their international political orientation differed even more radically from those of the founding members of the movement.⁸

The emergence of Tanganyika as an independent country in 1961 coincided with the appearance of a process of silent fission within the non-aligned movement. Nyerere placed a premium on "peaceful transition" to independence and "African Socialism". In international relations, Tanganyika preferred a centrist rather than radical version of non-alignment. This was in keeping with the importance that was given to the Commonwealth, East African unity and an outright rejection of "Scientific Socialism" and "class struggle".⁹ During the period 1962-66, the radicalisation of the non-aligned perspective of African leaders such as Nkrumah did not substantially affect the world views of East African leaders which bore a close resemblance to the political ideas of Jawaharlal Nehru. Obote alone among them was to take a combative stand against imperialism, racialism and colonialism (and neo-colonialism) in the crises affecting East and Southern Africa.¹⁰

The third major contradiction of the '60s developed within the "socialist

camp".¹¹ It took the form of the deep Sino-Soviet ideological divisions that impaired the unity of the world socialist movement. China was opposed to the Soviet Union's policy of extending military and economic aid to non-aligned countries. At the same time it was critical of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to expose the "paper tiger" character of imperialism.¹² The impact of this major contradiction on non-aligned African states, like that between the Super Powers, was, by 1970, considerable.

In West Africa and Arab Africa, the policy of equidistance between the two Super Powers was viewed in Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Egypt as calling for a pro-Soviet tilt. Towards the end of the 1960s, however, the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated its preference for the stability of post-colonial African states by giving unqualified support to the federal Government in the Nigerian Civil War. By 1970, Tanzania adopted a uniquely interesting posture in international relations by distancing itself from the Soviet Union (in respect of the Super Power contradiction) and drawing closer to China (in respect of the contradiction within the "socialist camp").¹³ As far as Tanzania was concerned it had more in common with China than with the Soviet Union.

During the period 1970-75 African attitudes (especially in Central, Southern and East Africa) towards the Sino-Soviet conflict underwent a further polarisation. National liberation movements in former Portuguese colonies achieved victory while the liberation struggle in Southern Rhodesia—Zimbabwe against UDI and imperialism reached a crucial stage. The Soviet Union chose its ground in these struggles with care, offering carefully calculated support to certain parties (e.g., Frelimo, MPLA and ZAPU) while avoiding direct conflict with America. In Zimbabwe in particular, the Soviet Union's reluctance to widen its support beyond the ZAPU (PF) to include the ZANU (PF), right up to the 1980 elections, can only be understood on the basis of the close ties that Tanzania, ZANU (PF) and Mozambique had with China.¹⁴ Cuba's involvement in Africa since 1975 has tended to weaken the impact of the Sino-Soviet contradiction; Cuba is viewed in a number of African countries not just as a close ally of the Soviet Union but *also* (and in some cases primarily) as a fellow Afro-American member of the non-align-bloc. China's monolithic global view formulated in 1968 that Soviet "social imperialism" ought to be regarded as the main enemy has been intensified to such a degree since the conclusion in 1975 of the Indo-Chinese wars of national liberation as to antagonise a number of substantial anti-imperialist national liberation movements and their supporters.

It is equally important to appreciate the general re-alignment of forces in African international relations during the 1970s. During the '60s, leaders such as Nkrumah had few ideological allies in Africa against imperialism and neo-colonialism.¹⁵ The situation changed radically during the 1970s; Nkrumah would have been more in his element in the mid-1970s than in the heyday of his political influence. The ranks of the more vocal among anti-imperialist and anti-colonial non-aligned Powers have increased. That these

Powers enjoy Soviet support must be viewed as a reflection of the soundness of the Soviet assessment of the objective situation rather than as evidence of readiness on the part of radical non-aligned African countries to join the Soviet camp. During the Havana Conference of non-aligned countries (September 1979), this aspect of the tensions prevailing within the "non-aligned movement" was thrown into relief in the exchanges between the more old fashioned non-aligned Powers, (e. g., Tanzania and India) on the one hand, and, on the other, those (e. g., Manley, Castro, Mengistu, Machel etc.) who tended to equate their apparent pro-Soviet tendencies with their anti-imperialist commitment. By comparison with the main speeches at the Havana Conference (1979), those leading upto the Lusaka Conference (1970)¹⁶ sound uncomfortably utopian and devoid of positive vision. Non-alignment in the 1980s is thus likely to be much more militantly anti-imperialist and anti-colonial than some interpretations of "Non-alignment in the 1970s" would appear to suggest.¹⁷ By the same token, it is likely that such a development might lead to a break within the non-aligned movement.

TANZANIA'S INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION—FIRST PHASE (1961-67)

In June 1963, Oscar Kambona, Tanganyika's Foreign Minister, declared in the National Assembly that the foreign policy of his country was based on

positive independence or non-alignment, African unity, anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination, and the consolidation and expansion of our diplomatic missions abroad.... Tanganyika... will judge all controversial issues individually on their merits....¹⁸

During the period 1962-67, Tanzania carved out a role for itself in African international relations and international relations in general, consistent with the general orientation given by Nyerere and Kambona to its foreign policy. The international role of Tanzania cannot be fully grasped by merely accepting at face value the anti-imperialist rhetoric of its foreign policy. It is necessary to examine the dynamic forces shaping the development of Africa as a whole and, within it, East Africa and Tanzania.⁴

During the 1960s, Tanzania was at the centre of a number of international developments whilst its internal political orientation was marked by a number of changes taking place on the domestic scene. At the level of the continent as a whole, the stage was set for the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). In the elaboration of its constitution and structure at a time when Nkrumah was advocating radical policies, Tanzania played a notably cautious, though by no means an unprogressive, role. It responded to the struggle of the liberation movements in neighbouring countries against imperialism, settler colonialism and *apartheid* by taking seriously the OAU'S

role as the main continental force in favour of liberation. In fact, Dar es Salaam, like Accra in West Africa, became the East African capital of African liberation movements.

As a regional organization, however, the OAU was consciously based on the lowest common denominator of agreement among its diverse member states¹⁹ rather than on a single coherent ideology forged on the anvil of mutual compromise. In the midst of the different, and often mutually contradictory, political tendencies reflected in the working of the OAU, Tanzania was noted, during this period, for its adherence in practice to a position of constitutional centrism on political questions claiming the attention of that body. Over a period of time (i.e., throughout the 1960s), the rather pristine political posture adopted by Tanzania showed it up as a unique (and, objectively speaking, lonely) Power whose real effectiveness lay in the diplomatic legwork that its representatives were prepared to carry out behind the scenes, rather than in the popularity of its policies over concrete issues.²⁰

The most momentous development affecting Tanzania during this period transformed the state itself. In 1964, consequent upon a revolution in Zanzibar bringing the Afro-Shirazi party into power, a series of negotiations led to the political unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into the new state of Tanzania. This political process coincided with the efforts on the mainland to strengthen the structure of Tanzania African Notional Union (TANU) within a "one Party" framework. The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), which came to power after the revolution, largely consisted of two disparate elements. On the Zanzibar island itself, tight control was exercised over the population by the party which adopted a policy of repression mainly (though not exclusively) aimed against the Arab population living in the hinterland. At the same time, the spokesmen of the ASP within the Tanzanian National Assembly (with the exception of Karume), who enjoyed little grass roots influence in Zanzibar itself, tended to be more radical in their pronouncements of Socialism and international relations than their TANU counterparts who stressed their party's commitment to forging "African Socialism" during the post-colonial era.

The impact of a refurbished TANU, along the new guidelines of the mid-1960s on the Tanzania State structure, has been the subject of much scholarly debate. For our purposes, it is important to note that the establishment of the Tanzanian State was swiftly followed by measures to strengthen the State structure and the parties controlling it. When viewed in conjunction with the events of the "week of the most grievous shame for our nation,"²¹ the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar would appear to have been intended not only in order to strengthen the forces of anti-colonialism and political stability in the East African region, but also to tone down the international publicity that events in Zanzibar attracted (specially in the West) as constituting a Marxist-type revolution. The scarcely concealed antipathy of Tanzanian leaders towards "scientific Socialism" and their unstated preference for

adapting Westminster-style political institutions to Tanganyikan conditions,²² rather than any eagerness on their part to embrace the Zanzibar revolution with open arms, would help explain this general development.

The consequences of the emergence of the new state of Tanzania for East African unity must be considered against a background of the deepening gulf between subjective aspirations and objective reality. Even before it became independent, Nyerere viewed Tanganyika as an integral part of East and Central Africa, rather than as a totally separate entity. The idea of all the nationalist parties of East and Central African countries pooling their political energies and organizations together in order to launch a combined struggle for independence had a greater appeal for Nyerere than independence movements such as the Mau Mau involving a protracted struggle against imperialism and colonialism. In essence, Nyerere viewed Tanganyika's method of achieving independence (more precisely, the TANU strategy in the anti-colonial struggle) as suitable for the whole of East Africa.²³ In the event, however, the political forces at work in the region as indeed the material conditions prevailing in different parts of East Africa, were too diverse to permit a united struggle against colonialism.

At the same time, it must be noted that the subjective desire to forge common East Africa-wide links in various fields could not be realised in practice because of the wide divergences of economic orientation among the East African countries. From the perspective of regional co-operation, Tanzania's relations with the other members of the East African Community underwent important changes after the incorporation of Zanzibar. The difficulties inherent in Tanganyika's comparatively weak economic infrastructure and relative poverty were to some extent modified by the apparently radical character of the new state. While this new development contributed to Tanzania drawing closer to Uganda under Obote, it also served as an additional factor in pulling Tanzania and Kenya further apart. The international political ramifications of the emergence of the new state of Tanzania were thus of considerable importance to the progress of East African regional co-operation.

During the period leading up to the Arusha Declaration, the events that precipitated the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) were the most momentous in Central and Southern Africa. For Tanzania, they provided the sheet anchor upon which to shape its role in international relations. Tanzania's role, during the mid-1960s, in meeting the challenge posed by the rebel Smith regime, consisted of focusing attention on it as an *African* problem requiring a united approach, and not simply as a bilateral question involving the people of Zimbabwe and the British colonial authorities. Although Tanzania could not get the OAU to match words with action, its delegates nevertheless successfully kept alive the Zimbabwe issue within the OAU by various means. In order to appreciate the true magnitude of Tanzania's role, it is essential to realize that, throughout the 1960s, national liberation movements were engaged in

struggles against Portuguese colonialism in several parts of Africa. Apart from Uganda, there was no stable, independent and like-minded Power (during the 1960s) in East Africa with which Kenya could combine forces. Kenya adopted a distinctly cool attitude towards anti-imperialist forces; Zambia's approach to the problems faced by neighbouring countries under Portuguese colonialism and White settler domination was far from militant or radical.

The main distinguishing feature of Tanzania's attitude towards liberation movements is evident²⁴ in the stress that its leaders laid on national independence, in contrast to national liberation. The entire dialogue in the National Assembly over the UDI (during the 1960s and early 1970s) was couched in constitutional and legal language whilst Britain was excoriated for its failure to shoulder the responsibility of nursing Southern Rhodesia's transition to majority rule. The idea of a war of national liberation against colonial rule and imperialism was not even mooted in the National Assembly debate which called for world wide economic sanctions against the rebel regime, under the leadership of the metropolitan Power, as the political remedy for bringing down the Smith regime.

Yet, even with such dire constraints imposed upon a complete appreciation of the international significance of the UDI, Tanzania's gesture of foregoing British aid for a number of years by keeping to the letter and the spirit of the 1965 OAU resolution calling for a diplomatic break with Britain, must be regarded as an impressive demonstration of the dialectics between the pulls exercised in two opposite directions on Tanzanian policy-makers. Again, it was a literal approach to politics involving the abstraction of Britain from the rest of the Commonwealth that enabled the Tanzanian Government to justify its continuance within the Commonwealth, while severing diplomatic relations with Britain. Peaceful transfer of power to the party representing the majority in Southern Rhodesia was, and had always remained, the corner-stone of Tanzania's policy. The UDI represented a direct violation of such an objective and therefore had to be opposed by Tanzania and other African countries. But, notwithstanding the seemingly dramatic character of Tanzania's gesture, the method of opposing UDI was carefully chosen in accordance with its commitment to a centrist concept of non-alignment and Tanzania's preference for avoiding popular (i.e., mass) struggles against imperialism and colonialism as far as possible.²⁵ In other words, Tanzania's policy during this period was *not* centrally located in a clear awareness of the three major contradictions affecting international politics that we have characterised.

Symbiosis Between Domestic Programme and International Roles

On the domestic scene, the Tanzanian political system was geared to the achievement of political stability under a one-party democracy. TANU was to be developed into a decentralized party capable of striking organizational

roots at different levels in every conceivable sphere of life—political, economic, cultural and social—and extending to the remotest areas of the country. At the same time, steps were taken to ensure the security of the country from external threat. A presidential system of state power orchestrated in conformity with the requirement that the National Assembly's general support should be secured for the government's major policies was rapidly developed.²⁶ During the six years leading up to the Arusha Declaration, the consolidation of political power by the party acted as a prelude to the ideological break-through that has attracted the attention of a number of commentators, especially in the West.²⁷ Yet, during this period and in the post-Arusha epoch, a symbiosis has been under way between Tanzania's domestic political and economic programme on the one hand, and, on the other, its international role which has attracted great sympathy from the forces of social democracy in the West. It is important to emphasize that critical international support for Tanzania has come, though by no means exclusively from this source, because it is towards this general international political orientation that Tanzania's Socialism has been consciously directed.

The significance of the above observation can be usefully explored by analysing the political contents of the debates on international relations that took place in the National Assembly of Tanzania during the first six years of independence.²⁸ Broadly speaking, the issues raised in this field fell into four general subject areas:

1. Economic policy (foreign aid, technical assistance, trade etc.).
2. Colonialism (mainly relating to Central Africa, and, within it, Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe).
3. Non-alignment, and
4. African unity (OAU and East African Community).

On the question of economic policy, members of the National Assembly were clearly not interested in exploring the possibilities of achieving a Socialist system of production and distribution. Foreign investment was to be encouraged.²⁹ There was a good deal of scepticism about socialism, and capitalism was assumed to be the only path to development.³⁰ Western countries were automatically regarded as the model. But for a lone dissenting voice, American Peace Corps was viewed as a positive presence.³¹

On Colonialism, events gathered such a momentum within two years of the break-up of the Central African Federation (1963) that anti-colonial rhetoric had to be redeemed in practice at considerable economic sacrifice—sacrifice particularly injurious to the interests of the dominant classes.³² There is a sense in which a consistent and radical anti-colonial stand has been developed by Tanzania throughout the 14 years of the Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe crisis. This is independent of Tanzania's general international orientation and role which have placed it fully and squarely—throughout

this period—within the “moderate” group of African nations which has, on occasion, shown little inclination to intensify its opposition to imperialism, even under relatively favourable objective conditions. Underlying this dichotomous attitude towards colonialism and imperialism is the deeply-held belief (to which Nyerere himself has been known to subscribe) that the United States and Britain should be viewed as Powers with different global political aims, and that, while the “democratic” commitment of the former could be tapped, the “colonial” proclivity of the latter could not altogether be discounted in any concrete situations.³² At the same time, the illusion has persisted that American public opinion is within reach of any reasonably articulate Third World leader. In other words, in its attempt to forge a role for itself in international relations, Tanzania has been oblivious of the crucial importance of at least one of the major contradictions of the world: that between imperialism and national liberation.³⁴

It is interesting to note that the National Assembly debates on non-alignment (during the 1960s) were almost entirely devoted to arguments for and against trading with, and accepting aid from Socialist countries.³⁵ The most popular line on this subject advocated that “as long as we do not follow their ideological beliefs, we should not fear anything from Communist exports.”³⁶ Yet, it was taken for granted that the powerful penetration of the Tanzanian school system and educational establishment by American and other Western inputs—from the primary to the university stage of education—was perfectly normal and could do no violence to Tanzania’s search for its own unique national identity.³⁷ The debates that were taking place within the non-aligned movement over the nexus between non-alignment and anti-imperialism did not find their way into the consciousness of Tanzanian legislators during this period.

African unity was a cause that found considerable enthusiasm within the National Assembly. The Zanzibari ministers were particularly keen to project African unity as “the only answer to oppression and exploitation.”³⁸ But, during the first four years of its existence, the OAU had not developed into an effective organization capable of dealing with concrete problems on a continental scale. Tanzania’s own interests were concentrated on the work of the OAU Liberation Committee which was, logically, headquartered in Dar es Salaam. On the question of the East African Community, however, much greater interest was evinced in the other two sister National Assemblies of East Africa than in the Tanzanian.

During the period leading up to Arusha, Tanzania’s role in international relations was unremarkable except for gestures of assertion of independence in foreign relations (e.g., relations with East Germany) and an amply demonstrated commitment to the principle of self-determination and majority rule for the remaining colonies in Africa. Tanzania’s support to the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was also part of its struggle against racial discrimination and *apartheid*. In its overall alignment, Tanzania adopted a stance much closer to Western reformist Social Democracy than perhaps any

other African country. In any characterization of its commitment to non-alignment, an important place must be given to the political process by which Tanzania became, during the post-Arusha period, the darling of the social democratic countries of the Western world and latterly came to excite the sympathetic curiosity of the United States (except during the most reactionary and counter-revolutionary years of Nixon's rule).

THE IMPACT OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION ON TANZANIA'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

During the first ten years of the Arusha Declaration phase,³⁹ a great deal of emphasis was laid in official proclamations on rural development based upon a strategy of self-reliance.⁴⁰ In actual fact, however, this was the boom period for the flow of foreign aid into Tanzania—mainly from Western countries.⁴¹ The dependence of the Tanzanian economy on foreign aid and input of foreign capital has been amply documented elsewhere. The awareness on the part of large sections of people that the various programmes undertaken to achieve rural self-sufficiency (e.g., *Ujamaa Vijijini*) largely resulted in reproducing a class structure not envisaged in the Arusha road to socialism, merely deepened the crisis engulfing the economy.

But Tanzania's world-wide constituency of supporters, drawn especially from the social democratic forces, were so deeply committed to the Arusha ideology that it was not at all difficult for Tanzania to attract vast quantities of aid and expertise from abroad. The failure of the Arusha experiment, or rather, the insuperable obstacles faced by Tanzania in its attempt to move towards an orientation of self-reliance evoked a positive response from foreign supporters (especially in the West, and within it, the Scandinavian countries) in the form of increased aid. To those entrusted with the task of re-shaping ideology in order to reflect reality, the slogan of self-reliance was employed in conjunction with a new slogan of self-sufficiency. Dependence on foreign aid, i.e., not working towards the goal of self-reliance, was justified (under conditions of crisis in production) in pursuit of the aim of achieving self-sufficiency.

This obfuscation of the Arusha goals merely underlines the fact that a systematic analysis of the class character of the Tanzanian state in promoting the interest of economically (and politically) powerful sections of the population has not been encouraged. In line with several other African and Asian countries, Tanzania undertook a kind of "socialist development" that would have no adverse effect on the interests of the economically powerful and politically influential classes. In the meantime, however, those who rushed to sing the praise of the Arusha Declaration during the late 1960s were no longer available during the 1970s to explain why they might have been mistaken about Tanzania's road to socialist development. To take the case of only two among the foremost exegetists of Arusha, Saul moved to the greener pastures of newly-independent Mozambique, and Cliffe directed his attention

to the countries of Central and Southern Africa during the early and mid-1970s. It is remarkable, too, that within Tanzania itself, there seems to be no real substantive debate concerning the character of the Tanzanian state and its impact on the Arusha strategy of economic and social development. Apart from a large number of scholars (some highly competent ones among them) who are concerned with difficulties experienced by Tanzania as belonging mainly to matters pertaining to implementation of what was essentially a correct strategy,⁴² and a few vocal simplifiers⁴³ who place the entire responsibility for Tanzania's economic crisis on the shoulders of imperialism (*a la* finance capital), there is a paucity of debate on the nature of the state and the character of class relations within Tanzania.

The practical difficulties faced by Tanzania in implementing the Arusha Declaration to *its spirit* has been listed by other scholars more intimately concerned with a study of its politics and economics. Suffice it to note here that the underlying strategy of the Third Five-Year Plan, like that of so many Third Five-Year Plans in a number of underdeveloped countries, was not sufficiently sensitive to the very real problem of reconciling the mutually contradictory interests of investors in the private sector who were in principle to be encouraged, with the interests of the ruling party leaders at different levels of the hierarchy whose control over private industrial establishments was forbidden by the "Leadership Code", except in cases where government investment dominated private capital.⁴⁴ At the same time, the desideratum and economic decisions was simply swept aside by the hard fact that these aspects of government were entirely in the hands of powerful para-statal bodies heavily subject to the advice of foreign experts and totally secluded from any kind of public contact.

It was under such circumstances that, by 1975, a new lurch was taken by the Tanzanian economy in the direction of industrialization. The underlying thinking, characteristically, was the result of trying to find a *via media* between the World Bank Mission recommendation that Tanzania should opt for a "maximum growth" strategy and the view of local economists that Tanzania should concentrate on "basic industries". No thought seems to have been given to fundamental questions of political economy on matters relating to international or structural aspects. The net result of all these efforts was to replace effectively the goals of self-reliance (and, by implication, national self-determination in a broad sense of the term) by the goal of self-sufficiency. The readiness with which external creditors showed willingness to write off substantial debts and the alacrity with which fresh aid was pumped in both by the social democratic Western countries and the World Bank can only be viewed as an indication of the high level of respectability which Tanzania's economic policy-makers appear to enjoy in Western countries.⁴⁵ Neither the Tanzanian brand of the rhetoric of non-alignment, nor the high idealism embodied in the Arusha Declaration has been mistaken for radicalism or revolutionary purpose in the quarters that control the flow of Western aid and trade. Objectively speaking, it would appear that

Tanzania's domestic economic policy has been consistent with its overall political neutrality, if not indifference, to the global implications of the maturing contradiction between the forces of imperialism and the forces of national liberation.⁴⁶

The main consideration that should emerge from this section relates to the central role played by the Arusha road to Socialism in the shaping of the Tanzanian state and the class forces controlling its power. A full analysis of this crucial aspect of politics is still awaited. But there is little doubt that after a dozen years of commitment to the Arusha ideology and several shifts in international orientation necessitated by the choice of techniques for which Tanzanian policy-makers have opted, Tanzania is now at the crossroads. What is crucial for our purposes is that these internal developments have taken place during an epoch in which there has been a quickening of pace of the national liberation struggles in different parts of Southern Africa—struggles in which Tanzania is internationally involved as the seniormost Front Line state. Though Tanzania's role in this capacity has, on the whole, been progressive, the situation in which the Tanzanian economy is placed and the political imperatives of the particular state structure that has developed in the country are such that, in objective terms, strict limits operate in practice on the extent to which Tanzania would be able or willing to stand up to imperialism in the context of an unlimited armed struggle.⁴⁷

TANZANIA'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF ANTI-IMPERIALISM ANTI-RACIALISM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION

Upto 1974-75 Tanzania was alone among the East and Central African countries to provide material and moral support to liberation and independence movements against colonialism in the rest of Africa. With the collapse of fascism in Portugal and a swift emergence of free Mozambique, this situation altered radically.⁴⁸ By 1976, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania together constituted a force determined to resist the forces of colonialism and imperialism in Southern Africa. In this capacity, they have exerted a pull on a vacillant Zambia and have to some degree enabled Botswana to view Southern African problems "as others see them". Yet, this seemingly coherent picture of evolutionary development along the Zambezi needs to be modified in order to take account of certain ambiguities of disposition for which the root cause lies in history.

On the Sidelines in the Struggle of the Portuguese Colonies

Firstly, Tanzania's policy towards national liberation struggles was far less sure-footed in the case of Angola than in the case of Mozambique. This in practice means that in the present context, there is a much closer rapport between Mozambique and Tanzania than between Angola and Tanzania.⁴⁹ Secondly, Tanzania while supporting the cause of national liberation

tion in the Portuguese colonies, really remained only on the sidelines (so far as the actual conduct of the struggles was concerned) and was in no position to influence (let alone shape) the political outcome of these struggles. Thus, there was not much that Tanzania could say concerning the level of "conscientisation" of the masses that it would consider adequate in a revolutionary party waging armed struggle against its oppressors; nor could it voice any clear views as to the precise character of the party ideally suited to inherit power in these situations. In Tanzania's own case, however, the preferences of the class forces in control of political power had been made clear enough through a dual policy of creating a party *for* the masses while embracing as well as containing radicalism. In other words, while Tanzania was enthusiastically in favour of liberation in Mozambique and Angola, it was in no position to indicate a preference for a specific outcome other than the smashing of colonial rule.

Influential Position in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, however, Tanzania has been in a much more influential position from the beginning. It is possible to glean from its policies and attitudes that Tanzania does have some clear preferences concerning the future of Zimbabwe. We shall here simply explore in a most tentative manner a few essential aspects of this question. Firstly, since 1975, Tanzania's position as a Front Line State has been strengthened by the association of Mozambique and Angola. In this capacity, Tanzania has been clear in its support for the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe from imperialism. But the political support that Tanzania gave the Patriotic Front (PF) in this regard was qualitatively different from the support that China gave to the Indo-Chinese wars of national liberation. In the case of Tanzania, armed struggle was a less preferred alternative to negotiated settlement. On the question of "negotiation with whom", Tanzania, unlike Zambia, was always consistent: not with the rebel government (including the government resulting from the "Internal Settlement" of April 1979) but with the Colonial Power which ought to mediate between the two aggrieved parties—the PF on the one hand, and the White settlers and their black supporters, on the other.

The entire thrust of the Tanzanian position can be properly understood only by focusing attention upon the secondary place it gave to armed struggle. Armed struggle is viewed as a catalyst, rather than as a means of transforming colonial society. Underlying such a conceptualization of the conflict between the settler colonialists and the African nationalists, has been an insistence that whatever course of action is adopted should be such as to be capable of "winning maximum external support." The premium placed on "external" (i.e., international) support was so great that in the Lancaster House negotiations (1979), the PF was arm-twisted by the Front Line States into giving in to "external pressure" on a number of salient matters. In

other words, the ideal situation, so far as "external" preferences go, would be one in which as close a political approximation to the pre-UDI reality as possible—under current conditions of course—be brought into existence as a background to an independence settlement (not a liberation in the full sense of the term, as understood, say, in the Indo-China context).

While there is no doubt that the strain of carrying the war of national liberation through to its logical conclusion was fraught with great problems and posed a number of difficulties to neighbouring states, we ought not to be blind to the fact that it is not these considerations, but rather the type of State that might result from a fully completed (as opposed to a politically and internationally truncated) war of national liberation which was at issue in the thinking underlying Zimbabwe's supporters and well-wishers on the Front Line, especially during the Lancaster House negotiations. Expressed in slightly different terms, underlying the question of what kind of State should be ushered into Zimbabwe was a specific interpretation of the world contradiction between imperialism and national liberation to which Tanzania subscribes. That viewpoint was not wholly committed to national liberation in the ultimate sense of the term.

At the level of rhetoric, racialism is condemned along with imperialism and colonialism. In practice, however, racialism is seen as the main enemy. Once racialism is removed and colonialism brought to an end, Zimbabwe, like any other independent African country, would be in a position to carve out its own foreign policy in conformity with the framework of non-alignment. The question of the role of imperialism in Africa, its continued penetration of the vital aspects of the economies of almost all countries and its powerful interest in shaping events in Southern Africa to suit its own changing material requirements are not considered *in themselves* to be sufficiently problematic. From this perspective, it is interesting to reflect that the much-discredited Kissinger's Six Point Proposals which constituted the basis of the Geneva meeting (October 1976) on Zimbabwe also constituted the first major step in the history of negotiated settlement (or, in other words, accommodation to imperialism). That such an avowed enemy of African liberation as Henry Kissinger was in a position to bring the conflicting parties round the table can only be taken as an indication of the enormous pull exercised by the United States on the non- and anti-Communist statesmen of Africa (and elsewhere). It also underlines the illusion that the United States can be persuaded to follow a policy primarily beneficial to the interests of the African peoples.

Yet, the myth persists even to this day. And, not a few of the 1979 Lancaster House meeting proposals and counter-proposals bore a remarkable verisimilitude to the Geneva proposals and counter-proposals of 1976. "Non-aligned" African countries, Tanzania not excepted, share this world view, not least because it has an immediate bearing on domestic developments. The crucial matter to which attention is being devoted is not the defeat of imperialism and colonialism in Southern Africa, but rather how

soon the armed struggle could be ended and the supremacy of the ballot box be re-established; not the continued politicization of the masses and mobilising and organizing them into a formidable political force, but rather consolidating existing party structures and their hierarchies, so that they would be enabled to wield state power without internal opposition. It is this post-colonial Zimbabwe towards which the Front Line States strove, though the battle cry sounded very similar to that heard in the other kind of Liberation War.

Uganda Liberated

On Uganda, however, we return to some of the classic problems of State behaviour with which we began this essay. Ever since Amin took power, Uganda (1971-78) attempted to use Tanzania as a scapegoat for its own internal problems. Tanzania's initial stand in refusing to recognize Amin was modified by the Mogadishu Accord re-affirming the OAU stipulation on the conduct of inter-state relations in Africa which was really no different from the principles adumbrated in the *Panch Sheel*. At the same time, consistent with its general stand on liberation, Tanzania gave refuge to Ugandan political exiles and allowed them to work against Amin's regime, provided they (especially after the debacle of 1972) refrained from launching any physical action against Uganda from Tanzanian territory. However, as internal tension within the Ugandan army mounted and sizeable sections of it revolted, Amin launched an unprovoked attack against Tanzania in 1978.

In dealing with Amin's contravention of the Mogadishu Agreement, Tanzania decided after careful planning to launch an armed action to retrieve lost territory and to pursue a military offensive against Amin into Uganda. In this strategy, two aims were interlocked. Firstly, Tanzania would legitimately take steps to retrieve by armed action what was its and what the OAU had shown itself incapable of securing. Secondly, Tanzania was well placed to stimulate a Ugandan National Liberation movement to take the place of Amin and march to power. I have dealt with this aspect of Uganda-Tanzania relations in detail elsewhere.⁵⁰ but in the context of this paper, it would be of interest to note that all the characteristics of a "non-aligned" nation were brought to bear upon the execution of the Ugandan campaign.

Firstly, the fact that none of the Great Powers had any interest in Amin, who had long been an embarrassment to them, continuing to remain in power meant that there was no great international obstacle to an anti-Amin move. Secondly, Tanzania's action against Uganda was specifically occasioned by Uganda's aggression against Tanzania. Thirdly, any change that could result from the removal of Amin would only strengthen the moral position of Tanzania in the region, and in Africa as a whole.

At a cost of nearly 24 million Pounds, Uganda was liberated from the

clutches of Amin's tyranny. The fact that this mission was undertaken at a time when the economic crisis in Tanzania was acute, and the war itself might have resulted in giving a boost to the sagging morale of the Tanzanian population, should not be allowed to obscure from our view the underlying international role of Tanzania which made liberation possible. Here was a non-aligned country expressing its commitment to non-alignment by positively repelling an invader, unpopular in his own country, and subsequently driving him out of power.

This is, indeed, a very unusual instance of its kind. That it is so was amply reflected in the adroitness with which Tanzania was able to stave off criticism of its counter-thrust against the Amin Government's aggression at the Monrovia Summit of the OAU in 1979. One other point needs to be noted. Tanzania has been uneasy not only with national liberation carried to its logical conclusion but also with fascist terror pursued by mindless tyrants in the neighbouring countries. This brings us back to one of our original observations that Tanzania is deeply committed to the middle way, or the social democratic variant of "socialism" under a one-party system. When this norm is violated in a fundamental manner in either direction, Tanzania feels somewhat politically ill at ease. There are no simple African equivalents to European Social Democracy, but Obote's regime certainly came close to being one, though not as fully developed as Tanzania in this respect.⁵¹ With the removal of Amin, it is likely that Uganda might well opt for some kind of social democratic political orientation.

NYERERE'S ROLE IN THE EVOLUTION OF TANZANIA'S INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION

A very brief concluding section is appropriate since so much of what goes for Tanzania's foreign policy has been the creation of a single person, Mwalimu Nyerere. Throughout the period of Tanzania's independent nationhood, Nyerere has been its spokesman in international forums. With the political eclipse of Kwame Nkrumah and with the stabilisation of Tanzania as a regional Power with ideological verve, Nyerere's stature increased and he became the spokesman of Africa in the world at large, and more and more countries in other parts of the world came to regard him as such.

Nyerere's thinking on various aspects of politics and international relations are easily available.⁵² They have been quoted again and again, and there are a number of exegetical writings on his work and contributions to African politics. But, from the perspective of this essay, it is important to emphasize that his ideas and aspirations are firmly based in the particular material conditions surrounding Tanzania's fight for independence and its subsequent post-colonial career.

By the same token, the interest evoked by Nyerere as a person who has been instrumental in shaping Tanzania's role in international relations

and defining a specific position on the nexus between colonialism and imperialism on the one hand, and national independence on the other, must be seen as a part of a wider picture involving the long and tortuous history of non-alignment. For, the importance of Nyerere lies in the fact that he self-consciously embodies a certain ideological position and, by contrast, rejects another position which is in a dialectical relationship with it. The first one is the ideology of national independence followed by an amicable relationship of economic dependence and political autonomy in relation to the metropolitan country and imperialism; the latter is the ideology of national liberation which is committed to a struggle of the masses aimed at defeating imperialism and completely smashing its collaborating ideology of racialism in Southern Africa. The dialectical process of history that is now under way and embracing all of Southern Africa is such that, on balance, the latter would appear to be gaining ground while the former is already somewhat obsolescent. Yet, Nyerere stands as the stoutest defender of the first tendency and in this role, what he has to say sounds like sweet music to the Liberal and Social Democratic forces of the Western world. This assessment is posited as an entirely objective reading of the role of a very important figure in contemporary history and the following, somewhat lengthy, quotation may help explain the intellectual basis of such an interpretation :

Mr. Gorton, the Prime Minister of Australia, has made the same point in relation to Viet Nam. He has said that Australia hoped to see the people of South Viet Nam freely able to choose their own form of government in a manner that was not only free but seen to be free; it was this outcome that the Paris talks must secure.

I understand that. I also understand why the South Vietnamese elections were not held in areas effectively under the control of the Vietcong (*sic*). It was argued that the people in those areas could not be expected to vote against the Vietcong (*sic*) because to do so would be to invite reprisals from the Vietcong (*sic*). The act of voting would not make the Vietcong (*sic*) go away even if that was what the people wanted, so no effective choice would be offered to them. To organise an election in that area, even if possible technically, was not only meaningless, it was also highly dangerous to the participants. This is exactly the position we take in Rhodesia in relation to "principle No. 5" (of the *Fearless* proposals). We in Tanzania regard it as highly suspicious that Britain should think of asking the people of that country whether they agree to being governed by a minority which is distinguishable by its money, its privilege—and largely by its colour. But although this seems to us peculiar, we have no objection to the people being offered a real and free choice on this matter. *Only we do have some reservations about the tests of opinion in Rhodesia as we have in communist countries.* Just as it is no use asking Australia or Tanzania—to believe that people will express

their real opinions about a police state if that police state will still have control over them after they have voted, so it is no use asking Tanzania—and I hope not Australia—to believe that people will express their real opinions about a Rhodesian minority government....⁵³

However, during the last decade or so, Nyerere has been somewhat impatient with the lack of understanding, in Western political circles, of the urgency of the racial question in Southern Africa. This is evident especially in his pronouncements during the last four years. In conjunction with Samora Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere has given support to the armed struggle for national liberation under the leadership of the Patriotic Front. While his role as an African leader in promoting the national liberation struggle of Zimbabwe should not be under-estimated,⁵⁴ any objective analysis of Nyerere's political ideas taken as a whole would point to an unshakeable commitment on his part to ensuring that national liberation was achieved within a broad framework of social democracy. In other words, Nyerere's international orientation has developed over the years in response to political pressures within Southern Africa, rather than against the background of the interplay between the three major contradictions which we have considered in this essay. This has meant that there is a curious hiatus between his apparently radical posture in dealing with regional questions and his relatively passive approach to non-alignment on a global level. At the same time, his radicalism in the regional context is directed towards eliminating racism, in the final analysis, through *negotiation* (rather than armed struggle taken to its conclusion) with the imperialist enemy. In fact, it was this underlying preference for a national independence strategy over a strategy of national liberation through armed struggle that constituted one of the main factors determining the shape and course of the Lancaster House negotiations (1979) over the Zimbabwe question.⁵⁵

November 1980.

NOTES

- 1 The use of Tanzania in the title includes the whole period of Tanganyika's independence leading up to the formation of Tanzania (25 April 1964) subsequent to the Zanzibar revolution.
- 2 In fact, even the recent lapse into Cold War rhetoric, with developments in Afghanistan and Iran (1979-ff) deeply resented by the USA, does not negate the essentially cautious view that each Super Power has of the other. A certain degree of positive reinforcement of the Camp David spirit would appear to have constituted an ingredient in the choice of Senator Muskie as Vance's successor (1980).
- 3 For an elaboration of this remark with special reference to the struggles for national liberation in Southern Africa, see T. V. Sathyamurthy, "Changes in the Power Structure in International Relations: Implications for Relations Between Imperialism and New States in Southern Africa," *Ninth ISA Conference Papers*, Uppsala, 1978, (revised version now in press).

- 4 For an empirical characterisation of the ideological promiscuity of non-aligned countries, see for example, Peter Willetts' essay in Y. Tandon (Ed.), *Horizons of African Diplomacy* (Arusha, 1976).
- 5 See, for example, Claude Ake, *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa* (London, 1978); and E. D. Kisanga, "The OAU on Imperialism and Liberation with Special Reference to Zimbabwe" (Dar es Salaam: University Department of Political Science, 1979, *mimeo*).
- 6 For example, see his *Neo-Colonialism : The Last Phase of Imperialism* (London, 1965).
- 7 Lest it should be misunderstood that Tanzania's Nyerere, or, for that matter, Uganda's Obote and Mozambique's Mondlane have been deliberately excluded from the list of names, we would like to make two points by way of clarification. Firstly, the West African political leaders achieved prominence as opponents of imperialism and neo-colonialism even as early as the 1950s, whilst their Eastern and Southern African counterparts rose to prominence somewhat later. Secondly, Nkrumah's disenchantment with Western democracy and Westminster-type institutions was accompanied by a systematic attempt on his part to analyse the root cause of dependence and the persistence of colonial and imperial relationships of dependence during the post-colonial era. This is not strictly the case with the East-African anti-colonial political leaders during the 1960s whose opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism was not of such a militant root-and-branch character. This is clearly evident in the inability of the two great leaders of Africa—Nkrumah and Nyerere—to agree on the nature of the fundamental conflicts affecting African countries in the post-colonial era.
- 8 A good empirical study of the varying attitudes of African countries towards imperialism within the context of the OAU is E. D. Kisanga, n. 5. Tanzania's attitude towards imperialism and neo-colonialism as such has never been clearly expressed although there can be little doubt about the verbal opposition evoked by these forces in Tanzania during the period under consideration (i.e., the 1950s and the 1960s). However, with the gathering of momentum of the freedom movements in the Central and Southern African countries where the colonial yoke and racial ill-treatment were being stepped up, Tanzania's position began to crystallise. Even so it was not until the 1970s that militant opposition to colonialism neo-colonialism and imperialism becomes fully ingrained in official policy and thinking. The evolution of this phenomenon can be easily followed by studying the works of President *Mwalimu* Nyerere in chronological order.
- 9 Nyerere's serious effort in this direction took the form of the 1958 Mwanza meeting of the representatives of the major nationalist political organizations and parties of the countries of East and Central Africa. On the question of "African Socialism" versus "Scientific Socialism", see, for example, Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-67) (London 1968).
- 10 The reasons for singling out Obote in this statement are as follows. Even though Nyerere had a good record of anti-racialism, during the first half of the decade of the 1960s, it was Obote who became the most militant spokesman of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and anti-imperialism in East Africa. The Government of Obote inherited the problem of containing a dangerous political force in the form of Baganda separatism and this in effect meant that the political leadership had to be strong and militant in opposing separatism and its foreign allies. The crisis in the Congo directly affected Uganda which had been known (through Obote's stand) for its support for Lumumba and the political forces that he represented. Thirdly, the 1964 mutiny was far more pregnant with consequences for a fragile unity such as that underlying Ugandan independence than for a fairly well consolidated country such as Tanganyika. Lastly, at the 1971 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore, a few days before the overthrow of his government with Britain's previous knowledge, it was Obote who took the lead in launching a frontal attack against the British Prime Minister over the question of arms sale to South Africa. See T.V. Sathyamurthy, *The Political Development of Uganda* (Arusha and

Dar es Salaam), expected 1980, Chapter 8, *passim*.

- 11 For a detailed discussion of this question see, for example, T.V. Sathyamurthy, "China's Role in International Relations," *The Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Vol 13 (Nov 11, 18 and 25, 1978, nos. 45-47, pp. 1851-1858, 1899-1909, and 1941-1955.
- 12 The final ideological break with the Soviet Union was to await the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was at this point that the Chinese party leaders started to characterise the Soviet Union as a Super Power engaged in "social imperialism".
- 13 Chou en-lai chose Dar es Salaam as the place from which to issue the call to the whole of Africa in the words, "Africa is ready for revolution." Subsequently, China followed a policy of consistent sympathy and friendship towards Tanzania which was reciprocated. The Tanzam railway is the best example of concrete help which bears the hallmark of a good political relationship between the three countries involved.
- 14 In view of the enormous strides made by the ZANU (PF) in the political arena, the Soviet Union has been compelled to adopt a more flexible stand by pursuing various gestures. Thus, even though Ethiopia is very strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, it offered military training to ZANU (PF) guerillas during the final stages of their struggle. By the same token, several East European states were known to have adopted a friendlier attitude towards the ZANU (PF) especially since 1977.
- 15 Perhaps the point should be made here that although Nyerere made anti-imperialist statements he did not share Nkrumah's analysis of the role played by imperialist and neo-colonialist forces in Africa. By the mid 1960s, Nkrumah had become fundamentally opposed to the entire legacy of colonial rule including the institutional framework bequeathed by the departing colonial ruler. Nyerere did not share this root and branch opposition though he did innovate institutional structures.
- 16 See, for example, Julius Nyerere, *Non-alignment in the 1970s* (Dar es Salaam, 1970).
- 17 That this radical segment of the international system is increasing its influence can be gleaned from the decision recently reached (subject to final ratification) to the effect that the forthcoming UNCTAD Conference will be held in Havana. The USA is of course vigorously opposed to this proposal and is working behind the scenes to get the decision reversed. In the context of Africa, it is worth pointing out that during the last decade or so the radical segment has tended to increase its international influence, though this observation should be qualified by drawing attention to the fact that radicalism appears in several guises in Africa and there is no single line of a radical nature shared by a large number of countries. The reaction manifested by different non-aligned countries towards the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979 December onwards), has been far from clear and reflects the rather confused nature of the current thinking among non-aligned governments about the precise significance of being non-aligned in the face of the major contradictions facing the world.
- 18 Much of the material covering Tanzania National Assembly Debates was taken from a mimeographed and classified collection of documents embodying the deliberations of that body during the 1960s. These volumes are available in the East African Collection of the Library of the University of Dar es Salaam.
- 19 Prior to the formation of the OAU, a number of alignments appeared on the international horizon of Africa. These took the form of the Casablanca, Monrovia and other alignments. See, for example, E.D. Kisanga. n. 5.
- 20 A brilliant example of this aspect of Tanzanian diplomacy consists of the behind-the-scenes manoeuvres of Tanzania's Foreign Minister to forestall Nigerian opposition to the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda at the Monrovia Summit meeting of the African Heads of State. (1979).
- 21 20 January 1964, the day of the Army mutiny.
- 22 See, for example, W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi 1967): R. Cranford Pratt, "Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania," *The African Review* (Nairobi), 5 (1975: 1).
- 23 J. Iliffe, *History of Tanzania* (Cambridge, 1979).

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- 24 National Assembly Debates of Tanzania for the year 1965 contain numerous references relevant to this observation including a speech by Nyerere in the wake of Southern Rhodesia's UDI. For the precise references see n. 18, above. Although there was no liberation struggle afoot at the time in Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia, liberation struggles were in full swing elsewhere in the world and the strategy of national liberation was already being fashioned by political movements in the Portuguese and some of the French African colonies.
- 25 See Julius Nyerere's speeches in the Tanzanian National Assembly from January 1965 onwards.
- 26 See Henry S. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton, 1970); see also Andrew Coulson (Ed.), *African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience* (Nottingham, 1979).
- 27 For example, John S. Saul, Lionel Cliffe and Henry Bernstein etc.
- 28 See n. 18, above.
- 29 See speech by Julius K. Nyerere, 14 February 1963 in the Tanzanian National Assembly. Reference: n. 18, above.
- 30 On 19 June 1963, for example, Kahama stated in the National Assembly that Tanganyika was safe for investment of foreign capital. "Sir Isaac Wolfson, one of the most outstanding international industrialists has endorsed it," he said. See *Summary of References to Foreign Affairs in the Debates of Tanzanian National Assembly* (December 1961—December 1966), University of Dar es Salaam Library East African Collection, *Mimeo*.
- 31 The lone dissenting voice was that of Bwana Mtaki, and even he objected to American penetration on nationalist grounds and not on grounds of anti-imperialism. *Ibid*.
- 32 The only clear call for such a redemption came from Joseph Nyerere during this period. *Ibid*.
- 33 See a number of statements made by Julius Nyerere in his capacity as Prime Minister before the National Assembly. *Ibid*.
- 34 This was particularly true of the Tanzanian attitude to world politics as a whole but was to be modified during the end of the 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of the national liberation strategy as the major weapon against colonialism (Portuguese and British) and imperialism. Perhaps it should be pointed out that this statement of Tanzania's obliviousness of this major contradiction of the world should be read as an objective condition rather than as a criticism of Nyerere's role. In other words, quite apart from what Tanzanian leaders may have said, our interpretation of Tanzania's role as judged from Tanzania's concrete policies would be that either the policymakers did not, during much of the decade of the 1960s, attach a great deal of importance to the world contradiction between national liberation and imperialism, or if they were aware of its importance, they were not sufficiently anti-imperialist to be legitimately thought of as necessarily pro-liberationist. The most eloquent evidence to substantiate this lies in the welter of apologies that flowed from the pens of Western liberal writers throughout this period and during the 1970s in which Tanzania's policies were defended precisely on such grounds.
- 35 See, for example, the summary of the debate on accepting aid from the Eastern bloc that took place in the National Assembly on 20 June 1963. n. 30.
- 36 *Ibid*. Numerous references to substantiate this can be spotted in this collection.
- 37 On one occasion, a member of the National Assembly demanded that American Peace Corps volunteers should be replaced by teachers recruited from Germany in the sphere of primary education for the reason that the disciplinarian approach of the latter would be preferable to the easier and looser style of the former.
- 38 See, for example, Hanga's speeches in the National Assembly during 1966. no. 30.
- 39 For an assessment of the first Arusha decade from the perspective of the Tanzanian state, see Julius K. Nyerere, *Arusha Ten Years After*. For a more critical empirical evaluation see Andrew Coulson (Ed.), n. 26.

- 40 See, for example *Towards Self-Reliance: Development Employment and Equity Issues in Tanzania* (Addis Ababa, International Labour Office, Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa, 1978).
- 41 There was of course some aid flowing from the non-Western world, in particular Chinese aid for the TANZAM railway, and East European sponsored projects (especially in Zanzibar but also on the mainland).
- 42 The bulk of the academic literature on this subject would appear to belong to this category.
- 43 The dominant figures belonging to this group during the period 1975-79 were Dan Wadada Nabudere and Yash Tandon. Both were Ugandan intellectuals who attracted a strong ideological following on the Dar es Salaam University campus. With the liberation of Tanzania from Amin's tyranny by Tanzanian troops, they went back to Kampala where the former took up the post of Minister of Culture and the latter took an important place in the National Consultative Council.
- 44 There is a fairly strong strain of analytical literature on *Mwongozo* (i.e., TANU Guidelines on Guarding, Consolidating and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania, and of Africa) relevant to this point to which Tanzanian scholars have contributed. See, for example, a number of articles in *Maji Maji* and also the chapter entitled "Mwongozo" (as well as the chapter on "Ujamaa Vijijini") in Issa Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1975) See also M. Rumulika's essay in K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi (Eds.), *Tanzania's Foreign Policy* (Dar es Salaam, 1980), (in press).
- 45 For example, Tanzania's Finance Minister, A.H. Jamal, was one of the few who were invited to be members of the Willy Brandt Commission on the future of North-South relations. For an account of its final report—see *The Times*, 10 February 1980. This report is noteworthy for its patronising attitude towards underdeveloped countries and for its deliberate failure to deal with imperialism's role in underdevelopment and related issues (e.g., the role of the Multinational Corporations and their collaborators in underdeveloped countries).
- 46 It must be pointed out, that on the surface Tanzania has pursued a more consistently radical foreign policy (especially as it affects Southern Africa) than many African countries throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. But, given the general orientation of its domestic economic policy (e.g., the recent controversy—in 1979—in Tanzania over IMF aid), there are strict limits within which radical foreign policies can be effective in the current African context. And, given its domestic economic policy, it would be difficult to argue, objectively speaking, that Tanzania's orientation towards the major contradiction between the forces of imperialism and the forces of national liberation leans on the side of the latter.
- 47 As long as domestic development is heavily dependent upon capital inflow from Western countries, resistance to imperialism on an international level can only be limited. It is possible to accept the idea that a country such as Tanzania is autonomous and sovereign and can even resist pressures from colonialist and imperialist countries while at the same time not being advantageously placed to resist imperialism in its totality as it affects all countries of the region.
- 48 Tanzania's position on Angola, during the interregnum between the departure of the Portuguese colonial power and the stabilisation of the MPLA as the ruling party, was less clear-cut than that of either those who wholeheartedly supported the opposing movements (the UNITA and/or the FNLA). The radical side of Tanzania's orientation enabled its policymakers to take the view that both the UNITA and the FNLA ought to be opposed. At the same time, Tanzania had reservations about Soviet and Cuban presence on a massive scale in Angola and this made it difficult to extend unqualified support to the MPLA during the crucial months leading up to the critical OAU vote in early 1976.
- 49 For a more detailed account, see T.V. Sathyamurthy, "Changes in the Power Structure

in International Relations : Implications for Relations Between Imperialism and New States in Southern Africa. n. 3.

- 50 T.V. Sathyamurthy, *The Political Development of Uganda*, n. 10, Chapter 10; see also M. Rumulika, n. 44.
- 51 *Vide The Common Man's Charter*, (Entebbe, 1969).
- 52 See for example Julius Nyerere, *Essays on Socialism* (London, 1968); Andrew Coulson (Ed.), n. 26, pp. 19-35 and pp. 43-72; I. Kimambo and A. Temu (Eds.), *A History of Tanzania* (London, 1969); J. Saul and L. Cliffe (Eds), *Socialism in Tanzania*, 2 Vols., (Nairobi, 1972-73); R. Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* (Cambridge, 1976); Issa Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, 1975); Henry Mapolu (Ed.), *Workers and Management* (Dar es Salaam, 1976).
- 53 Julius Nyerere, "The African View of Rhodesia: Objections to the *Fearless* Proposals," *The Round Table* (London) Vol 59, no 234, April 1969, pp. 135-140. I am indebted to Dr. W. Freund of Warwick University for drawing my attention to this reference.
- 54 See, for example, Julius K. Nyerere, *Crusade for Liberation* (London, 1978).
- 55 This view has been persuasively argued, though from a different perspective, in Ibbo Mandaza, "Imperialism, the 'Front Line' States and the Zimbabwe 'Problem' ", revised version of a paper presented (under the title of "Another Development in Southern Africa") at the C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A. Conference, Lusaka, 3-7 September 1979, *mimeo*.

US POLICY TOWARDS INDIA: A NATIONAL INTEREST MODEL

By A.G. NAIDU*

SCHOLARS and specialists of Indo-American relations have often cited "democracy" and "open society" as common and binding factors between India and the United States. Paradoxically, the relations between the world's two largest democracies have always been far from satisfactory. Following the Second World War, the United States pledged itself to make the "World safe" for democracy. Thus, the ideal, democracy became one of the major elements of US foreign policy—at least outwardly—in the post-war period. On the surface, the United States' commitment appeared to be a lofty ideal. But, the vague declarations which characterized the bulk of official American statements made it impossible to apply them in order to really understand the nature of American actions in the recent years. On the one hand, policy-makers in Washington forcefully argued that the policies were designed to uphold the principles of liberty and freedom in the world, and on the other, they emphatically put forward the concept of national security as their primary objective. Therefore, it is rather difficult to understand how these two competing, and at times conflicting, objectives are reconcilable.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of US policy towards India in the recent past. Based on an examination of the patterns of relations between the two countries, it has been concluded that US policy was not based on factors like common heritage or commonality of domestic institutions, but was the outcome of an analysis of objective realities of national interests. More often than not the United States tended to disregard the so-called democratic ideal and adopted a more realistic approach in its relations with other countries. Thus, US policy towards India conforms to a realist image of international politics, which has been the dominant trend in the past many years.¹ The conclusions are based on an examination of a model—national interest model, or what may be termed as a realistic model.

Foreign policy has been defined as "a formulation of desired outcomes which are intended (or expected) to be consequent upon decisions adopted (or made) by those who have authority (or ability) to commit the machinery of the state and a significant fraction of national resources to that end."² National interest generally refers to foreign policy. Diplomatic historians have often adopted the national interest as a criterion to evaluate the foreign policies of nations. However, as James Rosenau says, the concept has attracted attention as a tool of analysis, rather late in history.³

The Brookings Institution in one of its publications has defined national

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interest as "the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts." James Rosenau describes the concept as "an analytical tool, employed to describe, explain or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy." He further characterizes national interest as "an instrument of political action, that serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies."⁵ Donald Nuechterlein describes national interest as "the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which constitute its external environment." He says that "it is the product of a political process through which the leadership of a country arrives at a decision about the importance of a given external event to the country's well being."⁶ The above definitions thus stress the importance of national interest as a basis for the formulation of foreign policy. Any study, therefore, concerned with the purpose of foreign policy invariably refers to the concept of national interest. In this paper an application of the concept of national interest to the actual conduct of US policy towards India has been attempted.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST MODEL

An operational model has a hypothesis, a set of independent variables and a rationale underlying the relationship between the hypothesis and the variables.⁷

This model is based on the assumption that the foreign policy of any nation is defined by its national interests. Factors like ideology or democracy have a minimal effect on the foreign policy process. The main hypothesis underlying the model is that the level of relationship that one country maintains with the other, is the direct result of its perception of national interest. The rationale underlying the hypothesis is that all states are concerned as to how to promote and protect their national interests. Foreign policy, therefore, provides nations with opportunities to promote their national interests.

The National Interest Model consists of four main variables⁸ and each variable has its own components. In each case the hypothesis is the same.

The following are the main variables of the model :

- (1) Security or strategic interests.
- (2) Economic interests;
- (3) Political interests; and
- (4) Ideological or democratic interests.

Security or Strategic Interests

The components of the security interests are :

- (a) Mutual defence or security arrangements with the United States.

- (b) Stationing of US troops;
- (c) Securing military bases;
- (d) US military aid, and
- (e) US arms sales.

The rationale underlying the relationship between US foreign policy and security interests is that in the post-war period, the primary concern of United States policy-makers was national security. American policy-makers perceived a threat to their security, mainly from the Soviet Union. In order to shore up its defences against the Communists, the United States embarked upon a programme of building security systems—both bilateral and multi-lateral—drawing into its fold a number of non-Communist States. This course was vigorously pursued throughout the containment phase. During this period, the United States defined its security in terms of the threat posed to its interests from its main rival global actor, the Soviet Union.

Economic Interests

The components of the economic interests are :

- (a) Trade, and
- (b) Investment.

The rationale underlying the relationship between US foreign policy and economic interests is that, investment and trade would spur the economic growth of the United States. Secondly, they would provide access to raw materials which are essential not only for the sustenance of economic growth but also to maintain a high degree of defence potential. Finally, trade and investment would contribute to the expansion and consolidation of American influence and power in various regions of the World. Closer economic ties may even bring a less developed country into the American fold. They would use such a country as an expendable Power on the chess-board of the international power game. Thus, economic interests reinforce the strategic interests.

Political Interests

The components of political interest are :

- (a) Economic capability;
- (b) Military capability and
- (c) Population.

The rationale underlying the relationship between US foreign policy and political interests is that the importance of a state in the international power

structure is determined by its power capabilities. The material and human resources supported by one's ability to wage a war or to deter other states from attacking, generally determine the external behaviour of a state. The power capability of a nation may change the balance of power in the world, which may lead to an unstable international system.

Ideological or Democratic Interests.

The components of the ideological or democratic interests are :

- (a) Constitution;
- (b) Representative form of government;
- (c) Civil liberties;
- (d) Political rights;
- (e) Free elections, and
- (f) Rule of law.

The rationale underlying the relationship between US foreign policy and democratic interests is that Americans generally believe that the promotion of liberal democracy throughout the world would provide the best safeguard to American security. Americans are interested in establishing a stable world order where there is no threat to their domestic institutions.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The post-war period witnessed a profound change in the global system.⁹ The United States emerged as the pre-eminent global actor because of its economic capability. However, the revolution in nuclear technology has escalated the power of the main actors. Consequently, there emerged a two-Power system or what may be called a "tight bipolar system,"¹⁰ with two clusters of states formed around the two Super Powers.

The period also gave rise to the emergence of subordinate or regional systems.¹¹ The most important of them are—Middle East, South Asia and Latin America—where intense rivalry between the two dominant actors was witnessed. The dominant system's, penetration of the subordinate system, at times, led to direct confrontation between the major actors. Thus, the theatre of conflict moved away from the centre to periphery.

However, in the late 1950s, certain changes were discernible in the international system. Although the system remained essentially bipolar, it was gradually moving away from "tight" bipolarity to "loose" bipolarity. Among the factors that contributed to the changes were, dissensions within the blocs and the emergence of a numerically strong Afro-Asian group of non-aligned nations. Thus, the proliferation of actors on the global scene had a tremendous impact on the international system.

In the following decade, significant structural changes had taken place

in the international system. A system of multiple centres of independent decision-making or what is known as the "polycentry" system emerged. The People's Republic of China and France virtually challenged their respective bloc leaders and more Powers with nuclear capability emerged. Thus, the global system in the seventies had transformed itself into a "multi-veto system"—a system of five or ten states capable of destroying the global system.

FINDINGS

The findings for the above period indicate a strong support for the national interest model. Now, let us test the main hypothesis of the model in relation to the underlying variables and structure the patterns of relations between the two countries.

To start with, the findings in general support the thesis relating to the United States security interests. The components of the variable are quite strong throughout the period. These components have positive correlations with US foreign policy. The findings reveal that US relations with countries having strategic ties get priority over other countries. For instance, in the early 1950s the United States evinced a great deal of interest in India. But Washington's enthusiasm for New Delhi diminished when India did not appreciate American security concerns in Asia. The strategic problems posed by the emergence of Communist China and the subsequent Chinese intervention in Korea profoundly influenced the American strategic thinking in the region. Policy-makers in Washington were thoroughly disappointed when India refused to appreciate the American position on Korea and declined to endorse the Japanese Peace Treaty. The United States attitude towards India was influenced not only by its security considerations in Asia, but also by the threat posed to its vital interests in the Middle East. It also thought in terms of forging an alliance of all Islamic States against the growing threat of international Communism. In this context, American policy-makers concluded that Pakistan was crucial for the defence of its vital interests in the Middle East.¹² Further, Washington felt that Pakistani territory could provide an important base for American operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc. Thus, the United States propped up Islamabad even at the cost of cordial relations with India.¹³ In the mid-sixties, Ambassador Chester Bowles suggested that flow of arms to Pakistan be stopped as a measure of improving relations with India. The suggestion was vehemently opposed by the pro-Pakistani elements in the State Department and the Pentagon. Tremendous pressure was exerted on President Johnson not to take any measure that might jeopardize the relations with Islamabad. They contended that Pakistan was strategically important for American security. More important, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a report on Pakistan cited the strategic location of Pakistan, the facility of US Peshawar intelligence-gathering centre and serving the CENTO and SEATO as factors that

should be taken into consideration before any decision was arrived at on the matter. Ultimately, the Johnson Administration gave in and the alliance partnership continued with Islamabad.¹⁴

The United States rewarded the countries with strategic ties and neglected or penalised those displaying co-operation or friendly relations with the Soviet Union. By penalising a nation which had friendly relations with the Socialist bloc, the United States tried to dissuade the "neutral" countries from moving closer to the Soviet bloc. The Soviet factor, therefore, has a positive correlation with the United States foreign policy, indicating that the latter is far more concerned about the overall threat to its security than anything else. In his biography of Kennedy, Theodore Sorensen recorded that the then Ambassador to India, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, suggested to President Kennedy the link-up between the Kashmir problem and arms aid to India.¹⁵ Journalist Selig Harrison acknowledged that the United States had attempted to link up its future commitment to India against Chinese aggression with the question of limiting future Indo-Soviet ties.¹⁶ Ambassador Bowles in a cable to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, back in 1963, stated that he, at the instance of President Kennedy, explored the possibility of a long range military understanding which would prevent India from developing military relations with the Communist States and strengthen "our political and military ties with the Government of India in opposition to *Chicoms*."¹⁷

That the United States is primarily concerned with its strategic advantages *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union, while defining its relations with other countries, is quite obvious. In 1962 when China launched a massive attack on India's northern borders, the United States decided to give India military aid, because it suited its national interest. The then Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asserted: "We see a very real need for India to improve the quality of its defences against the Chinese Communist threat, and we believe it is in our national interest to assist them." He also said that it was important for the entire Free World that India should be able to defend itself against Chinese Communist aggression.¹⁸ To cite a few recent examples; on the issue of Diego Garcia, the United States argued that it needed the Indian Ocean base to counteract the growing Soviet threat to the region and brushed aside Indian objections. Secondly, Washington viewed India's nuclear explosion as a threat to global peace, because it would lead to the proliferation of nuclear "haves" and this would ultimately lead to unstable conditions in the international system. Hence, its insistence on India signing the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). All these issues are directly or indirectly concerned with American strategic and security interests.

Since American policy towards India operated within the framework of its global posture towards the Soviet Union, the initiative and evolution of the policy of containment and the subsequent moves had their inevitable impact on the relations between the two countries. For instance, Dean

Rusk, Secretary of State in the Johnson Administration, in one of his briefing papers to the President on the eve of the Indian Prime Minister's visit to the United States in the mid-sixties, suggested the following measures for improving relations between India and the United States. India, he stated, should go the "extra mile" in its dealings with Pakistan. Secondly, it should "reassure" the United States that it recognized the threat of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. And finally, he said, New Delhi should refrain from publicly criticizing US policies in Southeast Asia. The above conditions would not only mean major concessions to Pakistan on bilateral issues but also a total compliance with the American perception of the Communist threat and the international situation.¹⁹

In addition to the above suggestions, Rusk also insisted on some economic reforms as a *quid pro-quo* for American aid to India. The reforms included among other things, private foreign investment in India, devaluation of the rupee, import liberalisation to give incentive to private investments and reduction in defence expenditure.²⁰ This is enough to support the hypothesis relating to economic interests. The impact of economic interest is quite pronounced; economic interests have an important effect on foreign policy by virtue of their influence on US trading and strategic ties. Investment provides an infrastructure for the expansion of trade and commerce and exploitation of raw materials. Thus, there is a close relationship between foreign policy and investment. If the United States had developed strong investment ties with a particular country, then the relations between the two would be strong. If on the other hand, the investment was less or insignificant, the relationship also would be nominal. Secondly, the impact of trade on relations between the countries is also very pronounced. Trade has a positive relation to foreign policy; higher trade would lead to closer relations between countries but lower trade may not be conducive to closer links. In this particular case, the quantum of US investment and trade has not been quite significant.²¹

There is also strong support for the hypothesis relating to political interest. One of the major priorities underlying US policy can be defined in terms of power capabilities. The power capabilities include population, military potential and economic strength. These components have an important bearing on US policy reinforcing the power capability factor. They have a direct influence on US foreign policy. Even those who were not favourably disposed towards India, at times favoured better ties with India on political grounds. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "I would like to find— I think it would be wonderful if we could find—some way of getting closer to Indians."²² The then Assistant Secretary of State, Henry A. Byroade, who was not known for his pro-India sentiments, said: "I think what happens in India in the next twenty years may in the end be more important to us than what has already happened in Asia." Harold Stassen, Head of the Foreign Operations Administration, also stated, that "it was in the interests

of the United States to provide aid to India in view of the strategic position of India *vis-a-vis* Communist China." Even Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that it "is important to the United States that India's economic development plan must succeed and that to continue to help in this is legitimately in the self-interest of the United States."²³ To cite another instance, Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence, once recommended greater military and political relationship with India "both because it was a Power of greater consequence and because it shared our interest in opposing China."²⁴ Thus, the major interests defining US policy can be characterized by power capabilities defined largely in terms of population, military potential and economic capability. The connotations of the above variables are definitely inclined towards security. It is, therefore, the security interests which are the ultimate determinants of the foreign policy. This interpretation is in conformity with other security interests already discussed.

In the case of a variable like population some doubts are bound to arise, because population as a factor of power capability is measured only in terms of GNP and per capita income. Therefore the variables—population, economic and military capabilities are interrelated. Population by itself may be a significant factor in determining the power capability of a state, but its impact in the overall power position will be limited in the absence of a viable economic and military capability.

Despite its huge population, India has not been considered a Power of high capability because of its economic and military weaknesses. Policy-makers in Washington therefore tend to accord a low priority to New Delhi in their scheme of things. When the opportunity came, they preferred to go along with Communist China rather than democratic India due to what they described as "geopolitical" and strategic compulsions.

There is not much support for the hypothesis relating to ideology or democratic interests. None of the components of this variable appear consistently throughout the period surveyed. There is no consistent relationship between foreign policy and Democracy and hence there is not much support for the hypothesis relating to the democratic interests. If at all there is any support for the hypothesis, it is very weak. Thus, the United States often cloaked its vital interests in ideological garb in an effort to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad. When policy-makers said that "the American system can survive only if it becomes a world system,"²⁵ they really did not mean the extension of the democratic political institutions, but capitalist economic structures and its value systems. Very often the United States forged closer links with those regimes which restricted political activity by banning political parties and imposing Press censorship. There are instances to show that the United States supported military regimes as against liberal democratic states. As one perceptive scholar on Indo-American relations has put it, American policy-makers considered democratic regimes like India as impediments in their way because they were difficult to deal with,

unamenable to their control, sensitive and vulnerable to domestic criticism.²⁶ Nations pursuing policies commensurate with US interests have maintained closer links with it, even though they may have military or authoritarian regimes. As Stephen Cohen, an American scholar, has commented, "Washington psychology was more favourable to tough military policies of Pakistan than to the democratic principles of India."²⁷ However, the argument put forth by the policy-makers that the military regimes had to be supported because they were opposed to Communism which posed a threat to American security is not all that convincing.

CONCLUSIONS

The model supports the national interest interpretation of US foreign policy. The interests—security, economic and political—associated with the foreign policy interpretation have exercised a greater influence on policy-makers than the democratic interests. The democratic interests have had only limited or minimal impact on the foreign policy process. Thus, on the whole, it is the national interest which proved to be the criterion underlying US policy towards India.

From this, we can conclude that the United States did not differentiate between democratic set-ups and authoritarian regimes when it came to the question of safeguarding its national interests. When its national interests warranted, it went along with the dictatorial regimes as opposed to Democracies. It was also concerned with the power criterion of the country with which it dealt rather than its domestic political structure. US relations with India therefore depended upon its relative power capability, rather than with its willingness to uphold the democratic principles at home.

Washington's attitude has been thus determined primarily by the importance of India in the power structure of the international system. The purpose of foreign policy is to promote an international order which would strengthen one's own security. It aims at maintaining the balance of forces so as to promote a stable world order. In other words, nations strive to establish an international order or environment that will ensure their security. Once President Nixon reportedly remarked that India was always obsessed with the local grievances with little sense of responsibility for the overall international environment.²⁸

The above conclusion is in consonance with the argument advanced by the realist school of international politics. As Lord Palmerston, 19th century British statesman, said: "The national interest of Great Powers and in good measure the methods by which it is to be secured are impervious to ideological and institutional changes."²⁹

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NOTES

- 1 For an analysis of the realist position in International Relations, see E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London, 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York, 1973); Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (New York, 1935); Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (London, 1964).
- 2 David Vital, *The Making of British Foreign Policy* (London, 1968), p. 11. For a broad philosophical framework of foreign policy, see Arnold Wolfers and Lawrence W. Martin (Eds.), *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson* (New Haven, 1958).
- 3 James N. Rosenau, "National Interest", *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* Vol 11, (New York, 1968), p. 34.
- 4 The Brookings Institution, *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1953-1954* (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp. 373-5.
- 5 Rosenau, n. 3, p. 34.
- 6 Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of National Interest: A Time for New Approaches," in *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Vol. 23, no. 1, Spring 1979, pp. 73-93. For a more detailed study of the concept of national interest see Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (London, 1970); Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London, 1967), pp. 54-56; Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1934); W.R. Schilling, "The Clarification of Ends—or which Interest is National," *World Politics* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 567-8; Feliks Gross, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (New York, 1954), p. 53; N.J. Padelford and G.A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics* (New York, 1962), p. 8; Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defence of National Interest* (New York, 1951); Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," in *American Political Science Review* (Washington, D.C.), December 1952, pp. 961-88. For a critique of the concept of National Interest, see M.S. Rajan, "The Concept of National Interest and the Functioning of the United Nations: An Analysis of some Theoretical Problems," *International Studies*, (New Delhi) Vol 16, no. 3, July-September, 1977, pp. 311-30.
- 7 For research design and model building see Michael Brecher, B. Steinberg and J.G. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (London), No. 13, 1969 pp. 75-101; Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy Systems of Israel* (London, 1972). Also see Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London, 1974); R.D. McKinley and R. Little, "The U.S. Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and the Donor Interest Models," *Political Studies* (London), Vol XXVII, no. 2, June 1979, pp. 236-248.
- 8 Nuechterlein suggested four fundamental interests: Defence interest; Economic interest; World order interest and Ideological interest; see Nuechterlein, n. 6, p. 76. However, according to some others there are more than four interests. For example, R.D. McKinley and R. Little talked of five categories of interests: Economic interests; Security interests; Political interests; Development interests and Political stability and democracy interests. See R.D. McKinley and R. Little, n. 7, pp. 236-48.
- 9 Michael Brecher has enumerated twelve features of the global system which provide the categories for an analysis of the contemporary global system. He has classified them into structural and textural types. Structural are, level of power, power stratification, political organization, military organization, economic organization, intensity of interaction, penetration of subordinate system and penetration by the subordinate system. The textural category includes, level of communication, homogeneity of values, commonality of political systems, units of domestic stability. See Brecher, *The Foreign Policy Systems of Israel* n.7, p. 6. The systems analysis in Political Science contributed to the new approach in foreign policy. For a study of the systems analysis, see David

- Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political System", in *World Politics*, Vol IX, no. 3, 1957, pp. 383-400; for the impact of the global system upon State behaviour, see Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, 1957); John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York, 1959); Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston, 1963). For further literature on the global system see Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World", *Daedalus* (New York), Vol. XCIII, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909; Karl W. Deutsch and David J. Singer, "Multipolar Power System and International Stability," *World Politics* Vol XVI, no. 3, April 1964, pp. 390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (London), Vol X, no. 3, September 1966, pp. 314-27.
- 10 Morton Kaplan has listed six alternative models of international systems—Balance of Power System, Loose Bipolar System, Tight Bipolar System, Universal System, Hierarchical System and Unit Veto System. However, he added three variations of the Loose Bipolar System and the Unit Veto System—Very Loose Bipolar System, The *Detente* System and the Unstable Block System. See Morton Kaplan, "Variants on Six Models of the International System" in James N. Rosenau, (Ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York, 1969), pp. 291-303. However Michael Brecher identified five International Systems—global, subordinate and bilateral and dominant bilateral See Brecher *The Foreign Policy Systems of Israel*, n. 7, p. 7.
 - 11 Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics* Vol XV, no. 2, January 1963, pp 213-35.
 - 12 William Barton writing in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1950 argued that Pakistan would contribute to the cause of building a barrier of Muslim nations against international Communism and its threat to oil-fields in the Middle East. See "Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir" *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 28, pp. 299-308. Sir Olaf Caroe, in his *Wells of Power* emphatically argued that India was no longer an obvious base for the defence of the Middle East, because it stood on the fringe of the periphery whereas Pakistan was well within the groupings of Southwestern Asia. See Sir Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power* (London, 1957). For US attempt to forge an alliance of Muslim nations, see Avra M. Warren, "Pakistan in the World Today," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 26, pp. 1011-12.
 - 13 Admiral Radford, Joint Chief of Staff had said during the Senate Hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1956, that "We have in Pakistan a fine, loyal anti-Communist ally." See US Senate Congress 84, Session 2, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: The Mutual Security Act of 1956*. (Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 594. General White, Chief of Staff US Air Force, also told the Senate Committee that the US gave military aid to Pakistan because it was needed to support US strategic interests. See US Senate, Congress 86, Session I, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: The Mutual Security Act of 1959* (Washington, D.C., 1959), Vol. 1, pp. 193, 242-4.
 - 14 Report on "Pakistan and the Free World Alliances", CIA, July 1964, Country File Pakistan, National Security Files, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas, in Surjit Mansingh, "India and the United States: What Price Partnership," *Towson State Journal of International Affairs* (Towson) Vol. XIII, no. 2, Spring 1979, p. 71.
 - 15 Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (London, 1965), p. 664.
 - 16 Selig Harrison, "US at Crossroads in India: US Policy," *Washington Post*, 29 August 1965.
 - 17 Cable—Bowles to Rusk, 30 March 1965, Country File India, National Security Files, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas, in Mansingh, n. 14, p. 68. "Chicom" is Chinese Communists.
 - 18 US Senate, Congress 88, Session 2, Sub-Committee on Department of Defence of Committee on Appropriations and Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings: Department of Defence Appropriations 1965*, (Washington, D.C.) Vol. 1, p. 17.

- 19 Memorandum, Dean Rusk to President: "Briefing Papers for the Visit of India's Prime Minister," 21 March 1966, Department of State Paper released under the Freedom of Information Act, in Mansingh, n. 14, p. 65.
- 20 Ibid. For more details about American pressure on India, see P.J. Eldridge, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in India* (London, 1969), Chapter 3; Report "Large Range Assistance Strategy," Department of State, AID, August 1964, Country File, National Security Files, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas; Orville Freeman to the President, 28 November 1965, "The Indian Famine", National Security Files, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas in Mansingh, n. 14, pp. 62-63. According to an American scholar, a consortium of American corporations led by General Lucius Clay offered to build five fertiliser plants in India, but insisted on having exclusive rights to supply raw materials. They also demanded a guaranteed purchase by the Indian Government at prices enabling recovery of original investment in five years and waiving of minimum equity requirements for ownership. But according to the said author, the Indian Government turned down the proposal. See W.D. Postgate, "Fertilizers for India's Green Revolution: The Shaping of Government Policy," *Asian Survey* (Bekeley, California), Vol. 14, August 1974.
- 21 See C.S. Jha, "Indo-American Relations: Perspectives and Prospects," *Economic Times*, (New Delhi), 22,23 November 1979.
- 22 US Senate, Congress 83, Session 2, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing: The Mutual Security Act of 1954* (Washington, D.C.), pp 139-40.
- 24 Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York, N.Y., 1973), p. 42.
- 25 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism : American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (London, 1971), p. 18.
- 26 Mansingh, n. 14, p. 70.
- 27 Stephen Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia : A Policy Analysis," *Pacific Affairs* (New York,), Vol. 49, no. 1, Spring 1976, pp. 49-69.
- 28 V. Kunhi Krishnan, *The Unfriendly Friends: India and America* (New Delhi, 1974), p. 56.
- 29 In Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Restoration of American Politics* (New York, 1962), p. 199.

JAPAN AND THE INDIAN OCEAN BASIN*

By P.A. NARASIMHA MURTHY**

AS one of the leading commercial and maritime nations of the world, Japan has important interests in the Indian Ocean area. Those interests are primarily commercial and are related to sea traffic in the area and the flow of raw materials and fuels from the littoral nations and hinterlands to industries at home.

Foreign trade is an important source of Japan's economic prosperity and strength. Much of this trade consists of export of manufactured goods and import of fuels and raw materials. Manufactured goods account for roughly 97 per cent of all Japanese exports, while fuels, metallic ores, timber, rubber, cotton and other materials account for more than 60 per cent of imports. Industrial activity in the four leading industrial belts where manufacturing is heavily concentrated, viz., Tokyo-Yokohama, Nagoya-Yokkai-chi, Osaka-Kobe, and northern Kyushu, depends upon an uninterrupted flow of resources from outside and access to the markets of the world.

The foreign trade of Japan stood in 1979 at US \$213.70 billion, with imports at US \$110.70 billion and exports at US \$103.00 billion. The third largest trading nation in the world, Japan accounts for 8.3 per cent and 6.5 per cent of world exports and imports respectively. It is the leading importer of certain materials like coal, iron-ore, petroleum, timber, wheat, corn and so on.

Almost all of Japan's foreign trade is sea-borne. Hence it has a merchant fleet which is the second largest in the world. (Liberia holds the first place.) In 1977, the merchant fleet of Japan stood at 33.10 million gross registered tons (40.0 million tons if vessels under 3,000 deadweight tons are also included), of which tankers accounted for 15.94 million tons. Yet Japanese ships haul only 47 per cent and 21 per cent respectively of the nation's total imports and exports. The merchandise hauled by Japanese vessels, during 1978, stood at 639 million tons.

A large part of Japan's foreign trade flows along two major sea routes. The first is the Pacific Route of which the central lane links Japan with Canada and the United States, the southern lane with Australia, New Zealand and the Islands of the Pacific, and the southeastern lane with South America. Japan's trade with the United States alone stood at US \$52.6 billion in 1979—almost a quarter of its external trade. This trade is of critical importance to Japan as it has remained strongly in its favour throughout much of the 1970s. The United States remains Japan's number one trading partner.

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The second sea route along which Japan's trade flows is the Indian Ocean Route which connects Japan, via the East and South China Seas and the Strait of Malacca, with the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, Europe, and the east coast of Africa. About half of Japan's seaborne trade is carried along the Indian Ocean Route. For Japan's tanker fleet, in particular, this route is vital; it is the only economic route available to Japan. The importance of this route has increased with Japan's enhanced trade with the countries of the Persian Gulf region. During 1978 and 1979, Saudi Arabia remained the second largest trading partner of Japan with the two-way trade adding up to US \$24.7 billion. Much of this trade is petroleum-centered as is also Japan's trade with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iraq. Because of the overwhelming position occupied by petroleum in Japan's trade with the Middle East, the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean have been rightly described as the "great veins" on which depends the economic life of Japan. Imported petroleum constitutes 99.8 per cent of the liquid fuel consumed by Japan and a large part of it emanates from the Middle East. Hence the importance of the Arabian Sea-Maldives-Malacca and the Arabian Sea-Maldives-Sunda/Lombok-Java Sea routes.

Sea traffic apart, the Indian Ocean area is an important source of strategic raw materials needed by Japanese industry. In the early stages of expansion of Japan's iron and steel industry, iron-ore supplies from Asia (especially India) played a key role. In 1960, for instance, Asia supplied about 71 per cent of all the iron-ore imported by Japan with India's contribution remaining at 27.8 per cent. Since then Australia and Brazil have emerged as the leading suppliers. While the Asian share of the Japanese iron-ore market has come down to a mere 16.1 per cent, that of India continues to remain at 14.0 per cent of the total. In respect of petroleum, the Persian/Arabian Gulf region has a preponderant position in the Japanese market. With 73.0 per cent of its primary energy supply coming from petroleum, Japan remains the world's largest importer of crude oil. Its dependence on imports is of the same order as that of West Germany, Italy and France. The Middle East—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates—supplied during 1979 as much as 73.1 per cent of Japan's oil imports; Indonesia provided about 13 per cent; the rest was derived from Alaska, South America, Africa, People's China and the Soviet Union. The search for new sources and new energy materials is going on, but over the next 20 to 25 years the Middle East will most likely remain the principal supplier of petroleum to Japan.

From Africa in the West and Southeast Asia in the east, Japan derives significant quantities of other materials like cotton, tin, copper, bauxite, manganese, rubber, tea, cocoa, coffee and timber. The Indian Ocean also contributes nearly 2 million tons to Japan's annual supply of marine food. Some of the varieties most preferred by the Japanese people (prawn, fin whale, sperm whale, octopus, shrimps, and sea bream) are found here.

Leading Oil Suppliers to Japan, 1979
(million kilolitres)

| Source | Quantity supplied | Share in the Japanese oil market (per cent) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| Saudi Arabia | 74.6 | 26.9 |
| Indonesia | 40.2 | 14.5 |
| Iran | 36.1 | 13.0 |
| United Arab Emirates | 28.2 | 10.2 |
| Kuwait | 21.5 | 7.8 |
| Iraq | 17.0 | 6.1 |
| Others | 58.6 | 21.5 |
| Total | 276.2 | 100.0 |

**POTENTIAL THREAT SOURCES TO JAPANESE INTERESTS IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN BASIN**

There are two possible sources of threat to Japanese interests in the region. The first is the accelerated pace of military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the intense political and diplomatic competition between People's China and the Soviet Union. The second is the instability in the region coming from economic factors, tensions old and new, and armed conflicts. Both have an important bearing on Japan's economic interests as well as freedom of navigation along the Indian Ocean Sea Route.

Accelerated Pace of Big Power Military Rivalry

Since the mid-1960s, the Indian Ocean has been firmly drawn into the orbit of Super Power military competition, and this competition has gained further momentum in recent years. Even while stressing the need for *detente*, the two Powers are busy militarizing the Indian Ocean through the introduction of various components of their naval power. Their search for bases and other facilities in the region has naturally involved the littoral states and mid-Ocean islands in this competition. Obviously, each Power believes that it must bolster its military presence here in order to eliminate a real or imaginary regional vulnerability and maintain its lead over the other.

The desire to maintain access to the economic resources of the hinterland and littoral states is also an important, though secondary, factor in this

rivalry. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly dependent on the resources of the region, including the sea-bed resources that might be discovered in future. (The only exception may be the uranium resources of South Africa.) Both are, however, aware of the value of these resources. For the United States it is important to ensure, for example, the flow of petroleum from the Gulf countries to its allies in Western Europe and the Pacific. Of equal importance to American allies is the supply of minerals like cobalt, copper and uranium from the African countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Their non-availability could throw both the Atlantic and Pacific alliances —the core of US global military policy—into disarray. For the Soviet Union and its allies, neither the Middle Eastern oil nor the mineral wealth of coastal and peninsular Africa is important; not yet. But it would not be a wholly unwelcome development to them if these were denied to the United States and its allies.

Whether the enhanced naval presence of the Soviet Union and the United States in this area is related to the long-term objective of gaining physical control of oil and mineral producing areas of the littoral states and hinterland is open to question. At any rate, the growing militarization of the Indian Ocean through their naval activities must be seen as a part of their world-wide strategies. Hence it would be unrealistic to expect a reversal of this trend unless *detente* is revived, strengthened and given a fresh lease of life and the contenders themselves agree on settling the difficult disarmament issue. Till then the littoral states would find it extremely difficult to insulate their policies against the impact of this growing militarization.

Rivalry Between China and the Soviet Union

Equally menacing to the region is the rivalry between People's China and the Soviet Union. The entire rim of the Asian mainland, from Northeast Asia through South and Southeast to West Asia, as well as Africa, is increasingly feeling the impact of this rivalry. Land Powers of vast dimensions, both China and the Soviet Union have been busy balancing each other wherever possible. Each is endeavouring to maximize diplomatic, political and economic opportunities in the Indian Ocean basin and deny the same to the other. The Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are major targets of this endeavour because they are either close to China and the Soviet Union or share common borders with them. Developments in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula and Afghanistan amply bear this out. The Afghan developments, in particular, seem to have a great deal to do with the intimate exchanges that have been going on between China and Pakistan. The fear of American intervention in Iran to release the hostages and of the wave of Islamic fundamentalism hitting Afghanistan, seems to have been a remote cause.

From the point of view of the Indian Ocean basin countries, the United States-USSR naval rivalry and the USSR-China political and diplomatic

competition are two sides of the same coin. Both are full of dangers to peace in the area and freedom of the littoral nations. In the great game of checking the United States and the Soviet Union from reaching out to the Indian Ocean the littoral states have always been used as pawns, and they would continue to be used in that manner by new participants in the game unless they are able to evolve politically, economically, and socially viable structures.

The prevailing competition and rivalry among major Powers in the Indian Ocean region is bound to impinge upon the trading and maritime interests of a large number of other nations. More than others, Japan has reasons to feel concerned because a large fraction of its energy and raw materials import is either derived from this area or passes through it. Those interests could suffer a setback if Super Power rivalry in the region gains further momentum and results in the emergence of "spheres of influence" or "areas of prime defence concern." Once such exclusive areas come into existence, the right of navigation enjoyed by other nations would be in jeopardy. What is more, the freedom of littoral states may also be threatened; for, Super and Big Powers are not known to be sensitive to the freedom of others when they want to extend the areas of their influence and defence concern.

Japan's stand in regard to these issues was at the beginning in favour of the littoral states. It supported the idea that outside Powers should abstain from carving out areas of influence in the littoral states. It also took the position that security in the region must be left to the nations around the Indian Ocean, and they must be left free to make whatever arrangements they considered necessary to ensure freedom of maritime traffic in the area. In other words, Japan seemed to favour the littoral states expanding their naval strength in order to maintain peace in the region and also perform rescue and surveillance functions. There was also hope that the countries of the region would remain non-aligned and not initiate steps which might hinder other nations from using the Indian Ocean for peaceful purposes. Japan was one of the supporters of the Lusaka Declaration of September 1970 which called for designating the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace." That position seems to have undergone some change in recent years.

There has been concern in Japan that the rapid expansion of Soviet naval power in this region might lead to friction and tension. The source of this concern is obviously the uncertainty felt by the Japanese over Soviet intentions and objectives in the region, especially around the Persian Gulf. It remains to be seen whether this concern will diminish in the light of the recent Soviet invitation to the United States, Japan and People's China to join the USSR in a peace plan aimed at eliminating the use of force, or the threat to use it in the Gulf area, and to desist from intervening in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. It is also worth watching how Japan would react to the Soviet declaration that it has no intention of encroaching upon either the Middle East oil or its transportation routes. As in the case of the Straits of Malacca, which the Soviet Union insists should be treated as

international waters, so in the case of the sea transportation routes to and from the Gulf region; the Soviet declaration seems to accord well with Japan's interests.

Politico-Economic Regional Instability

Regional instability engendered by economic as well as political factors is also a matter of concern to Japan as it is to other nations dependent upon trade and maritime activities. Apart from the threat that they pose to peaceful sea traffic, conflict and instability can also result in the denial or suspension of vital supplies. Developments in the Gulf region during the last decade illustrate this point. Japan draws most of its crude oil supplies (estimated to remain at 280 million kilolitres during fiscal 1980, excluding the 37 million kilolitres of oil products) from this area, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates providing most of the deliveries. The prevailing political instability as well as the frequent outbreak of hostilities has vitally affected supplies to Japan twice within a decade. A deduction of 8 per cent of the supplies, in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, threw the nation into panic and caused serious, though temporary, economic dislocation. The more recent Iranian crisis and the Iran-Iraqi conflict have had the same effect.

Conflict and tension have also marked the situation in Southeast Asia, but the area is moving slowly towards relative stability with its polarization into two systems, viz., an insulated and centrally-planned Indochina and an open market-economy oriented Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the present state of relations between China and Vietnam, Vietnam and Kampuchea, and China and the Soviet Union indicates that the seeds of conflict and tension are still alive and may surface any time. With more than a hundred vessels of its tanker fleet passing through this area every month, Japan is naturally concerned about the safety of its shipping.

In so far as instability and conflicts are caused by economic factors, Japan feels that it has a role to play by way of extending economic co-operation to the countries of the Indian Ocean basin and eliminating economic disparities. Japan's involvement in national and regional economic development efforts in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia has been impressive. Through the instruments of trade, credit-finance, investment and technical co-operation, it has played a prominent part in raising the level of industrialization in the region; Japan's participation has been a major factor in the growth of key sectors of the economy in different countries.

In so far as conflicts are concerned, Japan remains helpless against the power ambitions and shifting positions of the regimes in the region.

AREAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR JAPAN

Although it has lent support to the idea of a "zone of peace", Japan realizes that without a concerted move by the littoral states and others, especially the Super Powers, who are vitally interested in the Indian Ocean basin, no progress is likely to be achieved in this direction. Pending the realization of this ideal, Japan feels it must pursue its interests in the region bilaterally or in co-operation with regional economic groupings. Over the years, Japan has developed policies carefully attuned to meet its far-flung trading and shipping interests in the basin while avoiding as far as possible sensitive political issues. To cite an example, Japan is fully aware of racial discrimination that is practised in South Africa, an important producer of uranium, coal, diamond and other minerals in the western part of the Indian Ocean basin. It is also aware of the extent to which this is opposed not only by the people of Africa but also by others elsewhere. While official Japanese policy supports the demand for abolition of racial discrimination and has avoided maintenance of diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa, it is a well-known fact that Japan and South Africa have important trading links with one another. In order to foster these links the Japanese have been accorded preferential treatment; they alone, among all the so-called coloured peoples of the world, enjoy the status and privileges of the "white" race. Japan seems to believe that the politics of "apartheid" and pursuit of economic interests are two different things. Elsewhere in the basin, particularly in the murky world of oil diplomacy, Japan has not been too successful in pursuing its economic interests without getting involved in politics.

It is possible to identify three areas of critical importance to Japanese policies in the Indian Ocean basin. They are : the Arabian/Persian Gulf region because of its oil; the Indian sub-continent because of its political stability and economic potential; and Southeast Asia (particularly the ASEAN countries) because it is an area of economic promise and also controls all the so-called "choke points" along Japan's oil route from the Middle East.

The Gulf Region : An Area of High Priority

Since the Fourth Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Middle East has been an area of high priority for Japan. Until then the countries of this region were remote from Japanese thinking because the international oil firms ("majors" as they are commonly known) handled most of the oil produced in the Middle East and more than two-thirds of the oil imported by Japan. The international oil cartel, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had been trying for many years to weaken the "majors", gained an upper hand during and after the war and completely defeated the moves on the part of the latter. The initiative in the production, distribution and

pricing of oil passed from the hands of the "majors" to those of the members of the cartel. For Japan what was in the past a highly reliable source of supply had suddenly become uncertain. The principle of "equalization" (that is, distribution of available supplies equally among all consumers irrespective of their needs) adopted by the international oil firms proved that Japan could not depend upon them for guaranteed supplies of oil.

The war not only demonstrated Japan's total vulnerability but also forced it to make such changes in its policy as would be agreeable to the Arab States. Between the Kuwait meeting of 17 October 1973, at which the Arab participants described Japan's position as one of "odious neutrality" and the Algiers meeting of 28 November 1973, when Japan and the Philippines were dropped from the list of "full embargo" countries, the Arab nations relentlessly applied the oil squeeze on Japan in order to bring that country to their way of thinking. Japan vacillated and consequently was bracketed with Italy, West Germany, India and Brazil which were subjected to a 10 per cent reduction in oil supplies. France and Britain declared they were with the Arabs and thus managed to be accorded a "most favoured" status. Britain even embargoed arms shipments to the Middle East, knowing fully well that this would adversely effect Israel other than the Arabs. France had maintained some form of arms embargo since the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.

Anxiety over supplies and repeated price hikes effected by OPEC moved Japan to quick action. It had no arms trade with the Middle East which it could manipulate in order to ensure oil supplies. Therefore, willy nilly, it had to resort to political moves. Statesman after statesman declared that the Japanese "understood" the circumstances in which the Arab nations were forced to fight Israel. In late October 1973, the Japanese Government informed ambassadors of all Arab nations stationed in Tokyo that Japan supported the Arab demand for the return of territory occupied by Israel. This was not enough. Saudi Arabia, for example, demanded that Japan break diplomatic ties and sever all economic transactions with Israel. The Arab nations obviously thought that if they tightened the "oil squeeze" on one of America's important allies, it might in turn appeal to the United States to stop or reduce supplies to Israel. Reeling under this pressure, Japan finally on 22 October 1973, brought its policy in line with the Arab demand. It supported the United Nations Resolution (Resolution 242) which required that Israeli forces should retreat to the pre-1967 cease-fire line. This was what the Arab nations had been expecting and, on 25 December 1973, Japan was elevated to the status of a "friendly country". Graduation to this rank involved a price, viz., going against the wishes of the United States.

The Arab gesture of lifting restrictions on oil deliveries to Japan produced reciprocal offers by Japan. Relief for displaced Palestinians, medical aid to wounded Egyptian soldiers and a \$240 million assistance to open the Suez Canal were offered by Japan in quick succession. Technical help in setting up petrochemical complexes and oil prospecting along the Iraq-Iran border

was also promised. These are still the lines along which Japan's Middle East policy is moving and the long-term goals of that policy are: (i) to gain a position in the oil industry (production) of the region free from the control of established "majors"; and (ii) ensure regular and uninterrupted supplies of oil from the area through government-to-government deals and technical assistance-oil barter deals.

The shifts in Japan's Middle Eastern policy are obviously contrary to the expectations of its Pacific ally, the United States of America. "Fine-tuning" of Japanese-American relationship in respect of the Persian Gulf seems to have failed because the two partners have different interests in the region. For the United States, with its goal of maintaining parity with, and if necessary surpass, the Soviet Union in military strength, the Gulf region is of importance only in strategic terms. It does not, however, need oil supplies from the region as badly as do its allies—Germany, France, Italy and Japan. The American economy would not come to a grinding halt even if the Persian Gulf oil were completely denied to it, given the substantial reserves of oil, coal, gas and uranium that the United States controls within its territories. Japan is on an entirely different footing. Domestic reserves of fuel materials, with the exception of some coal, are absent; much of its liquid fuel must come from the Middle East. If supplies from there are turned off, the Japanese economy would not be able to sustain itself for long.

"Fine-tuning" is also proving difficult in respect of Iran. After dodging American pressure for some time, the Japanese Government issued a directive to private trading firms on 21 April 1979, to reduce their purchase of Iranian oil. This was as much a response to American demand for enforcing selective embargo against Iran as to the Iranian demand that Japan pay US \$35.0 a barrel for its purchases. By early 1980 Iranian shipments to Japan had begun to dwindle, and the shortfall was covered by larger deliveries made by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Iran; their shares of the Japanese oil market went up to 30 per cent, 14 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. Despite this temporary move, Japan is hopeful that Iranian deliveries, which account for 10 per cent (or 620,000 barrels a day) of imported oil, would be resumed sooner or later. Hence it is in no mood to enforce harsher and complete economic sanctions against Iran. Stricter economic sanctions as demanded by the United States would involve freezing of exports to Iran and slowing down the pace of a joint Japan-Iran petrochemical complex which is 85 per cent ready (the estimated cost of the project is \$US 3.0 billion). These are substantial interests, and any one of Japan's European competitors or even the Soviet Union would be prepared to take them should the Iranian Government turn to them. It is this consideration that has prevented Japan from supporting American moves in respect of Iran; on the other hand, it has counselled restraint and called for international efforts to have the American hostages released from Iran.

Japan's dialogue with the representatives of PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) also suggest that co-ordination of policies with the United

States has limitations. Through the good offices of the United Arab Emirates' Oil Minister, Al Otaiba, Japanese representatives have already conducted preliminary talks with the PLO. Eventual recognition of the Palestinians would be the logical culmination of the policy shift initiated by Japan in 1973-74 in the Middle East.

Friendly Co-operative Relations with South Asia and the Indian Sub-continent

The size, economic potential and the relative stability of the Indian sub-continent have been key factors in Japan's search for friendly and co-operative relationship with it. With India, in particular, Japan has maintained the tradition of friendly good relations during the last three decades. It has been an important external participant in India's economic development through credit-finance, trade, and technical assistance programmes. Japanese co-operation has been made available to India in some important public and private sector projects including the shipyard at Cochin (Kerala), fertilizer plants at Gorakhpur (Uttar Pradesh) and Kotah (Rajasthan), and agricultural implements factories at Delhi, Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh), and Trivandrum (Kerala). Bilateral trade relations have been somewhat sluggish during the last five years and Japanese investments have shown no appreciable increase in India. Yet in the entire region, Japan has the most stable relationship with India, barring some temporary differences during the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971. Politically Japan has found it difficult to agree with India on many issues, but it is also aware of the steadfastness with which India has stuck to non-alignment.

Equally good relations are maintained by Japan with Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan too has received Japanese co-operation in building fertilizer factories and in setting up many small-scale industries. The Chittagong Steel Mill in Bangladesh was also set up with Japanese co-operation and help.

The psychological impact of recent developments in the neighbourhood of the sub-continent, especially in Afghanistan, have been great. Japan's response to these developments has been more forthright than to developments in Iran and the Persian Gulf area. Viewing the entry of Russian troops into Afghanistan seriously, the Japanese Government talked of suspending the US\$ 1.4 billion development credit and held out possibilities of withdrawing plans for co-operation in setting up a \$ 350 million steel plate plant; it also boycotted the Moscow Olympics. These moves may have revived the "fine-tuning" of Japanese-American relationship, but they are not suggestive of a Japanese decision to take an antagonistic stand *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union.

Southeast Asia: Japan's Lifeline

Because of its geographical location and economic importance, Southeast Asia has always been an area of high importance in Japanese thinking. It is here that all the gateways from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean are located, viz., the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar Straits. Japan's "life line" lies here, and hence maintenance of mutually beneficial and interdependent relationship with the region is regarded as a cardinal principle of Japanese policy.

Some years ago, when tanker traffic in the Malacca Straits was sought to be regulated by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Japanese feared that this might be a prelude to the eventual closure of the Straits. That fear is now gone and Japan has accepted diversion of some traffic to other routes within the region. The alternative routes are all in the national waters of the Republic of Indonesia. This, as well as the fact that Japan receives between 12 and 14 per cent of its oil supplies from Indonesia, has led to the emergence of Indonesia as a major target for enhanced bilateral co-operation from Japan.

Japan is not altogether indifferent to the strategic and political significance of Southeast Asia, but the broad thrust of its policy remains economic. That is so because it has important economic stakes. For instance, the five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines—account for 12.6 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively of Japan's total imports and exports. (Figures for the year 1978. During the same year, the United States accounted for 17.5 per cent and 24.5 per cent of Japanese imports and exports respectively.) In value terms, Japan's exports remained at US \$8.65 billion and imports at US \$9.92 billion. It is the largest trading partner of the ASEAN group. A dozen or more commodities which Japan imports in sizeable quantity come from this region: bauxite, coffee, copper, natural rubber, petroleum, phosphate ore, sugar, tin, and so on. Over 21.0 per cent of Japanese cumulative overseas investments (during 1960-77) went to this region, making Japan the second largest investor. Even in regard to the disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds, this region received high priority with US \$2.35 billion or 39 per cent of the total during the years 1960-1977.

Some important projects implemented with full or partial Japanese support or co-operation include the Malayawata steel mill in Malaysia, the Jurong shipyard in Singapore, and the development of bauxite, petroleum, and forest resources in Indonesia. Japan has also agreed to commit US \$1.0 billion to five new industrial projects, if their feasibility is proved.

That Japan's intentions are economic is the gist of the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine" enunciated in August 1977 by the former Japanese Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda. The doctrine is made of three points:

- that Japan will not play the role of a military Power in the region;
- that Japan seeks relationship of mutual trust with the region; and
- that Japan wants to maintain closer relations with ASEAN and at the same time endeavour to build better links with Indochina.

The last point is worth noting. Japan recognizes there is a gap between ASEAN and Indochina. This gap is more than economic and encompasses political, social and historical experiences. It also has the potential to plunge the area in conflict and tension. The Fukuda Doctrine envisaged that Japan could play the role of a bridge between ASEAN and Indochina in regional interest, as well as self interest. That role was not played because the doctrine itself was rendered irrelevant by other important developments. Believing that the "bridging effort" was a subtle effort to wean them away from the Soviet Union and other East European countries, the Vietnamese preferred membership of the COMECON to realize their economic goals. The Vietnamese were also not unaware of the talks that were going on between Japan and the People's Republic of China—a country which had turned increasingly hostile to the Soviet Union and Vietnam in pursuit of accommodation with the United States—for the signing of a peace treaty. (The treaty was signed at Peking on 12 August 1978.)

Vietnam's disbelief was further strengthened by Japanese, as well as Chinese support for continued American military presence in Southeast Asia; this was seen as incompatible with Japan's desire to play the role of a bridge. Even ASEAN felt uncertain about Japanese objectives in the region following the signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. Members of the group expected that there might be a redirection of the flow of Japanese capital and technology in favour of China.

Twice during the last two years Japan's political tightrope-walking has been made difficult. When Vietnamese troops entered Kampuchea in the middle of 1978, the initial Japanese reaction was to describe it as invasion. There was even a hint that Japan might cut all economic assistance to Vietnam. This position was corrected when there was criticism that by this step Japan had in fact lent support to China. In February 1979, when the Chinese sent their troops into Vietnam to "teach a lesson" to the latter, the Japanese thought it prudent to maintain silence in a bid to avoid causing embarrassment to China.

Given its present preoccupation with economic matters, Japan feels that its future in Southeast Asia lies with the countries of ASEAN. That future may also be marred if ASEAN were to get the feeling that economic relations with Japan tend to remain one-sided. Thailand and the Philippines have already expressed their resentment over the adverse balance of trade they have been experiencing. Throughout the region there is resentment against Japan's overwhelming economic presence, though some imaginative observers (like M. Sadli of Indonesia) believe that Southeast Asia cannot escape Japan's economic influence for at least the next 20 to 25 years. There

is also a feeling that Japanese enterprises seeking joint ventures in the region tend to deliberately ignore local interests and prefer overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and financiers as partners. Finally, Japanese business behaviour has been a source of constant complaint. These are, no doubt, small issues but might get blown up if corrective steps are not taken now.

JAPAN REBUILDS A DEFENSIVE NAVAL FORCE

Although a great sea Power in the pre-1945 world, during peace time Japan did not exercise any meaningful influence in the Indian Ocean area. Its interests—mainly cotton trade with India—were protected by the British Navy which exercised effective sea control between Aden and Hong Kong. Japan's imperial interests were limited to East Asia, and naturally, its naval influence was confined to the Western Pacific. Only once did it foray into the Indian Ocean, and that was after its fateful decision to fight a war with the United States and Great Britain. In pursuit of its war objectives, Japan tried to gain naval and aerial supremacy over the "Southern Resources Area"—a broad arc from the Andamans in the Bay of Bengal to the Bismarck Archipelago in Southeast Asia. In the early days of April 1942, Vice Admiral Juichi Nagumo's Carrier Striking Force sortied into the Indian Ocean, clashed with the British Eastern Fleet (commanded by Sir James Somerville), destroyed the British cruisers *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall*, sank the carrier *Hermes*, attacked the British naval bases at Trincomalee and Colombo, disrupted merchant shipping in the Bay of Bengal and finally withdrew to the Pacific. In about five months Nagumo's ships gained control over the sea from the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific to the East African Coast. This was, however, a short-lived ascendancy. The purpose of the operation was not domination of the Indian Ocean but the provision of cover for the Japanese Army's Burma campaign. The war was lost, the mighty Imperial Navy was destroyed, and Japan declined as a sea Power.

It was not until July 1954 that Japan started rebuilding its naval power. In that year was born the Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) as a wing of the tri-service Self Defence Forces. The MSDF is a modest force, and a far cry from the former Imperial Navy. With a personnel strength of less than 40,000 men and war vessels of different descriptions adding up to less than 250,000 tons, it is one of the smaller navies of the world. Regarded as a "minor naval force" it ranks 12th or 13th in the world. In contrast, some of the European nations, especially members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, maintain larger navies than Japan and are regarded as "major" naval Powers.

In the past, Japan's naval strength was based on big battleships and aircraft carriers like the *Yamato*, *Mutsu*, *Shinano*, *Shokaku*, *Zui-Kaku* and *Taiho*. The present trend is in favour of smaller and compact vessels suited to carry out anti-submarine activities: warning vessels, submarine chasers, mine-sweepers and mine-layers, and anti-submarine aircraft. Present and

future defence expansion programmes envisage additional helicopter carriers, long-range patrol aircraft and submarines and fleet-support vessels. The core of the MSDF, according to the Japanese Defence White Paper for 1979, consists of the following equipment :

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 4 Escort Flotillas | 59 vessels (61)* for anti-submarine surface operations, surveillance, etc. |
| 6 Submarine Divisions | 13 vessels (16) for surveillance and defence of strategic straits. |
| 2 Mine-sweeping Flotillas | for removal and disposal of mines. |
| 16 Aircraft Squadrons | 190 aircraft (210+90 trainers) for defence of major harbours and straits (include anti-submarine helicopter units, anti-submarine patrol units and land-based aircraft) |

*Figures in parentheses indicate targets.

Defining the mission of the MSDF, the Defence White Paper says that the force is intended "...to defend Japan against seaborne invasion and guard the safety of marine traffic in the waters around Japan." Thus, the peacetime job of the force is to keep vigil over the four home islands and the sea routes in adjacent waters. Extension of this task to a wider area requires a naval strength which Japan is not likely to possess in the near future. Some thought has been given to this problem by Japanese naval experts who tend to believe that sea-lane attrition is one of the dangers which Japan may have to contend with, particularly along the major routes on which the country is vitally dependent. Keeping this in mind, experts feel that with some effort the MSDF may be able to extend its task to an area lying between Borneo and Japan, and Marianas and Japan. Extension beyond this zone, into west of Malacca and beyond the Indonesian Archipelago, calls for a major naval expansion which, at this moment, seems quite unlikely.

US Seventh Fleet Provides an "Umbrella" to the Japanese Navy

Behind the MSDF stands the US Seventh Fleet, units of which are stationed at Yokosuka (1 carrier and 5 ships), Japan, and Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Fleet's mission extends widely over the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Its ability to control the sea is of critical importance to Japan. Under the existing Japan-United States security arrangement, Japan expects in times of emergency to depend on the Seventh Fleet for protection of its far-flung maritime interests. Even in its own area of operations, the MSDF hopes to carry out only defensive operations until such time as it receives succour from the Seventh Fleet. It is this dependence which

has led many Japanese to worry about the shifting of the Seventh Fleet units to the Indian Ocean to deal with developments in the Middle East. South Korea too, is equally worried about these transfers.

Both Japan and Korea are anxious about the Seventh Fleet units being moved out of the Western Pacific because they believe that this would create a "vacuum" at a time when the Soviet Union is expanding its naval strength in the area. The Soviet Union is said to have assigned about 32 per cent (113 vessels) of its submarine strength to its Pacific Fleet, 29 per cent (67 vessels) of its surface combatants, and 27 per cent (355 units) of naval aircraft. The Fleet is also supported by a large number of other vessels. On the whole, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is between 22 and 32 per cent of its overall naval strength. According to observers of the Soviet Navy, this deployment is not as extensive as Soviet deployment in other theatres, including the Indian Ocean. Yet it is a formidable force in Northeast Asia. The Soviet sea defence perimeter in this part extends to about 1500 sea miles from the mainland and covers a large part of coastal China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. None of the three nations has the power at this point of time to face such a formidable force single-handedly. Whether, and under what conditions, the Soviet Union would be induced to use this power are questions well beyond the scope of this paper. Referring to Soviet naval and military deployment, the Japanese Defence White Paper for 1979 states, "...that we continue to maintain close vigilance over these Soviet activities."

Japanese Naval Expansion in Response to Increased Soviet Presence

The rise of Soviet naval power has made it increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a naval presence in the Western Pacific at a level adequate enough to balance Soviet naval strength there, and at the same time guarantee to its allies that they would have continuous access to oil in the Middle East by keeping the Indian Ocean sea routes open and safe. It is for this reason that there have been pressures on Japan to grow into more than a local sea Power and contribute positively to the defence of the Western Pacific. This is believed to be desirable in order to reduce the burden on the United States and enable it to divert its naval resources to other areas, including the Indian Ocean.

Specifically, what is asked of Japan is an enhanced expenditure on defence and also a re-allocation of that expenditure in favour of its air and sea defence. At present Japan spends less than 1.0 per cent of its Gross National Product on defence. (In 1979 it was about US \$9.0 billion or 0.9 per cent of GNP.) Including all other payments such as pension disbursements (which everywhere form part of the military budget), Japan's defence expenditure is not more than 1.5 per cent of its GNP. In contrast, the United States figure is as high as 6-7 per cent, and 3-5 per cent for the NATO countries. The one per cent limit has been a self-imposed ceiling that has been in existence since the early 1960s. It seems reasonable to assume that this

ceiling would be maintained over the foreseeable future, unless there is a major change in the strategic environment around Japan. The domestic climate is still against a higher defence budget, though there have been strident demands in recent years from munition makers, groups of radical nationalists and the Armed Forces themselves for a larger defence-related investment. Domestic sensitivities to arms, war and conflict, as well as the provisions of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan (1947) are important factors keeping defence allocations within a modest limit. At the moment Japan seems to be firmly committed to the path of economic progress, rather than try and reach military greatness.

The lion's share of the defence budget is taken by the Ground Self Defence Force. Between 1970 and 1977, on an average, about 42 per cent of the expenditure was in favour of ground forces. The naval wing received about 22 per cent and the air wing about 24 per cent. It is admitted even by Japanese leaders that there is a good case for changing this proportion in view of the growing importance of air and naval defence. But in practice any attempt to alter the proportions of expenditure is bound to face strong resistance from vested interests within the Services. Even if such a re-allocation were to become possible, it is doubtful if Japan would be able to raise a force level anywhere near that of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The lesson of past experience is clear in this regard. Over 50 years ago, Japan believed that it would be able to deal effectively with the United States by building a naval force equal to what the United States might deploy in the Pacific (about 70 per cent of its total strength in those days). That belief was shattered when it failed to match the United States in carrier-borne air power.

Some observers hold the view that with a judicious re-allocation and a small increase of defence expenditure, Japan may be able to build a modest naval force which could gradually assume responsibility for surveillance and other duties in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. This would reduce the burden on the United States Pacific Fleet. A division of responsibility along these lines is considered to be both effective and economical. But leaders of the MSDF have often denied the possibility of Japanese naval units being despatched for duty beyond Okinawa. In practice, however, the long-distance cruises undertaken by MSDF units suggest that the area of interest is being extended slowly and imperceptibly. Southeast Asia is one of the regions often covered by such exercises. The Indian Ocean littoral states have been covered only 5 times during 1957 and 1978. Over how wide an area the MSDF is eventually going to assume responsibility, is dependent upon a number of imponderables. At this point it looks highly improbable that Japan will attempt to project its naval power into the Indian Ocean, no matter what the pressures and promptings are. All the indications are that it will continue to pin its hopes on the global naval strength of the United States to protect its maritime and commercial interests in the Indian

Ocean basin. As a *quid pro quo* it may agree to assume a larger share of the cost of maintaining US military bases in its territory.

Is Japan's Dependence on the United States Ending ?

Even in defence matters, the Japan-US "fine-tuning" faces a host of problems. Since at least the mid-1960s there has been criticism that Japan is enjoying a "free-ride" on defence. Pressures and inducements have failed to drive the Japanese to increase their defence expenditure beyond what they see as justifiable and adequate. There is apparently a gap between what the Americans think that the Japanese *can* do in matters of individual as well as collective defence, and what the Japanese themselves think they *will not* do. Much of this difference is due to differences in perception of the Japan-US Alliance. For the Americans, relations with Japan are total, embracing political, economic, technological and military co-operation. Whether Republicans or Democrats, American political parties regard Japan as crucial for the United States Asian policy. And there has been no serious domestic opposition to American relations with Japan (though on economic issues there is great irritation); there seems to be broad agreement that Japan is important for US national interest in the Western Pacific.

No such consensus exists in Japan. Most Japanese see their country's American connection at two levels: economic and politico-military. At the former level it is widely recognized that there is need for greater co-operation between the two partners. At the latter plane there has been reluctance to share the American view point and also the American burden. And this reluctance is due to the deep political schism that has existed within the body politic of Japan since the early 1950s. The Socialists, who constitute the major opposition in the country, and a large number of intellectuals and students have all along seen the security connection as risky and hazardous and have pleaded for unarmed neutrality of Japan—*no arms* and *no alliances*. The conservatives, who have continuously held the reins of power, hold that the American connection is critical for Japan's security. And this schism, however narrow and thin it may be, is one of the hurdles that Japan has to cross before coming to grips with problems of national defence and alliance.

A complete US withdrawal from the Western Pacific—a step which is unlikely to be taken at this stage—is one of the conditions which may induce Japan to reconsider its defence effort. Such a withdrawal would constitute a major change in Japan's strategic environment. An armed and independent Japan would not be a source of concern to the Soviet Union immediately, given its military preponderance at present. Politically, it might even feel happy and welcome a measure of Japan's independent military strength. If, however, it were to move in the direction of People's China, they would have reason to worry. A fully armed Japan combining with China would bring a major shift in the balance of power in Northeast Asia and this may have consequences well beyond the region. In that event, the Soviet Union.

would have two alternatives: (i) to rearrange its military and naval deployments and thus be tied down to this area; or (ii) create a countervailing force on the mainland to balance China, and deal separately with Japan. A possible countervailing move would be to work for the unification of Korea and lend support to a unified and independent Korea. If this were to happen, China would have two major problems along its northern and southeastern boundaries, viz., a unified Korea and a unified Vietnam.

IMPACT OF CONSOLIDATED SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

A development which may have a far-reaching impact on the political, economic, and military affairs of the Pacific as well as large parts of the Indian Ocean basin is the growth of Japan's relationship with the People's Republic of China. The direction in which that relationship moves needs to be followed carefully. China has always been fundamental to Japan for obvious historical, geographical, political, and economic reasons. The urge to remain close to China—sometimes implicit, sometimes expressed—has been one of the major elements in Japan's external behaviour during the last hundred years or so. In recent years, China has become the single most important concern of Japan, as is reflected in the accelerated pace at which Japan-China relations are moving towards firmer consolidation: close on the heels of normalization of relations in September 1972 came agreements on shipping, civil aviation and related matters; a long-term, quasi-official trade agreement was signed in February 1978, and in August of that year came the Japan-China Peace Treaty; and, finally in December 1979, a cultural agreement was signed along with a Japanese promise to extend government-to-government co-operation to China's modernization programme.

Apart from trade, which in recent years has made impressive gains, Japan is getting intimately involved with a number of Chinese projects for the expansion of the power and energy sectors, electrification and double-tracking of railway lines, expansion of harbour facilities for handling petroleum, iron-ore and coal, and development of basic industries. Funds totalling US \$11.5 billion—US \$10 billion in the form of commercial bank and Export-Import Bank loans, and US \$1.5 billion in the form of government-to-government co-operation—have been promised for the completion of those projects. In addition, China will also receive Japanese know-how and technology in a variety of industries, including those which mass-produce consumer goods. Although many Japanese are apt to explain these commitments in terms of fulfilling a moral obligation which their nation owes China for damages inflicted during an unfortunate phase of Japan-China relations, economic considerations have undoubtedly been of critical importance in shaping Japanese decisions. One of the considerations, for example, is the possibility of a new source of energy materials becoming available nearer home. This is significant in view of the uncertainty that surrounds

pricing policies of established suppliers of petroleum, and the discomfort caused by undue dependence on supplies from the Middle East. Present Chinese commitments to supply oil to Japan are modest (about 5 per cent of crude oil and refined products imported by Japan), but they could become larger with the joint development of oil-fields in the western and southern parts of the Bohai Gulf. While highly exaggerated projections put the quantum of deliveries at about 50 per cent of Japan's oil imports, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan suggests that a more realistic figure would be 20 per cent by 1985. Deliveries of 10 million tons of steaming and coking coals per annum are also expected to begin by 1985. The big question is whether Japan would like to put all its eggs in the Chinese basket or keep some option to revive or expand energy-related projects in Siberia and the Far East for which the Soviet Union has invited both Japanese capital and technology.

Induction of Japanese capital and technology on a scale at present contemplated is in the long run bound to strengthen China's economic base. China, of course, must modernize, and it needs all the help that it can muster in this effort. Considered in isolation all these are beneficial to the Chinese people. But a strong economic base might turn out to be an inducement for a sustained and enlarged military effort. After all, strengthening its armed forces is one of the four important goals of China's modernization programme. Even if Japan were not to provide any direct assistance to military-related projects, the fact that it will place at China's disposal significant quantities of foreign exchange should enable the latter to release domestic resources to strengthen its army, navy and airforce.

The moderation which one sees in Chinese behaviour today is a reflection of economic and military weakness; once this is eliminated, there might be a change in its policies and actions. That would be an issue on which China's close neighbours cannot remain complacent. Some of them, like India, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, share common frontiers with China and armed clashes have occurred in the past along those frontiers. For the Soviet Union the situation may not appear to be serious. The asymmetry in the military and economic positions of China and the Soviet Union is so large that it will be perhaps one or two decades before China can take a threatening posture *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union. For Vietnam and India it is a matter of vital concern whether China's rapid modernization will lead to the growth of its military strength and to a militant course. And this modernization hinges on the extent of Japanese capital and technology made available to it.

Even from the point of view of peaceful competition for markets, the pace and direction of China's economic modernization could affect the countries of South and Southeast Asia. They face the danger of being eliminated from a number of lucrative markets by mass-produced Chinese goods.

If strengthening bilateral commerce is the only purpose of building friendship with China, there would be nothing significant about the emerging

Sino-Japanese partnership. It goes beyond and takes on political undertones. It is difficult to resist the impression that through this partnership Japan is beginning to lean towards China in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and also to assume a bias against countries which have friendly relations with the Soviet Union. A degree of firmness in Japanese attitude towards the Soviet Union has become noticeable since 1978. As it is a leading member of the world community, Japan is bound to influence others if it were to embrace the Chinese world view that "Soviet Socialist Imperialism" is the main "hegemonistic force" in the world and countries which remain friendly with the Soviet Union are acquiescing in Soviet designs. The "state of the globe" perceptions based on such simplified notions present a potential hazard to endeavours aimed at evolving a peaceful and stable world order. Committed as it is to economic progress and prosperity, Japan needs that very order.

There is a subtle but unmistakable tendency in the Japan-China economic and trade partnership eventually to acquire a military clout and also become a new security system in the Asian-Pacific region. Since the early 1970s, China has muted its criticism of the "revival of Japanese militarism" and has thereby admitted that it is legitimate for Japan to maintain arms for self defence. It has not, however, made direct references to the possibility of an independently armed neighbour. Inferentially it can be argued that China would welcome a more fully armed Japan in so far as it raises the level of resistance to the Soviet Union. One must, therefore, estimate the impact of an expansion of Japan's sea and air power, if and when it occurs, in this light. A strong Chinese ground force and an equally strong Japanese air and naval defence would complement each other in Northeast Asia. The development of such complementarity may relieve the United States of its burden in the Pacific and enable it to concentrate on the Indian Ocean and other theatres. It may also create uncertainties for the Soviet Union; whether Soviet attention will be deflected from other areas is difficult to judge.

A strong Japanese sea and air defence complementing Chinese ground troops on the mainland would be the fulfilment of an old dream, viz., an East Asian Union consisting of China and Japan (including of course Korea). But contemporary realities make such a proposition extremely risky. An independently armed Japan might turn out to be a highly destabilizing factor in the region. It would certainly cause a shift in the geopolitical balance in East Asia, but such a shift may not necessarily remain in favour of China. If a well-armed Japan could pose a problem to the Soviet Union, so will it to China. Indeed China might find it more difficult to adjust smoothly to a neighbour better armed than itself. Given its technological and industrial lead over China, it would not take long for Japan to acquire armaments larger than China's. And there lies the seed for an armaments competition. If China accepts that better and more arms for Japan are in the interests of regional security, then the situation might remain manageable. If, however, it sees a challenge to its own political and military primacy in the region, it might try to boost up its own arms. The ensuing rivalry may lead to a

greater Chinese attention to its immediate neighbourhood. It may, if Sino-Soviet relations improve, also result in lesser Chinese attention to distant areas like Africa and the Indian Ocean.

Following the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty, China has endorsed the continuation of the mutual security arrangement between Japan and the United States. In 1960, soon after the May-June demonstrations in Tokyo against the new and revised Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, Mao Zhedong had hailed the opposition to the Treaty as a legacy which the Japanese people would leave to "their children and grandchildren." That was when there was antagonism between China and the United States and when the Treaty was seen as an instrument of United States' China containment policy. All that is now a matter of history. When the Chinese Deputy Premier, Deng Xiaoping, visited Tokyo for the exchange of ratification instruments of the Peace Treaty (October 1978), he took the Japanese people by surprise by his statement that China had no objection to the continuance of the security arrangement with the United States, if the Japanese people wanted it. China today is not only prepared to tolerate but even support American presence in the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. This change in the Chinese position has been an important factor in weakening the Japan Socialist Party's opposition to the Security Treaty; only the Communist Party of Japan remains unreconciled to it.

In April 1979, China indicated its unwillingness to renew the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950, and it lapsed a year after. China's action was a signal to the Soviet Union that it was no longer opposed to US military presence in East and Southeast Asia, and Japan's rearmament. The Preamble to the Sino-Soviet Treaty had avowed to defeat the revival of Japanese rearmament, and co-operation between Japanese militarism and any outside Power.

The changing geopolitical equilibrium in the Pacific is not entirely unrelated to developments in the Indian Ocean basin. If a tripartite arrangement involving China, Pakistan, and the United States is taking shape in the Indian Ocean, the contours of a similar arrangement are visible in the Pacific, involving Japan, China and the United States. Each arrangement buttresses the other, and both are aimed at balancing the growing might of the Soviet Union. They are manifestations of the intense triangular contest between the United States, Soviet Union, and China to which most parts of the world are today exposed. Each has its own fears and feels that it must act in order to neutralise the other wherever possible. China feels that the Soviet Union is drawing an "iron ring" around it in Asia and creating vulnerabilities close to its south-eastern frontiers; therefore it seeks the comfort of group arrangements. The Soviet Union fears that American naval deployment in the Indian Ocean poses a threat to its only link between its European parts and the Far East; these deployments are much too close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, given the "radius of action of modern means of strategic attack." Therefore, it seeks to maintain a visible

presence in the Indian Ocean and ponders over the advantages of posting a permanent squadron in Camranh Bay and Da Nang bases in Vietnam—a move which is sure to nullify the defensive mission of China's South Sea Fleet. The growth of Soviet naval power in the Far East as well as the Indian Ocean is a matter of concern to the United States; it fears that at an opportune moment the Soviet Union might tamper with the oil lifelines leading to Japan and the Western industrialized societies. It therefore not only wants to stay at Diego Garcia but also desires its NATO and Pacific allies to enlarge their navies and take on the Indian Ocean.

Neither Pakistan nor Japan is directly involved in these moves and counter moves, but both are being drawn into them through their Chinese and American connections.

APPRAISAL

Smallest among the oceans of the world, the Indian Ocean has literally become an "area of explosion." The coastal and hinterland countries bordering it—they account for over 25 per cent of the world's population—feel constantly insecure owing to the unabated rivalry in the region among the great Powers. Trading and manufacturing nations of the world feel concerned about maritime security and trade in the area. And efforts made at the United Nations and by the non-aligned group of nations to have the region recognized as a "zone of peace" have failed to bear fruit.

As mentioned earlier in the paper, Japan was one of the supporters of the Lusaka Declaration on the Indian Ocean. It also supported the move made at the United Nations in 1971 to have the Indian Ocean recognized as a "Zone of Peace". By 1979 however, there was a subtle shift in its stance; it was not prepared to take a position on the question of the presence of outside Powers in the Indian Ocean. Thus, at the 2-week conference of the 43 Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states held in New York in 1979, Japan dissociated itself from the final document issued by the participants. That document, in essence, called for the following :

- the great Powers should at once remove from the Indian Ocean and hinterland all military bases, installations, and other forms of their military presence;
- the coastal and hinterland states should not extend help to the great Powers in any military activity; and
- that outside Powers should not introduce nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean.

Japan's dissociation was perhaps the result of an apprehension that support for the document would go against its defence relationship with the United States. Australia, which also dissociated itself from the document, had this fear.

Because of its concern with the expansion of Soviet military power and the exposure of its oil route to possible action by the Soviet flotilla permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean, Japan seems to have veered to the position that the United States must maintain a strong naval presence in order to balance the Soviet presence there. Whether it will also now consider favourably joining an allied patrol fleet to be deployed in the Indian Ocean remains to be seen. Considering the domestic reaction to participation by units of MSDF in the RIMPAC exercises (rim of the Pacific), it would appear that co-operation with any collective or international task force will face considerable resistance. Further, Japan does not seem to be ready yet to make only major change in its policy of not sending its military troops abroad.

January 1981.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

NEPAL'S REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN

THE despatch of a large contingent of troops by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan in December 1979 and their continued presence since then in that country are developments of far-reaching significance not only for the countries of the region but also for the international community at large. The issue in fact is a highly complicated international problem in which not only the policies and interests of the two Super Powers are in sharp conflict but also the nations of the region feel concerned about the developments likely to impinge on their security and independence. In fact, for most of the countries of the Third World also, the issue is a glaring example of flouting the norms of interstate behaviour.

In the present crisis one of Afghanistan's big neighbour—the Soviet Union, a Communist country—has sent its army to shape the political order against the strong opposition of another Super Power—the United States. To the United States, the crisis poses an imminent danger to its only solid influence base in this region viz., Pakistan. To the People's Republic of China, it signifies the expansion of the perimeter of its rival's (Soviet Union's) political influence.

In such a situation there is not much that a small power like Nepal can do; nevertheless, the situational stimuli and the psychological predispositions of Nepal's decision-makers need to be explained. Both Nepal and Afghanistan are friendly, small, non-aligned Asian countries not too far apart. Whereas Nepal is a part of the South Asian state system, Afghanistan also forms at least the appendix, if not the functional ingredient, of this system. Both face big neighbours and have similar problems as land-locked states.

The present Soviet action even though justified as having been requested for by the lawful government of the country, raises pertinent questions: Has the big Power, howsoever friendly or good intentioned it might be, the right to play an active role to the extent of using military force in the domestic politics of a small neighbour? Is the lawful government of a (small) state morally or legally competent to ask for large scale military help from a big Power mainly for domestic purposes without the specific sanction of its peoples? and, Should a small non-aligned country be allowed to be a hotbed of big Power politics and rivalry.

Apart from these questions which emanate from the nature of the crisis, the parties directly or indirectly affected by it and their policy postures, together with Nepal's equation with such parties, are also important for a clear understanding of Kathmandu's reaction. Nepal as a non-aligned-country has consistently been maintaining a policy of equal friendship with both the Super Powers and its two big neighbours, India and China. All these countries are deeply concerned with the developments in Afghanistan. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China are

vehemently opposed to the Soviet action cutting across their conflicting ideologies. In fact, as is evident from the recent trends in international politics, alignment of nations transcends the bonds of ideology. Pakistan, a regional Power and a close neighbour of Afghanistan with whom Nepal also has always maintained good friendly rapport is literally following the Sino-American line. Nepal's age-old friend, the United Kingdom also subscribes to the Sino-American point of view. Further, a large number of non-aligned countries with whom Nepal co-operates in international conferences also condemn the Soviet military presence in a weak and non-aligned state. As against this, India with whom it has much more extensive contacts than any other country in the world and with whom it is supposed to have consultation and cooperation on the question of an issue affecting mutual security is pursuing a line of policy which, while trying to shield the Soviet Union from outright condemnation, intends to defuse the crisis and make the region free from the politics of big and external Powers.

All these form the scenario to which the decision-makers in Nepal are to react. But their own psychological dispositions provide them the spectacles to perceive the situation. Since the accession of King Mahendra to the throne in Nepal, the King, the political leaders of all shades, whether in government or outside, and even public opinion have with one voice been strongly opposed, rather extremely sensitive, to any country's interference in its internal affairs. Not unnaturally, non-interference in each other's affairs is one of the corner-stones of the principles of inter-state relations Nepal believes in and repeatedly emphasizes in almost all the international forums. In fact, this has direct bearing on its own security and political stability. In the light of its own past experiences, Nepal harbours suspicions about its big neighbours, and as a result, it has developed what may be termed as some sort of psychophobia. Therefore, the psychological bent of the Nepalese elites is such which does not brook any interference of a state in another's internal affairs. It is not merely a matter of conviction but a shield for them to safeguard their country's independence and sovereignty. Again, it is this fear-psychology, which originates from its own precarious existence between two big neighbours which propels Nepal to be a vocal champion of the rights of small Powers in international forums and also drives it to forge unity even at the cost sometimes of incurring the displeasure and annoyance of its big friendly neighbour, India.

OFFICIAL NEPALESE REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS

The first reaction of the Government of Nepal to the developments in Afghanistan was available on 1 January 1980 when a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry issued a statement in Kathmandu saying :

His Majesty's Government has been watching events in Afghanistan with increasing concern. Recent developments, including the large

foreign military presence, in that non-aligned sovereign country have deeply aggravated our concern, since they pose a danger to peace and stability. His Majesty's Government believes in the inviolability of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their right to determine and chart their own destiny themselves without foreign interference. Nepal opposes foreign intervention wherever it may occur. Nepal believes as a matter of faith and principle that foreign troops be withdrawn forthwith within national boundaries.¹

A few days later, at a meeting with foreign press correspondents in Kathmandu on 4 January 1980, the Nepalese Foreign Minister, K.B. Shahi deplored the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and called for their early withdrawal.²

Nepal's reaction was thus prompt and unequivocal. It has remained firm on its stand and has strongly reacted to any attempt to misinterpret or misrepresent its point of view. For instance, when it was brought to the notice of the Nepalese Government that the Soviet news agency *Tass* had circulated a report saying that the Foreign Ministry of Nepal did not regard the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as an interference in the internal affairs of that country and that the report was also broadcast by All India Radio, promptly on 6 January 1980 the Nepalese Foreign Ministry contradicted it and termed it as "not only a distortion but a complete reversal of facts." Reiterating its stand on the situation it maintained: "The principled stand consistently taken by Nepal on the inviolability of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of states and against any form of interference in their internal affairs is known to the international community."

Threat to International Peace and Security

About its line of action, the Foreign Ministry spokesman clearly stated:

The UN Security Council is now discussing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. His Majesty's Government fully supports the UN Security Council's consideration of the question, which, in its view, clearly represents a threat to international peace and sovereignty. His Majesty's Government deplores the intervention and hopes that the Security Council will uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter by calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops immediately from Afghanistan, thereby enabling the people of that country to determine their destiny themselves without interference.³

Later when the issue of Afghanistan was brought before the General Assembly on 14 January 1980, Nepal's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Uddhav Dav Bhatta, made his country's position clear

by asserting that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan contributed a threat to international peace and security and, unless eliminated immediately, it would have a far-reaching and negative impact on peace, stability and the atmosphere of co-operation and understanding of the region and beyond. He further added: "The presence of foreign troops has put at stake not only the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan but also the fabric of civilized relationships between states."⁴ On 15 January 1980, Nepal voted in favour of a resolution at the emergency session of the General Assembly which called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.⁵ The Nepalese stand was thus quite different from that of India which had abstained from voting in the General Assembly on that issue. Nor did Nepal try to link Soviet intervention with the Sino-American and Pakistani designs and activities in Afghanistan which India had been emphasizing right from the beginning of the Soviet action. In fact, the Nepalese Foreign Minister, K.B. Shahi, at a meeting with foreign press correspondents in Kathmandu on 4 January 1980, had described the United States decision to rearm Pakistan as a "bilateral affair" but soon corrected himself by adding that "rearming of any country in any part of the world will only create tension."⁶ This, however, revealed that in the Nepalese thinking the United States design and activities in the region should not be considered as an excuse for the large scale direct military interventions by the Soviet Union.

The Government of India was and is still keen that the countries of the region should evolve a consensus on their approach to the Afghanistan crisis and take a united stand to defuse it. The Indian Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe, therefore, went to Kathmandu on a two-day visit on 18 February 1980 exclusively to impress upon Kathmandu to view the Afghanistan crisis from an Indian perspective, although he described his visit as "exploratory" and pertaining to the international situation as well as bilateral relations in the economic and technical fields.⁷ However, when questioned by newsmen on his arrival in Kathmandu, he explained his real mission stating: "We will also discuss the situation in the region and convey to His Majesty's Government our perception of the situation. We will not seek any solution but will try to understand each other's viewpoints. There is no question of trying to create a front as we are not opposing anyone. The idea is to defuse the situation."⁸

True, there is not much substantial difference between India and Nepal on the question. Neither of them is happy with the presence of Soviet forces in the region. Both of them consider the development detrimental to peace and security in the region and both want the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But whereas India feels constrained to make an outright and unilateral condemnation of the Soviet action asking for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces because of its delicate diplomatic dependence on Moscow, Nepal has no such restraints. Also, as a small and weak Power the development pinches more intensely its feeling of insecurity than

it does in the case of India. The outburst of its reaction, is, therefore, natural.

Talks at the Foreign Secretary level between Nepal and India concluded on 19 February 1980. Both the Nepalese and Indian sides expressed deep concern over the prevailing situation; it was agreed that withdrawal of foreign troops and non-interference in the internal affairs of any country constituted the essential basis for the establishment of a climate of peace and mutual trust among the countries of the area. Apart from expressing this deep commitment to general stability in the region which had remained free of tension for a long time, both sides also agreed that the call to arms in the area was not conducive to peace and stability in the region. Both sides also agreed that "the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and non-interference in the internal affairs of any country constituted the essential basis for the establishment of a climate of peace and mutual trust."⁹

The Indian Foreign Secretary's visit to Kathmandu and his discussions with Nepalese officials did not impress upon Kathmandu to toe the Indian line although both sides maintained that they had similarity of views on the Afghan issue. Unlike India, the Nepalese Government continued to restrain themselves from condemning the US-China-Pakistan axis along with the Soviet Union on their dangerous game in the region. It however, only agreed to dub the "call of arms in the area as not conducive to peace and stability, in the region" thus obliquely referring to the United States policy of arming Pakistan.

Small Power Unity Proposals Mooted

Nepal's reaction to the situation was not confined to mere verbal condemnation of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and an unequivocal call for its withdrawal. Kathmandu also took the initiative to make other small Powers of the region realize the gravity of the situation and forge unity among them in opposing the Soviet action and remaining vigilant against the big Power's interference in the internal affairs of a small Power. The visit of the King of Nepal along with the Nepalese Foreign Minister to Sri Lanka, Singapore, Burma and Bangladesh, on the eve of the official royal visit to India and the nature and contents of his talks are quite relevant in this connexion. In a joint communique issued at the conclusion of his visit to Sri Lanka on 27 February 1980, it was mentioned that "His Majesty and President J.R. Jayawardene reviewed the developments in South East Asia and South Asia and noted with serious concern the armed interventions that had been taking place there. They reaffirmed their support for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and Afghanistan, and the right of those nations to decide their destiny themselves without external interference."

The two Heads of State also called for the "immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea and Afghanistan." In addition, they

reiterated their "faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and in the policies and principles of non-alignment" and expressed their determination to continue to work to strengthen those principles. They also expressed the hope that "South Asia will be an area of peace, stability and cooperation," and called upon all to scrupulously "respect the nonaligned status of the countries of this region."¹⁰

Thus while India was trying to apprise the countries concerned, of the implications of the situation obtaining from the big Powers' involvement in the region and mollify their one-sided reaction to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan with a view to defusing the crisis, Nepal was simultaneously making efforts to forge unity among the small Powers under its leadership in order to firmly oppose the Soviet action. It has been the constant endeavour of the Nepalese Government to assume the leadership of the small powers in championing their cause in the international field. The King of Nepal has exploited this opportunity. On the conclusion of the King's visit to five neighbouring countries including India, the Nepalese Foreign Minister K.B. Shahi clearly stated the purpose of the royal visit saying :

It has also contributed in developing a close regional consensus among countries who are deeply concerned over developments in these parts of Asia on the need for a scrupulous application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states; non-use of force in international relations, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. The need for more frequent contacts was felt everywhere in terms of these objectives.¹¹

Evidently, the Nepalese Government's objective and style of diplomacy were not in full conformity with that of India. Therefore, contrary to the expectations that during His Majesty's visit to New Delhi, Nepal and India would evolve the *modus operandi* to work hand in hand to defuse the crisis, they could not come closer to each other. They did discuss the matter at the highest level but merely agreed that "efforts should be made by all the countries of the region as well as outside Powers, to reduce tension in the area."¹²

True, for sometime since the King's visit to India, Nepal could not actively pursue its line of policy towards the Afghanistan issue. But that was more on account of its own preoccupation with domestic politics than because of any restraining influence of New Delhi. This is evident from the fact that as soon as it was free from the national referendum, it once again focused its attention to this issue. In between the last week of June and first week of July 1980, the Nepalese Foreign Secretary toured the neighbouring countries of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan and later also visited Bhutan. This was significant especially in the context of Nepal's support to the move to convene the meeting of the non-aligned nations for

discussing the issue of Afghanistan which India did not favour.

Despite all these, Nepal fully understands the gravity of the situation and has been cautious enough lest it drags it into the vortex of great power politics. It is significant to note that neither the King nor the Prime Minister of Nepal has ever directly referred to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan or even indirectly condemned the Soviet Union. Instead, the Government of Nepal severely dealt with people protesting violently against the Soviet action in various parts of the country maintaining that the Soviet Union is a friendly country. It is also significant to note in this connexion that despite its clear disapproval of the Soviet action, the Nepalese Government has not gone whole hog with the Sino-American line of approach and contrary to the latter's stand, it did participate in the Moscow Olympics.

To sum up, the Government of Nepal has reacted to the crisis in Afghanistan in accordance with its own perception of its implication for the region in general and Nepal in particular. Its stand on the situation is both in keeping with its national interest and value-commitments in international relations. Hence it has remained firm on it. Its refusal to amend its posture despite New Delhi's effort is expressive of its consistent yearning for independent functioning in international affairs, particularly in its relations with India. Its attempt to arouse the small Powers of the region against the situation is indicative of its urge for leadership and recognition of status in the field of international politics. Further, the intensity of its concern over Afghanistan is connotive of its own alarming concern about its security as a small and weak Power. The exclusion of any reference to US arming of Pakistan or Sino-US-Pakistani designs in Afghanistan, in its reaction to the situation, is based on its calculation of not harming Nepal's friendly relations with those countries as well as of demonstrating that it does not and need not blindly follow New Delhi's line in international politics. And finally, the caution and restraint with which it has expressed its reaction expose the limits of policy options and course of action of a small Power.

POLITICAL REACTIONS VARY FROM DENUNCIATION TO SUPPORT

Reactions of Nepalese Communists

While the Government of Nepal has indicated its clear disapproval of Soviet military action in Afghanistan and has supported every move for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the unofficial reaction varies from the strongest possible denunciation to whole-hearted support of the Soviet measures. The two broad divisions of the Communist Party of Nepal are at its two extremes. All the groups of Pro-Peking Communists launched a tirade against the Soviet Union denouncing its imperialist and aggressive designs as exposed in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The central office of the

Nepal Communist Party issued a statement strongly condemning "naked aggression" committed by Soviet "social imperialists" in Afghanistan. The statement read :

After its naked aggression in Czechoslovakia was condemned all over the world, Soviet social imperialism has used its agents, Cuba, to launch an aggressive campaign on several countries of the Third World. It has similarly used Vietnam to invade Kampuchea. Soviet socialist imperialism has now made Afghanistan another Czechoslovakia. Today, thousands of Russian military boots are trampling upon Afghani soil and the struggle for democracy and independence in that country faces a danger.¹³

Simultaneously, the All Nepal National Students' Union, the student wing of the Communist Party of Nepal (Mohan Bikram Gharti Group), handed over a memorandum to the Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu strongly condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and "the manner in which the Soviet Union, in collusion with Indian expansionism have undertaken military intervention in Bangladesh, destroyed the identity of Sikkim, and sought to exert political and economic pressure on small countries such as Nepal and Bhutan, thereby creating danger for peace and stability in the entire sub-continent." The memorandum demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet and Vietnamese forces from Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos and an end to military intervention and expansionsim, It also called for the abrogation of the Indo-Soviet military pact."¹⁴

Man Mohan Adhikari, a prominent Communist leader of Nepal also issued a statement condemning the Soviet action as well as the United States policy of arming Asian countries. The statement read:

Afghanistan's glorious struggle against British imperialism had been praised even by Lenin. Today, three Heads of State have been assassinated there, and the Soviet Union has sent nearly 100,000 troops to make that country its colony. Small and medium countries have no alternative but to feel concerned over this Soviet action. We support world public opinion and firmly demand the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.¹⁵

Adhikari maintained that the Soviet "invasion of Afghanistan" was providing a pretext to the United States for sending troops to various parts of Asia including South Asia and added :

We condemn the hegemonistic tendencies of both the Super Powers in this region. We condemn their unauthorized attempt to protect the countries of this region. This responsibility of protecting Asian or any

part of Asia lies upon the Asian countries themselves. We Nepalese should think how we can safeguard our country from the rivalry for hegemony.¹⁶

Later, addressing a public meeting at Kirtipur on 25 February 1980, Adhikari explained the implication of the Soviet action for Nepal and what step his country should take to maintain its independent identity. He stated:

With the military intervention in Afghanistan, the imperialist Soviet Union has realized its ambition of encircling People's China. If the Soviet Union succeeds in casting its net wide up to Nepal, it will mean our doom. We must remain alert against this possibility. If friendly relations are restored between India and China, peace will reign supreme in the whole of Asia. This, in turn, will enable small nations like ours to preserve our independence and sovereignty.¹⁷

His party, therefore, advised the Government to strengthen relations with India and China and conclude treaties of peace, friendship, non-interference, and non-aggression with them in view of the United States conspiracy to establish its military presence in Asia on the pretext of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.¹⁸

The Nepal Workers' and Peasants' Organization, which is a new name of a faction of the Communist Party of Nepal led by Narayan Man Bijukshe, popularly known as Rohit, organized in Bhaktapur an exhibition of anti-Soviet cartoons and processions in protest against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, burnt the effigies of the Soviet leaders and demanded immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops.¹⁹ Later, the President of this organization, Rohit himself issued a statement condemning the Soviet Union as "the most aggressive and imperialist country." Warning that "now Pakistan, Iran or any Arab country may become another Afghanistan," he maintained, "Nepal cannot remain unaffected by developments in other areas of Asia," and demanded that the government should renounce its pre-imperialist foreign policy and pursue a genuinely neutral and non-aligned foreign policy.²⁰

Pro-Moscow Faction Defends Soviet Action

In sharp contrast to the aforesaid stand taken by some factions of the Communist Party of Nepal, the leaders of the pro-Moscow section of the Party equally forcefully defended the Soviet action and condemned the Sino-US-Pakistani designs in Afghanistan and elsewhere too. The General Secretary of the Party, Bishnu Bahadur Manandhar, maintained:

The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is aimed at saving that country from the counter-revolutionary forces supported by the

USA and China. These forces are being organised from places in Pakistan. In the present international situation in which the forces of peaceful co-existence and the policy of *detente* are foiling the conspiracies of imperialist forces all over the world, US imperialism infuriated by its progressively declining influence, is trying to take international relations along the path of cold war on the pretext of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

He, therefore, cautioned the Nepali people "to remain fully vigilant towards these conspiracies of imperialist forces and their accomplices."²¹

A few days later, addressing a Press Conference in Kathmandu on 24 January 1980, Dr Keshar Jung Raimajhi, the chief spokesman of the Pro-Moscow Communist Party also said: "Soviet troops have been sent to Afghanistan at the request of the constitutional government of that country because obscurantist and fanatical elements, were receiving help from outside to convert the April revolution into a counter-revolution. We must believe in the Soviet assurances that these troops will be withdrawn as soon as the counter-revolution comes to an end."²² Justifying the Soviet action in course of an interview with a local weekly, he further maintained that Afghanistan had sought military assistance from the Soviet Union under the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Good Neighbourliness and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan accordingly and, therefore, that could not be taken as interference in its internal affairs.²³

Tulsi Lal Amatya, another stalwart of the party and formerly a close associate of Dr Raimajhi, who has now parted company with him but who is still following the pro-Moscow line, also strongly defended the Soviet action. He pleaded that the Soviets should not remove their forces from that country as long as the Afghan Government felt the need for troops on their soil and so long as there was the danger of imperialist threat.²⁴

Multi-Party Democratic Front Expresses Sympathy for Karmal Regime

Finally in conformity with the position taken by their leaders, fifteen members of the Central Committee of the Multi-Party Democratic Front (Pro-Moscow Left) issued a statement expressing sympathy for the Karmal regime of Afghanistan. The statement read:

Like Daoud and Amin, Babrak Karmal too has come into power after a *coup-d'etat*. But, in his address to the nation, he has pledged to establish a democratic regime and guarantee economic equality. We hope he will be true to his words. The Soviet troops have entered into Afghanistan in response to the request of that country itself for the well-being of its people and its security from the aggression of international reactionary elements. We do not support the over-reaction

shown by America and other countries to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The Multi-Party Democratic Front extends full support to the help provided by the Soviet Union to the people's power in Afghanistan in keeping it free from the intervention of international reactionary elements.²⁵

They also criticized the massive supply of arms to the dictatorial regime in Pakistan.

Thus the two main factions of the Communist Party of Nepal, in accordance with their ideological affiliations to Moscow or Peking, have taken diametrically opposite stands on the Soviet military action in Afghanistan. The reaction of the non-Communist parties has, however, been mild presumably because they were too pre-occupied with internal politics to take any keen interest in international issues and some of them were even apprehensive of its implication on their prospect in the national referendum that was to take place in Nepal subsequently. True, the Communists too were equally preoccupied in internal politics, but it was the question of their ideological issues and links which were at stake and so they could not afford to take it in a light vein. Indeed the issue was so important that even the non-Communist could not ignore it.

Non-Communists Condemn Soviet Step

Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, acting President of the Nepali Congress led by B. P. Koirala said that the Soviet Union had unfortunately chosen to establish its presence outside its borders through use of force. "The Soviet step," he added, "must be condemned in the strongest possible terms by freedom-lovers throughout the world." He cautioned that Nepal was too near to escape the adverse consequences of the sudden escalation of tension in the area. He, however, expressed the hope that Soviet troops would be withdrawn soon from Afghanistan.²⁶ Later, in course of a Press interview he remarked, "we strongly condemn such military intervention in any country."²⁷ The veteran leader of the Party, B. P. Koirala adopted a still more cautious approach in reacting to the situation. Referring to it at a function in Nepalgunj on 5 February 1980, he said that a small country such as Nepal should adopt an impartial stand on the issue of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.²⁸ He also expressed the hope that it would be possible to restore to Afghanistan its status of the buffer state pointing out that, "after all, Soviet troops had withdrawn from Austria after the Second World War."²⁹

D. R. Regmi, a former Foreign Minister and the leader of another group of Nepali Congress, promptly reacted to the Soviet action. He condemned the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and demanded their immediate withdrawal.³⁰ Surya Prasad Upadhyaya, a leader of another important faction of the Nepali Congress, also issued a statement describing both

the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the US-Chinese decision to rearm Pakistan as harmful to world peace and progress.³¹

PRESS UNEQUIVOCALLY CRITICAL OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTION

Although the political leaders felt constrained in expressing their intense feeling for various reasons, the non-political sections had no such inhibitions or considerations. They in fact, were furious in their protestations against the Soviet military action in Afghanistan. Various groups of students, teachers, and peasants organized meetings and processions in various parts of the country condemning the Soviet military intervention and some of them handed over memorandum to the Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu. Effigies of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev were burnt at some places.³²

The Press in Nepal in general has been highly critical of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Almost all the newspapers, except the *Sameeksha Weekly* which has pro-Moscow leanings, have come forth with numerous condemnatory statements of the Soviet actions and voice concern about the security of small nations. The *Matribhumi Weekly* wrote on 15 January 1980, "The developments taking place in the region have created a major danger for small countries like Nepal. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has made the fate of small countries uncertain." It also criticized India for opposing the United Nations proposal for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. In the words of *Jana Jivan*, "If this state of affairs continues, the Soviet Union will swallow up all small countries of Asia and thus impose a barbarous imperialism." The *Samaj* (1 January 1980), maintained that the sudden overthrow of the Amin regime in Afghanistan with Soviet military intervention has led small countries throughout the world to be greatly concerned and surprised at the Soviet arrogance. "All peace-loving countries throughout the world," it added, "are shocked, and small and weak countries in the neighbourhood of the Big Powers regard the latter as dangerous." The *Jana Jagriti* weekly (6 January 1980), termed the Soviet action as "detestable" and "aggressive" and maintained that, "it has evoked indignation not only among the self-respecting people of Afghanistan but also among the peoples of the world as a whole." In the same vein the *Nepal Post*, bi-weekly, 9 January 1980 wrote,

Flouting the UN Charter and world public opinion, the Kremlin has taken over power in Afghanistan. The direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan appears to be more brazen than the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.... Indeed, the Soviet action in turning Afghanistan into the Czechoslovakia of Asia has been condemned throughout the world....

The Government newspapers, however, were not so direct and vocal in criticizing the Soviet action

The final picture that emerges is that barring the pro-Moscow Communist leaders and newspapers, all other sections in Nepal have condemned the Soviet action in Afghanistan. This is because they perceive a danger to the security and independence of their own country if such actions are condoned by the international community.

September 1980

SHREE KRISHNA JHA*

NOTES

- 1 *Rising Nepal* (Kathmandu), English Daily, 2 January 1980.
- 2 Ibid., 5 January 1980
- 3 Ibid., 7 January 1980
- 4 *Gorakhapatra* (Kathmandu), Nepali Daily, 15 January 1980
- 5 *Rising Nepal*, 16 January 1980.
- 6 Ibid., 5 January 1980.
- 7 *Gorkhapatra*, 19 February 1980.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid., 20 February 1980.
- 10 *Rising Nepal*, 28 February 1980.
- 11 *Gorkhapatra*, 9 March 1980.
- 12 See the joint statement issued on 7 March 1980 after talks between the Nepalese King and the Indian Prime Minister. *Rising Nepal*, 9 March 1980.
- 13 *Nepal Post* (Kathmandu), Nepali Bi-Weekly, 16 January 1980.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 *Matribhumi* (Kathmandu), Nepali Weekly, 29 January 1980.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 *Charcha Weekly* (Kathmandu), 3 March 1980.
- 18 *Naya Sandesh Weekly* (Kathmandu), 7 March 1980.
- 19 *Gorkhapatra*, 7 February 1980.
- 20 *Matribhumi Weekly*, 26 February 1980.
- 21 *Nepal Times* (Kathmandu), 17 January 1980.
- 22 *Sameeksha Weekly* (Kathmandu), 25 January 1980.
- 23 Ibid., 1 February 1980.
- 24 *National Star* (Kathmandu), English Weekly, 22 January 1980.
- 25 *Sameeksha Weekly*, 29 February 1980.
- 26 *Rising Nepal*, 2 January 1980.
- 27 *Nepali* (Kathmandu), 30 January 1980.
- 28 *Rising Nepal*, 11 February 1980.
- 29 *Jana Akanksha Weekly* (Kathmandu), 11 February 1980.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 *Commoner* (Kathmandu), 23 January 1980.

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BOOK REVIEWS

POLITICAL STRATEGY AGAINST POVERTY

A Review Article

THE term Political Economy has once again come into vogue after years of neglect. *Wealth of India*, written by my teachers fifty years back, opened with the sentence, "India is a rich country inhabited by poor people,"—that was pure Political Economy! By the time I began my post-graduate studies Politics and Economics were tending to be two distinct disciplines. Now, once again, the term has come into its own; on my table there are half a dozen books with the words "Political Economy" in their titles.

Reactions to interlocking of Economics with Politics are sharply contrasting: Prof. J. K. Galbraith in his recent book, *Annals of An Abiding Liberal*, bemoans the fact that economics has been hamstrung by "the exclusion of power and the resulting political content" from its agenda. On the other hand, Prof. Theodore Schultz holds politics "responsible in large measure for the fact that the economic potential in agriculture is not being realized in many low-income countries.... The gap between the political market and the economic market is the analytical key to much of the failure of the world to realize its economic potential in agricultural production."

What Schultz berates as "the marriage of economics and politics" is the essence of analysis and understanding for Frankel. Her book* seeks to "examine the complex interaction between the economic and political strategies that shaped national development over the generation of India's democratic rule." (p. 27) With passage of time, she finds that political management has overshadowed economic improvement. D. F. Miller has caustically summed up the position, "India may not have achieved an expanding economy... it has, however, experienced an expanding polity;" Frankel's diagnosis conforms to Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* and Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* finding that India's problem is its "soft State."

"Above all", asks Frankel, "how could the goals of economic growth and social transformation be achieved, given on one hand the rejection of models of evolutionary economic change under capitalism, and on the other constraints imposed by politics and culture against the use of violence for the purpose of sweeping away obstacles to radical social change?" (p. 18) In striving to avoid the appalling cost of development under Capitalism or under Communism, Barrington Moore had cautioned against "India succumbing to the equally appalling cost of stagnation." Frankel's account tends to validate that meaning.

Both as a cause and consequence of stagnation, there emerges the growth of parasitic elements in society. And India has been prone, through its

*Francine Frankel, *India's Political Economy 1947-77: The Gradual Revolution* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979), 600 p., Rs. 130.

history, to parasitic landlords and rulers. That is the theme of P.S. Jha's book, *India, A Political Economy of Stagnation*, wherein the author seeks to "trace the effects of economic development on the distribution of political power and the result of shifts in the latter on future patterns of economic development." (p. ix)

In a sense India's development course was largely set in the last days of the British Raj. B. R. Tomlinson, in his book, *Political Economy of the Raj 1913-47*, observes, "By 1945 the Government of India Secretariat had hammered out something that approached a coherent plan of post-war economic reconstruction using the sterling balances to purchase capital goods and government loans, and deficit finance to provide aid to new industries, including that of nationalisation of heavy industrial sector if adequate private finance was not forthcoming." (p. 100) Significantly the blueprints lacked strategy for agricultural development. With partition India's food problem had become more acute. It is here that the Nehru Government struggled between institutional changes embracing land reforms and agricultural co-operatives, favoured by the Planning Commission, and a techno-economic approach advocated by the Ministry of Food & Agriculture. The fifties was a period of conflict on this issue, sixties saw the controversy pre-empted largely in favour of a techno-economic approach.

The techno-economic approach, including irrigation (gross irrigated area as percentage of gross cropped area increased from 17 in 1950-51 to 34 in 1978-79), energisation of wells, chemical fertilizers, high-yielding seeds etc., helped to increase food production but also aggravated economic disparities in the rural society. In 1961, 39 per cent holdings were under one ha., in 1971 over 50 per cent fell into that category. Data from the Reserve Bank of India shows that while in 1961-62 the lowest 10 per cent of the rural households owned assets worth an average of Rs. 42 per household (0.08 per cent of total assets of rural households), by 1971-72 they owned only Rs. 27 worth of assets per household (0.04 per cent). At the other end of the scale, the top 10 per cent of the households had assets worth an average of Rs. 37,906 (72.57 per cent) in 1961-62 and Rs. 59,000 (77.87 per cent) in 1971-72. There was thus a marked growth of a mass of marginal peasants at the bottom of the social hierarchy in the village—marginalised not only in economy but in life as a whole.

Persistence of an abysmally low standard of living can lead to low standards of expectations also. However, as discontent gets politicised the poor begin to dream of equality. The tragedy is that "scarcity inevitably breeds inequality"—even under Socialism, as Isaac Deutscher noted in his study of Stalin's Russia, *The Unfinished Revolution* (p. 29).

Redistribution of land in India would have to be drastic to satisfy land hunger. A person would require 0.38 ha. of land to meet the basic needs at an austerity level. On that basis, the entire 165 million ha. of land under cultivation would be needed to meet a rural person's basic needs, leaving

the urban people without any source of food supply.

The disposable income *per capita* of the rural and urban peoples both on thirds of the population is significantly less than half the average for India as a whole, and it is sufficient only for one-third of the estimated expenditure necessary to meet their basic needs. Doubling of the income of these lowest thirds, according to R. Sinha etc. in *Income Distribution, Growth and Basic Needs in India*, would require a reduction of 12.5 per cent in the income of the rural top hierarchy, one-third and 20.6 per cent in the case of the urban elite. Such a transfer of income would have to be repeated year after year because employment generation from income redistribution, even on this scale, is found to be negligible. (p. 106)

Income spillovers, considerably negate the long term effects of income distribution. Only re-distribution of assets can provide permanent alleviation. But our population is so large and our poverty is so great that only when there is "completely equal distribution of income from all productive sectors that basic needs for all would be achieved." (Ibid, p. 113) Only total egalitarianism can provide the minimum needs of every Indian.

The social structure would resist such a drastic change and political action cannot generate the thrust needed. Unlike China, India has hardly any history of peasant rebellions. Again, Indian peasants do not take to co-operative farming. It is interesting that the Communist Government in Kerala had recently to liquidate the collective farm set up in the State with Soviet aid because of lack of support from the cultivators.

Even those who advocate redistributive land reforms recognise that it is but one element in the anti-poverty strategies of rural development, equally important being the enhancement of opportunities for productive, remunerative employment through labour-intensive rural works, non-farming activities in small industries, intensification of agricultural production, etc. Fortunately the techno-economic thrust in agriculture is reaching a point where it discovers a stake in community action. Irrigation needs to be combined with drainage, the future has to work on the basis of watersheds. Likewise, agricultural output is both speeded up and increased by adopting nurseries for seedlings, both in the case of paddy and cotton. Pest control, as in cotton, requires wide coverage to be effective. Many post-harvest technologies, now being elaborated, require community action. The contrast between community efforts and techno-economic approach that was so stark in the fifties need no longer appear so in the eighties.

Again, widening of the ambit of agriculture to embrace besides farming, social forestry, dairy, poultry, fishery, bee-keeping, mulberry cultivation (rearing of silk worms, in which two million peasant families were engaged, was one of the bases of Japan's industrialisation), opens up many opportunities for remunerative employment and asset formation for the poor. To achieve the full potential of such an integrated development, there has to be localisation of planning and participation by the rural people, directly and decisively, in their development programmes. The most important step

in that direction can be the restructuring of polity in terms of decentralised democracy. Organisation of poor peasants that Frankel recommends (p. 582), may be easier and gain in immediacy under decentralised democracy than otherwise, (cf. *Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Institutions, 1968*).

Frankel warns against the danger of "the most progressive loss of legitimacy of traditional power relationships, without putting any substitute structure in its place." (p. 582) The answer to India's socio-economic problems is not an attempt towards a "hard State." The 1977 Elections showed that even the poor do not accept trampling of liberties. Anyway, hardly has any party, least of all the ruling party, committed cadres needed to make a "hard State" mobilising instrument. Instead what is needed is partial pulverisation of the Administration, bringing decision-making closer to the people through effective decentralisation of power and development. India's anti-poverty strategy needs fuller democracy, not draining it out.

Another element in the strategy, as emphasized by Jha in his study, is the elite moving away from the Western life-styles to the traditional patterns. That is a part of Gandhi's relevance today.

We should be thankful to Frankel for uncovering before us the whole kaleidoscope—political and economic— of our aspirations, efforts, achievements, evasions and errors since Independence. She thereby compels us to think deep and think anew.

June 1980

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ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURES

A Review Article

THE aim of the book under review* is to indicate, with the help of extensive extracts, the thinking of Jayaprakash Narayan, one of Modern India's dominating political figure. JP, as he was popularly known in India, was born in 1902, he died in 1979. An active participant in the Indian political movement, as a follower of Gandhi in the 1920s, he became a socialist when he was a student in the United States. On his return to India he founded the Congress Socialist Party, and from 1936 onwards was very active in shaping the political mind of India. During the Quit India movement of 1942-45 he emerged as an active champion of nationalism. In the nineteen-fifties, he developed his own thesis on the "Reconstruction of Indian polity," which among other things, deals with the plea for politics without parties. He accepted Gandhism with his own interpretations in the nineteen-sixties, and in the nineteen-seventies emerged as the most outstanding symbol of the democratic forces struggling against authoritarianism in India. Jayaprakash Narayan wrote and spoke at length throughout this period on political theory and practice. One sees in his writings the encounters between Nationalism and Internationalism, Gandhism and Marxism, Idealism and Realism and others between different political cultures. Some of these are reflected in this selection of his writings. In the extensive Introduction, the editor gives the landmarks in JP's life and explains how he tried, though not always with success, to influence the course of political events in modern India. Further he notes, that JP was not merely a theorist but an active participant in Indian politics for over forty years. His inability to influence the course of events, was not, as his admirers maintained, because he never aspired to any office of power. Gandhi also did not, in the conventional sense, aspire for power. But as the political opponents of the Mahatma fully realized, he had a clear understanding of the role of power in politics and he knew how to exercise power without holding any office. As many of Jayaprakash Narayan's statements and the short biographical sketch in the Introduction reveal, JP had no understanding of power. This was his gravest limitation and this was, perhaps, the source of his detached outlook, which gave a lot of objectivity to his analysis of complex problems.

NATIONALISM — AND INTERNATIONALISM

As is often pointed out by many writers, the politically conscious people of a country, which is under political domination, are obsessed with the struggle for independence. This makes them exponents of nationalism;

*Bimal Prasad, Ed.: *A Revolutionary's Quest: Selected Writings of Jayaprakash Narayan* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980), 406 p., Rs. 150.

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Jayaprakash Narayan was no exception. This is how Bimal Prasad traces JP's entry into public life:

Like several other sensitive young men of his time his mind had turned more and more to the struggle for Indian freedom. He had been excited by accounts of Gandhi's exploits in South Africa and had wept when Gokhale died in 1915. He had also been drawn towards the revolutionary movement and established contacts with one of its members. As Gandhi emerged as the leader of the freedom struggle in India in 1919-20, his magnetic pull naturally grew stronger. Then came his call for non-co-operation with all law courts and all educational institutions, maintained or aided by the Government. The call of Gandhi became irresistible and Jayaprakash Narayan left Patna College with a group of bright students to join the struggle for freedom. It was then that freedom became one of the "beacon lights" of his life.

To begin with, it was the freedom of the country which engaged his mind. During 1932-33, JP participated actively in the civil disobedience movement led by Gandhi. Until his arrest, on 7 September 1932, he worked in an underground organization conducting the struggle. In March 1940, Jayaprakash was arrested and tried for endangering the defence of British India. In a memorable statement given at the court, he observed:

As for the charge of endangering the defence of British India I think the irony of it cannot be lost upon us. A slave has no obligation to defend his slavery. His only obligation is to destroy his bondage. I hope we shall know how to defend ourselves when we have achieved our freedom.

During 1942-45, the Indian nationalist movement was organizing its last major struggle—the "Quit India" campaign. Like most other leaders, JP was also imprisoned in 1942, but, unlike them, he escaped from jail and organized the under-ground movement. He never ruled out the use of force against the foreign government. Shortly after his escape from prison, he wrote to all the "fighters of freedom": "The history of all Revolutions shows that a Revolution is not an event. It is a phase, a social process." And he also reminded his comrades and followers of their own inadequacies; "Firstly there was no efficient organisation of the national revolutionary force that could function and effectively lead to the mighty forces that were released.... Secondly, after the first phase of the rising was over there was no further programme placed before the people." Jayaprakash Narayan was again imprisoned and later tortured in jail. But he never yielded to the authorities and never gave out any secrets or made any confessions. He became the symbol of the uncompromising fighter for freedom who was prepared to make any sacrifice for the cause. And in very unfavourable

circumstances, he had a capacity to boost the morale of the people who were fighting for freedom.

Another important aspect of JP's personality was that he never forgot that an ideology, like that of Socialism, could be effective in India only if viewed realistically from the viewpoint of India's culture and national interests. In a bitter criticism of the Communist International led by the Soviet Communist Party, Jayaprakash Narayan wrote in 1941:

Whatever be the truth, one fact is clear—that every communist party must follow the dictates from Moscow because Moscow alone knows what is good or bad for Russia. Now, the Congress Socialist Party, while recognizing that the position and role of the USSR must enter into every socialist calculation, is not prepared to follow dictates from anywhere. Moreover, affiliating with the International not only means following its dictates, but also being obliged to uphold any and every action of the Russian Government. We are not prepared for such subservience.

This aspect of JP's political outlook was evident in his approach to the Communists before and after India's independence, and was also the line he advocated in regard to India's foreign policy after 1947. It was also clear in the balanced approach he took to Subhash Bose who collaborated with the Governments of Germany and Japan during the war. Occasionally, his antagonism towards the Communist took him to the company of the anti-Communists in India and abroad, some of whom were the champions of vested interests. These are not documented in this book.

Jayaprakash, in fact, had an obsession with the Soviet Union. This is evident, to a limited extent, in his letter to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. Taking an exaggerated view of the limited co-operation between the Indian Government and the Soviet Government at that time, JP wrote to Mrs. Gandhi:

You have talked of Social Democracy. What a beautiful image those words call to the mind. But you have seen in eastern and central Europe how ugly is the reality. Naked relationship and in the ultimate analysis Russian overlordship. Please, please do not push India towards the terrible fate.

Whatever might have been Indira Gandhi's faults, it did not include making India a satellite of the Soviet Union. JP also forgot that the Soviet Union was primarily interested in disentangling India from the influence of Western Powers and not in establishing a Communist dictatorship here which, if accomplished, would have posed for it greater challenges than Poland, China and Afghanistan.

It is also significant that, unlike Nehru, JP rarely condemned the American actions in various countries like those of Pakistan, Vietnam, Chiang-Kai Shek's China and Korea. In other words, this champion of "cultural freedom" saw threat to it only from one Super Power.

It must, however, be noted that both in regard to India's relations with Pakistan and China, Jayaprakash Narayan's was one of the dissident voices of India which made a plea for a sane and balanced policy.

EXPONENT OF SOCIALISM

After boycotting the college aided by the British Government in India in 1921, JP never went back to it or to a similar institution. Nevertheless, he was intensely keen to pursue higher education. This took him to the United States in 1922 where he remained for seven years. While he studied he also worked for a living. He took a Masters Degree in Sociology from Ohio. It was during this period that he studied Marx and Marxism. He also had the opportunity to mingle with students and associations interested in Socialism; ultimately, he was inspired by the ideas of equality and converted to Socialism.

When he returned to India JP wanted to work within the Congress, which represented the nationalist movement. But he was equally interested in spreading socialist ideas; in 1934 he formally launched the Congress Socialist Party. Jayaprakash was the brains behind the party whose affairs he controlled for a long period as its General Secretary. Some of his lucid writings appeared in the Congress Socialist Party's organ during 1934-1939. Along with those of Jawaharlal Nehru, they influenced a large number of young people of India to become socialists. Unlike Nehru, he organized a Socialist Party and, unlike the Communists, he never left the nationalist fold.

His book *Why Socialism?* (Banaras, 1938), has explained in a scientific way the foundations of Socialism and made a plea for a system of social reconstruction. Nevertheless, JP's writings of the period indicate that while he was influenced by the exponents of "democratic socialism," it was Marx and the Marxists who were his primary source of inspiration. He admired what he considered to be the achievements of Russia. But his approach towards Russia was not one of unqualified admiration or mechanical acceptance of what happened there. On the other hand, even in 1936 he wrote:

Let us be slow instead of hasty like the Russians. Let us use no coercion.... Let us make fewer mistakes than the Russians, if we are wise enough to avoid them.

JP also did not believe that Socialism was not applicable to India because of the country's backwardness. On the other hand, he felt that "if Indian Capitalism is weak, that, instead of being an hindrance to us in our task

of building up Socialism, should only facilitate it." There is no doubt that many of the later Socialists and the Communists of India were converted to Socialist doctrines by JP's *Why Socialism?*

However, Jayaprakash Narayan was not only the inspirer of the social democratic movement in India, but also the mirror of its weakness and ineffectiveness. His state—Bihar—was very often in the forefront of a political struggle in India, but until today, neither JP for his socialist friends could implement any socialist programme in that state. Not even a comprehensive programme of land reforms has been effectively implemented there. In this respect, it is a contrast to Kerala where the Communists are a major political force. Apart from his inability to build a cadre-based organization, JP was also not in a position to come to grips with the realities of a particular region. There was a spurious cosmopolitanism in him—a "concern" with "all-India" and international problems which made it difficult for him to understand local problems of a particular region.

JP's writings of this period also show his great concern for unity among the Communists and the Socialists. But they also expose his weakness as an organizer and his lack of understanding of power politics. As he himself admits, the Socialists Party apparatus was virtually captured by the Communists in South India—in Andhra and in Kerala—without its supreme leader knowing what was happening. Further, these works also expose another weakness of Jayaprakash as a political leader; he could not build a "cadre-based" organization. He was a leader of leaders and also a charismatic personality who had mass appeal. But unlike Lenin or Mao, he could not build up a party machine and unlike Gandhi, he was not a shrewd observer of men. Many of his "colleagues" and "followers" betrayed him. Some others left him when he was in the thick of the struggle.

A CRITIQUE OF GANDHISM

Jayaprakash Narayan tried to break new ground in Indian politics at a time when the cult of Gandhi had reached a very high peak. Many critics of Mahatma Gandhi were ineffective partly because, like M.N. Roy and the Communists, they were alienated from Indian realities. The communists—both Muslim and Hindu—had some influence, but they never questioned Gandhi's views on economic matters. The influence of an extreme nationalist like Subhash Bose was primarily confined to Bengal and he was concerned only with the strategy and tactics of the struggle for freedom. Nehru did challenge Gandhi in the realm of ideas, but completely obeyed him in the field of action. JP went further and criticised Gandhi's social and economic views; he also founded an organization to propagate them. Nehru was never willing to give up the opportunity of becoming a prominent nationalist leader. That was why he did not frankly associate himself with any socialist organization. Jayaprakash Narayan took this risk and confined himself to the Socialists in the nineteen-thirties.

In his critical appraisal, JP exploded the myth that Gandhi was exclusively Indian. He wrote in 1936:

Before launching upon a criticism of this curious philosophy, it would be profitable to consider if the views of Gandhi are uniquely Indian.... As a matter of fact, there is nothing new or particularly Indian in what Gandhi says. A large number of Western writers have expressed themselves in a more or less similar strain. The arguments vary in their emphasis, but their core remains much the same. Class struggle is silly. Capital and labour are independent and necessary for each other, revolution is wasteful; a synthesis of the contending forces of society is a higher ideal than revolution; enlightened control of profits, wages and profits, the theory of trusteeship—these are the Communist ideas of the West preached by smug bourgeois professors, thinkers and churchmen.

JP also noted that the struggle between revolution and reform was as old as human misery and that Gandhi's views were essentially those of a reformist.

He ridiculed Gandhi's concept of Ramarajya—a concept that ensured the rights alike of the princes and the pauper. According to him Gandhi did not raise the crucial question : "Why paupers should remain at all in society?". And then JP makes this observation:

By not questioning the right of the prince, landlord and capitalist to continue their functions, Gandhiji has signified his tacit approval of this large scale, organized theft and violence. Nay, the approval is not tacit; it is open and avowed. He has told the landlords that he would resist any attempt to deprive them of their property, and a little earlier he has told the Ahmedabad millionaires it was their moral right to make the money they were making.

JP also questioned the validity of two other features of Gandhism : the trusteeship and the opposition to the extensive use of machinery. On the issue of trusteeship he raised these questions:

The landlord, for instance, is a trustee. What part of his wealth must he hold as a trust? The whole or a portion of it? If again, portion, what and who determines the portion? If again, his tenants are equal sharers to his wealth, what exactly is meant by an equal share? Does it mean that half of the property belongs to the landlords and half to the tenants?... Is it that the tenants are free to use the palaces of the taluqdars and commission their limousines to drive to the city? What again is the meaning of harmonious co-operation? Who will bring about this co-operation?

Jayaprakash Narayan considered that this theory of trusteeship was a sentiment and not one which could not be implemented. He never believed that without coercion, the rich could be persuaded to, part with their wealth. He maintained that if the behaviour of a whole group and class had to be changed, that change had to be effected in the social organization itself.

Attempts to de-mechanize production were also criticized on the plea that it was neither possible nor desirable. He concluded his attacks on Gandhism with the following observation:

Gandhism may be a well-intentioned doctrine. I personally think it is. But then with the best of intentions, it is, I must admit it gives me no pleasure to say so—a dangerous doctrine. It is dangerous because it hushes up real issues and sets up evils of society by pious wishes. It thus deceives the masses and encourages the upper classes to continue their domination.

A large number of young people in the nineteen-thirties were convinced of the soundness of JP's arguments and rejected Gandhism although they accepted Gandhi's leadership in the struggle for national freedom.

TOWARDS IDEALISM AND ANARCHISM

JP had practically no major part to play when the transfer of power from the British to Indian hands took place and when the Indian Constituent Assembly framed the Constitution. Although he continued to be a leader of the Socialist Party for more than a decade after 1947, he was not active in party work. The Socialists, as a group, were not an influential group in Indian politics. This was because they failed to develop a cadre and partly because they were not active on the peasant and trade union fronts. Also they were not aware of the cultural dimensions of the political events connected with religion, caste and language. JP gradually became inactive in the Socialist Party also. Finally in 1957 he gave up politics. But it was significant that he was not like Prince Siddhartha, who gave up his throne and became Buddha. He left politics when he was not a prominent political leader. It was not, therefore, a renunciation. Of course, by compromising his ideals he could have entered the Congress Party and played an active part. He however, did not.

JP accepted "Sarvodaya"—a kind of a revised Gandhism—as a "new social philosophy which represented a distinct advance over the existing social philosophies and systems." While trying to defend and promote it, he said:

All actions, personal or public, political economic or others, should have an integration and the centre of this integration must be a philosophy of life. This leads me at once to all aspects of the task of social

and economic reconstruction that both Socialists and Communists have neglected. Socialism and Communism both lay great emphasis on material prosperity and on an ever-rising standard of living.... There could be no peace in the minds and hearts of men nor peace amongst men if hunger grows in them continuously. That would necessarily set up an uncontrolled competition between individuals, groups and nations.... Equality, freedom, brotherhood, would all be in danger of being submerged in a universal flood of materialism. There could be no poise to human life, no real satisfaction because the possession of more would only whet the appetite for still more.

What JP forgot was that he was preaching austerity not to those who were affluent but to those who were below the "poverty line" and to a society where only a small section of people were amassing wealth and material goods. In fact, he was unconsciously becoming a champion of the *status quo* because he advocated no action to revise it. And those who were dominating the Indian economy were very happy with him.

The political structure he advocated was also with a view to safeguard the interests of the privileged groups; it provided no machinery for effective social and economic reconstruction. In 1959 he made "a plea for reconstruction of the Indian polity," which stated:

It is time now to gather all the threads of the argument and tie them together. Ancient Indian thought and tradition; social science, ethical and spiritual goods of civilization; the demand of democracy that the citizen should participate in the ordering and running of his life; the need of saving man from himself and from the fate of robotism; the requirement that the state and other institutions of society be reduced to a human scale; the ideal, above all, that man should become the centre of civilization, all these point in the same direction: to a communal or a communitarian way of life; communitarian ethics and education; communitarian, social, economic and political organisation.

JP however, never discussed at length the ways and means of achieving this aim. He conceded:

The picture drawn here of the polity of India, and of social organization in general, might perhaps appear to be idealistic. If so, I would not consider that to be a disqualification. An ideal cannot but be idealistic. The question is if the ideal is impractical, unscientific or otherwise ill-conceived. I have tried in the preceding pages to show that all relevant considerations lead irresistibly towards it. The achievement of this ideal would, however, be a colossal task. Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of voluntary workers would be needed over a number of years to accomplish it.

This is exactly what JP could not provide. The inability to achieve this is partly inherent in the ideals themselves. And partly, it was in the system of the Indian polity he envisaged—he did not provide for an effective party or organization. Like the King of Nepal and Pakistan's military dictator, Ayub Khan, JP also advocated a "party-less Democracy."

JP's scheme for total revolution, which he advocated in 1969, also suffers from this refusal to face facts. At best, what one can say about his writings in this period is that they represented lucid and powerful protests against what was happening in India. He could explain the grievances, but could never suggest how they should be redressed.

LAST GREAT BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY

Jayaprakash Naryan's last great battle was launched in 1977 for the restoration of Democracy. India's infant Democracy was at first threatened by the Hindu communalists in 1947. Mahatma Gandhi had then put up the most heroic resistance against them. He had however to pay with his life, but his martyrdom succeeded in saving India's Democracy and Secularism from the onslaught of the religious sectarians. Then came the threats from the Communists in 1948 and 1950; they organized armed insurrections. The Indian state, under Nehru's leadership, was in a position to suppress and save the parliamentary system. In 1975 and 1976, the democratic system in India was faced with the greatest of threats. The ruling party enforced an "emergency" and censorship and imprisoned a large number of its political opponents. Jayaprakash Narayan emerged as the symbol of the forces of Democracy in the country. He was also the connecting link among the different political parties and elements; JP could fulfil this function because he was not a leader of any single faction, group or party. In the nineteen-seventies Jayaprakash was a father figure in Indian public life—a person who had few enemies among the various parties of the opposition who belonged to the left and to the right. This was a great achievement as during this period there was a fragmentation in Indian politics as all opposition political parties were regional organizations.

Another important characteristic of JP was evident on this occasion; he could rarely initiate a great political campaign or movement whether it was the struggle for national freedom or for Democracy. Nevertheless, when such a movement had once begun he could provide effective leadership. He had done so at the time of the Quit India movement of 1942.

In 1974, Jayaprakash Narayan himself said:

I was not involved in the student movement in Bihar in the beginning. However, on the insistence of the students and their Action Committee, I agreed to lead them on condition that they remained peaceful and acted in a non-partisan manner.

These conditions were great assets to the movement. And now, it facilitated its spread to other parts of the country. Jayaprakash Narayan was arrested and detained by the Government without trial. He wrote to the Prime Minister from jail in 1976:

My life's work is done... I have given all my life, after finishing my education, to the country and asked for nothing in return. So, I shall be content to die a prisoner under your regime. Would you listen to the advice of such a man? Please do not destroy the foundations that the fathers of the nation, including your noble father, had laid down. There is nothing but strife and suffering along the path that you have taken. You inherited a great tradition, noble values and a working democracy. Do not leave behind a miserable wreck of all that. It would take a long time to put all that together again. For it would be put again, I have no doubt. A people who fought British imperialism and humbled it cannot accept indefinitely the indignity and shame of totalitarianism. The spirit of man can never be vanquished, no matter how deeply suppressed. In establishing your personal dictatorship, you have buried it deep. But it will rise from the grave.

The same optimism was evident in JP when, after his release from jail in 1977, he campaigned for the elections against the ruling party.

But again, the ineffectiveness, which was continuously present in JP in the matter of coming to grips with social and political realities was evident in the Janata Party which formed the government after the general elections. It underlined that Jayaprakash could protest against the evils and make a lucid analysis of the social, economic and political situations, but could not suggest anything effective for reconstruction. The former, however, was not an unimportant function in a period when many opportunists had crowded public life.

Jayaprakash Narayan's historic mission was to be a dissident—an honest and a heroic one. He disagreed with Gandhi when the political conformists were trying to make capital of his personality. He spread Marxist ideas in India without associating himself with the establishment of the Soviet Union. When Nehru was at the height of power, he refused to accept his hand of friendship and refused to be drawn into the political structure headed by him. When Indira Gandhi tried to enforce her authoritarianism, he challenged it. There is not a single political current in India with which he was not associated from 1920 to 1978. But he never took advantage of this immense contribution that he made to the spread of ideas and the building of organizations connected with Socialism, Gandhism and Democracy. His life is the story of a restless person who was continuously in search of fresh ideas. Jayaprakash Narayan was in fact, a unique individual as some of his biographies and the collection of his writings and speeches make clear. Many of his dilemmas were not his own. Other leaders who were simultaneously

engaged in the nationalist movement, in finding solutions to problems of social and economic reconstruction of the country and engaged in strengthening democracy also faced them. And in the case of Indian leaders of the modern period, they had the experience of being pulled in different directions by a rich cultural heritage and by a powerful impact of western ideas and institutions. The vastness of the country and the plural nature of Indian society added new dimensions to the problems of the nationalist leader. JP's story is a symbol of an unusual mind who tried to face these complex problems and suggested solutions to them. The fact that he did not always succeed in active politics does not make it any the less fascinating. The apparent failure in solving them was inherent in the magnitude of the problems themselves. Moreover, some of his ideas will be of relevance to the future.

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THE LEGITIMACY OF SECESSION AS AN EXPRESSION OF SELF-DETERMINATION

A Review Article

THIS, perhaps the latest book on self-determination and secession,* is the result of painstaking research into the legitimacy of secession as an expression of self-determination. It is a scholarly, analytical and objective work on a complex and intractable subject. Much of the book is devoted to the search for a right "to secede;" and the author examines the possibility of laying down guidelines for deciding on the legitimacy of secession.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The author has traced the evolution of the doctrine of self-determination from very early times. Self-determination has had a chequered history. Although regarded as flowing from natural law and fundamental human rights, many countries have had qualms about its acceptance as a "right" to be incorporated in a binding treaty or covenant among nations, rather than as a principle governing the conduct of internal affairs and external relations. When the principle of self-determination was proposed at the 1919 Peace Conference after World War I, as one of President Wilson's fourteen points, the Conference decided against its incorporation in the Treaty of Versailles, because of the fear that its formal recognition and application would lead to the break up of Europe resulting from demands for self-determination by the numerous ethnic minorities spread all over and to consequent danger of instability, conflict and war. The Peace Treaty instead concerned itself with the protection of minority rights; and this, indeed, was one of the main tasks of the League of Nations founded after World War I.

Such is the basic rightness and morality of the concept of self-determination that it has survived and continues to gather strength. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the principle of self-determination was again debated. Several nations again expressed their reservations about the incorporation of the right of self-determination in the United Nations Charter, on the ground that it would spawn secessionist movement by various groups within sovereign states leading to anarchic situations, which would be fertile ground for external intervention. Eventually, a compromise formula was adopted in Article 1(2) of the Charter which lays down, among the purposes of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples...." The same phraseology is repeated in Article 55, in the Chapter on International Economic and Social Co-operation.

*Lee C. Buchheit, *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination* (Yale University Press, London, 1978), 260 p., £ 12.60.

Promotion from the Status of "Principle" to "Right"

Since 1945, efforts have been made at the United Nations and outside to invest self-determination with a more binding character and to recognize it as a "right" rather than as a "principle." The Bandung Declaration of 1955, the Belgrade Declaration of Non-Aligned States 1961, the Charter of the Organisation for African Unity, the United Nations' Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Declaration on Friendly Relations between States, have all recognized the right of self-determination of peoples. The United Nations General Assembly in 1966, in the International Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural rights has reproduced the text of the Declaration on Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

The Declaration on Friendly Relations between States, adopted by the General Assembly in 1969, states: "All peoples have the right freely to determine without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The Declaration in a subsequent paragraph, for the first time in any international document, recognizes the legitimacy of secession under certain circumstances. This paragraph, implies that not *all* states will enjoy the inviolability of their territorial integrity, but only those states "conducting themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

Despite the above-mentioned declarations and covenants and the advance of self-determination from the status of "principle" to a "right", there are inherent difficulties in its application. The questions that arise are what constitutes "self" and how is "determination" to be made. "Self" could mean anything from an individual to a group, ethnic, linguistic, cultural or other. Does self-determination comprehend the making of a choice by an individual, or a group or a nation as a whole? Is a religious group entitled to self-determination? Secular countries like India—as is well known—are totally opposed to this. As remarked by Sir Ivor Jennings, quoted by the author, 'On the surface it (self-determination) sounds reasonable; let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide—until somebody decides who are the people.' As the author says: "The use of variants of the expression such as 'national' self-determination or self-determination of 'peoples', merely places the definitional burden on the word nations or peoples and is therefore, of very little analytical help in this regard." With regard to the expression "determination" also, various questions arise. What is to be the method of determination—elections, plebiscite, periodic polls etc.? Should self-determination take the form of federation or political separation with economic union (as was

proposed by the United Nations for Palestine) or vice-versa? Must determination be peaceful or could it take the form of a revolutionary movement for secession backed by force of arms? Can external support for such a movement be in order?

Universal Recognition of the Right for the Colonially Dominated

The right of self-determination has been universally recognized in the case of peoples under colonial domination or trusteeship. Almost every resolution of the United Nations concerning freedom of such peoples has insisted on the actual exercise by the people of self-determination before independence. But these resolutions cannot be cited as evidence for the existence of the right of secession. Self-determination aimed at decolonisation does not mean secession but the assertion of the sovereignty of people hitherto suppressed by the colonial rulers. This view is wholly consistent with the United Nations Charter which not only in the case of territories under the trusteeship system, but also in the case of non-self-governing territories in Article 73 of the Charter, lays down that such territories are held "in trust" by the administering authority who are to prepare the people for self-government or independence. Modern international opinion denies the sovereignty of the colonial rulers over the territories and peoples conquered by them. Aside from the exercise of self-determination by peoples under colonialism, there has been no general agreement on the right of self-determination by ethnic, linguistic or religious groups in the form of separation from the mother state.

AMBIVALENT ATTITUDES OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION

The attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union towards secession, as part of self-determination, has been somewhat ambivalent. The United States, whose founding fathers were deeply influenced by the doctrine of natural rights, initially strongly supported the right of secession. According to Jefferson (again quoted by the author), 'If any State in the union will declare that it prefers separation, we have no hesitation in saying let us separate'. But even in his own life-time this doctrine was not supported. Abraham Lincoln in his earlier years favoured the granting to any group of disaffected people the revolutionary right to separate from the Union. But once he became President, his views changed. His part in defending the Union in the secessionist Civil War is well known. In modern times, the United States has consistently disapproved of secessionist movements outside the United States whether in Katanga, Biafra, Bangladesh or elsewhere.

In the USSR, Lenin favoured the right of secession as leading to "a freer and wider formation of large States" and as providing assurance to small units. As is well known the Soviet Constitution provided for the right of secession to its various constituent units. However, Lenin himself, and

Soviet leaders after him have drawn a distinction between the right to secede and the advisability of secession which must be decided by the General Socialist Movement (which means the Communist Party) "having regard to the interests of social development and of the class struggle of the proletariat." Towards external movements for secession also, the Soviet Union like the United States, has on political considerations generally opposed secession, though in the case of Bangladesh they strongly supported it.

Self-determination, including the right of secession, can best be exercised in conditions of peace. It may be fairly argued that the embodiment of the principle of self-determination in Article 1(2) of the Charter is predicated on this right being exercised in conditions of peace and within the parameters of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force for the settlement of disputes and upholds the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member States of the United Nations. In the light of this, revolutionary armed movements for secession would appear to be ruled out. The best instances of the exercise of the right of self determination and of secession have been in peaceful conditions and with the agreement or acquiescence of all concerned. In this connection, Buchheit has cited the Union of Norway and Sweden which was dissolved in 1905 after a plebiscite which resulted in overwhelming approval of the separation by the Norwegian people the secession of Senegal from the Mali Federation in 1960; Singapore's secession from the Malaysian Federation in 1965; and Syria's separation from United Arab Republic in 1961; which were all achieved peacefully.

Once secession is sought to be achieved by revolutionary change and rebellion or resort to arms, the whole situation changes and moves outside the parameters of the United Nations Charter on self-determination. The question becomes essentially military and political. All states notably the larger ones containing linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities are in mortal fear of secession of their constituent units, leading to the opening of a Pandora's box and the dismemberment of the State and anarchic conflict. They also have great fear of separated states becoming the hotbed of intrigue of hostile neighbours and other foreign Powers; this fear is compounded by the behaviour of big Powers who, as soon as a new state comes into being, rush in with the aim of making it a client state serving their global security or other interests into which they pump arms endangering peace in the region and also the security of the parent state. In the event of an armed secessionist movement, therefore, the state concerned takes military action to prevent secession and other states are largely influenced by their national interests. In the Bangladesh crisis, India, deeply agitated by the oppression against the people of Bangladesh, with 10 million unassimilable refugees on her soil and with the experience of her recent turbulent history, supported Bangladesh's secession. This was a purely political decision. Most of the other countries were also sympathetic to Bangladesh's secession.

Some countries have used the slogan of self-determination and supported it as a cloak for predatory designs or as a convenient handle for pressurising

a neighbour. The smuch bandied about slogan of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan and China, are examples in point. These very countries are highly resentful of any suggestion for conceding the right of self-determination to their own ethnic and linguistic groups, such as the Baluchis, Pakhtoons and Tibetans. Self-determination is essentially a matter between a State and a constituent group within it. India has made it clear that any plea by outsiders for self-determination in, or secession of, Jammu and Kashmir a constituent unit of the Indian Union is an intolerable interference in India's internal affairs.

APPRAISAL

The author has made an earnest effort to extract from the recent case histories of secessionist movements and from the attitudes of important countries like the United States and USSR, as indeed from the discussions at the United Nations, some guiding principles for determining the legitimacy of secession which might enable states to decide whether they could justly support a secessionist movement. He has rightly drawn the conclusion from this exercise that no guiding principles can be evolved at this stage. This is not surprising as each case of secession is *sui generis* and the circumstances surrounding each are different from one another. In the present state of international opinion neither the United Nations nor any State will countenance secessionist rebellion, nor does it seem possible at the present time to lay down precise and uniform criteria for determining the legitimacy or otherwise of secessionist movements. Yet, as the author has pointed out, "secessionist activity is an irrepressible feature of the contemporary world scene and the future is likely to see no abatement in such activity." Disturbed by this, the author puts forward the view, that "while maintaining the underlying force of the self-determination principle and yet minimise the dangers to international peace and security, one should concentrate on ascertaining *legitimate* claims of this kind." He envisages an enquiry into the nature of a group within a state, its situation therein, its prospects for independent existence and the effect of its separation on the remaining population and the world community in general. This point Buchheit has argued forcefully in the final chapter of his thesis—"The Standards of Legitimacy". He goes on to add: "The final decision regarding the legitimacy of a particular secessionist claim must result from the balancing of internal merits of the claimants' case against the justifiable concerns of the international community expressed in its calculation or the disruptive consequences of the situation." This seems neither easy nor realistic. The question is who is to make the judgement and how is it to be made? If individual countries are to make these judgements then there would be no advance on the situation as it is today. Must, therefore, new agencies and organizations be created for this purpose? Are existing or future organisations not excluding the International Court of Justice nor any other organisation (International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International etc.),

present or future, likely to be regarded as sufficiently impartial and objective to make value judgements on these highly political questions, acceptable to the States concerned or to the dissident groups within these states, or to other states? Secession is far too emotional and political an issue; and in the present state of the world one has to leave the judgement to individuals even though it is likely to be subjective and politically motivated. This is not altogether satisfactory but one must leave it to time and to the evolution of international ethos, for guidelines, norms and methods of determining the legitimacy of secession to be worked out. By all indications this may take a long, long time.

October 1980

C. S. JHA*

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Nuclear Technology Control

FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS and JOHN POLANYI, Eds. : *The Dangers of Nuclear War*. University of Toronto Press, Buffalo, USA, 1979, xiii, 197p., \$ 5.95.

THE book under review, is a collection of essays arising out of a Pugwash Symposium on "The Dangers of Nuclear War by 2000 A.D." held in Toronto in May 1978. Attended by 26 selected participants from 11 countries, the contributions of 15 participants—6 from the United States, 4 from Canada and one each from the USSR, France, UK, Isreal and India—appears in the text. It is significant that the most interesting, in the sense of advancing ideas not normally proposed at non-proliferation discussions, seem to emanate from Canadian, Israeli and Indian participants.

The astonishing development of China towards achieving a nuclear Super Power status is generally overlooked and only casually noted. Any close observer of China would have to note the curious contrast of China's development into a strategic nuclear Power and its comparatively poorer economic and technological performance. The political, social and economic turmoil in China for over a decade, while slowing down its scientific, technological and economic growth does not seem to have affected its missile and nuclear programmes. The broader significance of all this is perhaps even more important than the remarkable developments in China. Given the political will, a modicum of technological competence and some resources, natural and economic, any nation could achieve nuclear status. The various whispers one hears with regard to South Africa, Isreal, Brazil and Pakistan are indicative of a growing multipolar world which the Super Powers would like to brush under the carpet.

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The various theses presented by the participants are however mostly concerned with the problems of non-proliferation, that is of keeping control of nuclear technology. Various arguments have been advanced using various scenarios according to the predilections of the authors. Freir, with more clarity than many others, points out that cessation of local wars and the desire to develop nuclear technology, both peaceful and otherwise, depends largely on the Super Powers, their motives and their actions. The growth of nuclear fission technology has been tapering off—a feature of all technical exploration of major scientific discoveries. Undoubtedly, breakthrough in nuclear fusion or other technologies will increase the rate of technological development when it occurs. In the meantime, the fact of the technological asymptote is that it is increasingly easier for non-nuclear nations to go nuclear. The restraint is either through close relationship, access and credible mutual security arrangements, as in the case of Germany and Japan. Such arrangements are however fragile when faced with conceived dangers from neighbours. Outside this close circle the conditions are increasingly unstable and the political arrangements are largely ephemeral.

The articles are thoughtfully written and well-referenced, so that the historical perspectives of the nuclear threat is well brought out. The editing has been well done and the language and presentation makes the volume eminently readable. The University of Toronto Press is to be congratulated on the quality of printing and the low incidence of errors.

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B. D. NAGCHAUDHURI

Finance and Trade

K. VENKATAGIRI GOWDA: *Eurodollar Flows and International Monetary Stability*. Geetha Book House, Mysore, 1978, 539p., Rs. 125.

THIS is a fairly detailed study of a subject the understanding of which remains rather obscure in this country, and to that extent, fulfils a widely felt need. It is full of useful documentation for students and teachers of monetary economics in India.

There are chapters on the Reserve Currency Status of the US Dollar and the Instability of the Bretton Woods System, the various aspects of the growth and functioning of the Eurodollar market and its implications for international liquidity, inflation, exchange rates, and the financing of payments deficits. These are exhaustively reviewed, making use of a large number of books and articles and IMF reports published in recent years. There are a number of conclusions reached by the author such as that "the Euro-dollar market did exercise a decisive inflationary influence on the world economy" (p 222),

that because of it, it has become impossible for countries to follow independent monetary policies (pp 248-9), that "the floating exchange rate system would create foreign exchange crises more frequently" (p 294), and so on. With many of these, one could readily agree.

Nevertheless, taking the drift of the thesis broadly underlying this book, one feels constrained to point out that the author needs to do some deeper thinking, in the light of developments that have taken place, since this book has been published in regard to some of its basic assumptions.

The author says that "the fundamental weakness of the Bretton Woods system flow from the failure of its founders and the people operating it to understand adequately the role of money." (p 509) It has to be submitted that these are strong words devoid of sufficient justification!

Between the system, as designed by its founders, and the way it has been operated in practice under the compulsions of the national interests of some of its powerful members, there has been a great deal of difference. Right from the beginning, the United States and some of the industrial nations worked hard to render the system much more inflexible and much more conservative than was good for its success. The conditionality for the use of the Fund's resources has been made tighter and more and more rigorous. While the access to the Fund's resources was used to regulate and discipline the third world countries, the richer nations failed to observe and accept the Fund's advice or follow the code of conduct implicit in the Charter which they had signed. These aspects do not appear to be adequately noticed in this work.

The author also would have done well to bring out clearly that while the United States' deficits in international payments have helped to create international liquidity, this is not the way envisaged in the Fund system for the creation and regulation of international liquidity. The function of providing international liquidity, tagged on to the national interests of any single country, could not serve the interests of the international community. This point comes out clearly in the way in which the Euro-dollar market itself has emerged.

The financing of the Vietnam War by the United States over a quarter of a century involved the incurring of enormous deficits both in its domestic budgets as well as in its current trade balances over these years; it spread immense quantities of US dollars in the hands of other countries around the world. As the size of these balances grew, their holders developed nervousness about being able to convert them into gold or other tangible assets: they tried to unload them wherever they could creating instability and crises in the foreign exchange markets. Also, it pushed exchange rates up or down via short term capital movements and helped to wreck the fixed exchange rate system.

In the original design of the IMF, the creation and regulation of international liquidity had been envisaged to take place via the Bancors or SDRs as they have been recently rechristened. The industrial nations, and the United States in particular, have consistently resisted the growth of this function in

the Fund, so that the dollar could continue to perform as an international reserve currency, and as the creator and regulator of international liquidity. The dollar did create international liquidity but so much of it that it swamped the world with dollars and the fixed exchange rate system was the first victim to be stalled in that swamp! The holders of these dollars, when they realised that they may not be able to convert them, and felt that they might lose, if the dollar declined in value (as indeed it did) looked around to find some alternative way to pass on these dollars to some one else, and thus the somewhat illegitimate child of Euro-dollar market emerged! Thus the dollar having in a sense "usurped" the function of the IMF as the regulator of international liquidity, failed to perform that function with either efficiency or any particular concern for the stability of the international economy. Indeed, this was only to be expected because, the dollar deficits were caused by the inexorable demands of the Vietnam War and not the well-assessed needs of international liquidity—that is the kind of danger implicit in the creation of international liquidity, by placing too much reliance on the currency of any single country whose motivations are bound to remain integrated with the country's national interests which may or may not suit the interests of the World Community.

These aspects, which had often been stressed of IMF management organs by the Third World countries, also have to be taken into account in any discussion of this complex subject. The reviewer believes that in the absence of such a wider view of the problem, one would tend as the author does to blame the Bretton Woods system for the emergence of these problems. The system itself has been designed fairly well as far as the monetary mechanisms are concerned; but it has "failed" largely because of the basis on which the decision-making power has been concentrated through a weighted voting system with all effective control in the hands of ten industrialised nations, led by the United States and has left the other 120 nations with an all but ineffective representation. If the Bretton Woods system had indeed "failed", everyone would have by now suggested the winding up of the IMF. No one has done this, and everyone is asking for it to be further strengthened. The failure of the fixed exchange rate system, which is not the same thing as the failure of the Bretton Woods system has been brought about by the United States not playing according to the rules and not stopping when the referee whistled. That may represent a temporary set back. It is not a "failure" of the system, but a failure on the part of a few players who did not play according to rules. The world needs, and is bound inevitably though perhaps slowly, to amble along towards a monetary system managed internationally, and not according to the convenience of and the liquidity provided by the currency of a single country, however powerful it may be.

Pune

P. S. NARAYAN PRASAD

RICHARD BLACKHURST, NICOLAS MARIAN and JAN TUMLIR: *Adjustment, Trade and Growth in Developed and Developing Countries*. Gatt Studies in International Trade, Geneva, 1978, 98p., \$ 8.

THE book *Adjustment, Trade and Growth* is an extension of the thesis first presented in *Trade Liberalisation, Protectionism and Interdependence*. The differences between the two studies, as the authors admit in the Introduction, is that the present study has moved from the general issue of protection and liberalization to more specific problems in the realm of adjustment and trade.

It is hardly surprising therefore, that the first Chapter ranges widely over short-term and long-term changes in trade and growth of developing countries. It highlights the difficulties which these countries face as well as the difficulties they pose for the industrialization of developed countries.

The second Chapter discusses the problems experienced by the developed economies in adjusting to constant change not only in matters of national and international trade but also in such issues as population and technological innovation. The more specific issue to which the second Chapter addresses itself is the difficulties which obstruct opportunities for investment in industrialised countries from materialising into actual decisions. Apart from other reasons, a psychology of depression has developed which is creating further complications in an already complicated situation. Fear about long-term economic stagnation is publically expressed. This fear is compounded by another fear—the fear of economic disruption through “erosion of our industrial base”—through larger imports especially from developing countries. These two fears in turn reinforce the trend towards protectionism practised by the developed countries in recent years with greater vigour.

One of the principal themes of the study is the importance of international trade as an engine of economic growth. The subject has figured prominently in the writings of economists through generations, beginning with Adam Smith and stretching right down to Nurkse. In fact, it was Nurkse's doubt about international trade proving as effective an engine of growth in the 20th century, as it did during the 19th century, that inspired development strategies of the fifties and sixties based on import substitution. This line of argument was reinforced by the attempts of international trade theorists to measure the static and dynamic effects of trade. Studies showed static economies coming close to a fraction of 1 per cent of GNP. Dynamic economies were difficult to measure. Even if these economies did exist, they had to be balanced by the diseconomies or costs of adjustment to trade. The debate about the gains from trade and diseconomies of protection continues. Different studies have estimated the gains and costs differently.

The studies about gains of trade and costs of protection have been utilized by some economists in questioning the correctness of some of the economic policies designed to bring about a rapid economic recovery in industrialized countries. The absence of willingness to question the correctness of existing

economic policies has led to an irrational defence of those policies. Some people for example, are beginning to believe that inflation, inadequate growth and unemployment are regular features of economic life like floods, storms and earthquakes. A sophisticated technical version of this view is that structural imbalances between "import and export propensities" of different countries make it difficult to sustain international trade at a high level. It does not take one long to realize the absurdity of such theorising. Inadequate growth, unemployment and inflation are the outcome of man-made economic policies. One can only conclude by saying that these economic ills can be removed only by correct economic policies.

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Foreign Policy

UMA SHANKAR SINGH: *Burma and India 1948-62: A Study in the Foreign Policies of Burma and India and Burma's Policy Towards India*. Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, x, 256p., Rs. 50

IT was with great interest that I read the above book; not only because of my past association with Burma, but also because there is such a dearth of publications on our withdrawn neighbour. The need to create an awareness of the importance of neighbouring states in the perception of one's foreign policy is also obvious.

With regard to Burma, this place of importance has been dulled through the years after 1962. Any serious investigation as to this development requires an understanding of past relations existing between Burma and India. The importance of this book, therefore, lies not only in the study of a particular period but what it reveals that is pertinent to the present and future.

A striking fact at the outset is, that the book is entitled "Burma and India" and not *vice versa* indicating its projected perspective. The theme, however, is not concerned only with bilateral relations but deals with the interaction of the foreign policies pursued by Burma and India from 1948 to 1962.

The period covered is one when relations between Burma and India were at their closest. Much of this closeness had its moorings on geographical and historical factors which provided very early religious, cultural and economic ties. Political and administrative association from 1886 to 1937, under the British, forged deep psychological links and in their struggle for self-determination the Burmese drew inspiration particularly from leaders of the Indian National Congress. As newly independent states also, much of the attendant problems that they faced were similar, whether internally or externally. Moreover, the fact that Nehru and U Nu possessed idealistic and pacifist

temperaments resulted in the establishment of a personal bond which contributed not the least to effecting the most friendly relations between the two states.

In world affairs, Burma was an active participant particularly in those areas most relevant to its scheme of things. In this respect, Burma's attempts to promote Asian solidarity and its pursuit of non-alignment take up a major part of the book. The respective roles played by Burma and India in these two fields forms the backbone of this study. Both Nehru and U Nu played leading roles in organising and actively participating in regional conferences to promote and protect Asian interests initially. This led to the mobilisation of newly independent countries in forming a non-aligned group in the face of potential interference by powerful ideological and military blocs.

Yet, despite the close ties established, ironically, it was during this period when some outstanding differences arose and were allowed to foster. These sometimes threatened to mar the excellent relations and to alienate the states from each other. For instance, on the bilateral level, the problem of Indian nationals in Burma assumed bitter proportions and could not be satisfactorily resolved. In world affairs, even as Burma largely followed India's lead, some differences were apparent. Non-alignment, the cornerstone of their policies, was differently interpreted. That Burma has pulled out of the movement is consistent with its interpretation of non-alignment as being correctly neutral in *bloc* rivalry or influence. India's interpretation, as evidenced by its actions, however, often gave rise to some doubts of its credibility.

It may be questioned, therefore, how such differences could emerge and why they could not be reconciled, considering the close friendship established. For India, in particular, could this not indicate its failure to appreciate realistically potential problems and take command of them when it was in a position to do so?

Before seeking satisfactory explanations, it may be well to consider connected factors. Independence for both countries brought about heavy and growing responsibilities for fashioning their respective national and international destinies. Thus, because of various factors, internal and external, national interests could not always coincide in detail. After 1962 moreover, Burma set out on a stoic isolationist path, according to its perceived interests. Meanwhile, India's increasing choice to play a larger role in world affairs with its accompanying larger interests also contributed to a loss of the close confidence it commanded over Burma. As a result much of the old idealism was shed. In its place however, has grown realistic co-operation, for, whatever new pressures are arising, the larger interests of the two countries will remain similar.

The object of this book is not so much to analyze events and their future consequences as to recreate the historic development of relations between Burma and India. Dr. Singh draws upon a formidable array of sources for this purpose. Of some significance is his interview with ex-Premier U Nu himself, one of the main protagonists of this study. Coming at a time when

only a largely academic interest is evinced on Burma, the author is to be congratulated for his pain-staking research and for providing an important link to the understanding of Indo-Burmese relations.

Shillong.

R. KHATHING

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

General

RONY GABBAY : Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq. Croom Helm, London, 1978, 240 p., £ 8.50

IN 1955, Hudayb al-Hajj Hammud, a benevolent Iraqi landowner who followed the policy of dividing his farm produce equally between his peasant workers and himself and who on two Occasions freely distributed his lands in southern Iraq among the *fallahin* (peasants), was roundly dismissed as a local variant of Acharya Vinoba Bhave by the clandestine Communist periodical *Al-Qa'ida* (The Base). The argument advanced was that Bhave's gospel of "let us approach the landowners with love not by compulsion and threats" had failed "dismally" in India.

The book under review is an incisive study of the Iraqi Communists' changing perceptions of their country's agrarian problem and their role in solving it.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), founded in 1934, was initially an urban grouping confined to intellectuals and students in Baghdad and with no contact either with the placid peasantry, which accounted for 70 per cent of the population, or with the small and scattered industrial proletariat. Moreover, the ICP religiously shared Marx's inhibitions about the peasantry which it depicted as an inert and ignorant mass lacking class consciousness. This explains its rigidly dogmatic approach to the agrarian question until the mid-fifties.

Under the monarchical regime, which was toppled in July 1958, the number of the landless peasants and their dependants was as high as 4 million out of the country's total population of 6.3 million. On the other side, 3,347 landowners possessed 12 million donums (1 donum equals 0.62 acre) or 50 per cent of Iraq's cultivable land. Of these, 272 individuals controlled 4.5 million donums. Some families even accumulated over 500,000 donums each. In other words, the big landowners gobbled a good part of the nation's net income from agriculture which accounted for 39 per cent of the GNP excluding the oil revenues. Notwithstanding the size and gravity of the problem, the ICP did not pay much attention to the demand for agrarian reform voiced by several nationalist groups. On the contrary, it argued that such reform, if carried out,

could only serve as a "devilish tool in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie to consolidate their control" and might eventually turn the landless peasants into "conservative kulaks".

And yet the advent of the republican regime marked an appreciable change in the ICP's stand on land reform. The party called on its rank and file to support the Agrarian Reform Law of September 1958 'in every possible way'. The new law had restricted personal holdings to 1,000 donums in irrigated land and 2,000 donums in rainfall land; offered compensation to expropriated landowners through interest-bearing bonds redeemable in 20 years; and stipulated distribution of seized lands among the peasants so as to provide each recipient with a holding of 30 to 60 donums in irrigated land or double that size in the rainfall areas. The shift in the ICP's stand was dictated as much by its need for allies as by Moscow's exhortations to the Third-World Communists to seek accommodation and compromise with the national bourgeoisie. At the same time, Zaki Khayri, the party's spokesman on the agrarian question, hastened to add that the ICP's advocacy of the Agrarian Reform Law was not due to its "support of private ownership of land" but because of the "general conditions of the revolution".

The Communists indeed took a direct hand in the implementation of the reform law in July 1959, when the exigencies of domestic politics prompted Premier Abdul Karim Qasim to assign the portfolio of agrarian reform to Dr. Ibrahim Kubba, an ICP nominee. They used this opportunity to consolidate their hold on the newly established General Federation of the Peasants Societies and to raise the demand for a lower ceiling of 200 donums for irrigated lands and 400 donums for rainfall lands. More importantly, the ICP's ideological reservations about land reform were reflected in a general slowing down of land re-distribution, which, in turn, was expected to leave open the door for collectivization in the event of a complete takeover of the Iraqi polity by the Communists. However, the Communists' reckless bid for power evoked a strong reaction which eventually pushed them into political wilderness.

The ICP surfaced once again as a partner-in-power in 1973 when the ruling Ba'th Socialist Party admitted it to the Left-oriented National Front. In the meantime, a new Agrarian Reform Law was enacted in May 1970. It reduced the ceiling for irrigated land from 1,000 to 600 donums, expedited land re-distribution, and provided for a large network of rural co-operatives and social services. The current Development Plan (1976-80) stipulated a sizeable investment of \$11,500 million in the rural sector. By 1974 some 5.8 million donums were distributed among the landless *fallahin*, 1,386 agricultural co-operatives were established, and the average income of a rural family had increased to \$430 per annum against \$135 in 1960. But the ICP played a supporting rather than leading role in this endeavour. The author, however, gives the impression—I suppose unwittingly—that it was the other way round.

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M. S. AGWANI

TAYSIR N. NASHIF : The Palestine Arab and Jewish Political Leaderships : A Comparative Study. Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1979, x, 128 p., Rs. 40.

THIS is a study of the Palestinian Arab and Jewish political leaderships during the period of the British Mandate (1920-1948). The author, being a Palestinian himself, surprisingly does not distinguish between a Zionist and a Jew. The most annoying thing is that the book is full of historical errors and the language is atrocious. Hence a poor book, poorly brought out in a poor fashion!

Nashif in "his framework of analysis" says that the methodology he has adopted in this study is empirical and behavioural. But the scant data he has used hardly justifies his contention; the result is obvious—Nashif neither proves a good political scientist nor he comes out as a good student of sociology.

Nashif proudly says that the "data at hand reveal that none of the Arab leadership knew Hebrew... this lack of knowledge of Hebrew meant that the Arab political leaders were unable to learn about the Palestine Jewish entity from first-hand Hebrew sources." One can ask the "distinguished" writer what was the percentage of Hebrew-speaking even among the Jews during the Mandate period? Majority of the Jews who came from Eastern Europe were speaking "Yiddish; Hebrew became the *lingua franca* only when the State of Israel came into being. Nevertheless, the proficiency over the language of the antagonists fits well rather with the Zionist leadership where a significant majority remained completely ignorant of Arabic language. Notable examples were Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkal and Mrs. Golda Meir who deliberately refused to recognize the Palestinian entity and the Arab culture.

In the end, we find a hotch-potch in the name of an "analysis" of the "social background" of the Palestinian and Jewish leadership during the British Mandate over Palestine.

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SURENDRA BHUTANI

RAYMOND PEARSON : The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism 1914-1917. The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1977, x, 208p., £ 8.

DOOMED as idealists, the Russian moderates did not receive the attention due to them. The present work attempts to change the situation by filling this gap in Russian history. It makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of the moderate or liberal movement in Russia in the years 1914-1917.

The moderate movement was born in the turbulent decade at the beginning of this century. Inspired by the Liberal philosophy of the West, the moderates were drawn from the intelligentsia and certain members of the upper echelons of the Russian society. Its membership always remained confined to this section and was mostly restricted to the cities. The moderates played a crucial role in the Revolution of 1905. Later, in the Duma its members worked earnestly for constitutional monarchy. It vainly hoped to bend the autocratic structure, and some of them even hoped to usher in an era of parliamentary democracy. It dreamt of emerging as the "Third Force" between Tsarism and the Revolution. However, for various reasons, the moderates remained isolated from Russian society. In the absence of bourgeois class and tradition, it lacked social roots. The moderates found it difficult to communicate their ideas to the masses. They were met with either apathy or a firm commitment to the revolutionary cause. As a result, the moderates were forced to co-operate with the Left in order to win supporters to its cause, of bringing about a change in the political structure from below. Subsequently, this policy was revised in favour of bringing about the desired change from above. Besides, bickerings and squabbles among the members was another serious handicap to the moderate cause. At the time of the First World War, there were three factions; the Kadets, the Octobrists and the Progressists, of which only the Kadets could claim national status.

These defects became all the more glaring at the time of the World War. The immediate concern of the various groups was to sink their differences and work unitedly with the government in the War effort. Simultaneously, they hoped that this would bring in certain political concessions from the government. It is here that the book gives a valuable insight into the activities of the moderates, especially the intra -and inter-group rivalries. The book also highlights the activities of Okhrana (Tsarist Political Police) among the moderates, which was one of the major causes for the decline in moderate membership. (At the time of the February Revolution, 1917, the moderate membership was reduced to a bare thousand). Knowing these weaknesses, the Tsarist Government was in no mood to listen to the demands of the moderates and ignored them. As the economic condition of the country deteriorated, the masses became indifferent to the moderates and the Duma. In the revolutionary situation which was gradually developing, the moderates were isolated. Compelled to choose between the two forces, the moderates opted for support to the Tsar, with disastrous consequences. As rightly pointed out by the author, the moderates, or the reluctant revolutionaries, were given an undeserved second chance in February 1917.

The present book is a chronological account of the activities and the role of the various moderate groups in the years 1914-1917. The author has had access to valuable records of the Okhrana, seldom available to others. This has added considerable authenticity to the narration. Besides, the author has used a lot of primary source material in the Russian language. The book

should be useful to students of Russian history, especially to those who do not know the Russian language.

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NIRMALA JOSHI

Y. P. PANT and S. C. JAIN : *Agricultural Development in Nepal : A Search For a New Strategy*. Vora Publishers, Bombay, 1979. xxii, 162p., Rs. 35.

THIS second edition of the book, is evidence of its popularity as also the interest taken by people in the agricultural economy of Nepal. Nepal's agricultural sector sustains, directly or indirectly, 93 per cent of the population (about 12 million). The total cultivated area covers nearly 16.9 per cent of the total land area. Evidently, agricultural land constitutes the most important category of land-use in the country. Of the total cultivated area of the country, the entire Terai region occupies more than 60 per cent, although it forms only about 20 per cent of the gross area of the country, the rest being shared between the Hills and the Valleys.

The authors present their perspective in details and bring home the point convincingly that the main problems of Nepalese agriculture, viz., low productivity, underemployment and the consequent poverty of the mass of people, can be tackled by a policy of specialization and diversification of production activity within the different agro-ecological and agro-climatic regions. According to them, this strategy should emphasize specialization, i.e., allow regional areas to specialize in different types of activities, followed by a programme of diversification, especially in small-scale agriculture. Therefore, where an agricultural farm (irrespective of size) in the Terai region grows only cereal grain, it may be supported to maintain either a dairy, poultry, piggery unit, bee-keeping or assisted to grow sub-tropical fruits and vegetables. Similarly, a cereal, grain, or fruit, or vegetable growing farm in the hills should be helped to take up dairy, poultry or a piggery unit, a sheep or silk-worm raising unit or an activity of manufacturing handlooms and handicrafts. In the same way, an average farm raising sheep and goat flocks in the mountains needs to be assisted to make woollen textiles, shawls, blankets and carpets, ghee and cheese, undertake cereal cultivation and collection of herbs, and make handicrafts as a supporting activity. A strategy like this would help keep the farm family employed over a greater part of the year, raise productivity of resources under modern scientific methods and ultimately make the farm business a comfortably paying proposition so as to fulfil the basic requirements of a family subsisting thereon.

Since the first edition of this book in 1969, many changes have taken place in the agricultural scenario and the planning process in Nepal. Hence, this second edition became only too appropriate and is timely. While the authors have dealt with aspects like agricultural credit, marketing, growth, problems,

etc., a discussion on how in the long-term perspective the agricultural sector could be integrated so as to become the catalyst for further development of other sectors of the economy, including the export sector, is conspicuous by its absence. Likewise, more focus is needed to be given on the modalities for bringing about tenurial and institutional changes that could help in land reforms so as to consolidate growth of the agricultural sector.

It is well-known that the institutional environment affects the rural economy which draws its sustenance from the various institutions and organisations that cater to the vital needs of finance and training in skills. Crop insurance would be another important motivating element to encourage farmers to put in their best efforts in the field. While technical and economic factors play a very significant role in maximising productivity, the importance of human resources cannot be undermined as ultimately, it is the human factor which is largely responsible for raising productivity. It is necessary to evaluate technical innovations from the farmers' or artisans' economic angle at the unit level. They should relate their work more closely to the existing economic conditions so that the gap between the laboratory and the unit level could be reduced in a developing country like Nepal.

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NAVIN CHANDRA JOSHI

Ideology and Society

LUCIO COLLETTI : From Rousseau to Lenin : Studies in Ideology and Society.
Translated by John Merrington and Judith White. Oxford University Press,
Delhi, (reprinted 1978), 240p., Rs.20.

THIS book contains seven essays on ideology and society in modern times by the famous Italian Marxist philosopher, Lucio Colletti. His aim is to re-interpret Marxism from the contemporary perspective and to vindicate it against its detractors and adversaries such as Weber, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Bernstein, Mannheim and Marcuse. The result is a first-rate work, which is at once a Marxian social history of political theory from Rousseau to Marcuse and a masterly critique of the major schools of political thought that have either rejected or distorted Marx's original and profound critique of, and alternative to, the capitalist mode of production. While the entire book is highly commendable for the fresh insights it provides into the social history of modern political ideas, I feel that three of its essays would be of particular interest to those Indian readers who are concerned with the crisis of our society and the problem of its transformation. These three essays are: "Rousseau as Critic of 'Civil Society';" "Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International;" and "From Hegel to Marcuse."

Colletti demonstrates quite convincingly that Marx's critique of bourgeois society is prefigured in Rousseau's critique of "civil society." "So far as 'political' theory in the strict sense is concerned," writes Colletti, "Marx and Lenin have added nothing to Rousseau, except for the analysis (which is of course rather important) of the 'economic bases' for the withering away of the state." (p. 185) The primacy which Rousseau gave to politics is clearly brought out by the author when he shows that Rousseau, for the first time in history, transferred the problem of evil from the realm of religion (original sin) to the sphere of society (social inequality). In place of the liberal-natural-law conception of man's deliverance as individual freedom *from* society, Rousseau, Colletti tells us, re-defined freedom as freedom *in and through* society. Hence his "political" critique of "civil society"! Rousseau interpreted "civil society" as stabilizing the inegalitarian division of labour and private property. Its positive law "converted clever usurpation into unalterable right" and put "new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich." For Rousseau, this "civil society," which legalizes the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor is not genuine society. Hence he advocated the *socialization* of man in moral and political terms. His corrective, however, is shown to have suffered from the limitations of his times. His economic views, unlike those of Adam Smith, were backward and backward-looking. Marx, in contrast, is shown to have taken into account both Adam Smith's analysis of the progressive significance of the rise of industrial capitalism and Rousseau's analysis of the emergence of "social inequality" in "civil society."

While both Rousseau and Marx perceived that "formal" equality concealed actual inequalities in bourgeois "civil society," Bernstein, as Colletti demonstrates, had a shallow understanding of the significance of the new, post-Depression developments in the capitalist system. Bernstein was gladdened by the fact that the Great Depression of 1873-1895 was followed by an epoch of prosperity under the auspices of a radically altered capitalist system. He believed that factory legislation, "the democratization of communal administration," universal suffrage, etc., have eroded the basis of class struggle. In other words, he believed that under the new physiognomy of capitalism, political-juridical equality is tending to eliminate the old capitalist inequalities and exploitation. In a brilliant and lengthy critique of the assumptions and implications of this revisionism, Colletti shows that despite his greatness in recognizing that the new developments in capitalism created a crisis in the Marxism of the Second International (Kautsky and Plekhanov), Bernstein erred not only in his understanding of the significance of those new developments but also in his grasp of the original Marxian theory of the immiseration of the masses and of the eventual breakdown of the capitalist system.

While, according to Colletti, the monopolistic cartelization and protectionism of capitalist production were the final processes of the *involution* of capitalism, Bernstein interpreted them as processes of regeneration and self-correction that enabled capitalism to survive indefinitely. He saw a process of democratization of capitalism in the de-personalization of property under

the joint-stock companies. Colletti attacks this interpretation from the viewpoint that Marx had taken, namely that, the spread of joint-stock companies generated "a new financial aristocracy, a new variety of parasites in the shape of promoters, speculators and simply nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by means of corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation," (pp. 98-99)

Colletti also demonstrates that Bernstein erred in regarding Marx's theory of the *relative* immiseration of the masses under capitalism to be a thesis of *absolute* immiseration. Marx's theory, according to Colletti, is not disproved by increases in the real wages of the workers. The fulfilment of human needs, Colletti argues, is to be measured not only by the material means of their satisfaction but also by a social scale. In other words, even with increased wages, the *dependence* of the workers on the will of the capitalist class is an aspect of relative immiseration. Colletti points out insightfully that capitalist appropriation "is not exclusively or primarily an appropriation of *things*, but rather an appropriation of subjectivity, of working energy itself, of the physical and intellectual powers of man." (p. 102)

On the substance of revisionism and its distance from Marx, Colletti observes: "For Marx modern *social inequality* or capitalist exploitation occurs simultaneously with the fullest development of *juridical-political equality*; here [in revisionism], on the contrary, juridical-political equality—and hence the modern representative State—becomes the instrument for the progressive elimination and dissolution of real inequalities, which seem arbitrarily produced, rather than an organic consequence of the system as such." (p. 93) The source of Bernstein's error, according to Colletti, lies in his adopting, *pace* Plekhanov, a "factorial" (technological) conception of historical changes, emptied of the *socio-historical content* which Marx had put into it. Colletti argues that mere legal reforms cannot be the road to the elimination of the basic fetishism or alienation of capitalist society. He, like Rosa Luxemburg, advocates a social revolution. At the same time, however, he tries to avoid any "sectarian or primitive" attitude to political equality. He upholds the validity of Marx's critical-scientific theory of social transformation, according to which the self-conscious working class becomes the historical agent through whom the new society can be born from out of the old.

Colletti is highly critical of those who *refuse* to recognize this historical role of the working class. While he faults Bernstein for his shallow understanding of the significance of the new physiognomy of capitalism, he accuses Marcuse of a Great Refusal. According to Colletti, Marcuse's philosophy of the destruction of *things* is a culmination of the old repugnance of philosophical spiritualism towards the finite and terrestrial world. Marcuse's intellectual roots are shown to lie in Hegel's idealism, the central motif of which was "the destruction of the finite and the annihilation of the world" in the process of the realization of the Idea. Hegel's philosophy, however, was a philosophy of revolution because by its identification of the Real with the Rational, it lent powerful legitimacy to the view, such as the one held by Marcuse that

what men believed to be rational *must be* realized in the organization of their social and individual life. Colletti finds that Marcuse's philosophy of "revolt" against industrial society was influenced by Lukacs' idealistic reaction against science.

According to Colletti, Marcuse's indiscriminate indictment of industrial society is a romantic critique of the present in favour of the feudal or patriarchal conditions of the past. Instead of criticizing science and technology *per se*, Colletti would criticize the capitalist mode of employing them. He argues that Marcuse's un-Marxian indictment of industrial society, as though that society were without class divisions, has apologetic implications in favour of the great corporations—unless we take that indictment to be an invitation "to oppose the system with the 'Great Refusal' and [to] set sail together, perhaps, for Tahiti." (p. 140)

I mentioned above that Colletti's critique of Rousseau, Bernstein and Marcuse would be of particular interest to Indian students of socio-historical changes. I should now clarify that this is so because the backward-looking, romantic, revisionist and sectarian themes which Colletti subjects to insightful criticism have their analogies in some of the Indian critiques of modern civilization such as those of Gandhi, Aurobindo and some of the Communist theoreticians.

Since the present collection of essays were written on different occasions, it may not be proper on my part to find fault with the author for his omission of the important modification of Marxism that Mao made. However, I raise this point as it serves to underscore the fact that although I have benefited immensely from Colletti's insightful essays, they have left me wondering as to whether or not the developments that have occurred in society and economy after Marx have had any impact at all on the original science and revolutionary ideology of Marxism.

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Baroda.

THOMAS PANTHAM

AMITAVA RAY : Political Utopianism : Some Philosophical Problems.
Minerva, Calcutta, 1979, viii, 125p., Rs. 40.

MARX'S critics in the last ninety years have been legion. The entire corpus of Marxism has been dissected, criticized and debunked, so much so that there is no aspect which has gone unnoticed by critics in the West. The movement of the "revisionist" to modify its aspects also still continues.

There is no aspect of Marxism which has not been attacked, beginning with the economic, then the historical, followed closely by the sociological and philosophical, so much so that the anti-Marxian literature has swelled in such proportions that it can fill up the whole section of a library. Yet

paradoxically, Marxism has advanced in great leaps and bounds and come to dominate a large tract of humanity against which the liberal theories of the West are struggling in vain.

In this ocean of anti-Marxian literature, Ray has also taken a plunge and published a slender volume which has raised more questions than the young author has chosen to answer.

A reader will be intrigued by his method of criticism, which to say is fairly simple, i.e. to use one critic of Marxism against another. In the second Chapter, he quotes Sartre and later on Herbert Marcuse. This irritating method is followed right through the remaining chapters of the book till we come across the anthropological explanation of Levi-Strauss, whom he quotes to say that what magic was to primitive society, science is for the modern society.

The concluding Chapter, entitled Property and the State, leaves much to be desired. For one, Ray's understanding of Rousseau's theory is far from satisfactory. He seems to have consulted only Rousseau's *Social Contract* to the neglect of his essay on the *Origin of Human Inequality*; likewise he compares Proudhon's theory of property with that of Marx without taking into account Marxian attacks on Proudhon's book—*The Poverty of Philosophy*. No two thinkers could be more far apart in their view on property than Proudhon and Marx, yet the writer consoles himself for having established that all said and done Marx was a Utopian thinker and an advocate of anarchism.

It is indeed unfortunate that terms can be twisted around, and that to by a scholar, who, I think, should know better.

New Delhi.

FRANK THAKURDAS

India

THOMAS R. METCALF : Land, Landlords and the British Raj: Northern India in the Nineteenth Century. University of California Press, 1979. South Asian Edition, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1979; xiv, 436 p., Rs. 90.

THERE is an unfortunate fashion in Indian history for grandiose titles which tell one little of the contents, (I confess to having followed the fashion myself). This book deals with only one aspect of land, landlords and the British, and a much smaller aspect of Northern India in the nineteenth century. It is all the better for that, since we need tens, if not hundreds of monographs before we can write a good general account of Northern India in the nineteenth century. Metcalf has in fact written a history of the talukdars of Oudh in the nineteenth century, a natural successor to his earlier book, *The Aftermath of Revolt, 1857-1870*.

Metcalf traces the descent of the talukdar from his position as a raja under the Nawab of Oudh, nearly divine, "all-benevolent and all protective" (p. 378), to a mere landlord under the British, constrained by the law and his own ignorance and inherited values from behaving like a profit-maximiser.

There is a particularly full description of the changes in British policy; from the experiments of the first three decades of the nineteenth century, when the British had to decide who held what "proprietary interests" and the level of assessment, to the settlements with the talukdars at the end of the nineteenth century. The author traces the various turns British policy took over the century, reflecting the views of those like T.C. Robertson, who wanted to rule through the talukdars, the "natural aristocracy" of the country, to the views of those "levelers" or "radical paternalists," like Bird, or later McMinn, who saw the talukdars by and large as inefficient parasites serving no useful political or economic function.

The last third of the book, describes the talukdars' economic position, political manoeuvres and style of life. Metcalf gives the talukdars more than pass marks as estate managers; they might not have been great innovators, but neither were they the hopeless spendthrifts they are sometimes made out to be. In fact they added to their holdings in the second half of the nineteenth century. (p. 274) They get much lower marks as social reformers. How greatly did they add to the colour and amusement of life? Metcalf provides us with much interesting detail in his chapter on the talukdari style of life, but with no very striking conclusions. This is perhaps not an unfair comment on the book as a whole. But much of the detail is new; the author has drawn on a great range of sources, including the archives of some talukdari estates and family histories, and has rightly embellished his account with a number of photographs. His work is in short, essential to any library on modern Indian history.

University of Delhi,
Delhi.

DHARMA KUMAR

R.J. MOORE : Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-45. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, viii, 152p., Rs. 110.

SEVERAL books have been written on the Cripps Mission and its failure, an important episode in Indo-British relations which continues to be discussed. This is one of the finest books, if not the finest, on the subject. Moore is Professor of History at the Flinders University of South Australia, and like other students of India from Australian universities, he is able to achieve an objectivity which seems to escape British scholars. As Moore says, if Sir Stafford Cripps' mission to India in 1942 had succeeded, it could have prevented the partition of India by enabling India's participation in the war, with Hindus and Muslims co-operating in an executive which had power

to conduct the war. The Mission failed as a result of Churchill's stalling capacity and influence, in support of the overcautious Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow. As the story of a missed opportunity, Moore's sequel to his book *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-40* (1974), is a clear and convincing contribution to Indian political literature.

Moore starts with an unpublished version of the memoirs by Clement Attlee:

I had a good many stiff contests with Churchill on India, It was a great surprise when he embraced the idea of the Cripps Mission. The lines on which Cripps was empowered to go went beyond anything previously considered by any government. It embodied in fact some of the main ideas discussed by Cripps, Nehru and myself one week-end at Filkins.

The Cripps Mission may have taken shape from that party at Cripps' country house in 1938, and though much has been written about the failure of the Mission, there is general agreement with Attlee's view that the failure to set up a national Government at the Centre in 1942 delayed full self-government for India by some years, involving the loss of an opportunity for Congress-Muslim League co-operation. It gave the League three further years, till 1945, in which it could capture the Muslim majority provinces. When Churchill succumbed to the need for a revival of the Cripps offer, Jinnah had already imprinted Pakistan on Muslim consciousness indelibly.

For the Indian people who wanted immediate independence, and assurance of unity, the Cripps offer was the first clear hint of partition. But some Indian leaders who, for the sake of avoiding partition and taking part in the fight against fascism were prepared to co-operate in the war effort, believed, with Sir Reginald Coupland and others, that the Cripps offer made on 29 March, 1942 was a kind of declaration of independence. Partition was implicit in the Cripps Proposals, but it could be avoided by Congress-League co-operation or by a happy conjunction of developments. In 1942, with Japan hovering on the eastern borders, it seemed to Indian leaders that, while the constitution of a free India could be decided by Indian representatives themselves, the more immediate question was transfer of power at the Centre so that the Congress and the League could forge co-operation between themselves through wielding power in the war effort. To this end, Congress leaders worked with earnestness and energy. At one stage, Cripps and Nehru worked closely together and Col Johnson, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative in Delhi, gave a helping hand. The break came over the Defence portfolio. The Congress did not want to be only in charge of canteens and other such light matters.

An All-India Federation had seen the way out for India from internal problems as a result of the Round Table Conferences. But the idea of a Constituent Assembly was being pressed by Nehru and blessed by Gandhi and seemed sensible to many British statesmen. By accepting this approach

the Cripps proposals seemed to concede the substance of India's demands, but it could be only after the war. For participation in the war effort, Indians demanded that power be conceded immediately, but with the tide of victories for Britain, Churchill had lost all sense of urgency, and British offers were few and far between. Churchill also had to score over Cripps, as the latter's stars were on the ascendant. At every step British hardliners gained ground and the persistence which Cripps had shown was negated by the Churchill-Linlithgow axis. Roosevelt and his advisers had to yield.

Moore has made a worthwhile contribution, but most such contributions to the Cripps's Indian episode have come from British and other foreign sources. There must be Indian students of modern Indian history who, in spite of financial limitations, can make a more worthwhile contribution. For India, the Partition was a tragedy and the British contribution to that tragedy, through a long series of missed opportunities and much delayed action, will remain tragically important.

New Delhi

M. CHALAPATHI RAU

M.S. DAHIYA : Office of the Governor in India. Sundeep Prakashan, Delhi, 1979, x, 324p., Rs. 80.

THE pre-Independence provinces were for long under the direction, control and superintendence of the Central Government. Under the traumatic influence of Partition in 1947, Congress set up a strong central government within a fictional (politically, though not constitutionally) quasi-federation, for they believed that India's unity could only be maintained with a strong grip over the states of the Union.

It is often overlooked that the constitutionalization of Congress "unitarianism" started operating when Congress took office in 1937 in the provinces under the Government of India Act of 1935. Prof. R.J. Moore has pointed out that, "instead of Congress ministries operating as autonomous provincial governments within the federal structure, they accepted the Congress Working Committee as the legitimate directorate of a unitary government. The monolithic Congress stood in the place that the unitary Raj had evacuated. The new provincial system had been incorporated within the old Congress system!"

After Independence, Parliamentary Democracy of the Westminster model came to the provinces (now termed states) practically without any clothes. At the Centre, Indian Democracy largely reflected the personal qualities of Nehru about which John Mander wrote amusingly in an article in the *Encounter* of 1963 : "India is a Democracy but a one-man democracy. Jawaharlal Nehru may be the most enlightened despot the world has known; but he is none-the-less a despot. It is not that Nehru is an 'authoritarian' personality in the familiar sense. India required him to be a *guru*. If personal

authority of Nehru is considered in such terms, then the British analogy breaks down."

The Centre reflected the basic Democratic Party-political pattern borrowed from Britain; in the states it was intersected at many points by the older, traditional, sectarian pattern of personal authority strongly entrenched in the backward, rural society in the localities in the states.

Superficially, this may appear to be a dangerous situation for the functioning of Parliamentary Democracy in the states. But it was not so in practice. In the initial period of Independence, the states passed under the effective authority of the "old guard" of Congress leaders. Bengal became a satrapy of Bidhan Chandra Roy for ten years. Morarji Desai, Srikrishna Sinha, Gobind Ballabh Pant, Ravi Shankar Shukla—all proved to be strong Chief Ministers of the states which they ruled.

The Constitution had no doubt assigned a dual role to the Governor—Head of the State and the constitutional authority—but the "old guard" knew pretty well the location of real authority. The author quotes G.B. Pant as saying: "The Governor may, if he likes send down a note but he should not afterwards enquire about it." Here, Pant was pointing out the distinction between the status and function of the Governor. Ambedkar had earlier stated the position clearly in the Constituent Assembly, that the powers of the Governor were limited and nominal and his position ornamental.

India, till 1977, had been a one-party-dominant state. Under this condition, the Governors were relegated to a shadowy background. After the "old guards" departed from state politics, there emerged provincial "bosses" and factional politicians whose influence was derived from the localities, increasingly sustained by caste and parochial politics.

Congress at the Centre had two weapons readily available to control state politics and politicians and to impose a measure of stability in the states in the situations brought about by party factionalism and unprincipled defections. One was, to control by manipulatory methods the organisational wing of the State Congress. The other was the use, or rather the misuse of Article 356 of the Constitution, by imposing President's rule.

When President's rule is imposed, the Governor emerges from his gubernatorial mansion as the Chief Executive, but in practice, he is a subordinate functionary under the Home Ministry. This fact is however hidden from the public by the glittering trappings of his office. The constitutional theory is that Governor's report is a necessary preliminary to the imposition of President's rule. In practice, however, the Centre first decides and then the Governor follows up with some sort of a "cooked" up case for presidential action.

The author has presented an impressive list of the misuse of Article 356; but the practice is quite old. In 1953, the then Home Minister told me that the Cabinet had decided to impose Presidential rule in Pepsu and that necessary steps be taken. Since the Minister was reluctant to act on the provision, or otherwise, in Article 356, I invited the Rajpramukh of Pepsu—the Maharaja

of Patiala—and asked him to sign a letter which I had prepared. When the Minister asked me how I managed to get a report, I told him that the Maharaja valued his privy purse of 17 lakhs and cared a farthing for a silly sheet of paper.

Since Congress “unitarianism” had to override the constitutional position of the Governor, a necessary ambivalence had to be built into the office of Governor by making him a constitutional authority with some discretionary powers. In practice, the two roles have not so far been reconciled. Since he is a nominated and not an elected Governor, what exactly is his position—a constitutionally independent entity or a link with the Centre? The author rightly observes, he cannot be both, for these two roles are independent of each other and at the same time contradictory.

In the state, the ordinary citizen and even some disgruntled politicians look upon him as an agent of the Centre who can turn on the screw on the local government for any acts of misdeed, real or imaginary, or when it happens to be ruled by a party different to that of the Central Government.

One valid accusation against Governors holds good. Governors, in various situations and at various places, have indulged in undesirable and questionable practices in the dismissal of ministries. It is not the function of the Governor to determine the minority status of government; that is the prerogative of the Assembly. If Governors have shown an elastic conscience, there is little doubt, according to a leading Congressman, and a one time Governor, A.P. Jain, given to queer, unorthodox practices in office, that the fault lies less with men but more with the situation.

The author feels that there is no fixed criteria for the appointment of Governors. He says that in most places they are tools of the Central Government and men from the ruling party. It is not uncommon that political appointments are essentially a patronage and largesse in the hands of the Prime Minister, for after all, unlike in England, the Prime Minister in India has no House of Lords to kick politicians “upstairs”.

Nehru was rightly allergic to men of the ICS being Governors. Apart from one ICS Governor he inherited from the British regime, he only appointed three ICS officials as Governors. By contrast, after 1967, eleven ICS Governors were appointed. Of them, barring a Christian from Bombay and a Bengali, the rest were from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. They might have been a strange kettle of fish, in the author’s opinion, but he has gone a little bit far in describing one of them as acting “like the circus clown.”

It is sometimes said that the paucity of gubernatorial powers is sought to be compensated by the splendour associated with the office. Acharya Kripalani has been an abrasive critic of the pomp and glory of the departed British still haunting the Raj Bhavans in Republican India. As late as August 1977, he wrote a trenchant article in a Bombay paper. An English observer whose book on India was banned for a time in the sixties, noted : “State Governors could do their work efficiently and doubtless with greater public effort if they concentrated less with polishing the silver of the Raj.... Socialism in

a Mercedes-Benz may be eloquent but it seldom conveys the impression of sincerity”.

The study of the office of Governor depends at present largely on the politics at the state and local levels. Political Scientists can certainly teach us to make some generalisations. The Constitution may be closely scanned to tell us what are the limits within which an incumbent can operate. In the present state of parliamentary government in the states—big, small, mini—with bossism, factional politics based on parochialism, linguism, casteism, unprincipled defections and floor crossings—a Governor in office is but a transient and an unembarassing phantom. The office may acquire a recognizable identity when it is occupied by an elected person or when the state governments function within the framework of a truly genuine federal structure.

Bangalore

C.S. VENKATACHAR

SHYAMAL KUMAR RAY: *Indian Bureaucracy at the Crossroads*. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1979, ix, 407p., Rs. 90.

A WRITER who has not been involved in the task of administration, and especially one who appears to have specialized in the teaching of the subject of public administration, is at an advantage when writing on the subject of his specialization, for he may be able to study and present the features of his subject objectively, and with a certain detachment. But with the author of this book it is not so; for he wears upon his sleeve a prejudice against the Indian Administrative Service. He has let the Indian Civil Service off more lightly than he does the successor cadre of that older service; perhaps he might feel “*de mortuis nil nisi bonum*”; for the last member of the ICS has retired, and the cadre has passed into the fold of history.

Ray has to go back as far as 1940, in quoting the late Jawaharlal Nehru as saying that the first duty of the National Government would be to liquidate the ICS. Nehru was the nation's first Prime Minister, and held that office until his death seventeen years after independence. Having quoted Nehru, the author might profitably have spent some thought as to how it came about that for all those seventeen years Nehru did nothing of the sort; on the contrary, the ICS was made to feel that the practical administration of this great nation must be looked after by its members. In fact it was amusing at times, to see Ministers vying with one another in their keenness to have in their respective Ministries members drawn from the rapidly dwindling ranks of the ICS.

But in kindness, if not in merited fairness, to an author who has after all taken the trouble to write and have published a book on a serious subject, one must remember that his lack of direct administrative experience has limited his ability to relate administrative theory to administrative fact and

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practice. Indeed, the weakness of treatment of his subject is illustrated nowhere so well as in the title itself, which consists of a two-fold abstraction, for all its eyecatching phrasing. The first abstraction is "Indian Bureaucracy", which Ray treats as consisting merely of the so-called elitist cadres, and "crossroads" an empty abstraction.

The author's understanding of the role of the ICS (p. 44), reveals abyssmal ignorance and the answer to it is given at page 4 of his book, (but not by him), where Gorwala has given a description of that role. Ray's ignorance of the role of the ICS under British rule is matched by his ignorance about the origins of members of the Service

I am sure the author meant no plagiarism, when he draws upon an example from this reviewer's own book on District Administration; indeed one must feel flattered!

Twenty eight pages of bibliography is a bit much for a book of this kind.

There remains to be written a worth-while account of the whole bureaucratic system in India and its working. Whatever the governmental system, from the extreme right to the extreme left, whatever the composition of the government at any level, it is a fact of life that, willy nilly, one must depend upon some form and substance of a bureaucratic system, to keep the nation functioning. And bureaucracy is a neutral term, as is politics, whatever one's inclination may impel one to import into either of them.

New Delhi

S.S. KHERA

D.E.U. BAKER: *Changing Political Leadership In An Indian Province: The Central Provinces and Berar, 1919-1939*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, x, 233 p., Rs. 60.

THE year 1919 is an important landmark in the constitutional, political and administrative history of India. The four salient features of the Montford Reforms (Government of India Act, 1919) were: (a) lowering of the franchise; (b) the setting up of a legislative Assembly at the centre; (c) democratisation of local self-governing institutions in urban and rural areas; and (d) the most important of all, the introduction of partial responsible government in the provinces. All these created new and wide opportunities for the distribution of political patronage and the struggle for political power. The new political horizons were accompanied by new administrative vistas opened up for the Indianisation of superior civil services consequent upon the recommendations of the Lee Commission. The inauguration of these reforms, however, coincided with the launching of the non-co-operation movement by Gandhiji which electrified the whole country.

The period 1919 to 1939, chosen by David Baker for his study, thus, was marked by all-round political activity both on the part of the British Govern-

ment in power and the various political parties, factions, groups and interests. The period of seventeen years (1920-37), in particular, was characterised by political manoeuvres, wranglings, machinations, negotiations and parleys for determining the next step in the "progressive realization of responsible government" between the Indian leaders and the British rulers on the one hand and among the Indian political parties and groups on the other. The introduction of the Government of India Act 1935, on 1 April 1937, witnessed a new urge among all political parties, first for contesting elections to the provincial legislative assemblies and then for accepting office under the provincial autonomous set-up. The last two and a half years of this period were marked by the Indian National Congress itself forming ministries in six out of eleven provinces. In brief, this period provides good scope for the study of the political process at work in any one province.

Somehow, the state of Madhya Pradesh, including its predecessor, the Central Provinces and Berar have not received adequate attention at the hands of scholars of the nationalist movement in the country or researchers in the field of government and politics, even though it constitutes the heart-land of the country. We, belonging to this region, therefore, have good reason to be grateful to Baker for undertaking this study. But why did the author choose the neglected Central Province and Berar? Three reasons may be discerned for this choice. First, this province, along with Bengal, had the proud distinction of wrecking the working of dyarchy in the province in the first five years after its initiation. In the second place, the province provided a good example of an arena of conflict and strife for political ascendancy between the eight Marathi-speaking and eleven Hindi-speaking districts constituting the province. Thirdly, in the words of the author himself, "...the period from 1919 to 1939 saw not only a marked growth in political awareness among different sections of the population but also a transfer of political leadership from Marathi to Hindi-speaking politicians. On the national front, this development formed part of the gradual assumption of power by Hindi politicians from northern India over the Indian National Congress." (p. 2)

Dr. Baker's interest in the Central Province and Berar can be traced as far back as 1964. He later wrote his doctoral thesis on the politics of this province. He continued his work in this field when he was appointed research fellow in the Department of History in the University of Western Australia. The author is thus, well qualified to write a book on changing political leadership patterns in this province. However, the author has clarified the nature of his research by admitting in the Introduction to the book that "this study, then, will seek to examine not the depths of micro-history but broader issues, and equally heroic themes". Thus, while not ignoring the general socio-economic background against which the political drama was played, he has emphasized the role of leaders like Moonje, Raghavendra Rao, Khare, Shukla and Mishra.

The book can easily be divided in two parts. In the first part, the author

discusses the basis for the Marathi dominance in the province and its subsequent erosion. He throws a good deal of light on the struggle for power between the Tilakites and the Gandhian Congress, the brahmins and the non-brahmins, the special role of Berar, etc. The second portion is devoted to an analysis of the expansion and strengthening of the Congress in Hindi areas and the ultimate establishment of its supremacy over the whole province. This rise to power of the Hindi region can be subdivided into the period of ascendancy of Raghavendra Rao for a full decade—1927-1937—and the subsequent coming to the top of the Shukla-Mishra team. The last Chapter of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of the Congress in office between July 1937 and November 1939.

Attention may be drawn here to two specific points of importance, namely, the role of Raghavendra Rao and the unhappy Khare episode in 1938. On both these points there obtains a difference of opinion between David Baker and D.P. Mishra (*Living An Era*, Vol I: *India's March to Freedom*. Vikas). Mishra agrees with the author about the distinctive role of Raghavendra Rao and his contribution to the transfer of political power from the Marathi to the Hindi region, when he writes, "These conditions made possible a career that was unique in the history of the reformed constitution in British India between 1921 and 1935. More important, however, Rao's career made possible the transfer of power from the Marathi to the Hindi region at the level of government." (p. 256) However, the two distinguished writers differ on their evaluation of Rao's role. Mishra uses uncomplimentary epithets like "a rebel" and "a traitor to the Congress cause," to describe the unsavoury and conspiratorial role of Rao who "ruled over CP and Berar with the support of two British Governors, Sir Montagu Butler and Sir Hyde Gowan." (p.98) On the other hand, Baker praises Rao for his great political acumen in being able to forge a sort of alliance of harijans, non-brahmins, Muslims and some Hindi-speaking members of the provincial legislative assembly to support him against the Brahmin and Tilakite combination. He also compliments Rao for his influence over the superior civil services. To quote the author, "As an Executive Councillor and virtual leader of the government from 1930, Rao enjoyed even greater power over the civilians. ... Rao formed important friendships with many British officials as with the increasing numbers of Indians entering the ICS in the province." (pp. 164-65).

Similar is the case with the Khare Episode, where the two learned authors differ particularly regarding the role of the British Governor in the whole episode. Mishra has charged the Governor, Sir Francis Wylie, of having "conspired with Khare to get rid of the three of us and have a new ministry installed, and thus present the Congress Working Committee with an accomplished fact when it met on 23 July." (p. 299) The Congress Working Committee too came to the conclusion "that the Governor of the Central Provinces has shown by the ugly haste with which he turned night into day and forced the crisis that has overtaken the province, that he was eager to weaken and discredit the Congress in so far as it lay in him to do so."

(Mishra, p. 295) Mishra has given his reasons for this conclusion. Baker refutes this allegation against the Governor when he writes, "Contrary to the belief of the Working Committee, Wylie did not 'conspire' with Khare to unseat the Ministry or embarrass the Congress." (p. 184) As a researcher he has given some evidence to prove his point.

Obviously, it is not possible for the reviewer to give his considered opinion in the matter and the only suggestion he can make is that this is a matter for some researcher to take up for indepth and detailed study to be able to endorse one point of view.

To sum up, to enable him to understand and appreciate the roles played by important persons or "heroes" as the author will call them, in the political drama, Baker has taken into full consideration the social and economic factors of the two regions of the province (vide chapter III). He has gone further and studied the physiognomy of the province, the process of immigration to the Hindi areas from the north and the Marathi areas from the west, the history of the earlier kingdoms, their conquest by the British, the ad hoc administrative arrangements made by the British for the governance of these areas and their subsequent amalgamation into one unit in 1861, which was given the name of the Central Provinces. He has also taken note of the history of Berar and its special position. In the second place, he has well brought out the active role of the British Governors in guiding the political process in the province in his period of study.

One may, however, differ from the author in his basic attitude and approach to this study. He has studied the political process in terms of a game of power politics as it is played in a free country with parliamentary democracy. He has somehow overlooked the basic fact that India was not a free country then and that the Indian National Congress was essentially an organisation striving to wrest political power from none-too-willing foreign hands. Thus, the Congress bid first to capture the Legislative Assembly and later to accept office under the 1935 Act were just means like non-co-operation and civil disobedience to realise their main aim. Unless this fundamental fact is constantly kept in view, any study of the political process at work in any province in this period is bound to be distorted.

The type, printing and the general get-up of the book is excellent and the book is happily free of printing errors except in one place, p. 24, sixth line from the bottom; the word 'were' has been used twice.

I expect that this book will encourage similar studies about other states to enable "the historian to compare political developments in different parts of India, and to see events in the province as forming part of a national pattern." (Baker, p. 1)

Sagar, M.P.

A. AVASTHI

HOSHIAR SINGH: *State Supervision over Municipal Administration: A Case Study of Rajasthan*, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xi, 191p. Rs. 50.

THE book under review, is the published version of the author's doctoral dissertation presented to the Rajasthan University, Jaipur. The author has studied the legislative, administrative, financial and judicial supervision of municipal bodies in the State of Rajasthan. The inclusion of judicial supervision seems somewhat out of place since the study has concentrated on supervision by the State Government. For the relevant data the author relies on an attitude survey of local political leaders, administrators and subordinate officials, in addition to the accessible materials contained in the official files and other published documents. However, one gets the feeling that political aspects dominate the nature of State-municipal relations and the administrative practices do no more than formalize such a situation. Under the circumstances, one could infer the nature of State-municipal relations from the prevailing practices and present it as an operative model, and then attempt to bring out the implications. A normative approach would, on the other hand, start with outlining a model on a few preferred postulates and see to what extent the reality conforms or deviates from the model. Unfortunately the study lacks any such model-building approach, with the result that the suggestions made in the study seem somewhat incongruous and *ad hoc*. It is possible that there may be contradictions within the legislative framework itself, or between the legislative intent and administrative actions. It is difficult to appraise the anomalies in State-municipal relations without an overall framework of such relationships.

Apart from the lack of a framework, the study is also somewhat weak on the issue of suggesting an alternative machinery for control, such as the creation of a Board. How the existing ministerial responsibility to the legislature would be compatible with such a Board is not examined. A Committee of the Legislature on Local Bodies could be an alternative, but to what extent it would solve the problem of day to day relationships is an open question. The second aspect that has been completely ignored in the study is the fiscal relationships through resource transfer: its criteria, adequacy, regularity and the available machinery. The financial control aspects examined cover a somewhat narrow area of expenditure control and does not include the wider fiscal aspects that dominate in any multi-level government scene.

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ABHIJIT DATTA

M. SHIVIAH, K.V. NARAYANA RAO, L.S.N. MURTY and G. MALLIKARAJUNIAH:
Panchayati Raj: An Analytical Survey. National Institute of Community
 Development, Hyderabad, 1976, v, 339 p., Rs. 75.

PANCHAYATI RAJ is the system of rural local self-government introduced in India as a result of the recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee. This book examines the main links of its conceptual frame-work, its nature and structure, manner of its functioning, the content and quality of its performance, and its actual and potential role in the modernization of rural society.

The authors dispel the two commonly held nationalist notions that the Panchayats, as autonomous village republics, go back to India's hoary past, and that the British deliberately destroyed them to meet their ends. Examining various sources from early Vedic times, they come across the concept of the Village Council as a regular body only in the 4th Century A.D. From subsequent material, it appears that the Village Council was not elected but was an ad-hoc body of elders concerned not so much with local government, as with moral and social behaviour, and functions pertaining to temples. When the British took over, the Panchayats were little more than judicial bodies administering traditional usages. There is therefore little truth in the popular notion that the British were responsible for giving a death blow to the corporate life of these ancient village republics.

Gandhiji's idea of self-sufficient village panchayats, constituting the basic units of the country's political system, was also not incorporated in our Constitution. In fact, the village Panchayats found a mention only in Article 40, which enjoined the State to organize them as units of self-government (and not of government). Actually, statutory Panchayats had already been created in most British Provinces and Indian states. But with independence came the community development programme and the CD Block as the unit of developmental administration. Then followed the need and the urge to unite the efforts of the people with those of governmental authorities, to foster the growth of the leadership potential in every development block, and to integrate the community life of villages and the blocks into the life of the nation.

The Balwantrai Mehta Committee was appointed to consider these and related issues; it presented its report in 1957. Its case for a three tier democratic organization, organically linked to each other through direct elections at the village level, and indirect ones at the block and the district, and in charge of all aspects of development work in the rural areas did not rest on any theory or dogma, but on practical considerations, like the need to decentralise functions and authority, and to co-ordinate the working of the official machinery with that of popular representatives, the village with the block and the block with the district. The Report did not take its main inspiration either from India's ancient past or from Gandhian ideology, but was based on a hard-headed awareness of the practical tasks of developmental

administration in the field.

The book then describes the structure and functioning of Panchayati Raj institutions in various states, and the experience gained from the system at work. It highlights various problems including those of co-ordination, supervision and control, of financial management, of personnel administration, and of political aggrandizement. But various problems and deficiencies notwithstanding, there is no doubt that Panchayati Raj has caused more than a ripple in the stagnant pool of rural society. Irrespective of the balance of socio-economic forces in the initial stages, it has quickened the process of politicalisation. The masses of Indian people are beginning, for the first time in our history, to experience the realities of Democracy in howsoever distorted a form. Panchayati Raj thus represents an apparatus for modernisation in the very heart of rural India. Elections, developmental bureaucracy, the deliberative and executive mechanism of statutory bodies, and the growth of political middlemen practically in all strata of society create a new pattern of inter-dependence, and generate a churning process which is bound to loosen traditional structures and make for greater dynamism and a spirit of modernism in rural India in years to come. This is why a distinguished foreign scholar describes Panchayati Raj as the most important "political invention" of independent India.

The book presents evidence of deep study and scholarship. Therefore it is a pity that numerous mistakes of spelling and several of facts have crept in. For instance on page 121, Rajasthan is listed both in 2 and 3 of Maddicks classification, and in the middle of page 134, Uttar Pradesh is listed as having directly elected members in its Zilla Parishads. Similarly, in the second half of page 135, it is stated that except in Maharashtra and Gujarat, where the Collector is completely kept out of the Zilla Parishad, and in Tamilnadu and Karnataka, where he is also the Chairman of the District Development Council, in other states he is a member of the Zilla Parishad without voting rights. This is factually incorrect, for according to the Uttar Pradesh Act, he is not a member of the Zilla Parishad but exercises general powers of supervision and control from outside.

Nevertheless, the book is very useful for both the social scientist and the administrator.

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SATISH CHANDRA

S.P. JAIN : Panchayati Raj in Assam. National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, 1976, vi, 132p., Rs. 38.

PANCHAYATI RAJ institutions are central to rural development. The National Institute of Community Development have in this book carried out a study, financed by the Government of Assam, to measure the

effectiveness of these bodies as agents of social change and as agencies for implementation of developmental programmes. The investigation is intended to provide policy guidance.

The survey covers one *Mahkuma Parishad*, two *Anchalic Panchayats* and four *Gaon Panchayats* of one district of Assam. A background has been provided of the older traditional village institutions. The statement indicating that during British rule officials designated as *Patels* and *Tahsildars* were created in the State of Assam is inaccurate. There is also misconception of the functions of village institutions like *Majumel*, *Sarumel*, *Dekamel* and *Gabharumel* as the prototype of present day Panchayati Raj institutions. They were only the executive functionaries of the apex village council known as *Mel*, which had the final say in village affairs.

However, these inaccuracies would not have been of very serious consequence if the study could have focused on an assessment of the vital role of Panchayati Raj institutions. Instead, the focus is merely on their mechanical functioning. In the chapter on attitudes and opinions of the people, opinions were not elicited on whether the Panchayati Raj-oriented development had proved to be any better than the earlier block development under the aegis of Block Development Committees, which had the freedom to question social and economic programmes without responsibility for their implementation. This lacuna compromises the aim of the investigation as to whether Panchayati Raj was more successful as an agent of change and as an implementation agency for development programmes than its predecessors.

The book provides useful factual material on Panchayati Raj institutions in Assam and an objective insight into the working of one *Mahkuma Parishad*, two *Anchalic Panchayats* and four *Gaon Panchayats*. It is necessary to pick up the threads and study more intensively the qualitative change these institutions have engendered. While it is useful to enumerate meetings that were held and record the attendance at each, it would also be desirable to analyze the changing trends in the deliberations that provide a window to the thinking and aspirations of the people. Similarly, the analysis of income and expenditure of a Panchayati Raj institution under broad heads should have been the first step towards a deeper evaluatory assessment of the social and economic objectivity of the schemes undertaken, and whether these made a better impact on rural society, than the older pattern of community development blocks.

With changes in the structure of the Panchayati Raj institutions over time, as documented in the book, the elected members have changed their socio-political moorings. Now, unlike in the initial stage, the Panchayati Raj elections are contested on political party affiliations. This major change is not studied in the book. It could have provided a much-needed insight into the working of the village institutions. Refusal to assess the implications of party affiliations on the people's representation to the Panchayati Raj institutions reveals the helplessness even of bodies required to carry out objective investigation into the effectiveness of village institutions.

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In the mechanical presentation of income and expenditure, there is room for evaluating the effectivity of the system by studying the internal and external audit reports. Another point that requires probing is the efficacy of the contribution of co-operative bodies associated with the Panchayati Raj institutions in Assam, towards economic development and the economic interests of the rural poor.

A few remarks regarding the methodology of the investigation are called for. Whereas there was a purposive selection of the *Mahkuma Parishad*, *Anchalic Panchayats* and *Gaon Panchayats*, the respondent villagers were selected on random samples. The reason for adopting such a technique is not easily comprehensible. Since the entire study was required to yield a normative picture of the functioning of the Panchayats, the respondents at the village level could as well have been selected objectively from different sections of the people so as to exclude the possibility of omission of some of the smaller but significant groups. If random sampling was initially intended to provide some sort of estimate, it would have been preferable to resort to a village-level stratification of the population by occupation, education, or some other criterion, so that a good cross-section of the population was represented at the village-level sampling when an intricate matter such as the opinion and attitude of the people was to be assessed. The respondents are numbered as 142 out of which 100 of the village were selected on a random sampling basis. At Table I, all the 142 respondents are distributed by age groups that excludes the age group 0-14, It should have been explained how this was done.

It may be said, in short, that whereas the factual data presented in the book may be useful for future studies, it is difficult to appreciate how the findings and the observations in their present form can serve the purpose of providing policy guide-lines to the State of Assam.

New Delhi.

J.K. BARTHAKUR

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

General

BEN WHITAKER, *Ed*: The Fourth World: Victims of Group Oppression. The Minority Rights Group, London, 1973, 342p.

GEORGINA ASHWORTH, *Ed*: World Minorities, Volume One, The Minority Rights Group, London, 1977, xxii, 167p.

THE problem of minorities has surfaced more recently in a big way in several parts of the world. It is a vexing problem because it has many facets. There are minorities which are national, others are religious, still others are racial or linguistic minorities. One ticklish problem is how to

integrate them into the texture of the modern nation state; another disturbing problem is whether they want to be integrated or to use their minority status to be a pressure group within the state.

Several associations in different countries have come into existence to safeguard the interests of minorities. The Minorities Rights Group is one such voluntary association formed in England which has among its aims "to secure justice for minority or majority groups, suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world." To achieve its objectives it conducts research into the position of minority groups within the larger community.

The books under review, are two of the early efforts which project the discriminations and inequalities in the enjoyment of fundamental rights suffered by minorities in several countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and the New World. *The Fourth World* exposes the predicament of eight groups, with varied historical background, spread over the globe. They are authentic accounts written by specialists, who have a "feel" of their subject.

In the *Fourth World* the Asian Minorities of East and Central Africa, could not have found better exponents of the disabilities and injustices heaped on them than Professors Dharam and Yash Ghai of the Universities of Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam respectively. Themselves victims of discrimination, they have objectively and effectively presented the case of the Asians who were certainly better off under the British umbrella in African countries and who nearly became stateless once these countries came to be independent. They have presented a graphic picture dealing with education, social relations, inter-racial differences and animosities.

Africa has a surfeit of minority problems; Godfrey Morrison writing on "The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of Wider African Problems," states that across "Africa... runs a human fissure. In a fluctuating line through Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania the black and brown races of Africa meet. In several cases ethnic differences are aggravated by the clash of Islam with Christianity and various pagan beliefs." Compounding these differences and antagonisms are the consequences of the struggles and rivalries of the European Powers for control of different parts of the continent. Contemporary African states are not natural or "national" nor even tribal units; they are artificial colonial creations. Several of their problems arise from their historic conditioning.

Africa has thrown up classic examples of minorities—white racists—oppressing black majorities. "The African Predicament in Rhodesia," is sympathetically presented by G.C. Grant, a Rhodesian citizen. Fortunately, the majority has come into its own and South Africa remains the sole example of a white minority lording it over black and coloured majorities. Discriminations against the blacks in Brazil follows the usual pattern although the myth of "racial democracy" is widely circulated. They are the poor, the illiterate, the unemployed, and there follows the usual pattern—want of

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qualifications makes them unemployable. The author, Anani Dzidzienyo hopes that in an age of "mass communication and instant coverage of world events," Brazilian blacks would react to the discriminations they suffer much as Africans or American blacks have done.

An interesting and distinctive chapter is by Harold Jackson on "The Two Irelands: The Problem of the Double Minority—A Dual Study in Inter-group Tensions." It is surprising that religious bitterness between two Christian groups persists so sharply in the contemporary world and that the British Government pursues policies which are irrational, outdated and inconsistent with the break-up of the Empire.

Soviet Russia's attitude to religion and religious groups, in the post-Stalin period, is critically reviewed and the conclusion drawn is that there is no possibility of an early review of the official policy of discrimination against persons and groups found practising religion. The Christian, Jew, Moslem or Buddhist—each is on the wrong side of the law. Non-religious minorities, too, are subject to discrimination, particularly the Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans, two national minorities. Both these chapters are well-documented; the sources being Russian and non-Russian.

"Japan's Outcasts: The Problem of the Burakumin" by George A. DeVos makes the Indian reader draw parallels with our "untouchables".

World Minorities is only the first volume of an ambitious Minority Rights Group project to bring out a "complete world directory" of minorities. It consists of thumbnail sketches of minorities as far removed from each other as the Adivasis, the "Scheduled Tribes" of India, Yugoslavia's minorities or the Canary Islanders and the Sami, the Lapps of Scandinavia. The volume covers Africa, Asia and Europe. India is prominent with bare facts about the Adivasis, Anglo-Indians, Christians, Muslims and Kashmiris. While the sketches on the other minorities are fair, the one on the Muslims is somewhat slanted; the author concedes that while in law there are no disadvantages for the Muslims—their personal law is respected—their representation in the economic segments is comparatively low. He however strikes the right note when he states that —

The problem of Muslim minority lies not so much in the facts of discrimination, but in the feeling of the community that they are discriminated against.

One hesitates to go along with him when he predicts that Muslims will in the future try to resolve their problems with the help of the one major non-Hindu party—the Indian Communists. There is a major slip in this chapter—not in 1949 but in 1947 India was partitioned.

Next on the list is Pakistan—the Ahamadis, Baluchis, Hindus and Pash-toons (Pathans) get their share of notice. The Hindus alone are a double minority—religious and linguistic, the rest are Muslims and yet they suffer disabilities imposed by the dominant Punjabis.

There is an interesting study of Yugoslavia's manifold minorities and the problems they are going to pose in the future—the post-Tito era—with six republics, two autonomous regions, eight national groups, three religions and two alphabets. Today they are knit into a federation; how long this will survive is anybody's guess!

As distinct from the minorities of Asia and Europe, Africa has its own tribal minorities. Ghana may be taken as a typical example where tribal discrimination is rampant. The many *coups* and revolts merely explain the situation; they do not resolve conflicts.

Possibly the most interesting part of the book is the very perceptive and sympathetic preface by Conor Cruise O'Brien on "What Rights should Minorities Have?" He has put into focus the minorities' claim to social integration into the wider society and pointed out the obstacles in achieving this. The other claim is to "economic, technical and functional integration including equality of access to training and promotion." As an extreme resort they claim secession. The warning he sounds that the minority must not be allowed to block the progress of the majority or the whole nation is well taken.

The books are necessary reading for all interested in minorities and in civil and human rights.

Bombay.

A.J. DASTUR

MAN MOHAN SHARMA: *Through the Valley of the Gods : Travels in the Central Himalayas*. Vision Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, Second Edition, 1978, xii, 278 p., Rs. 65.

PERHAPS because the pace of life was slower and communications poor, District Administrators, soldiers and policemen, during the British period of Indian history have produced travelogues and local histories which continue to be of interest. After independence, the increase in the number of stenographers, type-machines and tape recorders does not seem to be compensation enough for the improvement in communications and the advantages of frequent visits of Ministers, MPs and MLAs. Whatever may be the reason and whatever may have been the position before independence, we now have too few local histories coming out. Actually, *Sthala Purana* in India has never enjoyed the prestige of the *Hsien Chih* in China. The local chronicles of Western Europe too are much more informative than our *Vamsawali*. Man Mohan Sharma's attempt at doing something about Kumaon area is, therefore, very welcome.

By its very nature, the work is more a friendly account by a lover of the area than a scholarly study, though the author is well-read enough. Of the instances wherein the account is more readable than just keeping abreast

with recent research work, one is the treatment of the Rupati legend. As narrated here, it has obviously been heavily influenced by later accretions, probably dating from the 18th and 19th centuries. *Bodh* is *Bhoota* and does not mean "fled"; whether or not it is derived from *PO* or *PO* itself is a transliteration of *Bhoota*, later modified in pronunciation. Sharma's account of the history of Kumaon starts only from the 15th century. Much more is available for the earlier period even in the old Gazetteers, let alone the new series. *Kirata* is a generic term and *Sokpa* means "Mongol." The portion dealing with folk industries does not cover wooden bowls and plates. The Chapter on folk arts is well written and all of us should be grateful for the transcription of the songs (something which the Ministry of Culture and AIR are yet to get round to). Of the rest, the Badri Nath yatra should be made compulsory reading for the Tourist Department, while the report on the Sikh shrines is a revelation to many of us. Sharma does not deal with the Kumaon-Tibet boundary for, one suspects, obvious reasons. The bibliography is a "select bibliography" and contains notable omissions. The absence of Richardson and inclusion of Shen-Liu is curious. Francke has to be there for any student of Himachal Pradesh-Uttra Khand. There is only a nominal index, which in a book of this type should not matter.

All in all, an excellent addition to post-independence literature on the Himalayas and worth acquiring by all libraries and lovers of the region.

Agartala

T.S. MURTHY

India

JOEL LARUS : Culture and Political-Military Behavior : The Hindus in Pre-Modern India. Minerva Associates, Calcutta, 1979; xi, 208p., Rs. 60.

PRIMA facie validity of correlation between the internal dynamics of a society and its national political life, as expressed in its internal relations and military behaviour, seems to be apparent. The problem is to isolate the cause and effect on an empirical basis. A related problem is the determination that no other factor was responsible for the effect. That is to say, it has to be proved that the society and the forces generated by it were not only the material causes, but the efficient causes as well.

What were the causes for the repeated defeats of the Hindus by foreign invaders? Were the defeats pre-determined by the structure of the Hindu society? Could the defeats have been averted by adjustments possible within the framework of Hindu social structure? Or was there any extraneous factor such as leadership on either side? Is it possible to blame the Hindu society for the defeats sustained at the hands of Alexander or of Sultan Mahmud, who carved out a large Central Asian empire, and, like Alexander, never lost a battle?

Some nexus can be established between the behaviour pattern, particularly of the ruling elite and military unpreparedness by a detailed study of the history, both political and social, of the defeated nation as well as of its conquerors. It is not possible to comprehend the repeated conquests of North India without a proper study of Central Asian history. From early days down to the Mongols, barbaric hordes started in Central Asia and swept over not only north India, but also two other centres of Asian civilization: Iran and China. It was like dropping a pebble in calm water: ripples in concentric circles spread till the force was dissipated.

Unfortunately, the author has not taken notice of these factors, and even his knowledge of Indian history is too limited for this type of specialized work. He notes the well-known defeats sustained by the Hindus, but overlooks their victories. He describes (pp. 156-57), the Chahamana defeat by Ghori at Tarain, but passes over the defeat inflicted on Ghori by the Chalukyas led by their boy king and his mother. Similarly, he overlooks the important fact, that the Muslim Turks failed to conquer Assam, Orissa, and most of Rajasthan, and were driven out of Andhra by a popular movement. This brings us to the problem as to whether such a critique of the Hindu society can be ended with the coming of the Mughals in the 16th century, for within about a hundred years of Akbar's death, his empire was pulled down by the Rajputs and the Marathas under the same social structure even when Sultan Mahmud invaded India.

It is not possible to analyze the work in detail, but it needs to be pointed out that the author is not consistent even with his rather startling theory that the coming of the Buddhist Kushanas resulted in scattering the puritanical Brahmins of north India, who migrated south and their presence "did much to dampen the Dravidians' interest in transmarine activities." (p. 79) However, later (p. 181), he puts forward the theory that the "ultra-orthodox Brahmins" were impelled by Kushana conquest to migrate to South-East Asia. Now, the Kushanas ruled over the western part of north India, and the coins of Wema Kadphises call him a 'mahisvara', and shows a representation of Shiva as well, just as some Kanishka coins show representations of Shiva, and Kanishka's third successor was named Vasudeva. All these factors taken together should have assured the Brahmins, but they continued to migrate to South-East Asia for centuries after the Kushana rule ended!

In his preoccupation with the elephants as a factor of Hindu armies' weakness, the author overlooks that foreign conquerors, like the Turks and the Mughals, also established huge elephant forces. Seleucus and Sultan Mahmud successfully employed elephants outside India. As Prof. René Grousset (*L'empire des Steppes*, p. 201) has said: "La victoire de Mahmoud sur les Qarakhanides serait due à l'emploi des éléphants indiens." Dr. Chakravarty's opinion on the proper and improper use of elephants (p. 118), is applicable to every arm. The tactical use of cavalry, for example, has decided many battles. The Hindus failed in the tactical use of all arms, as did the

Turks and the Mughals when they were defeated by Taimur, Nadir, and Abdali.

But probably we are expecting too much from a work which confuses between the Battle of Hydaspes with the Battle of Arbela (pp. 113; 118).

Santiniketan.

A. K. MAJUMDAR

V. C. CHANNA: *Caste : Identity and Continuity*. B. R. Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, x, 180p., Rs. 45.

THE present work is based on the Ph. D. dissertation of the author. Attempt is made to study identity and continuity with reference to Agarwals. The study is based on field work done in Delhi. It is claimed by the author, that this is the first study of its kind which would have an impact in the marriage patterns as well as the occupational patterns followed by the Agarwals. It is true that references have been made to studies of Agarwals by Dr. M.S. Gore. However, there is no evidence of its proper use. Detailed description is given about the setting in which the Agarwals live and function. A view of the past of the Agarwals is described in some details and on the basis of such description, efforts are made to delineate changes by comparing what the Agarwals are now. The enhancing of their economic condition and the consequent form which is generally reflected in their marriage, rituals and ceremonies is highlighted by the author. Their status seems to be mainly linked with monetary circumstances as one would expect; there are naturally certain changes which have taken place over time, such as reduction in the rigour with which mates are selected in respect of the traditional caste hierarchy. However, there is no proper discussion of the forces which are responsible for the changes delineated. All in all, the book presents a picture of continuity of the caste identity. Perhaps, this is mainly because of the occupational nature of the Agarwal caste. The title is high-sounding because caste identity and continuity means inter-caste relationship.

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MIRIAM SHARMA: *The Politics of Inequality: Competition and Control in an Indian Village*. Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1979, xvii, 262p., Rs. 75.

MIRIAM SHARMA'S book is an important contribution to Political Anthropology. Anthropologists have not, until now, devoted as much attention to politics as they have to caste. The author, in the present study, concentrates solely on political activity as an essential part of human

behaviour. She does not, however, stop there but follows that activity into whatever areas of village life it permeates; conflict, which is essential to gain control over scarce resources, to influence behaviour in the desired direction and to acquire or exercise power, has been dealt with. The study is generally confined to the village arena although in some cases there are extensions outside.

The entire study is based on a series of case studies in a village near Varanasi. It deals with three major issues which are integral to political anthropology. The issues are: (1) to distinguish between political activity that pervades all human behaviour and that which is confined to the village political system, (2) to clearly delineate the political arena, and (3) to discuss the rules relating to decisions about resource allocation and to see how conflicts are resolved. The study tries to analyze the ways in which participants themselves structure their perception about their political activity and examine the extent to which certain relationships may be indicative of class.

An attempt is also made to distinguish between two leadership styles, the aristocrat (Rais) and the "big man" (Bada Admi). However, the two categories do not seem to be exclusive and certainly tend to overlap. This is more so when people belonging to the former landlord class, who were recognized as aristocrats, are also designated as "big men". However, a new class of leaders is emerging; they do not have roots in the past. Their importance is increasing on account of the developmental effort being made in the village on behalf of the government. These are the new intermediaries who tend to blossom as entrepreneurs.

In this book, Miriam Sharma has made a detailed study of factionalism which is the traditional and predominant form of rural conflict. This is related to the diffused nature of authority inherent in the caste system. Factional strife in the village follows a vertical cleavage, that is surprisingly stable in terms of its coalitions and followers. The political arena of the village sometimes tends to extend beyond the confines of the revenue boundaries when sometimes its big men have to act as middlemen to exploit resources from another area. The discontinuity between the village and region reveals that there are competing ways of organizing political activity that lie outside the vertical patron-client bonds.

The changes taking place in the post-Independence period have led to the introduction of new resources, new alternatives for action and the break-up of the old authority system. There is no single head or uncontested leader within each caste; each has its own men of power and influence in the village as a whole and the authority over a given caste is concentrated in the hands of castes which are dominant. In the dominant caste itself, leadership has become more open to competition and the traditional leaders have been more or less replaced by the entrepreneurial "big men". These leaders have been transformed into brokers; they establish linkages between different spheres of exchange. The village "big men" also mediate extra village relations.

The author has discovered new alternatives for action and for conflict

resolution, which are often based on rules of behaviour that are contradictory. This may lead to structural change not only in the village society but in the society at large. Some new resources have been introduced in the village arena for allocation of which no accepted rules exist. But an increase in the resource-pool cannot ameliorate the competition for intangible social resources. It is interesting to note that all these changes have led to a change in the nature of the political arena in which the village politician operates. This has multiplied factional conflict. However, factionalism is not all dysfunctional. It has been the most efficient way to organize political activity.

Factional conflict cuts across classes. Factions do not reflect the conflict between the dominating landed class and the landless labourers because factions are still pre-eminent. The importance of class conflicts and its possibility for providing the basis for future political action, as well as indications of contradictions and change that lie outside the village arena, have been minimised. The decline of traditional patron-client ties in Jajmani relationship has affected caste groups differentially. To some extent, the changes taking place in recent times have succeeded in transforming the moral bond between the patron and client into an instrumental tie between the "big men" and his followers which is utilised in the political arena. It is thus seen that it is not the caste system *per se* that has inhibited the growth of class feeling but the presence of factionalism based on vertical patron-client bonds as the characteristic mode of politics.

The detailed case studies have made the book lively. The network of social relations reflected in caste and kin, conflicts and their resolution, the role of "big men" and the working of factions, both in respect of such a scarce resource as water and at the time of elections, have been lucidly described. The last chapter brings together the theoretical leads that emerge from the case studies.

A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies,
Patna,

SACHCHIDANANDA

R.N. JOSHI: Education: Elsewhere and Here—A Key to Prosperity. Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1979, xx, 176p., Rs. 25.

STUDIES on comparative education are few in our country; this book is therefore a welcome addition to educational literature.

The main thesis of the book is that education is the key to prosperity. While we may agree with the author that education is a powerful instrument of social reconstruction, there are other social and economic factors far more powerful which shape the destiny of a nation. As a matter of fact, the educational system of a country itself is the result of these factors and is considerably moulded by them.

The usefulness of the book would have been considerably enhanced if the

author had made a critical analysis of the educational systems of different countries and then had suggested how we in India could benefit from them. Instead, there are certain vague and contradictory statements in the book. About the Soviet system of education the author says, "Education in the USSR is a tool of propaganda. This is a means of increasing production. It is a force for the perpetuation of the hold of the Communist Party of the country. It is a medium for producing national leadership." (pp. 74-75) The author later on concludes by saying, "It is quite possible to learn something from the Soviet experience, leaving aside any likely controversy regarding Communist philosophy." The Soviet system of education is a reflection of the Communist philosophy and the two cannot be separated. It is not possible to reject the one and accept the other.

Similarly with regard to the Japanese system of education the author says, "The personality of the Japanese may have been shaped by the history and the geography of their country. Sequences of events, opportunities and disasters might have contributed to the building of their qualities." (p. 53) Subsequently the author says, "Whether there is any emphasis on moral lessons of the pre-war days or not, the school atmosphere is designed to produce a citizen who would respect the nation above other things and would have a regard for traditions and customs." (p. 54) On the one hand, the author says that the personality of the Japanese may have been shaped by history, and on the other, he is not sure whether there is any emphasis on moral lessons of the pre-war days. Similarly he makes another rather vague statement about India, "India was known for her profound learning since the days of Buddha or even earlier." (p. 121) The author also maintains that Indians are strong in verbal wisdom but in respect of machine-related handling, the average Indian is weak. This weakness is not due to intrinsic weaknesses, as the author maintains, but due to the fact that our entry to the industrial age was rather late. There is no doubt that our people would take to machines as ardently as they had taken to verbal learning in the past! Intelligence—verbal or manual—is not the monopoly of any country or race, but equally distributed among all nations and races. If India is not as advanced in technology as some of the Western countries are, it is not due to any intrinsic weakness of the people, as the author maintains, but due to lack of opportunities. One would have expected more precise and accurate statements in a scholarly work of this nature.

Udaipur.

K. L. SHRIMALI

DEVAKI JAIN *et al*: *Women's Quest For Power: Five Indian Case Studies*.
Vikas Publishing House, Sahibabad, 1979, vi, 272p., Rs. 75.

THE title is misleading unless we accept the thesis that the near success of attaining economic independence, through unremitting labour and

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elimination of exploitation by middlemen and municipal authorities, is really women's quest for power.

The study is sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research. It deals with five cases: 1. The pavement traders of Ahmedabad who were unorganized; 2. Women engaged in the supply of milk; 3. Lijjat Pappad rollers, which from an enterprise of 7 rollers has grown into an organization of 12,000 spread out in five scattered centres; 4. Women painters of Madhubani in rural Bihar and 5. The night patrollers of Manipur. It is a mixed bag, the only common feature is that they concern women in pursuit of economic independence, except the last where the economic motive is indirect; it is more an exercise of women's power against injustice and for public good than a quest for power. The most inspiring case study is that of SEWA (Women's Self Employment Association). SEWA demanded herculean efforts to organize unorganized street vendors, almost all of them backward and illiterate and exploited by the police, municipal authorities and moneylenders. It is the result of the effort of a few dedicated women like Ela Bhatt and her colleagues that SEWA today is a registered organization with its own union, co-operative bank, social security scheme and other ancillary activities like functional literacy. Incidentally, it focusses attention on the degree and extent of exploitation throughout India, as pavement traders are to be found in every part of India. Only there are no leaders as those of SEWA of Ahmedabad to organize them.

The organization of women into milk co-operatives of the Anand pattern and Lijjat Pappad rollers, is child's play compared to SEWA which had to face a sea of troubles before they could even form a union or register as a society. Lijjat is not registered as a co-operative, although it has all the characteristics of the co-operative as far as work participation is concerned. These two studies have one common feature; both deal with consumer articles where the demand is and will always grow. Lijjat Pappad being a processed article is subjected to severe tests with regard to quality. In both cases, existing unorganized skills are mobilized and used for commercial purposes, but women are carefully kept out of the structure, because as we are told, of traditional inhibitions! Unlike the SEWA, these organizations are staffed and controlled by men who also seem to have inhibitions regarding the handing over of executive functions to women!

Lijjat Pappad has today become an article of universal consumption and it has an expanding market both within and outside India. Women in the organization however, have no union rights; also, neither power is given or acquired by them through participation in management. The fact that 12,000 women are employed without the regulation of factory laws and that women can pursue their work at home and have the freedom to get others involved in the process may appear satisfying. Yet, considering that it is a women's speciality, because no man would have the patience to sit for hours and roll pappads, it is to be wondered why they are not in the management. It is also significant that the majority of the daughters of Pappad rollers do not wish

to be papped rollers. Here is a business entirely based on women's skill but managed by men! I think some investigation should be made on the effect of pappad rolling on women's health.

The contrast is provided in the discovery and development of the folk art of rural India in Madhubani, Bihar. It is true that the discovery, sale and export of their art work, originally done on the walls and floors in vegetable colours and now on handmade paper, by the Handicraft Board has given fresh stimulus to the artists. Few women of the Madhubani artist group however have been given any recognition. Its potentiality as an article of commerce is strictly limited because there is not much of a market inside India; once organized and art forms graded, even its originality might become a thing of the past.

The last case study of the night patrollers of Manipur has no direct bearing on the economic motives of these women unless we regard prohibition as a means of increasing the economic strength by diverting the money spent on alcohol for domestic wellbeing. Yet it is not the economic motive that drove women to organize militantly to wean men from alcohol. In Manipur there has always been the tradition of women organizing themselves to fight for justice, against wrong government policies as when they banded together to ban the export of rice, against the revival of forced labour and to fight against the liquor trade. There are other instances when women of Uttar Khand started the "chipko" movement to prevent the contractors from cutting forest trees, or when they did satyagraha before liquor shops demanding their closure. Having failed in their appeal to the Government to ban liquor, women had to band together and patrol the streets with lathis to catch the errant drunk as they hobbled along merrily. The Manipur women have shown the organizing capacity and solidarity of women when they are threatened with bad government policies which destroy domestic peace and economic wellbeing.

These case studies, well organized and scientifically presented, bring despair rather than hope. The indifference of the male-dominated society which takes for granted the exploitation of women, and when approached, their unwillingness to help voluntary effort to eradicate social habits, customs and practices which effect society adversely, is indeed distressing. As one goes through the pages of the study on SEWA one is astonished and ashamed that a voluntary organization, dedicated to the cause, should meet with so much difficulty and not appreciation of what is being done. In fact, there is an almost vicious effort on the part of authorities to foil such attempts on the plea, if plea is the correct term, that the rules do not permit such efforts. However, it gives us the hope that if women have a sensitive understanding of their problems they can move mountains.

Another thing that causes despair is, that although women have come to realize that they are as good as men, Indian Society is so tradition-bound that even when women are economically independent their social status remains almost just the same, subservient; the patience of women is still the power of

men! Well, fighting backwardness and exploitation is by no means a quest for power, but certainly it is a quest for social justice.

Trivandrum

LAKSHMI N. MENON

SHUDHA MAZUMDAR: A Pattern of Life: The Memoirs of an Indian Woman. (Edited by Geraldine H. Forbes) Manohar, New Delhi, 1977, viii, 246p., Rs. 45.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL records are rare in India, and by women, even rarer. Shudha Mazumdar's memoirs, which scan the first thirty years of this century, are significant because they bring out the pattern of life of an Indian woman vividly and forcefully. She writes with verve and humour making even every day insignificant details interesting and readable.

Typical of the times, the father appears liberal and unorthodox whereas the mother conventional and old fashioned. Both come from zamindar families. The father lived in a westernized style in the front wing of the house, which had a Victorian drawing room, a book-lined library and an English-style dining room. He not only ate "belati food" (English food) himself but encouraged little Shudha to partake of the "unclean food" like chicken cutlets prepared by Pir Mohammed, the Muslim cook. He also encouraged her to recite English poetry and enrolled her in St. Teresa's convent where Shudha was the only Indian girl amongst the English and the Anglo-Indians.

The mother knew that the vocation of every Indian girl was to be a wife and a mother, ultimate destination—the in-laws' house. No careers were open to a Hindu girl (they were not even Brahmos). Being a dutiful wife, she did not oppose her husband, she merely started countering his influence. First of all she arranged for Shudha to learn Bengali. Then gradually she initiated Shudha in the Hindu traditions of worship and sacrifice through the medium of little rituals, prayers and fasts. Tales of Ramayana and Mahabharata were recounted to her. She was also made to wash her own clothes, help in the kitchen and do other household chores. But most of all, she was taught how to conduct herself in the in-laws' house after she was married.

Shudha's mother did not usually oppose her husband but when the father made Shudha a boarder in that *firangi* school, the mother felt that she had no choice but to rescue her daughter from certain disaster and brought her back home. It was not orthodoxy but sound common sense. The mother knew that if Shudha stayed on in school as a boarder it would be impossible to find a husband for her. And if her husband insisted on putting Shudha in a boarding school he should first of all execute a deed in favour of his daughter granting her substantial rights in his real estate in order to make her financially independent.

Shudha's mother was practical and forward-looking. When it came to choosing a husband for Shudha, it was she who opposed her daughter marrying a landowner. "She had democratic ideas and set her heart upon a man who was capable of earning his living by some gainful occupation." The young man chosen by her, and approved by Shudha, was not so good looking but had splendid physique with good education and belonged to the Bengal Civil Service.

Perhaps it was due to her mother's training that Shudha, at the age of twelve, glided into her new role of a wife and a daughter-in-law with seemingly no problems of adjustment. In spite of having been brought up under two different cultures one is surprised at her lack of conflict and friction. She remains at least in the pages of this book full of poise and serenity. Two years after her marriage she went to live with her husband and adjusted herself easily to the nuclear family. She did feel lonely at first, but soon got absorbed in social work among women. Gradually she came out of purdah. Her husband was transferred to new places every few years. Wherever they went she started a Mahila Samiti. During this period, under her husband's encouragement she started writing short stories and poems which were duly published.

Shudha bore two sons though characteristically she had set her heart on a daughter and even chose a name for her. She did social work, wrote and took interest in whatever was going on around her. Hers was a time of great political change, and even though she did not participate in it except for attending an odd meeting, she took keen interest in the Swadeshi Movement and later in the activities of the Indian National Congress. But, in spite of her lively interest in things around her, her story remains a story of change, never of revolt. She remains first and foremost a wife, a mother and a daughter-in-law.

The memoirs give an excellent insight in the way a woman's life in India changed. What motivated the change and what obstacles to change existed? What strikes me is that the pattern of life described in the memoirs still continues. The rituals, the prayers, the fasts are still being observed, so are the ceremonies as followed at the time of Shudha's wedding or at Durgapuja. She, in the twenties, was looking for a bride for her brother-in-law. My experience was similar to hers when I had to look for a bride for a near relative in the mid-sixties. I am appalled at the lack of change rather than the role and status that the women have attained in India after fifty years of struggle.

The front page of the book uses the word "edited", the contents use the word "transliteration", while according to the blurb, Geraldine F. Forbes "translated" the memoirs. Again, while according to Shudha Mazumdar she was born in 1899, the blurb puts it as 1898, an unpardonable error. As for the transliteration, it may help the western reader, but it certainly jars the Indian. To give but one example, "Khuri" or "sakora" i.e. a small earthenware pot is called "terracotta bowl".

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One wonders what made Shudha stop writing her memoirs at the early age of thirty-one.

New Delhi.

URMILA HAKSAR

V.K. SUBRAMANIAN: *The Indian Financial System*. Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1979, xii, 233p., Rs. 60.

THE author, who is known to me for many years and who has distinguished himself in other unrelated fields, has added a feather to his cap by writing this book. It covers a wide spectrum indeed on the subject of public finance. It traces the history of Indian public finance from ancient times to date. One is struck with the essential common purpose and attitudes of all governments—ancient and modern. It deals in some detail with the process of budget-making in modern India; it elucidates the relationship in the fiscal sphere between the Union and the Constituent States. It deals with government accounting and the part which audit plays in the exercise of financial control in a democratic parliamentary set up. He touches upon the public debt, various five-year plans and patterns of taxation; the Reserve Bank of India and monetary control. He has also, in passing, touched upon the growth of the public-sector in industry on the one hand and the problems of rural finance on the other. The long list of fields the author has dwelt upon will amply justify the book being described as comprehensive. If however, I had had the chance of speaking to him earlier, before publication, I might have advised him to delete some portion of the historical background and say a little more about the present-day taxes and distribution. The absence of any more exhaustive treatment of certain aspects does not detract from the usefulness of the book for students of public finance as it is well-written, readable and avoids abstruse terminology.

New Delhi.

S. RANGANATHAN

MARCUS FRANDA: *Small is Politics: Organizational Alternatives in India's Rural Development*. Wiley Eastern, New Delhi, 1979, xii, 296 p., Rs. 45.

IT is a pity, that this so well-researched book should become out of date so soon. It was perhaps not realised by the author that the topic which he chose had an inherent instability linked with the political fortunes of the Janata Party. The author says that the focus of the book is the rural orientation of the Janata Party Government that came into power in March 1977; he has made a survey of a year and a half of the Janata rule. He has as background also made a short survey of the record of rural development activities during the preceding 30 years.

The areas studied include Rural Credit and Co-operatives, Rural Industries and Employment, Panchayati Raj, Voluntary Action, Party Organisation, Caste and Agrarian Reforms. Some of the chapters read like journalistic exercises dealing with the kaleidoscope of the rapidly changing affiliations and alignments in the political arena. In places it appears to be an apologia for the programmes envisaged by the Janata Government and the onslaught with which it was faced during its short and sorry tenure. But by the time one reaches the concluding portions of the book, one finds that the optimistic note with which it started has spent itself and the conclusions reached are, that the socio-economic processes which have been operating in the rural society ever since independence have not undergone any significant change. The author, for instance, finds that the previous governments were dependent mostly on the affluent minority in the rural areas and the same situation had more or less continued during the Janata Raj. Panchayats though heralded as bastions of democracy did not have either the power or the funds which could have given them any meaningful role. The author admits that violence had become more and more commonplace and virulent, opposition to parliamentary democracy and rule of law had impinged on national policy-makers, caste and communal tensions had become more pronounced, prices for food and essential consumer articles had continued to rise relentlessly in spite of so-called surpluses, and industrial development had been hindered to a great degree by shortages at the level of infrastructure such as want of electric power and facilities for transportation. It may be said to the credit of the author, that he has after making a very detailed research not been able to find any worthwhile change in the situation in rural India during the eighteen months of the Janata rule.

Allahabad.

M. ZAHEER

ROBERT ERIC FRYKENBERG *Ed.*: Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History. (First Revised Indian Edition), Manohar, New Delhi, 1979, xxi, 277p., Rs. 85.

THIS volume, which was first published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1969, is by now almost a classic in its special field and its Indian edition is particularly welcome as it is enriched by a paper written by the editor on "Traditional Processes of Power in South India: An Historical Analysis of Local Influence." The editor himself considers this paper to be a study in traditional disintegration which stands in contrast with Burton Stein's analysis of "The Integration of the Agrarian System of South India," a seminal essay which is one of the major contributions to this book and to the understanding of the social and political structure in India in general. Actually Frykenberg's and Stein's papers are not studies in contrast but descriptions of two sides of the same coin. Frykenberg shows how central

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authority is "made captive to Lilliputian systems of power," but also admits that these local systems are "interlocked within larger structures," while Stein traces three types of integration from above which are different modes of coming to terms with those local systems. The first type is that of the medieval kingdom encompassing several nuclear areas with a great deal of local autonomy, the second type is that of a network of regional warlords and the third that of bureaucratic integration under British rule. Frykenberg is mostly concerned with this third type, and in this context, he sees the local system as an "anti-state" which "prevents the state from functioning properly." But he also mentions that "British...persistence had a relentless, almost machine-like quality so that, while wheels turned slowly, they were able to make steady progress." These wheels of the British machine are the main focus of interest of several other contributions to this volume: Nilmoni Mukherjee's study of the ryotwari system, Thomas Metcalf's analysis of British land policy in Oudh, Tapan Raychaudhuri's case study of the permanent settlement in operation in a Bengal district and Ainslee Embree's general essay on landholding in India and British institutions.

A very detailed case study of the actual impact of the British machine on Indian rural society, which takes up one quarter of this book, is Bernard Cohn's analysis of land sales in Eastern Uttar Pradesh. The data shows that the local Rajput lineages lost far more land than they acquired under early British rule and in strictly legal terms they could be considered as "dispossessed", but Cohn raises the question whether the loss of legal status made much of a difference to their actual control of the land. In an expanding agrarian economy, so he argues, the rise of one class, the new zamindars, "did not necessarily mean the concomittant fall of another." However, while his documentaion for the loss of legal status is very convincing these concluding remarks of his study are merely hypothetical and would require more evidence which is difficult to obtain as legal status was recorded whereas the exercise of actual control eludes the statistician. Several local cases reconstructed by Cohn tend to support his hypothesis of the continuity of control by the "dispossessed". It would be interesting to pursue this argument in terms of the subsequent strengthening of the status of occupancy tenants by British legislation which probably favoured those who were "dispossessed" at this earlier stage and could now claim a protection of their interests as substantial tenants with the effect, that their rights in land became more valuable than the rights of the zamindars.

In a kind of keynote essay, at the beginning of this volume, Walter Neale has tried to raise some fundamental questions concerning land tenure which are related to the problem of continuous control under different legal titles. "Land is to rule" he points out, and this concept of control is more important than that of legal ownership; he contrasts Indian "political behaviour" with English "economic behaviour", placing Henry Maine's old distinction between status and contract in a new context. He suggests, that much what might have been bad economics was actually good politics. In other words, the

British knew how to arrive at contracts with those whose status they wanted to protect, in the interest of the maintenance of their rule. In fact, much more material could be presented which would show that the British machine was adjusted in such a way as to come to terms with the "Lilliputian systems" of local power. Behind the facade of legal definitions there was much scope for political flexibility. The earlier practice of the Mughal regime to use the general term "zamindar" for all wielders of local power was a good precedent in this respect. Nural Hasan's contribution to this volume shows this very clearly although it was not written with the specific view to demonstrate this point. It is a pity that this essay on "Zamindars under the Mughals" is very brief and one could only hope that a revised and enlarged edition of this very valuable book would include a study of the agrarian integration in Northern India which would match Burton Stein's comprehensive essay on the South.

Much additional work on the subjects covered in this volume has been done since it first appeared in 1969; most of the contributors have published further studies in the meantime and others have joined this field of research. A new edition would therefore be very welcome.

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Heidelberg.

DIETMAR ROTHERMUND

D.P. CHAUDHRI : Education, Innovations and Agricultural Development: A Study of North India. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, vii, 127p., Rs. 95.

THIS publication is based on the author's study of the effects of general formal education on agricultural productivity in Punjab and Haryana States during 1961-72. The study was financed by the International Labour Organisation under the World Employment Programme. Though the publication is outdated by about eight years, during which period several major changes in the agricultural activities in the two States have taken place, the basic data presented in the book and the analytical approach of the author to examine the data and present the findings are very valuable. A systematic approach has been made to reason out a yardstick to measure the correlations between general education and agricultural productivity in the pre-and post-green revolution periods. The author has formulated some major hypotheses and tested them with statistical analyses of the data at his command.

According to the author, the educational impact on agricultural development could be divided into four components, namely :

1. Innovative effects,
2. Allocative effect,

3. Worker effect, and
4. Externality of education.

The author found no statistically significant relationship between literacy and productivity, but the relationship between elementary education and productivity and the use of chemical fertilisers was positive for the pre-green revolution period but not for the post-green revolution period. According to the author, elementary education and from another angle secondary education facilitated the diffusion of innovation leading to the green revolution. He goes on to differentiate between the head of the household and the agricultural workers in respect of their literacy and the years of schooling. He also found a positive and statistically significant co-efficient of education among agricultural workers with the wage differentials they earned. Though the author himself agrees that cost-benefit analysis of rural education on agricultural productivity is not that simple, he suggests, based on his analyses of the situation, that in a dynamic situation as that of green revolution mere primary education is not enough and it has to be sustained upto the secondary level to get a higher pay-off.

On the whole, the study is very valuable though confined to two States of Punjab and Haryana. If it were extended to all the states of the country and the information updated it would be of great value for planners and plan implementors in the country.

The Chapter on Conclusions and Policy Implications though very comprehensive could have been more explicit in bringing out the findings of the author. While the title says that policy implications are covered, the author comes out only with policy conclusions and the various other implied aspects are not fully discussed. Another aspect which is not explainable is that repeated mention is made of more than one person having carried out the study whereas the publication is in the name of one author. Statements such as "we examine", "our studies" etc., are not in line with the single authorship of the publication.

New Delhi.

G. RANGASWAMI

M.V. KAPDE : *Economics of Marketing Co-operatives*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xvii, 206p., Rs. 60.

THE major thrust of this book is to gauge the impact of the co-operative movement in the sphere of agricultural marketing in the Ajmer district of Rajasthan. The study covers seven marketing co-operatives. The author feels that Ajmer is an appropriate choice for conducting a meaningful investigation into the working of the marketing co-operatives since this particular district has been a nerve centre for the co-operative movement for quite some time.

Marketing is a process by which agricultural produce flows from the primary producers to the ultimate consumers. Obviously, the question of marketable and marketed surplus in each crop assumes special significance in any system of marketing. The author has painstakingly identified the extent of marketable surpluses generated by different classes of farmers and worked out the share of these surpluses handled by the co-operatives. He has also made a comparison between the prices paid to the farmers by the co-operative agencies and by the private traders.

The usefulness of the present study lies not so much in establishing the superiority of the co-operative marketing system, as in locating the severe limitations under which the co-operative agencies are functioning in Ajmer. It has been estimated by the author, that the co-operative agencies handled only a very small portion of the market arrivals of foodgrains and commercial crops. The bulk of the market arrivals are handled by private traders who are in a better position to corner the stocks because of personal contact and farmers' indebtedness. It is surprising that though the co-operative agencies pay a higher price to the farmers, they are not in a position to buy any substantial portion of the market arrivals. One probable reason for this state of affairs is that the co-operative agencies have no arrangement for contacting the farmers in villages for purchasing their produce. On the other hand, most of these societies function as intermediaries between wholesalers and primary producers, thus defeating the very purpose of co-operative marketing. In this process, the monopoly interests of the wholesale traders remain intact.

Thus the co-operative agencies handle only an insignificant portion of the market arrivals and their role in other spheres, viz., pledge finance, arrangement for grading and weighing, provision of inputs and transport, etc., is equally ineffective. The private agencies have monopolized all these activities. The seven co-operative marketing agencies covered in this book have so far played only a peripheral role and have not contributed anything substantial in improving the living standards of cultivators.

The book contains some useful suggestions for improving the working of co-operative marketing societies in Ajmer though they cover no new ground. It appears that some of the important suggestions regarding grading, pledge finance, transport and training of staff, etc., are devoid of practical significance. Under the existing set-up, many of these societies are not competent to undertake any of these tasks. Even if they try, they are not likely to make much headway since farmers have an apathy for any institutional approach. They still prefer private parties who are in a much better position to meet their requirements.

Much of the details given in the book regarding the financial status and other operations of the co-operatives have not served any useful purpose apart from increasing the size of the work. The author has rightly concluded that the working of these agencies is very unsatisfactory and the reasons for such a state of affairs are to be found not in the structure of the co-operatives but in the social and economic conditions under which they are functioning.

As such, it is felt that the author should have concentrated more on these aspects to identify the factors that pose a serious challenge to the growth of co-operative movements. As has already been observed, the author does not go beyond enlisting the obvious factors. A serious pursuit like the work under study, should have done something more than that. Rajasthan is still very much conditioned by its feudal legacy and most of its cultivators do not have any social orientation to organize themselves under the co-operative banner. Unless this is recognized and steps taken to create the necessary climate, the co-operative movement will remain ineffective. It is clear that any type of imposition from above as has happened in the case of Ajmer Co-operatives may not make much impact. What is stressed here is that a mere study of the working of co-operatives has no significance whatsoever without realizing that the soil is not yet ripe for such ventures.

Nevertheless, the author deserves wholesome praise for reaffirming the oft-forgotten truth that, the bulk of the marketable surpluses are generated by small and medium farmers. A better price for this surplus would improve the quality of the living standards of this class and not the rich farmers.

New Delhi.

A.K. BHATTACHARYA

D.S. GANGULY : *Regional Economy of West Bengal: A Study in Urbanization, Growth Potential and Optimization of Industrial Location*. Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1979, x, 314p., Rs. 80.

REGIONAL studies have become an expanding field of research in the last two decades and they have usefully supplemented the more common aggregative analyses of the economy. It is easy to realize that the problems of a large country like ours cannot be always put in the framework of a simple, but realistic, all-India model and that policies appropriate to one region may not be appropriate for another. The first task of a regional economist is, however, to define his area. The most common definition adopted in India makes a region identical with a state. While this is convenient from the standpoint of collecting the data and for making administratively feasible policy prescriptions, a more logical definition will be in terms of economic homogeneities. Such a definition will regard the contiguous parts of Bihar and West Bengal as one economic region. There are many other similar economic regions in India cutting across state boundaries.

By the same logic, one can define an economically homogeneous region as a sub-area within a large area, when such a limited area has easily identifiable common characteristics. Ganguly's study relates not to the regional economy of West Bengal (as the title would seem to indicate), but to a particular region within the State. This region comprises the six western-most districts of West Bengal—Bankura, Birbhum, Burdwan, Hooghly, Midnapur and Purulia—or practically the whole of the area west of the Hooghly river. Howrah is quite logically excluded, because it really is a part of the economic zone of

Calcutta. The districts are largely agricultural, ranging from relatively prosperous Burdwan to extremely poor Purulia. Hooghly and Burdwan contain concentrated industrial areas, but one has to take note of the agricultural transformation that has taken place in these two districts.

Ganguly has not gone into the problems of agriculture and has concentrated on the problems of industry, current and prospective. Within this field he has made a commendable effort in collecting his facts. These have mostly been taken from published official reports and some bank surveys (which, in their turn, also depend on published data). Apart from the detailed statistics (some going down to the "mouza" level), there are fifteen maps relating to the region covered and also to the individual districts. The author has thus provided a useful reference handbook to planners on practically every important point—geography, urbanization, power and transport and, of course, industry. While the analysis of the problems of industrial growth is competent, the reader feels that the book would have improved considerably if the agriculture-industry links had been carefully brought out. Even a specialized study of industry has to look into the problems of input supply and also into the problem of rural demand for industrial products.

One of the reasons why Ganguly has neglected the agriculture-industry links is perhaps that the whole of the last decade has been left out of his analysis. And it is in the last ten or twelve years that agricultural changes have been substantial. The present study was submitted to the Planning Commission in 1972, and the information relates mostly to years not later than 1968-69. Except in a few places, the population data (including the figures for occupation and work) are taken from the Census of 1961. The long timelag between the completion of the study and its publication makes the book less useful than it would have been, if it had been published much earlier, or if extensive revisions were made.

Such revisions would have been worth making; one notes, for example, that the short discussion on power appears now singularly unreal after about nine years' experience of severe shortage. The Appendix table giving the dates of electrification of the villages means little when electrification has in many cases meant only a few poles and sometimes a cable too, without what the cables would carry. An up-to-date view of the development of Haldia and its neighbourhood would yield more educative conclusions than Ganguly was able to derive about ten years ago. And this applies to all his suggestions regarding the development of industry in the outlying districts.

It is the clear duty of sponsoring authorities to see that the results of the researches financed by them are available to policy-makers and others (particularly later research workers in the same field) as early as possible. In this particular case, the sponsor was the Planning Commission itself. The findings of the study, if published in time, would have been useful both to that body and to the State Planning Authorities. All that one can hope now is that Ganguly will be able to present an up-dated report when he prepares the

next edition of the book, or, preferably, would write another book which would take account of the new facts, linkages and problems.

Calcutta

BHABATOSH DATTA

LAW AND JUDICIARY

H.R. KHANNA : Liberty, Democracy and Ethics. Radha Krishna Prakashan, New Delhi, 1979, 75p., Rs. 30.

MR. JUSTICE H. R. Khanna is known for his candour, courage and robust commonsense. A man of gentle moderation and intrinsic humility, he speaks on the theme of "Liberty, Democracy and Ethics" in this volume with transparent sincerity of purpose.

The book is a collection of addresses delivered on public occasions and is therefore necessarily general in its approach and thought content. These addresses are not analytical and critical law review essays of academic craftsmanship in any narrow or specialised groove. The strength of Justice Khanna's book is its breadth of vision and concern and its deep humanism and patriotism. It informs, educates and awakens its readers and lucidly explains the elements of our constitutional system and its underlying values. Much of what Justice Khanna says is not new, but he says it forcefully, persuasively and engagingly.

Defending and defining right to personal liberty, Justice Khanna cautions the nation by stressing that a constitutional bill of rights is not to be converted into a suicide pact. "Democracy", he says, "embodies the principle of resistance to government within the principle of government itself." He tells us that "entrustment of power to those in charge of the government of the country calls for utmost vigilance," and at the same time reminds us that "a weak government is also an unconscious ally of the forces of tyranny and oppression."

In an address to the International Conference on Dynamic, Durable and Ethical Democracy in March 1978, he describes the dilemma of powers necessary for effective government and the concomitant problem of abuse of power.

In his Feroze Gandhi Memorial Lecture (1978), Justice Khanna addresses himself to the perennial question of ethical standards in public life. The two remedial answers he offers to the problem of corruption in public life are : (i) public opinion; and (ii) a permanent constitutional or statutory body, perhaps in the nature of an ombudsman.

In an address on Living Democracy on the birth centenary of Frank Buchman, Justice Khanna tells us that the only keepers of democracy are the "people" and offers, what I may call, a stimulating challenge and a challenging consolation: "No office is more important than that of being a

citizen." His epilogue of "Melancholy Reflections," is perhaps more a warning and an exhortation than a pessimistic prognosis. He concludes with a quotation: "Republics are created by the virtue, public spirit, and intelligence of the citizens. They fail when the wise are banished from the public councils, because they dare to be honest, and the profligate are rewarded, because they flatter the people, in order to betray them."

Justice Khanna's book is a useful, edifying and welcome addition to the basic educative literature on liberty and democracy.

New Delhi

L. M. SINGHVI

V. R. KRISHNA IYER : The Integral Yoga of Public Law and Development in the Context of India. N. M. Tripathi Ltd., Bombay, 1979, xvii, 154p., Rs. 35.

THESE are three lectures in the first series of Public Law Lectures organized by the University of Cochin, delivered in 1977 by the Hon'ble Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, Judge of the Supreme Court of India.

For novelty of ideas and more so for his original way of expressing them, Justice Iyer has no superior. For example, who would think (as the title suggests) that there is any yoga in Public Law and Development. For one, who did not practice standing on the head in Court or outside it, a yogic approach to law is something very new. I read the lectures with much interest and considerable profit. They are learned, as is to be expected from Justice Iyer, who is nothing if not learned. But his meaning is buried beneath layers of imperspicuity where he battologizes with novel conceits and becomes pleonastic and periphrastic. To him "law is pragmatic and philosophic, not vapid beating of juristic wings in the void." As he puts it:

Norms are its content substantive;
fair procedures its scheme adjectival;
broad societal backing its legitimation
and strength; impartial and independent
application its majesty and credibility.... (page 38)

He should have borrowed from Pickwick's speech and added that acceptance by the people is "its insurance office."

Such longsome exposition borders on pleonasm in spite of certain conceits which Donne could have perhaps used in his poetry. The author should have eschewed in his exposition this circumstantiality and also onomasiological and semasiological neoterism.

However, the book is full of deep thinking and has a philosophical approach. The author rightly thinks that what he calls "Law India" (inverting the adjective and substantive without an adjective) should grow and develop

only along acceptable ways. As he expresses it effectively but in his quaint manner "stateways do not always affect folkways." Only thus, according to him, law will be "tuned to the *zeitgeist*" which incidentally is German for "spirit of the times."

Speaking of the Constitution, the learned author attempts an analysis which, he apparently thinks, is frugiferous:

The Indian Constitution is a social nidus, a spiritual appetiser, a super-legal parchment, a political programschrift, and an economic directive.

One is left with a doubt whether this is a doxological paean or mere persiflage. In his "sky view" and "ground view" he begins with giving new meanings to *dharma* but he admits that "orthodox eyebrows" may be raised at such license. Indeed he himself quotes Rajeev Dhavan's criticism although the latter makes an equally vague contribution to Dicey's and French views when he says "the rule of law represents an ethical neutrality."

In his exposition at the end of his First Lecture, the author has some fecund observations to make:

Let me conclude. Gandhi and Nehru, Maharshi and Marx, Vivekanand, Bertrand Russel and Aldous Huxley, neotic and natural scientist have all a part to play in achieving true prosperity for a society.

One may agree so far, but see what follows:

The developmental distance to Rajghat and Shantivan is long and lies along a social economic and spiritual route to be spanned by stern jural steps, not by hortative promissory exercises, if the Indian Drama must wipe every tear from every eye (sic)."

His further opinion as given in the Second Lecture is that—

the versatile genius of jurisprudence must, therefore, play upon the developmental direction and destination of a given people recognising ordered liberties, distributive potentialities....

This fruitful wedlock between law and the people is the ideological validation of my semi-juridistic wanderings.

His conclusion is somewhat numinous, He says:

The law of life will outlaw lawyer's law and judges justice—*absent* legal aid to the indigent and down-trodden.

To him "the jurisprudential mission of social transformation" is the

"development of man, every man." For this he craves for "judicial statesmen, visionary jurists and legal architects."

The reader may well ponder what all this adds up to. Will he answer his question to himself "What have I read?", in the words of Hamlet to Polonius, "Words, words, words," or will he say "I got something out of it." This depends on who the reader is. No doubt the lectures have the virtues of a curate's egg because they have a meaning, if only one can unscramble the jargon.

New Delhi

M. HIDAYATULLAH

URBAN PLANNING

B. BHASKARA RAO: *Housing and Habitat in Developing Countries*. Newman Group, New Delhi, 1979, iv, 291p., Rs. 75.

POST World War II years witnessed a large interest in housing, starting with housing for the War displaced and those who had been through the ignominy of partition and pestilence; this interest has continued to be expressed at all levels, local, national and international. Housing thus has been a favourite theme for writing and from a number of points of view because of the individual experiences which people have come to have about housing, whether it be the common man who seeks a shelter over his head at a cost he can afford in a location in which he and his family likes to stay, or a professional architect, engineer, economist, sociologist, statesman or a politician. Each has a definite objective and approach: the economist is concerned with housing cost and the resources required considered as a burden on the community; the architect, with its design for living and its aesthetic appearance individually and collectively on the landscape; engineers, with the use of technology and new scientific knowledge to improve every aspect of house construction and maintenance; the sociologists, on the impact which a particular type of housing will have on social development and community interaction; and lastly, but not the least, statesmen and politicians, in regard to the role and responsibility of the government, community, and the public at large to achieve the objectives of a reasonable shelter for every family. A large number of books have been written on housing in India and other countries and they have covered different aspects of this vast subject and brought out various points of view. Prof. Bhaskara Rao's contribution is significant because of his earnest attempt to reconcile these various viewpoints and to present an overall picture of housing as such. He has wisely avoided quantitative and qualitative descriptive material in regard to the housing situations which could have filled pages and yet be irrelevant. At the same time, those interested in such data have access to it in the supplements and appendices to the book.

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Rao's concern is the total environment and the role which shelter or housing would play in improving the habitat. He has tried to deal with this at all levels, macro, meso and micro and discussed policies and programmes at the national level as also the problems of slums, their morphology, and the strategy to do away with them. The rural habitat has not been overlooked and the village level housing and its peculiar problems have been brought to light. The book has attempted to deal with the developing countries as a whole but its main contribution is only in regard to India because of the large data in India that has been introduced and the somewhat sketchy accounts of housing in other developing countries of Asia.

The book is in three parts; the first deals with the conceptual frame and terminology, the second, with people and the environment around them and housing as a part of that environment, and the third part, with slums and a development strategy for tackling them. The book has a large number of supplements and appendices dealing with the methodological aspects as well as perspective frames for projection of the housing situation towards the end of the century.

The treatment of slums is along traditional lines of identification on the basis of quality of physical structure and amenities, analysis of population living in the slums, their needs for proper housing, employment and so on. After thirty years of dealing with slums and having successfully created more of them, it seems appropriate to ask ourselves whether slums can ever be got rid of totally. It may be possible to get rid of the substandard nature of the physical facilities and ensure a liveable environment but slums are not only physical but are, more so, social, emotional and, one can even say anthropological; further, a slum is a subjective condition defined differently at different times by different people. Therefore, apart from removing such causes as excessive concentration of people owing to migration, lack of opportunity or resources to improve one's own housing, improvement of educational and medical facilities etc., any attempt to impose solutions might ultimately fail as the recent Latin American examples have shown. Rao deserves to be congratulated on his eminent dealing of a subject like housing which appears to be familiar and easy but most difficult to set out without getting bogged down by either a scientific or a technological bias, losing the overall point of view.

New Delhi.

C.S. CHANDRASEKHARA

B.S. BHOOSHAN, *Ed.*: *Towards Alternative Settlement Strategies: The Role of Small and Intermediate Centres in the Development Process.* Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, 404 p., Rs. 95.

THE book is a compilation of four regional studies undertaken with a view to exploring the role of small and intermediate size centres in the

social and economic process. The studies were sponsored by the International institute for Environment and Development, London, in collaboration with four other institutes in four developing regions, namely the Department of Architecture, University of Khartoum; Institute for Development Studies in the University of Mysore; Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Lagos and the Regional Centre of Urban and Regional Studies in Buenos Aires. The studies, which cover the Comahue Region in South America, Mandya district in South India, Badagry-Porto-Nova Region in Nigeria and Gezira region of Sudan, have been put together by the editor who is also a co-author of one of the studies. The book starts with a prologue by Jorge E. Hardoy and David Satterthwaite and ends with a chapter by the editor setting out the interrelated aspect of the findings of the four studies and listing the significant conclusions that may have emerged in regard to the role of small and intermediate centres in the development process.

The title of the book, "Towards Alternative Settlement Strategies" is not borne out by any of the studies as in each case there is one strategy and no attempt has been made to test alternatives and assess their merits. The Gezira study clearly comes out with the statement that, "developing countries lack adequate data and cost-benefit techniques to evaluate alternative development strategies and select the most favourable scheme." The studies by themselves make an excellent and useful evaluation of the objectives, methodology and implementation of the projects underway in each of the four regions. This book is undoubtedly a useful contribution to the field of regional studies where factual case histories of regional development projects are not many. The four teams which undertook the studies deserve appreciation for their scientific and analytical approach to the project which has led them to list both success as well as failures in regard to the different aspects of the project, leading to a frank and objective appraisal free from any political or other bias.

In discussing alternative strategies, the prologue refers to the growth pole concept with activities trickling down to the lower order of settlement as well as the strategy of direct investment in rural areas on rural population for hastening rural development. Indian experience has categorically shown that the growth pole concept can only be of academic interest and that the process of trickling down does not occur unless there is a vehicle for conveying the growth impulses from one centre to another and the centre receiving the growth impulses, has built into it the necessary receptivity. Unless the total system of a sender, a receiver and a conveyance media functions, growth cannot spread. The example of Mandya in this case is most appropriate. The authors have intended to expose the irrelevance of the hypothesis their analysis reveals, but fail to be categorical in their conclusions.

Among the four studies, the Argentinian study relating to the Comahue Region is excellent for its detailed analyses, methodology and the conclusions. The study has brought out that urban-rural distinction is irrelevant and hypothetical from the point of view of development. The authors propose a

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different classification based on physical proximity, namely agglomerate, dispersed and scattered. This certainly has a greater rationale in practical terms. The study has also brought out that settlements which have come into existence because of a political decision such as a provincial capital, military base etc., tend to stagnate unless an economic base, built upon natural resources and physical infrastructure is injected. The study has also brought out the negative effects that have developed because of political organisation, uncontrolled growth of larger agglomeration and the growth of larger centres in the Metropolitan spread without the advantage of being a Metropolis.

The study of Mandya District, which is only a part of the region, attempts to assess the impact of the adjacent Metropolitan city, both in the negative and positive aspects. The study however, does not come out categorically with the weaknesses of the settlement strategy, if one exists at all, and the manner in which there could be a re-orientation. The interpretation of urbanization in the developing countries as a "centre down" process is contrary to the process of "accretion" that is taking place in the lower order settlements and the authors will do well to check their hypothesis in this regard. The study also puts forward the hypothesis that the role of the small and intermediate towns does not get changed with public investments alone. This is saying the obvious, as the small and intermediate towns are essentially service-oriented and market-oriented settlements and in the free market or mixed economies it is the private sector that plays the larger role in the marketing and provision of services of different types. Public investment in development infrastructure can substantially promote productive activities as also marketing and services and only then the role of small and medium towns can be enhanced.

The Badagry study dealing with towns and the villages all round has underlined the importance of the informal sector in fulfilling economic and social roles and the lack of resources in the developing countries to deal with it effectively. Rightly, the study stresses that boost of employment during the construction period on account of multiplier effect would not have much permanent positive benefit and for that an altogether different strategy is needed. This is borne by several examples in India.

The last study of Gezira in Sudan is an example of a development scheme which ties the interests of a developing country to the international markets of the developed world. Gezira is the largest irrigated agricultural development project in the world, evolved with the primary objective to develop production of cotton to be sold in international markets for the benefit of the nation as a whole. The authors of this study frankly admit that Gezira is not a regional development project nor has it been viewed as such at any time. Its main purpose is agricultural development and it ignores totally the community development base. It is only after nationalisation that there was an attempt to introduce some facets of economic and social development. The Gezira hierarchical pattern of settlements which are wholly service-oriented

have tended to force continuous migration from the small and intermediate settlements to the regional centre and to Khartoum, the national capital. Such migration has led to the excessive growth of the regional centre demanding separate investment to take care of the additional population on one side and stagnation and ultimate decline of the small communities on the other. The authors rightly concluded that agricultural development by itself is not an adequate base for rural development and rapid long term growth can only be achieved by taking up social and community development as an integral part of investment policy for national development. It is interesting to note, that a study of a single project with limited objectives has been able to reveal the various deficiencies in the regional development programme. As most projects in the developing countries are conceived in the same manner as Gezira, the study is a real eye opener to deficiencies in planning in the developing countries.

The concluding Chapter is not convincing in regard to its comparative assessment of hypothesis from the four studies and it does not cover objectives, methodology or alternate strategies specifically. The Editor has made it clear however, that the conclusions are only indicative of possible directions of approach and not necessarily acceptable. As a major part of the work is yet to be done an evaluation of the same schemes five years later would have been a very revealing exercise.

New Delhi

C.S. CHANDRASEKHARA

B.S. BHOOSHAN and R.P. MISRA : *Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses: Volume 1 : India*. Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1979, 288p., Rs. 200 (Per Set).

THE first in the series of *Habitat Asia*—a systematic assessment of the impact of the recommendations in the Asian region of the United Nations Habitat Conference which met in Vancouver in 1976—the volume under review deals with India. The first four chapters of the book deal with the Issues and the other four chapters are the Responses to the issues.

The General Editors have raised certain basic questions in the Preface, and answers are apparently to be found in the Volume. What have the national Governments done as follow up of the Habitat Conference? Which of the recommendations have received wider responses? What are the obstacles in the way of their implementation? How do the member nations view the Habitat issues generated by the Vancouver meet and what should be done at the international and other levels to accelerate implementation of the Vancouver recommendations?

Rather tall questions but apt; yet they ignore certain basic facts. The Habitat Conference recommendations are comprehensive, perhaps too

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comprehensive, and they touch every human activity in one or other. There are no priorities listed and obviously they could not be. If a country wants to implement them they are all there, but to begin, there must be preparations and these are complex and involved. They have to take note of the manner in which the national governments function, the democratic and other processes in which the governments are formed, dissolved and re-formed and the national compulsions at each point of time in regard to habitat polity. The United Nations Organisations themselves are yet to take substantial steps to put into effect Habitat recommendations and to take action. In the Asian scene, ESCAP is yet to set up a separate non-governmental legislative committee to deal specifically with human settlements. Developed countries are not eager to contribute to the international resources needed for the human settlement programmes, and at the international level, the only agency which has shown any sustained interest and perseverance is the World Bank which has expressed its concern for the urban poor in unequivocal terms.

There is also an initial hiatus in the understanding of the Habitat Conference recommendations. The ordinary man in the agrarian economies of Asia instinctively associates habitat and human settlement programmes with cities and towns and strongly reacts by putting forward the problems of rural areas and the rural population. In spite of all clarifications and clearly enunciated policy in the Habitat recommendations, covering both urban and rural population, the last few years' experience has shown that human settlement programmes get invariably involved with urban and metropolitan issues and therefore, at the national level where the rural population commands a majority, habitat programmes rarely get the necessary legislative and financial support.

This attitude is also reflected in the book, which has differentiated the issues concerning the quality of life in the urban settlements from that in the rural areas. The deterioration in the quality of life in urban settlements comes out magnified and can prejudice any action taken to restructure the human settlements programmes to make it an integrated one.

The chapters dealing with the Issues are essentially a recapitulation and re-arrangement of secondary data on national development trends, such as population growth and distribution, urbanisation, national income, its origin and distribution, etc. The data on migration and its analysis is rather sketchy and one would have expected an in depth treatment here as migration is one of the important processes which will alter radically the demographic and economic configuration in the country. The chapter on human settlement system is again a re-arrangement of secondary data regarding the population in the different size of settlements, urban hierarchy, etc., together with references to the special problems of the tribal population.

While discussing future policies concerning human settlements in India, the authors do not seem to be aware of the vigorous discussion in the pre-Vancouver period about the need for a positive approach to urbanization and the need for accelerated urbanization, as well as the benefits which this

would confer on the rural economy by relieving it of the surplus population and engaging it in productive occupations. The chapters dealing with quality of life in urban and rural settlements provide statistical information in regard to the various aspects of living such as density, shelter, living pattern, accommodation available, water supply and other essential services both in the rural and urban areas. Some interesting illustrations have been provided by quoting studies on urban and rural settlements undertaken by collaborators.

Section B attempts to assess the responses, and the concerned chapters deal with human settlement policies and strategies, policies on land and environment, shelter, infrastructure and services, resources and technology and lastly institutions, management and public participation. The assessment fails to recognize that whatever is being done today started much earlier to the 1976 Habitat Conference and the Habitat Conference has had hardly any impact on these programmes. In fact even in 1978, the Government of India had not implemented any of the Vancouver Conference recommendations as they were still under study; there were even some negative responses from India in the UNCHS commission meetings in Nairobi.

The authors have highlighted the activities of the various agencies dealing with habitat in their respective areas such as water supply, housing, town-planning, training, municipal management and so on. The Volume will thus serve as a collection of useful information on various aspects of habitat policies and programmes; so far as the progress on the recommendations of the Vancouver Conference is concerned, the Volume has been able to contribute very little, and one is glad to note that the authors have frankly stated that the Habitat movement did not help to bring about any nationwide discussion and debate on the settlements and land use policy. The authors also record that the vast bulk of even the educated public remained outside the discussion and studies and the common people did not even know what Habitat was or what it meant. This is an eloquent enough answer for the questions posed in the Preface. This does not however mean to say that human settlement policies and programmes are not being formulated and implemented Habitat or no Habitat.

Substantial policy-level transformation has taken place on the basis of continuous study, research and persuasion brought about by professional people in the governments at appropriate levels causing changes in attitudes towards urbanization and its role in national development. The latest draft of the National Plan views increased urbanization absolutely necessary in the context of the projected increase in employment, improvements in productivity, betterment in standards of living and elimination of differentials between urban and rural conditions of living. The Plan accepts that the "thrust of the urbanization policy during the next decade must therefore be to increase the rate of growth of small and medium towns and to slow down and if possible, reverse the rate of growth of the metropolitan cities. It is proposed to achieve this by giving greater emphasis to the provision of infrastructural and other facilities to the small and medium towns and to equip them to

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act as growth and service centres for the rural hinterland. For this purpose, increased investments are proposed in these towns in housing, water supply and communication facilities (e.g. post office, telephones and telegraphs). Likewise, facilities for education, medical care and recreation will need to be augmented. On the other hand, adequate support will also have to be given to the larger cities directed specifically towards the condition of the urban poor and raising civic services upto acceptable levels."

New Delhi

C.S. CHANDRASEKHARA

DONNA SURI, R.P. MISRA, R.N. ACHYUTHA and B.S. BHOOSAN: *Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses: Volume II: Indonesia and Philippines*. Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1979, 187p., Rs. 200 (Per Set).

THE problem of better human settlements is a multi-dimensional one; it varies from country to country involving and depending upon the past and existing socio-economic and political structures of the countries concerned. It is especially acute in the ex-colonial developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Arab world, which are almost saturated with evergrowing but unevenly and haphazardly distributed population. Solution of the problem requires proper planning and adequate funding; naturally therefore, it calls for the attention of administrators, academicians; national governments and different governmental and non-governmental agencies. In such a situation, it is gratifying that a Conference on Habitat (human settlements) was held in Vancouver, under the auspices of the United Nations, in May-June 1976 to discuss the various issues and problems of human settlements and to recommend action for the national governments of various countries.

Habitat Asia, Volume II, contains the findings of a research project to study the responses and follow-up actions of the Habitat Conference by the Governments of Indonesia and the Philippines. The book, as R.P. Misra, the General Editor, admits in the Preface, is mainly in the form of a general report, rather than an analytical study, of what actually happened in these two great archipelagos about better human settlements since 1974. The study is mainly based on a two-week field trip of the authors to the countries concerned and, as the references at the end of each chapter indicate, secondary source materials. Naturally therefore, one cannot expect much from such a work. The 187-page book, including two appendices, a short bibliography and an index, is divided into two parts, each part respectively dealing with Indonesia and the Philippines.

Quite naturally, in a developing economy there develops a tendency, if things are left to market forces unhampered by policy interferences, for

industry, commerce, banking, insurance, shipping and almost all the economic activities, to cluster in certain favoured localities, which in their turn attract population. Indonesia and the Philippines are no exception of this. In Indonesia, population grows at the rate of 2.4 per cent per year and about 64 per cent of the total population live on 7 per cent of the country's total land area of Java and Sumatra (1971). In the Philippines, where population growth rate is the highest in Asia (3 per cent annually), the Luzon and Visayas Islands are the centres of concentrations. The Manila Metropolitan Area alone accommodates about half of the urban population and more than one-fourth of the total population of the Philippines (1970). Increasing population concentration in major cities results in uncontrolled use of land and the scarcity of suitable land for housing, the lack of water supply, and good sanitation. As a necessary corollary of this, the rest of the country economically lags behind and suffers from the lack of infrastructural facilities and other corresponding limitations.

According to Indonesia's National Report for the Habitat Conference, national policies regarding human settlements have emphasized the need for population control, the distribution of population, and the conservation and development of the country's resources. These critical issues have involved the problems of land policy and land use, creation of new infrastructural facilities in rural area, transmigration, and rural and urban housing, etc. The basic idea has been to create some growth poles around big cities and urban areas which are expected to disperse population throughout the country and establish better human settlements. As the authors contend, however, the whole programme lacks people's participation and seems to be in the planning process without any implementation. The paternalistic state structure, the complex civil-military relations and economic constraints impose severe limitations on the capacity of the government to implement the recommendations.

According to the authors, "Philippines is one country which has taken up the habitat movement seriously," and is ahead of the Vancouver Conference policy recommendations. As early as September 1973, a Task Force on Human Settlements (TFHS) was created there. The TFHS suggested a two-pronged strategy for "decentralized concentration" through growth centres in new areas. The strategy was to control developmental schemes for the metro Manila and to develop simultaneously the strategically selected areas throughout the country. But the authors conclude, that in the Philippines the programme has been essentially a bureaucratic one and "the habitat programmes had achieved very little...."

As a report the book does not seem to be of a very high order, and the publication of such reports, when practically nothing has been achieved in the field, is of little use.

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KALYANI BANDYOPADHYAYA

R.P. MISRA and B.S. BHOOSHAN : Human Settlements in Asia: Public Policies and Programmes, Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 280p., Rs.75.

RAMESWARI VARMA and N.N. SASTRY : Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses: Volume III: Japan and Singapore. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, 192p., Rs. 200/- (Per set).

THE Misra-Bhooshan volume is devoted to a quick review and assessment of public policies and programmes of six selected Asian countries out of the 145 national governments that participated in the Habitat Conference held at Vancouver (Canada) in May-June 1976 under the auspices of the United Nations. The Conference made a set of comprehensive recommendations for action. One and a half years later, the International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED), London, initiated a project to assess the nature and extent of the follow-up action in the participating countries through the co-operation of selected institutions in each major region. The work for Asian countries was given to the Institute of Development Studies, Mysore, under the leadership of Professor R.P. Misra. As stated in the Preface, work on the project was started in November 1977 and the report was complete by July 1978. For obvious reasons the scope of the work was limited to a survey of "national policies" and the investigators "had to be satisfied with (only tertiary and secondary information." Almost the entire Report is based on official reports of the respective governments. Within these constraints of source material and time, the authors have succeeded in presenting a consolidated and comparative review of the human settlement and habitat policies of seven Asian countries—India, Nepal, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Japan, as well as China (which was not a participant at the Vancouver Conference).

The book is divided into nine chapters, plus an appendix on the United Nations' "Standards and Norms for Habitat Planning". The introductory Chapter presents a discussion on conceptual aspects of human settlements, the remaining ones are devoted to discussions of "General Characteristics and Trends", "Settlement Policies and Strategies", "Land Resources", "Infrastructure and Social Services", "Resources and Construction Technology", and "Management and Public Participation", in each of which a consolidated picture for all the six participating countries is presented. A separate chapter deals with China, and the book ends with a short chapter on general conclusions.

Settlements are the nodes within and around which all cultural activities of man take place. Included in the connotation of the term are all natural elements and man-made structures resulting from the process of settling establishment, of shelter, the barriers that separate settlements and transportation and communication networks that interlink them, as well as the plethora of social, cultural, economic and political institutions and forces

created to manage and govern them. Various types of settlements are closely interrelated—they are part of an integrated system and, as such, it is unscientific to talk of villages and towns as two distinct phenomena, one opposed to the other. Settlements are the basic spatial units of socio-cultural organization of man and all socio-economic planning in order to be really meaningful must start with them. As the Habitat 1976 Report noted, "The condition of human settlements largely determines the quality of life, the improvement of which is a prerequisite for the full satisfaction of basic needs such as employment, housing, health services, education and recreation." Hence the urgency of scientific analysis and planning of settlements of man.

The existing general patterns and trends, in settlement planning in the six selected Asian countries (other than China) is reviewed in Chapter II, which takes stock of the overall socio-economic picture in each of them. Despite the participatory democratic system in India, "the poor have become poorer and the rich richer. Inter-personal, inter-regional, and inter-sectoral disparities in development have widened" because "the realities of power distribution are such that not much can be done to alter this pattern, especially as no major political party is willing or able to provide or support a 'class war,'" the authors lament. The position is still worse in Nepal, "where the ruling class is not only relatively smaller but also very exclusive." The scene is contrasted with that obtaining in China where, the authors observe: "There are no rich and poor in economic terms... whatever is produced is shared by all almost equally on the principle from each according to his capacity, to each according to his need." In sharp contrast, stand Philippines and Indonesia, in both of which political and economic power are concentrated in the hands of a small group. As such the gaps between the rich and the poor are wider than in India and the popular participation in development efforts is almost absent. "The development projects are big, grandiose and catchy", but "many have little, if any, relevance for the poor." Singapore and Japan present a different scenario. Singapore, with a strong centralized government is set upon a course of rapid but planned industrialization and modernization by "refusing to barter rapid economic growth for Western Democracy." Japan is unique in that it does not have the spectacle of poverty that plagues almost every other Asian country. Industrialization has developed to a level at which instead of poverty, population is the major concern of the Government. In this affluent country, the main determinants of the policies and strategies of development are "business and businessmen."

Reviewing national policies and strategies, the authors observe that instead of policies, there are programmes, projects and schemes to tackle various emerging problems, and except for China no country has a clear-cut human settlement policy. In some ways this is so because most of these countries are pushed toward "subsistence policies," since under the conditions prevailing, political and economic survival is the foremost issue facing political leaders in these societies having a large mass of illiterate and poor people that are progressively becoming more and more frustrated and

demanding. As such priority has often gone to keep things going through short-term measures and palliatives rather than long-term developmental plans.

Regarding policies relating to land resources and reforms, the general perception of the problems has changed drastically in the post-war period. Whereas formerly, the main concern was with the land itself, now land-use problems are primarily viewed as social problems—problems of the people—too many people on too small land, people in the wrong places, and the need for resettlement schemes. The effectiveness of the central governmental authority has been, as in all other aspects of planning, the chief determinant in land-use planning and reform. The general trend, despite government advocacy of socialistic-democratic goals, has been toward an elitist land-use policy so that the general tendency is toward uprooting the already disadvantaged, and depriving them of whatever community facilities they had been able to create for themselves in order to make the environment of the privileged more pleasant. Thus, we find that slum-clearance is high on the land-use policy programme of every one of the six non-Communist countries surveyed. Likewise the picture in respect of shelter, infrastructure and social service facilities in villages and towns is also disparate and confused. While in the two developed countries—Japan and Singapore—the problem is one of improvement of quality, in the other four countries the problem is essentially of solving the dilemma: “which comes first—the belly or the shelter?” The authors feel that “one cannot hope for a better situation unless the right to have a minimum living to the people below the poverty line is recognized... and the whole system of production and consumption is so organized that all have almost equal access to income, wealth and productive resources;” whatever that may mean, and however utopian the dream.

In respect of resources and construction technology, the situation in Japan and Singapore (both areas of scarce resources) is quite different from the rest of the Asian countries, for in these two highly modernized countries the problem is not appreciably different from those of the developed countries of the West. On the other extreme is Nepal, where the problem is both of scarce resources as well as underdeveloped technology. In India, Indonesia and Philippines, “high-energy modern technologies and low-energy traditional technologies exist side by side often resulting in friction.” The authors view this situation as “a consequence as well as a cause of the dualistic system.” Although there is a general awareness of the need for alternative technologies and more efficient utilization of existing resources, there have been several impediments in the way of adoption of new technologies that are more relevant to prevailing socio-economic conditions. Continuance of “dual technologic structure” suits the privileged elites who dominate the decisionmaking. Besides, “monopolising industrial houses” sabotage efforts toward the adoption of indigenous technology.

In the end, the authors pose the question: “Where does the significance of Habitat ‘76 lie?” and in answer note, that while in the case of the

Philippines, the recommendations of the Conference were on the whole taken "very seriously," China had completely ignored them, for, to put it in the author's words, in the Chinese context "probably they are impertinent if not irrelevant." Japan and Singapore have by and large adopted a "cold attitude" toward the recommendations for "they think that Habitat '76 has not made them any wiser." In India, Nepal and Indonesia, on the other hand, "Habitat declarations are profusely quoted in public speeches ... but the general feeling is that this set of recommendations is mostly irrelevant to rural societies struggling for subsistence."

The book presents a useful general introduction to the nature and aspects of human settlements and habitat in the selected countries of Asia. As a quickly prepared general survey, based on official reports, it may not contain much that is new to area specialists, nevertheless, it gives a valuable and quite informative overall picture for the general reader and should interest all those interested in the problem of human settlements in Asia. The book is well produced on good quality paper although proof reading has left much to be desired. The book also bears marks of its struggle against time with a view to completing it "in a short time of six months." One may in this context mention Figure 8 on Nepal (p. 84), where east has become west and vice-versa.

The Varma-Sastry volume on *Japan and Singapore* is third in a three-volume set on *Habitat Asia: Issues and Responses*, prepared under the general editorship of R.P. Misra under the programme sponsored by IIED London, with a view, as noted above, to assess the follow-up action on recommendations of the Vancouver Conference—"Habitat'76". The other two volumes deal with India and Indonesia and Philippines, respectively, while an independent volume has been published on Nepal. In fact, as the Preface to this volume has clarified, the Misra-Bhooshan Volume, reviewed in preceding paragraphs, is churned out of the separate country reports published in this three-volume series. As the general editor has put it: "This volume is based on the data both secondary and primary readily available from the two countries. The series editor and Rameshwari Varma spent quite a few weeks in these countries during which they had the opportunity to discuss various developments with the people responsible both in public and private institutions." But, as the editor himself noted: "Secondary data and a visit for two weeks does not take one far. Nevertheless, the exercise which has given this report cannot be said to be fruitless." Readers who are interested in greater details on Singapore and Japan than the summary statements contained in the Misra-Bhooshan volume, may turn to the pages of this volume for amplification.

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RAMESH DUTTA DIKSHIT

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social science.

BHUNIYA, Niranjan. *United Nations; Problems and Prospects*. K.P. Bagchi & Co., Calcutta, 1980. 169p. Rs. 35.

Sketch of the world body since the time of its birth, including its organisation and description of the main organs. The book is a companion volume of the author's work "League of Nations: Failure of an Experiment in Internationalism." The author pleads for a change in outlook and thinking of the critics of the world body for he firmly believes that the UN is the only hope for the survival of mankind.

CHAKRABORTY, Ashit. *Ukrainian*. Pt. 1. Chhaya Chakraborty, New Delhi, 1980. 120p. Rs. 25.

Comparative-contrastive study of Ukrainian and Russian for translators and students with a knowledge of Russian dealing with Ukrainian texts as well as a self instructor for students.

CHATURVEDI, S.K. *The Seventh Lok Sabha Election: An Analysis of People's Verdict*. Grantham, Kanpur, 1981. 160p.

Analysis of 1980 mid-term Parliamentary Elections, divided in three parts. Part one deals with the political situation that led to the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in 1979. Manifestos of various national parties are analyzed under three heads, viz.; Economic, Social and Political in the second part. Poll analysis and trends are analyzed in the third part. Statistics are provided in the appendices.

EKBOTE, Gopal Rao. *A Nation Without a National Language*. Marathi Sahitya Parishad, Hyderabad, 1980. iv, 56p. Rs. 8 (Paper.)

Collection of two presidential speeches, one delivered at a seminar held in Hyderabad in 1975 under the auspices of Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha and the other at the Second Official Language Conference in 1976, and one article of the author published in a local newspaper. This collection deals with all the aspects of Union official language Hindi viz., its role, constitutional provisions, Official Language Acts, etc. In the article the status of "Urdu" is discussed. It attempts to create a rational consensus on the use of Hindi as a national language.

GANDHI, Indira. *My Truth*. Presented by Emmanuel Pouchpadass. Vision Books, New Delhi. 1981. 200p. Rs. 100.

Autobiography of the Prime Minister of India. It is not merely a life story but gives an insider's account of India's political history since Independence. It makes revelations about major events, many of which created big controversies: the overthrow of the first Communist Government in Kerala, the 1962 war with China, Congress split, Sanjay's role, 1977 electoral defeat, etc. The last chapter provides her vision of India, its culture, land and people, problems and resources and her personal outlook on life.

It is an account which reveals many dimensions of her personality that do not ever make newspaper headlines as her political acts do, but which are the bases of her public actions.

GHURYE, G.S. *The Burning Cauldron of North-East India*. Popular, Bombay, 1980. x, 163p. Rs. 72.

The renowned anthropologist presents facts and details about the tribes of North-East India in this highly readable book containing only three chapters, originally meant for inclusion in the author's original book—"The Scheduled Tribes of India" which discussed tribal groups of hither India.

GUPTA, Mahabir Prasad. *Aspects of Knowledge*. Dr. Mahabir Prasad Gupta Peace Foundation, New Delhi, 1980. x, 288p. Rs. 60.

A medical man by profession who firmly believes that combination of Gian (Spiritualism) and Vigyan (Science) can usher in a new era of universal peace, harmony and prosperity, and thus confer the greatest benefit on mankind. Projects a serene and highly intellectual analysis, of religion, politics and international affairs in this compilation of his articles published in some national dailies. The author's "Eight Point-Plan for Harmony," evoked a great deal of discussion in the Parliament and the Press, and a formal motion for its consideration was admitted in both Houses of Parliament for adoption and implementation. His writings reveal that the author has a clear perception and vision of the political situation in the world; this is amply displayed in a chapter "Coming War of Wars: Mediterranean will go into Flames between 1st June 1982 to 30th May 1983".

GUPTA, Prem Sagar. *A Short History of All India Trade Union Congress (1920-1947)*. All-India Trade Union Congress, New Delhi, 1980. 508p. Rs. 50.

History of 22 sessions, gives out important decisions, policies, resolutions and demands of the working class movement, brought out on the occasion of its 60th anniversary (Diamond Jubilee).

JOSHI, Nandini. *Power vs. Poverty: A View of UNCTAD 5*. New Order Book Co., Ahmedabad, 1980. 76p.

Non-governmental observer's reaction to the 5th United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which met at Manila in 1979. It shows how the advanced countries have gained the economic power to retain their material superiority and control and managed to have better terms in international economic relations. The understanding of this process, the author contends, could help developing countries to evolve a fruitful economic co-operation and partnership amongst themselves.

LAL, J.N. *Carter's Presidency: A Study of Promises and Performance*. The author, Balrampur, 1980. 46p. Rs. 4. Paper.

MEHTA, Balraj. *India's Political Economy*. Avishkar, New Delhi, 1980. 122p. Rs. 45.

Noted writer on economic affairs and development, discusses the deteriorating economic situation which began to be manifest in the mid-seventies as a wider crisis in Indian polity and society.

MISHRA, S.N. *Politics and Society in Rural India: A Case Study of Darauli Gram Panchayat, Siwan District, Bihar*. Inter-India, Delhi, 1980. 184p. Rs. 50.

Empirical study of the nature of the politics and society at the grass-root level in rural India. The case study attempts to throw light on various aspects of rural society, among them are urban influence, caste, panchayat elections, leadership, relationship between panchayati raj institutions and police functionaries, social conflicts, etc. It provides basis for a comparative study of rural areas in other parts of the country.

MITRA, C.R. *Sree Narayana Guru and Social Revolution: A Complete Biography*. Mitraji, Publications, Shertallai, 1979. 294p. Rs. 35. Paper.

History of social revolution in Kerala starting from the Channar riot of 1859 to Temple Entry Proclamation of 1936, through the life and activities of the great saint and champion of the depressed classes. The author also discusses the literary achievement of the Guru and describes "Kundalini" elaborately. In one of the chapters, the organisation called "Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam," formed for fighting social injustices and securing legitimate rights of the under privileged, is discussed. It is a well documented book and upholds the immortal precept of the Guru, one caste, one religion, one God for man.

MOHAPATRA, Ramesh Prasad. *Udayagiri and Khandagiri Caves*. D.K. Publications, Delhi, 1981, xxii, 270p. 20p.

Based on the author's doctoral thesis, discusses importance of the twin caves, situated in the Bhubaneswar sub-division of the Puri district, in the development of Indian art and architecture.

NARLA, V.R. *Poverty of Intellectualism in India* (University of Mysore Special Lecture, 73). Director, Prasara, University of Mysore, Mysore, 1978. 75p. Rs. 6. Paper.

Two lectures, first dealing with Ancient and Medieval periods and the second with Modern period, record critically our intellectual history.

PANDHE, M.K. *Ed. Social Life in Rural India*. India Book Exchange, Calcutta, 1977. ix, 306p. Rs. 45.

Highlights contemporary rural scene in India, based on official and semi-official sources.

RAJAGOPALACHARI, C. *Speeches V. 2*. Bhavan's Book University 50, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1978. xii, 222p. Rs. 13. Paper.

Delivered during the first ten years of India's Independence—includes one on "Nuclear weapons".

RAJASEKHARIAH, A.M. and SUBRAMNIAN, S. *Outlines of Political Science for Pre-degree, Plus Two and Intermediate Course* Vol. 1. Macmillan, Madras, 1980. viii, 107p. Rs. 9.75 Paper.

Textbook, defines and describes the terminology, concepts and men's thinking about the origin and development of the state as a political association, the problems of organisation and working of various forms of government and the realities of political evolution in general.

RANGARAO, K. *Village Politics: A Longitudinal Study*. Popular, Bombay, 1980. ix, 158p. Rs. 60.

Analyses the role of different political leaders in a village community against the background of its socio-economic structure and the society in general. The study brings to light the dynamics of political power and conflict in a village set up in Telengana at various periods. It also analyses the impact of the Communist-led peasant rebellion during 1947-51 and the impact of Panchayati Raj on the leftist forces.

RAO, V.M. *Rural Development and the Villages: Perspectives for Planning for Development* (Studies in Integrated Rural Development). Sterling, New Delhi, 1980. x, 122p. Rs 45.

The author argues in this monograph the need for grouping of villages into clusters capable of serving as "unit areas of development" for effective planning for rural development. He points out the missing link in the prevailing modes of spatial-cum-sectoral planning and also the adequacy of the conceptual base of the present system of block-level planning in the light of findings of studies completed in the Tumkur project.

SATYANARAYANA SASTRI, B.L. *Mandukyopanishad: A Study*. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1979. xiv, 31p. Rs. 6. Paper.

SHARMA, T.N. *Religious Thought in India*. Ramneek Publications, New Delhi, 1980. xii, 144p. Rs. 45.

Discusses some fundamental principles of religious thought followed by the people from very early times to the present day; based on different sacred books of various religions and wise sayings of saints and seers.

SINGH, Nagendra. *Juristic Concept of Ancient Indian Polity*. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980. xxvii, 200p. Rs. 65.

Fourth series of Sir B.N. Rau Memorial Lectures under the auspices of the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, by a jurist of world distinction. The book comprises of two lectures which deal with the ancient legal, constitutional and administrative concepts, the kinds of law prescribed and practised, and the priorities in the application of the law in any given case. The period covered is from the Vedic times to the Magadhan imperialism and onward to the Gupta Empire and Ashokan empire.

SRINIVASAN, R. *Facets of Indian Culture* (Bhavan's Book University, 101), Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980. xviii, 271p. Rs. 8. Paper.

Collection of articles, extracts and memoranda of a renowned educationist and philosopher, reflects his interests in music, mathematics and mysticism through which he understood the soul of India's culture.

VIJAYANAGAR, R.L.N. *Diversion of Funds: Myth or Reality*. P.P.S.I., Bombay, 1978. 29p. Rs. 2. Paper.

Answers to the allegations made against the textile mills that the programme of modernisation and rehabilitation of the mill has been held up by the diversion of funds by textile entrepreneurs to more profitable avenues of investment and by the declaration of excessive dividends.

FOOD POLICY AND POLITICS IN BANGLADESH*

By MARCUS FRANDA**

BANGLADESH is *sui generis*, if only because it is so poor and so over populated relative to food production that it forces one to ask the question, "How can any country get into the predicament of a Bangladesh?" The answer to such a question involves exploration into a number of complexities, including cultural patterns, political realities, economic changes, policy choices, and a multitude of historical events. A useful focus for inquiry is the food distribution system, which lies at the core of the nation's poverty. What are the political determinants of food production? To what extent and in what ways have national political and economic policies affected the nutritional levels of the poorest of the poor? How do present-day food policies compare with those of the past in terms of improving nutritional levels for the poorest segments of the population?

HISTORICAL FACTORS AFFECTING POVERTY

In a remarkable paper that has, to my knowledge, never been published, Dr. Akhter Hameed Khan has traced the history of the food problem in what is now Bangladesh, from the time of the Great Famine of 1943 up until the division of Pakistan in 1971.¹ Khan is in an especially good position to understand the mechanics of famine and food scarcity in Bengal because he was a government officer in the famine areas in 1943, a relief worker in the Khulna famine in 1951, a district officer during the days of community development and land reform in the 1950s and 1960s, and the founder of the heralded Comilla Academy of Rural Development. He argues that the 1943 famine was a major historical turning-point in Bengal because it seriously diminished the Britishers' "proud confidence" in their ability to govern, and it resulted from factors that are "still either patently active or merely dormant." Moreover, Khan insists, the policies born out of the trauma of 1943 "were scrupulously followed for more than two decades and have not yet been discarded."

The Great Famine of 1943 Man-made

Britishers, Bengalis and outside observers now agree that the 1943 famine was entirely man-made, the result of a wartime decision to upset traditional patterns of food production and distribution in order to prevent conquest of India by the Japanese. In early 1942 the Japanese had struck Asia like

*Paper to be presented at the Conference on Politics of Food, sponsored by the Pakistan Agricultural Research Institute at Islamabad, Pakistan, in September 1981.

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a "military tornado"—crippling the Royal Navy, overpowering the British in Malaya and Burma, looming like dark clouds over India's eastern borders. As a precaution against a potential enemy landing in the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, the British decided to pursue what was called a "denial policy"—i.e. to remove carts, boats, rice supplies and other necessities from the southern districts of Bengal in order to "deny" these to the invaders. As Khan points out, the Japanese escaped the hardships intended for them by not arriving, but unprecedented suffering took place among Bengali farmers, fishermen, carters, boatmen, rice merchants, and, most of all, rice eaters.

The areas of the 1943 "denial policy" were historically surplus rice areas, where grain merchants (*biparis*) purchased surplus rice after the big harvests (in January, February and March) and then sold it to other *biparis* in Dacca during the rainy season (June, July and August). One key variable in the distribution system was the annual flooding of the rivers, which enabled boats to take the rice to markets in Dacca and other over populated districts once the monsoon spate had risen high enough. By seizing all boats and carts, the British prevented rice from moving very easily into Dacca, with the result that a scarcity mentality set in, hoarding intensified, and prices soared. Bengali farmers were delighted when they found that prices were moving upward every week, and they quickly decided that they would wait before selling, sell in small quantities, and watch the market. Khan points out, "never before had Bengali farmers seen such favourable trends or possessed such holding capacity."

Within a few months, the "denial policy" had brought unprecedented affluence to hundreds of thousands of people—farmers, *biparis*, merchants, or anyone else who could store rice—and pitiful destitution to millions of others. Khan describes a big farmer who could not tell the police inspector after a 1943 burglary how many currency notes had been stolen because he did not know the extent of his new wealth. On the other side, Khan says, "I met many buyers—artisans, labourers, tenants—who had sold all their belongings to buy their daily rice."

Food Distribution Network Not a Force for Equality

The 1943 famine was publicly blamed on a series of chronic factors that were undoubtedly present in Bengal but were not the trigger causes of the immediate food scarcity. Production had not kept pace with population growth, the historic Bengali "safety valve" of imported food from Burma during periods of acute scarcity had not been working; and the increasing salinity of previously fertile land in the southern districts was beginning to be a problem. The reaction of the British, and later the Pakistanis, was to invest large amounts in attempts to increase agricultural production, and to intervene on a massive scale in an attempt to rearrange food distribution networks. For the first time in Bengal, five

interventionist measures of government became prominent, and all five have remained as salient features of food policy up until the present time. These are : (1) control of food prices; (2) control of the foodgrains trade; (3) control of movement of foodgrains; (4) government procurement of food; and (5) rationing.

Since 1943, the State—whether it was under the British, the Pakistanis, or independent Bangladeshi governments—has conceived of itself as the custodian of foodgrain consumers, and especially city-dwellers. Whenever there has been the slightest hint of scarcity, the Government has moved in to fix ceiling prices to consumers, to restrict the amount of profits that can be made from foodgrains, and to prevent hoarding. Surplus-districts have occasionally been cordoned off by policemen and the military, who are at those times supposed to allow only small handfuls of grain to move legally between districts without government permission. The Government itself has undertaken large-scale “procurement” of foodgrains, with the declared intention of supplanting old traders and providing fairer prices. The rationing system has always publicly promised constant prices and stocks, but has blatantly been structured to favour the six largest cities. Unlike the middle-class and rural poor, even low income urban consumers have generally been able to get cheap food, although first priorities for rationed food supplies have gone, by law, to the army, the police and the bureaucracy.

Every available study indicates that government intervention in the distribution of foodgrains in Bengal has not been a force for equality.² Rations have gone primarily to the better-off, and for the rest have been unreliable, inadequate and of poor quality. Price controls have generated a black market that has favoured the rich. Procurement and price controls have served as disincentives to growers, who have resented the fact that their interests have been sacrificed for the sake of the town-dwellers. Attempts at control of the foodgrains trade has given birth to unprecedented corruption and smuggling, with all records of dishonesty in other sectors of the economy being surpassed by those of government officials and police assigned to control grain movement.

Food Production Does Not Keep Pace with Population Growth

Poverty in Bangladesh has been intensified by a number of other factors. Primary among them is a massive population growth that has resulted from exceptional improvements in public health in this century, with no corresponding improvements in industrial or agricultural productivity. Overall annual population growth rates have risen from an average of just over one per cent in the 1940s to more than two per cent in the 1950s and more than three per cent in the 1970s. A plethora of recent studies indicate that there is some support for control of family size and spacing of children in Bangladesh, and especially among mothers who have already had

a number of pregnancies, but that the economics of poverty—essentially, the necessity for large numbers of hands, to improve the likelihood that some of them will be productive enough to sustain the family—still persists.³

Partition Exodus of Hindu Landlords Aggravates Poverty

A second factor intensifying poverty in Bangladesh was the large-scale Hindu-Muslim riots during the years of partition, which, when coupled with the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, led to the exodus of more than 4 million Hindu landlords (*zamindars* and *jotedars*), moneylenders, school teachers, government officials, and other elites between 1947 and 1954. These were the people who had run East Bengal—who had built and maintained the embankments (*bheris*) against floods, constructed large tanks (*pukurs*) and lakes for irrigation water, or had financed and supervised the reclamation of old silted riverbeds as the massive rivers of Bengal inexorably shifted course over the years. Without the *zamindars* and *jotedars* the *bheris* were not maintained, new *pukurs* were not dug, and the silted up rivulets and canals were not re-excavated. Pakistani military and administrative officers during their years in power (1947-1971), tried to take the place of the old authority figures of East Bengal by launching dozens of government programmes designed to supply irrigation water, but the Pakistanis ultimately proved illegitimate in the eyes of Bengalis, and Bangladesh was born as a consequence of the only successful civil war in this century.

The Liberation War and Subsequent Domestic Turbulence Disrupts Achieved Gains

The liberation war, along with a series of disruptions before and since, have interfered with whatever slight gains may have been made in food production. As is indicated in Table I, foodgrain output over the past four decades has generally not kept pace with population increases, but there have been certain periods (particularly in the first decade—the 1960s—and during the last few years), when there have been spurts of growth. Not surprisingly, these have corresponded with periods of relative calm and stability in the countryside.

During the 1950s, food production was severely hampered by the flight of Hindu landlords and capital to India, and by the resulting insecurity within Bangladesh as the Muslim peasantry fought over tenuous rights to the lands abandoned by the Hindu *zamindars*. Every communal riot in the late 1940s and early 1950s enhanced the nervousness of the elite Hindus of East Bengal, causing them to steadily shift their assets out of Pakistan and into India. The same riots fractured community structures in the villages of East Bengal, making it difficult (and often impossible) for anyone

TABLE I

COMPARISONS OF FOODGRAIN PRODUCTION WITH POPULATION, BANGLADESH, 1949-1981

(in millions of tons)

| Population Size | Year | Rice | Wheat | Total Food-grains |
|-----------------|------------|----------------------------------|-------|-------------------|
| 112% { | 42 million | 1949-50 | | |
| | 55 million | 1959-66 | | |
| | 70 million | 1969-70 | | |
| | 89 million | 1979-86 | | |
| | 91 million | 1980-81 (projected estimates) | | |
| | | 13% { | | |
| | | 7% { | | |
| | | | 38% } | 77% { |
| | | | 11% } | |
| | | 7.5 | — | 7.5 |
| | | 8.5 | 0.2 | 8.7 |
| | | 11.7 | 0.5 | 12.2 |
| | | 12.5 | 0.8 | 13.3 |
| | | 13.9 | 1.3 | 15.2 |

Source : Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh and its predecessors, as quoted in Haroun er Rashid, *Geography of Bangladesh* (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1977), pp. 242, 247; and in interviews with Dr. A.K.M. Ghulam Rabbani, Secretary of the Statistics Division, and with Dr. Charles Antholt and Stephen French of AID-Dacca, all in November/December 1980.

to muster enough authority to maintain the kinds of public works necessary for productive agriculture. A poorly implemented land reform—ostensibly abolishing all intermediaries, fixing ceilings at 33 acres, and giving occupancy rights to tenants—enhanced conflicts within village communities, to the detriment of productive enterprise.⁴

For a short time in the early and mid-1960s, it seemed as though a long-term agricultural boom was underway, in both East and West Pakistan, but this proved to be a temporary phenomenon. Concessional foodgrain imports from the United States emboldened the Pakistan Government to relax procurement and controls, and to otherwise remove disincentives to production. Positive incentives were introduced in the shape of subsidies for fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation water, seeds, tubewells and machinery. Ceiling prices for food crops were replaced by floor prices. Counterpart funds were generously provided for rural infrastructure. Large-scale projects were initiated for water control, village roads, drainage and irrigation, rural employment, and many other aspects of rural development. But all these activities were not fully tested during the days of a united Pakistan, if only because they were interrupted by so many occasions of domestic dissension.

These are solid indications that the nascent beginnings of a "green revolution" in Bangladesh have widened the gap between the better-off and worse-off segments of the population, but a more salient feature of the rural scene is the way in which almost all productive activities have been constantly interrupted by the devastations of war and civil strife. The introduction of the new technology in agriculture was seriously retarded in the late 1960s by the build-up to the 1971 civil war, beginning with the general disenchantment (rural and urban) against the rulers of united Pakistan after their embarrassment at the hands of India in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The migration—primarily from rural areas—of 9.7 million political refugees to India in 1971, and then back again to Bangladesh in 1972, was the culmination of a series of upheavals accompanying the independence movement, which seriously affected agricultural production. The gory aftermath of the liberation war has continued through the three coups of 1975 and the numerous unsuccessful coup attempts of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Not only were crops not sown or maintained or harvested during the years of actual turmoil, the war years have left a legacy of land disputes about who has seized who's land when, or who is entitled to it now that so-and-so has returned from India or West Pakistan and so-and-so remains in India or West Pakistan, or whether such-and-such political party or government was legitimate in promulgating particular pieces of legislation or ordinances to deal with rural conflict and development. In the eyes of many rural dwellers, there has been so much disorder, so much bloodshed and so many changes (or attempted changes) of government during the past decade that it is now impossible to live a harmonious existence. Stories abound of individuals or families gaining vast amounts of wealth from abandoned land or possessions, or from the spillover of the large international relief and development presence in Bangladesh, but these are more than balanced by stories of those who have lost everything—often in the short space of a few minutes, hours or days—through the ravages of civil war and domestic turbulence of the most extreme kind.⁵

WHO ARE THE POOREST?

People are poor for different reasons. The landless in the rural areas and the unemployed squatters in the cities (most of whom are the landless from the countryside), are unquestionably the most miserable in Bangladesh, but nutritional surveys indicate that 60 to 80 per cent of the Bangladesh population is undernourished or malnourished, depending on definitions. Small holding peasants and underemployed urban unskilled labourers are poor by any standards, but they are not always poor in the sense of having nothing. Small holding peasants have at least a homestead; many day labourers in the cities come from homes in slums rather than straight off the pavement. In general, the urban unemployed tend to be a bit better off than the rural landless because food rations usually reach the poor in

the cities long before they get to the most impoverished villagers.

A large percentage of the landless in Bangladesh are from the minority Hindu community (now probably 10 per cent or so of the population), the remnants of the former ruling community of East Bengal. Detailed studies of the Hindu community are not available, but the impression of community leaders and observers is that most Hindus, while woefully poor, are still a cut above the poorest. Perhaps because they are discriminated against, they tend to band together in community solidarity. Although the bulk of the Hindus are landless, they tend to dominate in certain low-level service occupations—as barbers, washermen, fishermen, potmakers, artisans and carpenters. As a community, it is the tribal population which fits much more universally among the poorest than do the Hindus, but the tribal population accounts for less than one per cent of the population (approximately 700,000 people in 1981).

In talking to the poor, one gets the impression that their poverty is caused primarily by changes in family fortunes, flooding and the shifting of rivers. According to Muslim law, each son gets one share and each daughter a half-share of a father's wealth, so that land can become terribly divided in a generation or two. Certain categories of the unfortunate—widows, lepers, the diseased and maimed—tend to be most neglected by families and least employable. Their position in society becomes particularly appalling when a major flood or a shift in the course of a river destroys their home or community, or washes away whatever little wealth they may have accumulated. It is now estimated by the government that more than 30 per cent of the people of Bangladesh have had their homes and possessions washed away by floods at some point during the past 10 years, while, during the same period, more than 10 per cent of the population has had their lands seriously rendered less fertile by inundations of sand and silt.

Most studies of poverty in Bangladesh focus on the rural landless, with the percentages of those categorized as landless ranging up to 59 or 60 per cent of the total population if one includes those who claim ownership to less than one acre. The most authoritative recent study, by Jannuzi and Peach in 1977, indicates that 59.4 per cent of the rural population claims (ownership rights to less than 1 acre, and 83.3 per cent claim) such rights to less than 3 acres. At the same time, the most fortunate 1.16 per cent of the rural population controls just slightly more than 15 per cent of the land, and the wealthiest 16.7 per cent of the population controls exactly two-thirds of the land. (See Table II)⁶

Among villagers themselves, Thorp has found that "the possession and use of 6 acres or more seems indisputably to constitute a person as a 'rich man,' and potentially a 'big man' in rural society."⁷ At a step below that, a person owning 3-6 acres is conceived by villagers to be "in a position to improve his situation if the combination of circumstances involved in producing a crop and marketing it are all in his favor." Thorp also argues, quite appropriately it seems to me, that "although it is empirically justifiable to

TABLE II

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL OWNED LAND IN RURAL BANGLADESH¹

| Number of Acres | Number of Households | Percent of Total | Number of Persons | Percent of Total | Area (Acres) | Percent of Total |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| Zero | 1,767,334 | 14.69 | 8,081,266 | 11.59 | — | — |
| 0.01-1.00 | 5,375,887 | 44.68 | 27,561,648 | 39.54 | 1,733,223 | 8.33 |
| 1.01-2.00 | 1,830,170 | 15.21 | 10,821,861 | 15.53 | 2,660,128 | 12.78 |
| 2.01-3.00 | 1,045,072 | 8.69 | 6,706,826 | 9.62 | 2,556,850 | 12.28 |
| 3.01-4.00 | 621,105 | 5.16 | 4,438,188 | 6.37 | 2,141,713 | 10.29 |
| 4.01-5.00 | 370,799 | 3.08 | 2,811,716 | 4.03 | 1,651,046 | 7.93 |
| 5.01-6.00 | 253,414 | 2.11 | 2,027,653 | 2.91 | 1,375,463 | 6.61 |
| 6.01-7.00 | 173,661 | 1.44 | 1,520,481 | 2.18 | 1,123,908 | 5.40 |
| 7.01-8.00 | 110,825 | 0.92 | 963,593 | 1.38 | 827,971 | 3.98 |
| 8.01-9.00 | 94,944 | 0.79 | 835,505 | 1.20 | 803,505 | 3.86 |
| 9.01-10.00 | 66,979 | 0.56 | 581,056 | 0.83 | 636,690 | 3.06 |
| 10.01-11.00 | 60,764 | 0.51 | 568,972 | 0.82 | 634,253 | 3.05 |
| 11.01-12.00 | 38,668 | 0.32 | 378,394 | 0.54 | 444,383 | 2.14 |
| 12.01-13.00 | 36,251 | 0.30 | 358,024 | 0.51 | 451,674 | 2.17 |
| 13.01-14.00 | 25,894 | 0.22 | 276,200 | 0.40 | 350,779 | 1.69 |
| 14.01-15.00 | 19,679 | 0.16 | 215,091 | 0.31 | 285,006 | 1.37 |
| Over 15.00 | 95,790 | 1.16 | 1,556,732 | 2.23 | 3,137,282 | 15.07 |
| TOTALS ¹ | 12,031,272 | 100.00 | 69,703,206 | 100.00 | 20,813,879 | 100.00 |

¹Components may not add to totals due to rounding.

Source : F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach, *Bangladesh: A Profile of the Countryside* (Bangladesh Mission, Agency for International Development, Dacca, 1979), p. 120.

categorize...farmers who possess less than 2/3 acre as functionally landless... this categorization is (not) culturally justifiable." Jannuzi and Peach, like Thorp and other analysts of rural Bengal, distinguish (see Table III) between those who own no land at all (Landless-I), those who own only a homestead plot (Landless-II), and those who claim ownership to less than a half acre (Landless-III). In Thorp's words, "To possess only a homestead plot makes a considerable difference in the perception a person has of himself and in the perceptions his neighbors have of him....Having been shown these small plots by a number of very proud possessors when I went out to the fields with them, I cannot be satisfied with categorizing them as 'landless'."

Those in the bottom 8-11 per cent of Bangladesh rural society, who have no claim to any land whatsoever, are the truly "landless" in terms of their own cultural conceptions and the perceptions of their peers. In Thorp's terms, they cannot "go out to their fields" because they have no fields. "They

TABLE III
 LANDLESSNESS IN RURAL BANGLADESH

| | Number of Households | Percent of Total | Number of Persons | Percent of Total |
|--------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Landless-I | 1,311,570 | 11.07 | 5,884,927 | 8.13 |
| Landless-II | 3,385,733 | 32.79 | 18,703,472 | 27.10 |
| Landless-III | 1,811,276 | 15.29 | 9,538,436 | 13.82 |

Definitions :

A *Landless-I* household is a rural household that claims ownership of no land, either homestead or other land.

A *Landless-II* household is a rural household that does not claim ownership of any land other than homestead land. Such a household may claim ownership to homestead land.

A *Landless-III* household is a rural household that claims ownership to some land other than the homestead, but no more than 0.5 acres of land other than the homestead. Such a household may claim ownership to homestead land. Thus, the sum of landless-II and landless-III households equals the total number of households which claim to own 0.5 acres or less of land other than homestead land.

Source : *Report on the Hierarchy of Interests in Land in Bangladesh*, by F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach (Agency for International Development, Washington: 1977), p. xxii.

do not have even the security of their own green vegetable garden or fruit bearing tree near their dwelling. Their residence. . . is at the pleasure of some other householder. They are the powerless in rural Bangladeshi society."

While peasants with small homesteads or with plots of less than a half-acre are undoubtedly somewhat better off than those with no land whatsoever, all three of these categories of peasants would be considered by most outsiders to be quite desperately poor. Indeed, estimates of the poor in Bangladesh range up to 80 and 90 per cent of the population, and especially if one includes the unemployed in the towns, unskilled workers, and other city slum dwellers. Urban analysts will often argue that statistics on urban poverty, which invariably show higher per capita incomes and more amenities for the urban poor than for the rural landless, are misleading. In this view, the degrading conditions of city slum living make for a less desirable "quality of life" than one finds in even the most wretched rural conditions. This factor alone provides the basis for the usual explanations of the relatively slow rate of rural-urban migration in Bangladesh, with the urban population still accounting for less than 10 per cent of the total population.

Antiquated Agrarian Structure Major Impediment to Improvement

Perhaps the most important point to be made about the poor in rural Bangladesh is not the extent of their landlessness, but rather the antiquated nature of their agrarian structure. As Jannuzi and Peach have so ably documented, the agrarian structure of Bangladesh "constitutes the major impediment to the implementation of a range of rural development programs that (might otherwise) promote economic growth within an environment of social justice."⁸ In this view, even land redistribution in Bangladesh would not be meaningful, either for increased production or redistribution of wealth, unless it were accompanied by a change in the agrarian structure. That structure is characterized by landlordism of the type that has prevailed in Bengal for the last few centuries and continues into the 1980s, despite recent attempts at change.

At the heart of Bangladesh's agrarian structure is the *malik* (landlord), whose holdings, rights and prerogatives today are nowhere nearly as great as were those of the old Hindu *zamindars* or *jotedars* of East Bengal. Nonetheless, modern *maliks* are still divorced from direct agricultural operations, and particularly those operations of low status that involve what are perceived to be dirty or menial tasks. To this extent, modern *maliks* are still absentee or non-cultivating landholders, even though several levels of subinfeudation have been abolished and landed estates severely reduced in size.

As landholders, modern *maliks* attempt to minimize the assumption of personal risk in connection with agricultural operations. They typically sublet their lands in order to limit their direct responsibility, either for providing agricultural inputs or for assuming a share of the costs of such inputs used in cultivation by others on their land. In the words of Jannuzi and Peach, "This means in practice that the lessor (sharecropper) has customarily assumed all of the risks and most, if not always all, of the costs of production. No matter how much or how little the sharecropper produces, the *maliks* are guaranteed at least fifty per cent of the product."⁹

Because of the gap between the landed and non-landed, many scholars, politicians and administrators have tried to conceive of Bangladesh in terms of socio-economic classes, or, in the case of the large number of small Marxist-left parties in Bangladesh, to promote "class solidarity" among the poor. Such attempts have run straight up against what Peter Bertocci calls "structural fragmentation" among the poor—i.e. atomized occupational structures and other factors that stifle the growth of class solidarity and consciousness by virtue of the variation in disparate interests and, therefore, the diverse group identities they engender.¹⁰ One major study indicates that, among the lowest 44 per cent of the rural population in terms of landlessness or relative landlessness, 12 per cent—almost a quarter—engage in petty trade as a primary (and 6 per cent as a secondary) source of income, while 8 per cent depend on menial occupations as their basis for subsistence and many others

work in non-agricultural food production areas (e.g. fishing, 12 per cent).¹¹ As Bertocci points out, this "suggests a multiplicity of individual links into the institutional framework of the rural economy, the nature of which has been virtually unstudied."

Even among those landless who depend primarily or secondarily on field labour as their source of income, there are important differences. Migrant labourers—who travel away from their homes in search of work on a seasonal basis—have been shown to drive down agricultural labour wages generally, in direct competition with landless labourers who are locally resident.¹² Further differences exist between landless labourers who have established or maintained traditional patron-client relationships with a *malik*, and other labourers—whether resident or migrant—who are paid strictly on a cash basis and who tend to denigrate patron-client ties.

Among those with land, there are also large numbers of fundamental differences that separate them, including family size, quality of land, efficiency of cultivation, adoption of new techniques, availability of credit and other inputs, and so forth. Jannuzi and Peach found that those farmers who owned the mean or larger amounts of land tended to rent or sharecrop it out to others, while those who owned less than the mean tended to rent or sharecrop additional land from others in order to make ends meet. Bertocci has identified a number of patterns where *maliks* with amounts of land below the mean would take in land one season and give it out the next, and he has found at least two studies which indicate that rates of indebtedness (including mortgaging of one's land) are higher for "surplus" farmers than for "subsistence" farmers.¹³

Cross-cutting all of these socio-economic divisions are a number of moral precepts and cultural models that promote interpersonal and inter-group factionalism over class conflict. One of these is implicit in the personal struggle between *takdir*, which refers to "the predestined limits and potentialities bestowed by Allah on each individual life," and *takbir*, the "obligation of each individual to realize via maximum effort the fulness of one's given potentialities."¹⁴ In discussing these two moral precepts, Bertocci identifies a "widely accepted belief that one's capacity to maximize attainment of one's (especially economic) goals is intimately linked to the degree one is successful in attaching oneself to persons who are powerful and prestigious." It is not difficult to see how such a belief promotes inter-personal and inter-group factionalism of the type so often identified with Bangladesh countryside. Bertocci also suggests that the the Bengali Muslim peasant's conception of what is "justice", the distribution of power and prestige, or, conversely, what is "exploitation" or "abuse of power," is radically divergent from the conceptions of Western (or even urban Bangladeshi) class analysts.

In talking with people in Bangladesh, it quickly becomes clear that a majority will classify itself as being among the poorest of the poor, although numerous segments of that majority will seriously question whether other segments should be so classified. This is partly because rewards and subsidies

have recently been introduced for those who can qualify for various categories of poverty, but it is also the result of genuine feelings among many people that they have been put upon in recent years, or that their life situation has positively declined relative to what it was before or what it was for their ancestors. It is also clear that there has been a great deal of mobility, both upward and downward, within Bangladeshi society recently, with millions of people losing all or most of their wealth in the succession of floods, famines, wars and civil strife that have battered this part of the world during the last four decades.¹⁵ The contrast between those who have lost and gained is especially striking because the losers have plummeted into the depths of the poorest anywhere in the world, while the gainers have been, almost invariably, poorer Muslims who have, for the first time in the history of this traditionally Hindu-dominated region, acquired considerable degrees of wealth, influence and power.

Nutritional Levels—An Ideal Tool for Identification

Perhaps the surest way of identifying the poorest segments of the population is by focusing on nutrition levels. Fortunately, in Bangladesh there have been two excellent nutrition surveys—in 1962-64 and in 1975-76—which make it possible to compare nutrition over time and in great depth.¹⁶ The results of the surveys indicate that both average dietary intake and a average calorie intake have decreased for the entire population by an average of 9 per cent each, from levels that were already unsatisfactory at the time of the first survey. The first survey indicated that 45 per cent of all rural families had calorie intakes below a recommended daily minimum of 2,120 calories. In the second survey, this percentage had ballooned to 59 per cent of rural families.

Consumption of foodgrains declined by 9 per cent between 1962 and 1975, even though massive imports of wheat maintained and enhanced consumption levels of that commodity (wheat is the only major category of food that is being consumed in greater quantities now than it was in 1962). Bangladesh is still the fourth largest producer of rice in the world, but rice production has failed to keep up with population growth, with the result that per capita consumption of rice has been steadily declining over the past two decades. Consumption of meat, potatoes, pulses and fish have also declined noticeably during the past twenty years.

The consequences of lack of proper nutrition are not difficult to see in Bangladesh. More than 80 per cent of children of ages 0-5 suffer from malnutrition (a state of ill health) or under-nutrition (meaning that they are less robust or have less vigour, strength or reserve than they would otherwise). A similar percentage of children ages 0-11 are found to be stunted (62 per cent), or wasted (4 per cent), or both stunted and wasted (12 per cent). Almost a million Bangladeshis suffer from night blindness due to vitamin A deficiency, and vitamin A deficiency is also the major cause of total blindness, which

has afflicted people in Bangladesh to a greater extent than elsewhere. Seventy per cent of the population—more than 63 million people—are anaemic; 82 per cent of the children below 5 years of age do not have the minimum acceptable level of haemoglobin in their blood; and numerous others suffer from such nutrition-deficiency related diseases as Xerosis conjunctivae, Bitot's spot, angular stomatitis, angular scars, marasmus or Kwashiorkor.

Nutritional levels and habits correlate quite positively and strikingly with income. As incomes increase, consumption of all foods other than vegetables—and especially cereals, pulses, fish and milk—increases. The fact that consumption of vegetables does not increase is an indication that vegetables are not a prestigious food item in Bangladesh, a matter that is of considerable concern to nutritionists in the country. An astounding finding from the 1975-76 nutrition survey (p. 132) is that *every member of every single family owning less than three acres of land was deficient in its intake of calories, calcium, vitamin A, riboflavin and vitamin C*. Overall, the relationships between different indices of socio-economic status with nutrients are more or less the same as their relationships with food groups.

Variations in nutritional levels are often a seasonal phenomenon, and are clearly related to food prices and availability. A major study done over a number of years at a factory town called Companyganj indicated that levels of nutritional status will routinely dip drastically in August, just before the summer rice harvest, but will then bounce back if the harvest is bountiful.¹⁷ The same study also found a correlation between the price of rice and the death rate, with the incidence of deaths rising rapidly and in quick response to increases in rice prices. A major mapping project by Bruce Currey of the East-West Center in Hawaii has identified areas "liable" and "very liable" to famine, with the major factors contributing to such liability being identified, in order of importance, as flooding, drought, population pressure, food deficit, lack of alternative employment, low crop yields, poor land transport, river erosion, cyclone risks, and maldistribution of agricultural inputs. According to Currey's analysis, the first five factors of those listed above account for over 70 per cent of the composite index of famine liability.¹⁸

Not all malnutrition or under-nutrition, of course, is related to economic status. Indeed, there is a great deal of room in Bangladesh for health education among all socio-economic segments of the population, and especially as regards the rearing of children under 5 years of age. There is a common belief throughout the country that the colostrum—the first milk—is not good for the child, a belief that could not be at greater variance with scientific findings.¹⁹ Because of this belief, parents of newborn babies will commonly withhold milk from the newborn for 24-48 hours. Even health workers will often take the colostrum and dispose it of, while recommending that the baby receive water and honey, a practice that at once exposes children to unsanitary water and deprives them of the nutritional benefits of the first milk.

A second source of under-nourishment throughout Bangladesh is the

widespread practice of providing supplementary foods only at the age of 15-18 months, at which time a baby is quickly and completely weaned. Some degree of nutrition is assured by the fact that 98 per cent of Bangladesh's mothers breast feed, but tremendous gains in nutritional levels could be made if supplemental foods (simple fruits, vegetables, carbohydrates) were introduced in tiny quantities around 4-6 months of age, progressing to a full diet by 18 months, with a delay in the weaning process until the age of 18-24 months.

A third cultural source of undernourishment is related to treatment of diarrhoea; the common practice in Bangladesh is to withhold food and liquids from sufferers of diarrhoea until stools are firm and infrequent. This practice is extremely detrimental—often resulting in death to a diarrhoeal child—because body fluids are not replaced. Parents argue that they do not want to give food and liquids because this makes stools runny and more frequent, but doctors recommend re-hydration solutions—commonly a salt, sugar and water mixture—which helps provide nutrition and absorption of needed salts. Health studies in Bangladesh reveal that the major causes of death in the first few years of life are related to neo-natal tetanus, diarrhoea, pneumonia, and measles, with all of these becoming the more serious to the extent that a child is malnourished by insufficient food and calorie intake. A series of studies surveyed by Lawrence Marum has suggested that economic factors do outweigh cultural factors in producing malnourishment and undernourishment, but Marum nevertheless concludes that attention to educational and cultural factors might well mitigate some of the harsher effects of economic hardship.²⁰

PUBLIC FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SAFEGUARDS GOVERNMENT-EMPLOYEE INTERESTS

Throughout the 1970s, Bangladesh never really had a coherent food policy. There was an expansion of the public food distribution system (PFDS), but this was not a planned expansion, nor was it a sign of anything other than a failure to make significant gains in food production. During the latter half of the 1970s, the PFDS handled almost twice as much foodgrain as during the latter half of the 1960s. At present, 13-15 per cent of all foodgrain consumed in the country pass through this system, which employs more people than any other government department. A full quarter of the population (23 million people) is served by it in one form or another, and it requires for its maintenance 1.8 million tons of foodgrains each year.²¹ In recent years, 75 per cent of the foodgrains in the system have been imported and financed by concessional aid.

The PFDS in Bangladesh was not designed to feed the poor. Its major purpose is, and has always been, to provide government workers, the police, the military, and other "priority" sectors with payment in kind, as a means of protecting them against the erosive effects on their real income of seasonal

and year-to-year fluctuations in food prices. The highest priority within the system is a category called Statutory Rationing (SR), which goes to about two-thirds of the residents of the six major cities (Dacca, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Narayanganj and Rangamati). Almost everyone residing in these cities is entitled to a ration card, but food is distributed first to certain "priority categories," in both urban and rural areas, which include members of the armed services, the police, all government employees, students, and employees of large companies. In 1980, these categories (SR, 23 per cent and priority categories 31 per cent) accounted for a total of 54 per cent of food distribution through the PFDS.²²

Aside from the six largest cities, the rest of the country is served by what is known as modified rationing (MR), and by Food-For-Work (FFW) and relief programmes. Residents in the rural areas are classified into four income categories (A,B,C,D), with those in the lowest, tax-free income category (A) usually being favoured in the administrative rules of distribution. In fact, however, MR, FFW and relief programmes are all administered at the local level, and every single study that has been done indicates that much of the grain allotted to local officials for MR, FFW and relief is sold for personal profit.²³ Local Union Council leaders will record that they have distributed a large amount of grain in MR areas when in fact they have distributed much less; they will use faulty scales and weighing methods that err dramatically in their favour; and they will pay workers for moving a small amount of earth under Food-For-Work schemes, but will report to government that much greater amounts have been moved. In addition to these, there are many other ploys that are commonly used to divert PFDS grains into the private sector.

In recent years, Food-For-Work programmes have acquired a reputation for greater honesty than some of the older relief schemes, primarily because international agencies have established elaborate procedures for measuring the amount of earth to be moved before the initiation of a canal-digging or road-building project, and then measuring the amount actually moved after the project's completion. FFW projects run by CARE are known to be particularly well-administered, with CARE officials commonly paying local project leaders fewer foodgrains than claimed because of shortfalls in amounts of earth actually moved. This manner of proceeding contrasts sharply with older relief and ration programmes in Bangladesh, which are typically viewed as little more than political patronage pure and simple.

There is an anti-corruption wing of the Food Ministry which is supposed to check instances of foodgrain diversion and misuse of ration cards, but it has thus far been ineffective. President Ziaur Rahman himself admits that there is unquestionably more corruption now than when he first came to power five years ago, but he argues that this is a "fact of life" which results from the large-scale influx of foreign food and money.²⁴ Zia and the major leaders of all other political parties in Bangladesh are convinced that the nation needs more rather than less foreign aid.

In a country where filial and fraternal solidarity are highly valued, it is often difficult to distinguish close kinship networks from corruption.²⁵ Then too, even without considering kinship, identification of corrupt acts is often elusive. There is disagreement, for example, about whether provosts in university dormitories are guilty of corruption when they buy large amounts of wheat with ration cards and then sell wheat on the open market because, they claim, students will not eat wheat products. A well-known story in Dacca involves a case filed by the anti-corruption wing against a prominent social worker who had 50 ration cards. The social worker got the case withdrawn on the argument that so many people came to see her because of her fame as a social worker—this blind man, that beggar, this well-wisher, that friend—that she needed to buy large amounts of food to entertain them. Being a social worker, she successfully argued, she could not afford that much food without ration cards.

Once grain has been diverted from the PFDS into private hands, it will often be held and sold only after scarcity conditions develop and prices rise. In this way, the public distribution system—as it operates on the ground—actually punishes the rural poor rather than helping them. Recent figures also indicate that the rationing system is increasingly being skewed against the urban poor. This is so in large part because the Government has stopped issuing ration cards to people moving into SR areas after 1974, except in cases of public employees being transferred into these areas. Since the vast majority of the migrants into the six largest cities are rural poor looking for jobs, the new regulations have effectively increased the proportion of the subsidized ration going to upper income groups.

While there has been a great deal of talk in recent years about the need for food self-sufficiency and rapid agricultural growth in Bangladesh, these priorities have not been reflected in government budgets. A December 1979 World Bank Report found that the share of agriculture and rural development in Bangladesh plans had declined from 33 per cent to 17 per cent between 1973 and 1979.²⁶ During the same period, private sector investment in agriculture was practically non-existent. The Bangladesh Government itself estimates that less than 20 per cent of total development expenditure has gone to agriculture since independence. It also estimates that the average rural resident receives 28 pounds of foodgrain per year through various forms of public distribution, including Food-For-Work, MR and relief, compared with 321 pounds per year for each ration card holder in the SR cities.

A FOOD STRATEGY FOR THE EIGHTIES

The World Bank, the Aid Bangladesh Consortium and other international donors have exerted increasing pressure on the Bangladesh Government in recent years to put more money into agriculture, and to either do away with the rationing system entirely or re-structure it in such a way that it favours the poor. These pressures have become the more intense in the early 1980s

as world food supplies have failed to keep up with demand, and as traditional concessional suppliers have found new commercial foodgrain markets. In early 1980, American diplomats in Dacca officially informed the Bangladesh Government that it could not count on American concessional food supplies in the future.

Infrastructure for New Bureaucratic Controls Created

Bangladesh has responded with the formation of a new inner-Cabinet National Committee on Food (NCF), which sits once a fortnight or so and reviews the food situation. The NCF consists of the Ministers of Food, Relief, Agriculture, Shipping, Transport, and so forth, and is chaired by President Ziaur Rahman. There has also been established a Planning and Monitoring Unit within the Planning Commission, which deals primarily with food-related issues. Both the NCF and leaders of the Planning Commission Monitoring Unit meet occasionally with an Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Food, which is headed by the Food Minister and includes a number of Members of Parliament. The Advisory Committee is supposed to represent the interests of farmers, consumers, and other concerned segments of society. Aside from these bureaucratic committees and some political parties (discussed below), the public in Bangladesh is not really represented in decision-making in the food policy area. There are no citizens' committees of any consequence that can reach to the inner councils of government.

Food Security Plan Launched

In collaboration with aid donors, the NCF formulated (in August 1980) a Food Security Plan, which outlined a number of areas where the Government and the aid donors are in substantial agreement. The Plan envisages a gradual reduction in the importance of the ration shops, movement towards an open market system in such a way as to require government intervention only at times of extreme scarcity or surplus, and provision of price supports and other incentives to agricultural producers. Publicly, President Zia has established woefully unrealistic five-year goals to abolish the rationing system entirely and double food production.

Some indication of the sincerity of the Government in its efforts to move away from rationing was indicated in May 1980, when a number of measures were promulgated to equalize ration shop prices with those prevailing in the open market. Total shares of food available to any one person in the ration shops was diminished from $3\frac{1}{2}$ shares to 3 shares, with two-thirds of the new rations being provided in wheat and only one-third in rice (previously, wheat and rice were available on a 50-50 basis; wheat is still considered to be much less desirable than rice). Prices on rationed items (which include salt, sugar, edible oils and other foods, as well as foodgrains) were significantly raised in May 1980, to the point where they then provided only a

15 per cent average subsidy when contrasted with open market prices, as opposed to a 70 per cent subsidy before May 1980.

It is important to point out that the May 1980 tightening of ration shop prices was undertaken at a time when food surpluses in independent Bangladesh were approaching an all-time high, owing largely to a coincidence of large-scale foodgrain imports and several good rice harvests during the year 1980. However, foodgrain imports are still plentiful because the government was expecting relatively poor harvests in 1980; the fact that harvests have been so bountiful (primarily because of excellent weather conditions) has left the government with an embarrassing surplus that cannot be adequately stored. In early 1981 large-scale building programmes for public food storage warehouses have been undertaken; subsidies are being provided to builders of food storage areas in the private sector; government is renting out school-buildings, private homes and numerous other structures for rice storage, and a number of proposals to export rice are being seriously considered.

Both the Bangladesh Government and the international agencies are convinced that the only hope for a viable Bangladesh economy is to increase the output of food sufficiently to generate an export surplus and establish a grain reserve within Bangladesh. As Faaland and Parkinson have pointed out, if Bangladesh were routinely exporting food, "a bad crop could be accommodated by reducing exports and the problem moved to other people who ought to be able to buy elsewhere."²⁷ A reserve of 1-2 million tons of grain would enable the country's leaders to provide their own emergency relief in times of scarcity, would allow them to better control prices and otherwise counter the moves of private hoarders and speculators and would offer some hope of insulating food prices in Bangladesh from the vagaries of the international market.

In pursuance of an "export and grain reserve" strategy, Ziaur Rahman's Government has, for the first time in independent Bangladesh, increased the procurement price of foodgrains to the point where it now constitutes an attractive support price, and the Food Ministry is furiously trying to procure as much grain as possible for government warehouses. The government can presently store about one million tons of grain at a maximum, but the quality of that storage space is highly variable, with perhaps as much as half of it being either temporary or downright inadequate. A crash programme is being funded by international donors (led by the Japanese) to provide additional storage for about 200,000 tons of grain by summer 1981, and plans are being made for open-storage—on platforms, covered with plastic and tarps—at eight or nine old World War II airports. Food Ministry officials estimate that they might obtain as much as 300,000 tons of storage capacity from new open-storage plus rental of school buildings and other structures.

On the export front, the Bangladesh Government is negotiating with India to repay a previous loan of 150,000 tons of rice in kind, and is also seriously considering three other export possibilities. One is to export rice

and import wheat at cheaper prices. A second is to produce some very high grade aromatic rice which the Gulf and Middle East nations are currently purchasing at \$500 per ton, with the idea of exporting these in return for imports of ordinary rice at \$200 per ton in bad years. The third possibility is to export low-grade rice, of which Bangladesh has a great deal, primarily to African countries like Senegal, which prefer the low-grades (Senegal, for example, prefers 80 per cent "brokens" when it buys on international markets whereas in the US consumable rice is usually 20 per cent "brokens").

Problems of an "Export and Grain Reserve" Strategy

The difficulty with the export market, of course, is that it is a terribly complex business, and one in which Bangladesh has no experience. Saleable rice for international markets has to be maintained at certain standards of moisture content, shipped free from foreign material, exported on schedule, and guarded against pilferage and damage at both ends of a transaction. If rice were exported from Bangladesh today, it would have to go through the big international grain companies, on foreign ships. Even then, it would take at least a few years for the government to re-structure its production and marketing habits, its transportation networks, banks and port facilities before it was geared up to any kind of significant amounts of exportable grains.

There are many other pitfalls in the path of an "export and grain reserve" strategy. It is entirely dependent on a high support price to producers and large-scale procurement by the government, but both of these are terribly expensive for the government to maintain over a prolonged period. During the coming year, for example, there is a real question whether the Bangladesh Government will have enough currency—and especially in the right places at the right times—to buy the large amounts of grain it intends to purchase. If the Government falls short of its procurement targets, or fails to maintain high prices to producers, consumer prices will invariably fall below ration shop prices, ration offtakes will dry up completely, and the government will be left with enormous stocks rotting in warehouses. This would throw the market completely out of control and permanently damage the credibility of Zia's Government in future foodgrain transactions.

Many of Bangladesh's food strategy problems result from its lack of insularity from the economies of India and the rest of the world. If Bangladesh were to develop an exportable food surplus and a grain reserve, for example, it would inevitably be tempting for government officials and the private trade to smuggle some of that surplus into food-deficit areas in India at times of scarcity, along time-tested food smuggling routes of the past. There are even greater problems associated with the attempts to get agricultural inputs to Bangladesh farmers, as was demonstrated in 1980, when a major Bangladesh Government effort to provide a significant fertilizer subsidy to Bangladesh farmers had to be abandoned because

much of the subsidized fertilizer was finding its way into black markets across the border with India.

To the extent that the government does successfully maintain high support prices, procures at unprecedented rates, creates an export surplus, and accumulates a domestic grain reserve, it will most likely favour larger and medium-sized farmers at the expense of the landless poor.²⁸ Government spokesmen argue that this is not necessarily the case because more than 80 per cent of the rural population is involved in production of grains and even small farmers are forced to sell rice when the bulk of the paddy comes in during the Aman harvest (December-January). Without adequate storage, and heavily in debt for his agricultural inputs, the small farmer customarily sells much of his crop for much-needed cash immediately after the Aman harvest, and then is forced to buy rice during the "hunger months" preceding the next Aman. If government could enter the market with high support prices immediately after the Aman comes in and then sell it cheaply just before the next Aman, the argument goes, it could undoubtedly benefit the small farmer. Landless or predominantly landless labour would be benefited, government spokesmen say, by a general increase in production and by greater use of high-yielding varieties, which require more labour than the older varieties for productivity.

What makes arguments like those above questionable in the aggregate is the mounting pace of unemployment in the Bangladesh countryside as a consequence of unprecedented population growth and burgeoning age cadres among teenagers. According to the most reliable estimates, an increase in agricultural production to 20 million tons of foodgrains in five years would produce 1 million new jobs in the agricultural sector, but there would still be a net increase of unemployed or under-employed in the rural areas of an additional 3 million people during this five-year period. Under these circumstances, most experts anticipate that increases in agricultural production will benefit those with land, that more and more of the smaller landed will become employees of the larger landed, wages will remain low, major returns will go to inputs, and the position of the poorest rural dwellers will continue to recede. This is all the more likely to happen if the Ziaur Rahman Government enthusiastically pursues plans to promote a "privatization" of agriculture, permitting the big producers to purchase inputs off the shelf and to otherwise act without the restraints of previous bureaucratic controls.

A number of individuals and organizations in Bangladesh have been working with Secretary of Agriculture Obaidullah Khan to initiate experiments that would provide non-land assets to the landless, organized into service co-operatives that could enable their members to earn a decent standard of living.²⁹ Prototypes of such co-operatives have already been organized by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Proshika (a Canadian-funded voluntary association), around tubewell pumps, with co-operatives of the landless operating the pumps and supplying irrigation water (for a fee) to the landed. One expert, who prefers not to

be identified, envisages the possibility of 20-30 landless pump co-operatives of this type eventually forming a "union" or "federation," which might in turn generate an agro-business, or be used for political purposes and self-protection. Acknowledging the enormous problems involved in sustaining such groups, he suggests that co-operatives built around non-land assets is a "vision" that provides one of the few real possibilities for absorbing the massive waves of rural unemployment that can be expected in Bangladesh over the next few decades.

President Ziaur Rahman's solution to the rural unemployment problem has been a series of massive public works projects—building roads and embankments, digging canals, or re-excavating old silted up rivers—in an effort to put people to work in productive activities without enormous government investments. Zia himself travels out to the rural areas (usually by helicopter) at least 15 days a month; the purpose of most of his visits being the inauguration of a canal-digging project or some other public works effort. In the northern parts of the country, most of these voluntary activities are designed to provide irrigation water, either by digging canals directly to fields or by excavating canals that can be used to store water for low-lift pumps. In the southern regions—and especially in the districts of Noakhali and Purnea—Zia's public works programmes have consisted primarily of what is known as *polderization*, a Dutch term for reclamation of low-lying lands by the building of embankments and other flood control measures.

What Zia is clearly trying to do is to provide from above the necessary authority and legitimacy structures to generate enough labour for completion of large public works that have been neglected for several decades. The major impact of his large-scale voluntary projects, however, is not to provide paid employment to the poor, since there are no wages involved in these schemes. The immediate beneficiaries of Zia's voluntary canal-digging schemes are the landed, who now get water or flood protection that was not previously available. In some cases the landed will voluntarily provide some food or cash to voluntary labourers involved in these schemes, but in most instances gains for the poor are expected to come solely from the increased agricultural activity that becomes possible once a canal is re-excavated or an embankment built. A reflection of the widespread cynicism about voluntary schemes (which should be distinguished from Food-For-Work and other public works projects where labourers are paid) was a comment by one day labourer in Mymensingh :

The people who have always dug these canals are the same—they are my ancestors. It is a question of how the others are going to convince us to do the work. My grandfather used to get rice and comfort from the *zamindar*. I get only a few taka per day during the harvesting season. This is not enough to buy food for my family. Now the government is asking me to volunteer my labour. But how are we supposed to work all day when we have no food?

FOOD POLICY AND THE OPPOSITION

Marxist Leftist Parties Disagree Over Role of the Poor

The only political parties in Bangladesh that have done any extensive work among the poorest of the poor, or have tried to mobilize them behind a fairly thorough re-structuring of society, have been a few relatively minor Marxist-Left parties, the most notable among them being the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD). But these parties, like all political parties in Bangladesh, are funded by businessmen and led by the educated urban middle class.³⁰ The JSD was perhaps the most prominent party that contained a hard core of dedicated students who frequently went out to rural areas to mobilize the poorest segments of the population, but in late 1980, the party became hopelessly divided on ideological lines, with both factions becoming seriously demoralized about the possibilities of rural change. Neither faction—nor any other significant Marxist or Communist party in Bangladesh today—believes that the poorest 30 or 40 per cent of the population can lead a future revolution, although they disagree about the extent to which the poorest segments might at some stage be brought in behind other leadership as a revolutionary force.

Bangladesh National Party Concentrates on the Creation of New Rural Institutions

President Ziaur Rahman is reported to have proposed a substantive agrarian reform when he first came to power in 1975, in the hope that he might be able to build a mass rural base, but this idea was opposed by his key political advisors at the time. Zia's own Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is made up, almost exclusively, of people from middle and upper-class backgrounds, with ex-military officers and ex-bureaucrats assuming major roles in leadership positions. Since the consolidation of his rule a few years ago, Zia and the BNP have concentrated on the creation of new rural institutions—clustered around Gram Sarkars (village councils) and a Village Defence Force—all designed to attract village influentials to the development programmes of the BNP while enhancing party and administrative control and influence in the rural areas.³¹

Poor Disenchanted With Awami League Policies

The Awami League—by far the largest opposition party—is also led by middle and upper-class politicians. It still maintains considerable support among Hindus, some of whom tend to be among the poorest, but otherwise its rural support is mobilized by its own village elites, who are opposed to the BNP's rural elites on the basis of personalistic differences and group factional positions. Rounaq Jahan has pointed out that support from the

poor for the Awami League has steadily declined since the liberation war, for a variety of reasons. She explains :

The independence of Bangladesh brought with it great expectation, which later turned into great frustration. The galloping inflation of the early 1970s meant economic hardship for the poor. The high incidence of crime which followed in the aftermath of independence also meant suffering for the poor. As a result, the masses were no longer as enthusiastic about political struggle as they were before independence, when they believed that a political change would necessarily bring about the betterment of their socio-economic conditions. Ziaur Rahman's survival in power, in part, reflects this changed mood of the masses, who are now more cautious about bringing in political change.³²

Other Opposition Groups Fail to Win Over the Poor

Other opposition parties have been no more successful in organizing the poor than have the BNP and the Awami League. The Democratic League of former President Khondkar Mushtaque Ahmed is extremely critical of the Government on the corruption issue, but its own programme for rural development and food policy is essentially the same as the one now being pursued by the Government, with perhaps a slightly greater emphasis on privatization. Ironically enough, while Mushtaque Ahmed is highly critical of Zia's regime because of its corruption, Mushtaque's own party has suffered organizationally because Mushtaque himself was in prison for four years, having been convicted on charges of corruption. The other major non-communist party—the Jamaat-i-Islami—is, by the admission of its own leadership, primarily an urban party that appeals to the religiously-minded educated classes. This is so, say its leaders, because “the educated are better trained and equipped than the poor to understand Islam.”

Do the nation's political leaders perceive of hunger and malnutrition among the poorest as a critical political issue or a high priority political issue? The answer to that question is clearly no, although there is every fear that, if the middle-class or upper-class is not properly catered to, there will be unrest.³³ Some elite Bangladeshis, as well as many people in the international development agencies, have felt very intensely the normal dilemmas that stem from their enclave existence in the midst of massive hunger and poverty. There are a number of imaginative pilot projects that have attacked the poverty issue head-on in a particular village or group of villages. And yet, these projects are the exceptions, the aberrations, which do not fit with the main thrust of what the Bangladesh Government is up to nor with the priority goals of the financial Powers that back the international development establishment. As one of Zia's close associates put it, “You do hear about poverty questions from a lot of well-intentioned people in the middle ranks, but anyone involved in the power structure of Bangladesh is interested in other questions—

like how Zia will fall, whether there is disaffection in the army, who is getting promoted, who is getting contracts, and these kinds of things."

CONCLUSIONS

In Bangladesh, it is difficult to identify the poorest of the poor. Somewhere between 80 and 90 per cent of the population is poor by anyone's standards, and most people within the country tend to perceive of themselves and their own socio-economic categories as being among the most severely disadvantaged. Those with homestead plots in the rural areas tend to be better off than the completely landless, and perhaps even better off than the urban poorest, who live in more degrading physical conditions. For all of these segments of the population, however, nutritional levels have been steadily declining.

Subsidized food rations have not been intended for the poorest, except in times of acute scarcity when international relief agencies and some domestic programmes have successfully strived to prevent famine of the magnitude of 1943. Nevertheless, high population growth rates have combined with economic failure and almost constant civil strife to produce a precipitous decline in the purchasing power of the poorest. Since neither agricultural nor rural industrial growth have kept pace with the population spiral, both landlessness and unemployment have rapidly increased. Rural-urban migration has not escalated any more quickly than in other parts of South Asia, but it is growing. More important than rural-urban migration has been the constant influx of Hindus and other low status groups to India, an exodus that has been a growing irritant in Indo-Bangladesh relations.

There is a great deal of rhetoric about poverty whenever Bangladesh is discussed, and most government programmes are publicly justified by referring to their poverty-relieving potential. The major concern of government leaders, however, is clearly with political stability, which depends primarily on the support of the bureaucracy, the army, the police, and a number of key middle-class groups. The leadership of Bangladesh would like to do something about bottom-end poverty, if only because it is so degrading to the international image of the country and so demoralizing domestically. But when it comes to actual development programmes, there is usually not enough of a surplus to satisfy the pent-up demands of the upper tenth of the Bangladesh population—which is not outrageously wealthy by any outside standards—much less to tackle the food problems of the 80 or 90 per cent of the population that is under nourished or malnourished.

Agricultural production has not kept pace with population growth. Technology in the rural sector is still in the bullock and wooden plow stage, being dependent in most areas of the country on traditional seeds and other inputs. Where the new seeds and new technology have been introduced, they have unquestionably benefited the larger landowners, thereby contributing to the widening gap between rich and poor. In a country where a farmer with

unequivocal rights to 6 acres is considered well-off, the problem of equity is not one that revolves around large commercial holdings and big estates. Poverty is still associated with an agrarian structure that encourages land-holding by *maliks* who do not themselves engage in cultivation, but the poorest of the non-*maliks* and *maliks* alike are most consistently identified by their inability to master water resources.

Governments have been somewhat helpless in dealing with the pauperization of the Bangladesh countryside because they have not been able to muster enough authority to maintain the large public works—embankments, canals, roads, and so forth—essential to a productive agriculture in this largest deltaic area of the world. The present Government of Ziaur Rahman is the most effective that Bangladesh has had, but it is still struggling with longstanding food problems. Excellent weather in 1980-81 produced a bumper harvest which, when coupled with bountiful foodgrain imports, created an embarrassing surplus of food for the first time since independence. The Bangladesh Government and international donors are busily constructing new warehouses and storage areas in an attempt to build a foodgrain reserve that could be used by the Food Ministry in its future attempts to gain clout against grain hoarders and speculators. A number of schemes for exporting rice are also being considered.

The Bangladesh Government is well aware that surplus world food stocks are dwindling. A new "export and grain reserve" food strategy is a response to this phenomenon. The goals of the Government's new food policy are to increase agricultural production by maintaining high price support levels to farmers, all the while using government procurement to initiate rice exports and a grain reserve. Ziaur Rahman's declared intention is to do away with the rationing system entirely, and to double food production in five years, but even his own Food Ministry officials and party leaders remain unconvinced of these possibilities.

Movement towards an open market system and privatization of the food-grain trade is something that governments in Bangladesh have done whenever there has been a food surplus. Governments can politically afford to go to open market systems when the price of food comes down so low that it approaches the price in ration shops. The question of whether the government is serious or not about going to an open market system while maintaining high support prices to farmers will come when foodstocks dip and the price of foodgrains rise. At that point, a dilemma has always presented itself. If the Government is unable to maintain large amounts of food in its own warehouses, or is unable to procure by maintaining high support prices, then stocks would diminish, prices rise and the government would have to go back to its old rationing system in order to satisfy urban elites, the military and the police. If, on the other hand, the Government does succeed in maintaining a surplus, keeping procurement prices high, and satisfying rural producers, the benefits of government policies go, almost exclusively, to the better-off in the countryside.


One way to escape from the above dilemma would be by revolution, which might produce collectivization or some other drastic change in the agrarian structure, but all of the available evidence indicates that the poor in the rural areas are either unwilling or unable to support revolutionary political activities. Those political party leaders who did attempt to espouse the interests of the poorest, landless sections of Bangladesh's villages in the 1960s and 1970s are now disillusioned, their parties fragmented. There are no political organizations that effectively represent the interests of the poorest segments of the population, nor is there a single significant political organization that is led by individuals who have come from the most disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Individual mobility, both upward and downward, has been fairly common in modern Bangladesh, but support for revolutionary activities that would overturn newly-formed elite structures has been ineffectual.

Perhaps the most difficult aspects of Bangladesh's food problems stem from the inability of national leaders to insulate the nation's economy from international forces. Bangladesh's vulnerability to Indian economic activity—including smuggling of foodgrains, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs across a sieve-like border—makes it almost impossible to control many of the key variables involved in Bangladesh's domestic food strategy of food policy. The availability and terms of international food shipments to Bangladesh are dependent primarily on political considerations within the United States and other Western nations, such as the extent of food surpluses and foreign policy orientations towards the Soviet Union, China and South Asia.

Unfortunately, the vast bulk of the poor in Bangladesh have been trapped in a terrible bind. They are themselves so powerless and unorganized that they are unable to counter the oppression of the newly-formed elites within the country. They are also unable to take advantage of whatever international moral sentiment might exist for their position because access to their problem is controlled by their own domestic elites and by an international development establishment that is not primarily concerned with the alleviation of bottom-end poverty. Under these circumstances, perhaps the most that one can hope for is the extension of some individual programmes for the poorest segments, which have either provided small avenues of mobility or have relieved the conditions of poverty in a local context. Talk of eradicating poverty in Bangladesh is the irresponsible rhetoric of millenarianism. Mankind will be lucky enough if the awful trends of the past three decades can merely be reversed in the next few years.

April, 1981.

AREAS LIABLE TO FAMINE IN BANGLADESH



Source and Explanation of Map : Bruce Currey *et al.*, *Mapping of Areas Liable to Famine in Bangladesh* (1978).

The research project which resulted in this map was carried out by a team of researchers from the John Hopkins University Center for Medical Research for the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of Bangladesh, with support from the United States Agency for International Development (AID). The map is reproduced here with the permission of Professor Currey, the principal investigator for the project, and of AID. Professor Currey cautions users of the map that it "only shows areas with a structural proclivity to famine." It does not say, for example, that the white areas will never suffer from famine, nor does it preclude the possibility that some areas may become more famine-prone because of changes (such as population shifts or activities of war). The principal factors contributing to *structural* liability to famine in Bangladesh were defined by the John Hopkins team as follows (in order of importance) : flooding, drought, population pressure, food deficit, lack of alternative employment, low crop yields, poor land transport, river erosion, cyclone risk, and maldistribution of agricultural inputs. Taken together, the first five of these factors account for over 70 per cent of the composite index of famine liability.

NOTES

- 1 Akhter Hameed Khan, "A History of the Food Problem," Unpublished Paper presented at the 16th Conference of the Pakistan Economic Association, Islamabad University, 18-20 February 1973. All references to Dr. Khan's writings are taken from this paper.
- 2 Two excellent studies are: Donald F. McHenry and Kai Bird, "Food Bungle in Bangladesh," *Foreign Policy*, (New York), 27, Summer 1977, pp. 72-88; and F. James Levinson, "The Role of Subsidized Consumption in Reduced Population Growth: The Case of Sri Lanka, Kerala and Bangladesh," Paper presented at the Conference on Nutrition Needs, Laxenbur, Austria, May 1978.
- 3 The best recent study is W. Brian Arthur and Geoffrey McNicoll, "An Analytical Survey of Population and Development in Bangladesh," *Population and Development Review* (New York), IV:1, March 1978, pp. 23-79.
- 4 See A. Alim, *Land Reforms in Bangladesh: Social Changes, Agricultural Development and Eradication of Poverty* (Dacca, 1979).
- 5 An excellent study that brings this out is Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1975), Fourth Edition, see especially pp. 200 ff.
- 6 Jannuzi and Peach have published two volumes of findings: 1. *Report on the Hierarchy of Interests in Land in Bangladesh*, by F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach USAID (Dacca, 1977) and 2. *Bangladesh: A Profile of the Countryside* USAID (Dacca, 1979).
- 7 John P. Thorp, "Socio-Economic Factors and Muslim Cultural Conceptions about Land Ownership in Rural Bangladesh," Unpublished paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies meetings, March 21-23, 1980, Washington, D.C. All quotations used here and in the following paragraphs are from this paper. See also John P. Thorp, "Masters of Earth: Conceptions of 'Power' Among Muslims of Rural Bangladesh," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978.
- 8 *Bangladesh: A Profile of the Countryside*, n.6, p. 85. See also A.K. Nazmul Karim, *Changing Society in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1976), Third Edition.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- 10 Peter Bertocci, "Structural Fragmentation and Peasant Classes in Bangladesh," *Journal of Social Studies* (Dacca), V, October 1979, p. 46. All quotations from Bertocci, plus the general line of the argument, are from this article.
- 11 Abu Andullah, Mosharaf Hossain and Richard Nations, "Agrarian Structure and the IRDP—Preliminary Consideration," *Bangladesh Development Studies*, (Dacca), IC:2, 1976, p. 214, as quoted in Bertocci.
- 12 Edward Clay, "Institutional Change and Agricultural Wages in Bangladesh," *Bangladesh Development Studies*, IV:4, 1976, pp. 423-440.
- 13 These are by Ali Akhtar Khan, *Rural Credit in Gazipur Village* (Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Comila, 1964) and Kirsten Westergaard, "Mode of Production in Bangladesh," *Journal of Social Studies*, (Dacca), II, 1978, pp. 1-26.
- 14 The terms are Bertocci's, n. 10, See pp. 52 ff.
- 15 For example, see two recent village studies: 1. Anwarullah Chowdhury, *A Bangladesh Village: A Study of Social Stratification* (Dacca 1978), especially pp. 141 ff.; and 2. Jenneke Arens and Jos Van Beurden, *Jhagrapur: Poor Peasants and Women in a Village in Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1980), especially pp. 190 ff.
- 16 See *Nutrition Survey of East Pakistan, March 1962—January 1964*, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, (Washington, 1966) and *Nutrition Survey of Rural Bangladesh, 1975-76*. Institute of Nutrition and Food Science, Dacca University, (Dacca, December 1977). All figures in this section, unless otherwise noted, are from these two reports.

- 17 *Death Rate, Land and the Price of Rice, 1975-1978*, Evaluation Unit Report No. 04, Companyganj Health Project, Noakhali, by Colin W. McCord, Shafiq A. Chowdhury, Abdul Hai Khan and Ali Ashraf (Dacca, March 1980).
- 18 Bruce Currey *et. al.*, *Mapping of Areas Liable to Famine in Bangladesh* (Final Report, Preliminary Version), USAID, Washington, September, 1978.
- 19 Merlyn Vermury, *Beliefs and Practices Affecting Food Habits in Rural Bangladesh*, (New York, April 1980).
- 20 I am especially indebted to Dr. Marum, an M.D. working for CARE in Bangladesh, for information on which this nutrition section is based. Much of the material is culled from an interview with Dr. Marum in December 1980 in Dacca.
- 21 Statistics are from the Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, and from an interview with its Director, Dr. A.K.M. Ghulam Rabbani. An excellent summary description of the PFDS appears in Rehman Sobhan, "Politics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh," in *Bangladesh Politics*, (Ed.) Emajuddin Ahmad (Dacca, 1980), pp. 158-187.
- 22 Stated in interviews with Food Ministry officials, Dacca, December 1980. See also an unpublished paper entitled "Food Policy", Ministry of Food, 27 November, 1980.
- 23 An excellent study and bibliography of food and other rural issues is B.K. Jahangir, *Differentiation, Polarisation and Confrontation in Rural Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979).
- 24 For an expanded version of Ziaur Rahman's views of the food issue see my "Bangladeshi Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency," *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports* (2-part series), forthcoming 1981. The quotations are from Part I of these reports.
- 25 An extremely well-researched book is K.M. Ashraful Aziz, *Kinship in Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979). See also Mohammad Afsaruddin, *Rural Life in Bangladesh: A Study of Five Selected Villages* (Dacca, 1979), Second Edition. Unfortunately, neither of these books is very sensitive to political issues and processes.
- 26 This Report, *Bangladesh: Food Policy Issues*, was published for restricted distribution only in December 1979. Nevertheless, its contents have been widely reported in the Bangladesh Press and has been fairly widely circulated in Dacca.
- 27 Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson, *Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development* (Boulder, Colorado, 1976), p. 53.
- 28 The reasons are explored in Mohiuddin Alamgir, *Bangladesh: A Case of Below Poverty Level Equilibrium Trap* (Dacca, 1978). See also Noazesh Ahmed, *Development Agriculture of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1976).
- 29 Some of the background thinking to this work appears in Geoffrey D. Wood, "Rural Development in Bangladesh: Whose Framework?" *Journal of Social Studies* (Dacca), No. VIII, April 1980, pp. 1-31 and, Geoffrey D. Wood, "The Rural Poor in Bangladesh: A New Framework?" *Journal of Social Studies*, No. X, October 1980, pp. 22-46.
- 30 The social backgrounds of political party leadership in Bangladesh are traced out in several essays in Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Group Interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1981). For a Marxist perspective see Badruddin Umar, *Imperialism and General Crisis of the Bourgeoisie in Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979).
- 31 For an analysis of attempts at institution-building in the country-side before Ziaur Rahman, see Harry W. Blair, *The Elusiveness of Equity: Institutional Approaches to Rural Development in Bangladesh* (Ithaca, 1974). For more recent studies see Mohammad Mohiuddin Abdullah, *Rural Development in Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979) and M. Nurul Haq, *Village Development in Bangladesh*. Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, (Comilla, 1978) Ziaur Rahman's attempts at institution-building are analyzed in my 1981 *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports* entitled "Bangladeshi Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency," n. 24.
- 32 Rounaq Jahan, *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues* (Dacca, 1980), p. 217.
- 33 For a detailed analysis of Bangladesh politics see my two part 1981 *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports* entitled "Bangladeshi Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency," n. 24.

THE SEPARATIST EELAM MOVEMENT IN SRI LANKA : AN OVERVIEW

By S.V. KODIKARA*

DISSIDENT Tamil politics in Sri Lanka over the past two and a half decades has sought systematic change in the prevailing political structure as a way out of the continuing impasse in Sinhala-Tamil relations and as the only remedy against alleged ethnic discrimination by Sinhala-dominated governments against the Tamil population of Sri Lanka. The Tamil population of Sri Lanka is divisible into two categories : the Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Tamils, numbering 1,416,000 (11.1 per cent of total population) in the 1971 Census, who are indigenous, of South Indian origin and who have a long history of settlement in the island; and the more recent immigrants, the Indian Tamils, numbering, 1,195,000 (9.4 per cent of total population), who also emigrated from South India in and after the 19th century, mainly as workers in British-owned tea and rubber plantations. Areas of Sinhala settlement divide the main Sri Lanka Tamil Northern and Eastern Provinces from the Central Province, which is inhabited by Indian Tamils and Sinhalese. Since the mid-fifties, Sri Lanka Tamil leaders have sought the right to speak on behalf of all Tamil-speaking people in the island, including the Tamil-speaking Muslims, numbering about 850,000 (6.5 per cent of total population), but neither the Indian Tamils nor the Muslims have supported the demand for a separate state.¹

SEPARATIST DEMAND IN TIME FRAME : BACKGROUND TO THE MOVEMENT

The demand for a separate state for Tamils was first formally proclaimed by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in October 1976, and purported to represent the views of its constituent units : the Federal Party (the main political party of the Tamils up to that time), the Tamil Congress, the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), representing the Indian Tamils, and a small but influential group led by C. Suntheralingam, former Minister and MP, who in fact fathered the idea of a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. The Indian Tamil leader, S. Thondaman's adherence to the TULF was largely motivated by his political opposition to the then Bandaranaike Government, and not out of any convictions in regard to the separatist ideology, which in fact he promptly disclaimed. The demise of two Sri Lanka Tamil leaders of the troika presidency of the TULF left him in the invidious position of sole President of the Party for sometime, until he left to join J.R. Jayewardene's government as a Cabinet Minister after the 1977 elections.

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Federal Party Opposes Citizenship Laws, Tamil Repatriation and Sinhala Peasant Colonization

The Federal Party, founded by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam in 1949, was originally concerned with four basic issues which were held to be vital to Tamil interests:

1. Establishment of one or more Tamil linguistic states as a federating unit or units enjoying wide autonomous and residuary powers within a federal state in Sri Lanka;
2. Restoration of the Tamil language to its "rightful place" enjoying absolute parity of status with Sinhala as an official language of Sri Lanka;
3. Conferment of full civic rights to all Tamil-speaking people (i.e., to all persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka) and
4. Cessation of colonisation of traditionally Tamil-speaking areas with Sinhalese people.

In point of time, it was opposition to Sri Lanka's definition of its citizenship laws in 1948-49 which brought the Federal Party into being. These laws distinguished between citizenship *by descent*, based on a two generation connection with Sri Lanka, which required no proof in respect of inhabitants considered to be indisputably indigenous (Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims, Burghers), and citizenship *by registration*, based on tests of domicile, which required documentary proof of past residence and present means. The Sri Lanka Government's citizenship policy was avowedly based on the assumption that not all persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka were qualified for Sri Lanka citizenship as being permanently settled in the island, and that those not admitted to such citizenship had to be repatriated to India. On this issue, the Federal Party and the CWC were at one; indeed, the Federal Party attitude to the citizenship question was even more militant than that of the CWC, which was the accredited party representing Indian Tamil interests. For whereas the CWC later implicitly acknowledged the Sri Lanka Government's assumption and supported the Indo-Lanka Citizenship Agreement of October 1964, which provided for the repatriation of more than half a million persons of recent Indian origin to India in return for the grant of Sri Lanka citizenship to 300,000 such persons, the Federal Party consistently rejected repatriation as a solution of this question, and vehemently opposed the 1964 agreement.² For the Federal Party, the numbers game was the crux of the matter; reduction of the number of Tamil-speaking people entailed diminution of its own political position as advocate of all Tamil-speaking people in the island. The CWC itself had little interest in the Federal Party demands for linguistic parity, cessation of colonisation, or the establishment of a federal state.

The numbers game became relevant for Sinhala-Tamil relations in another context. Since the 1930s, agrarian policy in Sri Lanka had been directed towards extending irrigated areas under rice cultivation in North-Central and Eastern Provinces, and establishment of peasant colonisation schemes in these areas. These areas had been the centre of the ancient rice-growing culture, but they had been also the centre of ancient Sinhala-Tamil political rivalries, where wars between the Sinhalese and invading South Indian armies had been fought. The Federal Party position was that allocation of land in the traditional Tamil homelands (Eastern Province and parts of North-Central Province) should be reserved exclusively for Tamils, and regarded establishment of Sinhala peasant colonisation schemes such as that at Gal Oya, in Eastern Province, an attempt to challenge Tamil political predominance in their own homelands. For successive Sri Lanka governments the question at issue was essentially the question of landlessness, and landlessness was seen as being even more acute among Sinhala peasants than among the Tamil. The Sri Lanka Governments could not accept the concept of traditional Tamil homelands. Yet the border areas remain politically sensitive, and in the North-Central and Eastern Provinces, these areas witnessed some of the bitterest conflicts of the 1956 and 1958 communal riots.

Imposition of Sinhala Seen as Instrument of Ethnic Discrimination

1956, the year when Sinhala replaced English as the official language of Sri Lanka, provides another time-frame of reference in Sinhala-Tamil relations.

A highly politicised electorate returned S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike at the head of a triumphant coalition dedicated to a Sinhala-Buddhist philosophy at the 1956 elections; the Federal Party, too, came to Parliament with its representation greatly increased, in fact as the sole recognized representative of Tamil opinion in the north, and with its sense of mission as the saviour of Tamil interests greatly enhanced. Autonomous systems of communication in Sinhala and Tamil areas widened barriers caused by the Sinhala-only legislation and anti-Sinhala agitation by Tamils. From 1956 to 1965, no Tamil minister or deputy minister served in successive governments under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, W. Dahanayake, Dudley Senanayake and Mrs. Bandaranaike. Language was seen as the instrument of ethnic discrimination by the Tamils; language was seen as the instrument of class oppression by the Sinhalese.

For the Sinhalese, replacement of English by Sinhala heralded a challenge to the socio-political dominance of the English-educated elite in Sri Lanka and opened the doors of the administrative system to Sinhala-educated talents. The fact that Tamil public servants would now be required to pass a basic proficiency test in Sinhala was seen as a reasonable condition of their continuance in service. Sinhalese nationalists had often pointed to

the disproportionate number of Tamils in public service under the old dispensation, but Sinhala-only was not inspired by an anti-Tamil purpose, only by the necessity to administer the country in the language of the majority of its inhabitants.

Bandaranaike's original intention of writing into the Sinhala-only Act certain statutory safeguards pertaining to the reasonable use of Tamil was abandoned under pressure from nationalist Sinhalese interests. In 1958, however, he enacted the Act which legalized the reasonable use of Tamil for prescribed purposes. These included the right of Tamil pupils to be instructed in the Tamil language at all levels of education; the right of those educated in the Tamil language to take public service examinations in that language, provided that they had a sufficient knowledge of the official language of Sri Lanka, or that such knowledge was acquired within a specified time after admission into service; the right of any Tamil to correspond with any government official in Tamil, or of any local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to do the same with any official in his official capacity and the right for Tamil to be used in these provinces for prescribed administrative purposes without prejudice to the use of the official language in respect of these prescribed purposes.

These provisions marked a significant acknowledgment of the Federal Party position short of granting Tamil absolute parity of status as an official language of Sri Lanka. However, it was necessary that Regulations were passed for the 1958 Act to become effective, but these were not gazetted until January 1966.

1966 Tamil Language Regulations Modify the Sinhala-only Principle

The Language Regulations of 1966 declared that, without prejudice to the Sinhala-only Act, the Tamil language shall also be used :

1. In the Northern and Eastern Provinces for the transaction of all government and public business and the maintenance of public records, whether such business is conducted in or by a department or institution of the government, a public corporation, or a statutory institution; and
2. For all correspondence between persons, other than officials in their official capacity, educated through the medium of the Tamil language and any official in his official capacity, or between any local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces which conducts its business in the Tamil language and any official in his official capacity.

The Regulations also provided that all ordinances and Acts, and all orders, proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law, the Government Gazette and all other official

publications, circulars and forms issued by the Government, public corporations or statutory institutions, shall be translated and published in the Tamil language also.

The 1966 Language Regulations undoubtedly entailed significant 'modifications of the Sinhala-only principle. It made it mandatory for a government official, who received a communication from a member of the public in Tamil in any part of the country to reply in Tamil. The 1958 Act had only stated that correspondence between persons, other than officials in their official capacity, educated through the medium of Tamil, and any official in his official capacity, may, as prescribed, be in Tamil. Similarly, any local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces could conduct its business in Tamil, and if their correspondence with government officials anywhere in the country was in Tamil, the reply also had to be in Tamil.

Here too, the change was from the "may", as prescribed in the 1958 Act, to the mandatory "shall" in the regulations. As regards the use of Tamil in all official publications, Acts, orders, circulars, etc., there was nothing new in principle; this provision merely gave legal sanction to an existing practice. But the provision which stated that Tamil shall also be used for the conduct of public business and the maintenance of public records in the Northern and Eastern Provinces involved a departure from the principle of the 1958 Act, which merely declared that in these provinces Tamil may be used for prescribed administrative purposes without prejudice to the use of the official language in respect of these purposes. Sinhala did still remain in law the only official language of Sri Lanka, in as much as correspondence between officials in their official capacity throughout the country was required to be in Sinhala, and there was nothing to prevent the use of Sinhala, in addition to Tamil, in the conduct of public business in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In practice, however, the regulations granted Tamil an equality of status as an official language in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. For these reasons, the Federal Party leader Chelvanayakam himself welcomed the regulations as an important step forward in the implementation of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958. His objection to them was that "they do not confer on the Tamil-speaking people in the seven (Sinhalese) provinces their full language rights."

Decentralisation of Political Decision-Making

Decentralisation of political decision-making, short of establishment of a federal state, appeared to offer scope to both Sinhala and Tamil leaders, at least until the sixties, of a mutually acceptable basis of organizing Sinhala-Tamil relations. The idea of replacing the over-centralised *kachcheri* system of administration (based on the over-lordship of the civil servants, first on a provincial, later on a district level) with Regional Councils had been mooted by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike even before independence, when

he was Minister of Local Administration. The idea was revived after he became Prime Minister, and in 1957 Chelvanayakam and Bandaranaike entered into an agreement (the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact) pertaining to recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority in Sri Lanka as well as establishment of regional councils with wide powers delegated by Parliament and dealing with lands and land development, colonization and land alienation, education, cooperatives, health, fishing and social services, etc. Draft legislation to give effect to the Pact was prepared by the Government and was ready by April 1958. But in the communally tension-charged political atmosphere of Bandaranaike's times, implementing it proved to be impossible. Anti-Sinhala agitations organized by the Federal Party in the North had its repercussions in the South, and powers to be delegated to the proposed regional councils in respect of land settlement, in particular, were vehemently opposed by Sinhalese nationalist interests. Bandaranaike was forced to abrogate the Pact in the face of organized opposition to it from a group of Buddhist *bhikkus*. Rationalizing later, Bandaranaike took the view that resumption of anti-Sinhala agitation by the Federal Party leadership after the negotiation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was against the spirit of that agreement. "When that position arose", said Bandaranaike, "the Pact, had, in fact, been made a dead letter."⁴ Mrs. Bandaranaike's administration (1960-65) favoured District Councils rather than the provincially based Regional Councils and seriously considered draft legislation for their establishment; again, Sinhalese interest groups objected to the idea partly because their establishment prior to the solution of the citizenship status of persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka was thought to lay open the midland parts of the island, in addition to the North and East, to the domination of Tamils.⁵

The fact that neither of the main Sinhalese political parties (UNP and SLFP) commanded an absolute majority of seats in the 1965 general elections placed the Federal Party in a strategic position in Parliament, and it joined the Government of Dudley Senanayake conditionally on the basis of specific guarantees in regard to language, district councils and conditions of repatriation of persons of Indian origin. The Senanayake Government's language regulations of 1966 redeemed part of its compact with the Federal Party. Its revival of the district councils idea, however, evoked widespread opposition mainly from the Buddhist *sangha* and from local authorities in Sinhalese areas. Senanayake had been one of the strongest critics of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact on the ground that it envisaged the devolution of wide powers to Regional Councils, especially powers regarding lands and land alienation.

The District Councils now envisaged by Senanayake were to function under the central government and would have limited powers. Even so, the very idea of accepting District Councils, as it seemed under pressure from the Federal Party, was anathema to the Sinhalese. The demand for

an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka, first put forward by C. Suntheralingam at about this time, only hardened Sinhalese opinion against any concessions on the district councils issue.⁶ Nor were the Tamils themselves or Tamil-speaking people united on the issue. When the idea was first mooted by Bandaranaike, the Muslim Federal Party MP for Mannar (a predominantly Muslim area) had objected to Mannar being included in the proposed Regional Council for Jaffna (which would have represented the Tamil Northern Province). The Tamil Congress leader, G.G. Ponnambalam was diametrically opposed to District Councils, stating that their establishment would be "suicidal" for the Tamils.⁷ Advocacy of District Councils during the tenure of Dudley Senanayake's Government was therefore largely confined to the Federal Party, the position of which as a government party was becoming increasingly untenable due to escalating resistance to its policies from Sinhalese interest groups and its own failure to deliver the goods to the Tamils. Withdrawal of a government White Paper on District Councils, alleged non-implementation of promises by the Prime Minister in regard to acquisition of Sinhala proficiency by Tamil public servants and differences with the Government over declaration of the area around the Hindu Koneswaran temple in Trincomalee as a sacred area, led the Federal Party Minister of Local Government to resign his portfolio in September 1968, after which the Federal Party reverted to its traditional oppositional role in Parliament and outside.

Under the next government, that of Mrs. Bandaranaike (1970-1977), introduction of a Political Authority system brought about the first real measure of administrative decentralization in Sri Lanka since independence. Political Authorities, who were Members of Parliament and generally incumbents of deputy ministerships in the government, were appointed at a district level to coordinate all matters pertaining to the district with the *Kacheheri* head of administration (the Government Agent), and the budget was decentralized to permit special funding for district projects emanating from the Political Authority. The Government of J.R. Jayewardene (1977-) went one step further and made statutory provision for the appointment of Ministers without Cabinet rank from among MPs, who would be in charge of administrative districts. There is no statutory necessity that ministers so appointed should belong to the government party, but in the absence of co-operation from the Tamil parties, all such ministers appointed so far have belonged to the government parliamentary party, and all of them have been appointed as District Ministers in the 24 administrative districts of Sri Lanka. The Minister appointed for Jaffna District is a Sinhalese, and Muslim ministers represent districts in the Muslim populated areas of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.⁸

TULF ACCENTUATES POLITICS OF DISSENT

The change of government in Sri Lanka in May 1970 presaged also a change in the emphasis of Tamil politics from District Councils back to the language issue, with a new focus of interest in the Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka, inaugurated on 22 May, 1972. The new Constitution was devised by the House of Representatives, sitting simultaneously as a Constituent Assembly, and Tamil political parties participated in the initial stages of constitution-making. Divergences over the language provisions of the draft constitution, led to a boycott of the later Assembly proceedings by most MPs of the Tamil constituencies. However, two members of the Tamil Congress voted with the Government when the Constitution was adopted.

Tamil opinion was opposed principally to the language provisions of the new Constitution but also, to a lesser extent, to the provisions which declared that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism which was accorded the "foremost place" in the Republic of Sri Lanka "while assuring to all religions the rights granted by section 18(1)(d)," i.e., the fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Though the Constitution did not define citizenship as such, Tamil opinion was opposed to the implied distinction between citizens by *descent* and citizens by *registration* as contained in the proviso to section 67, which declared that no law of the National State Assembly shall deprive a citizen *by descent* of the status of citizen of Sri Lanka.

The language provisions of the Constitution declared that the official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala as provided by the Official Language Act of 1956; that the use of the Tamil language shall be in accordance with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958; that all laws shall be enacted or made in Sinhala; that there shall be a Tamil translation of every law so enacted or made and that the language of the courts and tribunals shall be in Sinhala throughout Sri Lanka and accordingly, their records, pleadings, proceedings, judgements, orders and so on shall be in Sinhala provided that the National State Assembly does not provide otherwise under its own law in the case of institutions exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Tamil political parties objected to the provision for the use of Tamil in the courts in these two provinces being left to the discretion of the National State Assembly instead of being guaranteed under the Constitution.

In the Constituent Assembly, the Federal Party held that both Sinhala and Tamil should be the languages in which laws should be enacted, the official languages of Sri Lanka, the languages of the courts as well as the languages in which all laws should be published.⁹ When these proposals were not incorporated in the draft constitution, all the Federal Party MPs and some members of the Tamil Congress walked out of the Constituent Assembly on 14 May 1972. The Federal Party, Tamil Congress, Ceylon Workers

Congress, the Elathamilar Ottumai Munani (led by C. Suntheralingam) and the All Ceylon Tamil Conference joined together to form the Tamil United Front to protect "the freedom, dignity and rights of the Tamil people." Tamil MPs returned to the National State Assembly in June 1972, but only to accentuate their politics of dissent. Putting forward a six-point programme for the amendment of the Constitution, the Federal Party leader Chelvanayakam resigned his parliamentary seat in an effort to challenge government allegations that his party did not truly represent the aspirations of the Tamil people. His move was vindicated by an impressive victory in a long-delayed by-election. In October 1972, the Tamil United Front launched a non-violent struggle to achieve its objectives and coinciding with the first anniversary of the new constitution in May 1973 decided that the rights of the Tamils could not be regained except within the framework of a separate Tamil state. The call to *satyagraha*, first made by Chelvanayakam on a visit to Madras in late February 1972, acquired a new dimension of importance by the ostensible support accorded to it by Tamil sympathisers in Tamil Nadu and the analogy which was drawn with Bangladesh at the time.

TULF Goes Terrorist by 1975

Chelvanayakam's politics of separation was based on Gandhian principles; his demise however left the Federal Party under the control of its militants, who had no desire to co-operate or collaborate with Sinhala parties in a search for a solution to Tamil grievances short of a vow of the separatist demand. In fact, Tamil politicians who collaborated with Sinhala parties, or who did not toe the TULF line, became targets of terrorist activity organised by a militant group of Tamil youth, calling themselves the Tiger Movement. In July 1975, Alfred Duraiyappa, a former Mayor of Jaffna and member of the party in power, the SLFP, was shot dead outside a Hindu temple. In January 1978, an attempt was made on the life of M. Canagaratnam, the erstwhile TULF second MP for the constituency of Pottuvil in the Eastern Province, who had crossed the floor to join the UNP government ranks the previous December. Canagaratnam escaped with minor injuries. Apart from armed robberies including bank hold-ups, the brunt of terrorist vengeance was directed against police officers, mainly Tamil, who were involved in the investigation and detection of terrorist activities in Jaffna. Among these were Inspector Navaratnam, who was shot dead in his own residence near the Jaffna Police Station in May 1978 and Inspector Bastiampillai, the C.I.D.'s chief investigator of terrorism in the North and East who was lured by a decoy to a jungle with three of his operatives in April 1978 and brutally murdered. By July 1979, 14 police officers investigating terrorism had been murdered, and the Tiger Movement itself, in a letter to a leading Tamil daily, claimed responsibility for the Duraiyappa and Bastiampillai murders.¹⁰ All police victims were Tamils.

The TULF leadership publicly disclaimed any connection with the Tiger Movement. but neither did it act in a way that would discourage criminal activities of Jaffna youth nor dissociate itself completely from such activities. Army and Police sources have divulged that a connection did exist between the TULF and the Tiger Movement.¹¹ This is not surprising, since both organizations stood unequivocally for the same goal, namely the realization of a separate Tamil state. A conspiracy of silence has existed in Jaffna where terrorist activity has been under police investigation, and law-enforcing authorities have been hard put to obtain evidence to indict suspected terrorists. When, in June 1974, a terrorist youth, Sivakumaran, who had been arrested for bank robbery committed suicide in prison, he was accorded a public funeral in Jaffna in which prominent TULF leaders participated and a statue was later erected in his honour. The fact is that the Tiger Movement was a source of strength as well as of embarrassment to the TULF leadership. As a source of strength, it served to highlight Tamil grievances, especially those of Tamil youth whose admission to Sri Lanka Universities in the much sought after faculties of Medicine, Engineering, and Science had progressively declined after the standardisation formula for University admissions had been adopted in 1970.¹²

The Counsel appearing before the Sansoni Commission on behalf of a group calling itself the Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation Organisation declared:

The majority of the people in Jaffna wanted to receive a higher education, pass examinations, and secure employment. The main industry in Jaffna is education. They have said so even in Parliament. Every parent in Jaffna wanted to give a good education to their children and send them to a higher position.¹³

This was indeed no different from the aspirations of Sinhala youth and parents in the South. Standardization was meant to correct imbalances in marking both media-wise and subject-wise, and was coupled with a scheme of area weightage intended to redress disadvantages of rural schools as opposed to urban schools, where better facilities and staff obtained. Standardisation applied to the GCE (Advanced Level) examination, which was the qualifying examination for university admissions. Tamil politicians and Tamil youth were at one in attributing the higher proportion of admissions of Tamil students to engineering and medical faculties of Sri Lanka universities to greater application and skills of Tamil students, a view seriously challenged in certain Sinhalese quarters, where it is alleged that Tamil examiners, or at least some of them, have a tendency to mark up Tamil students.¹⁴ However, that there may be a correlation between the standardisation scheme and the terrorist movement suggests itself. Both involved frustrated Tamil youth, and both were post-1971 phenomena. Tamils now have a separate University in Jaffna, but still favour admis-

sion to the established universities in Peradeniya and Colombo, especially for studies in Engineering and Medicine, which provide avenues of employment not only in Sri Lanka but, more profitably, abroad.

While subscribing to the same goal of self-determination within a separate state of Eelam, important differences of approach have divided Tamil militants from the TULF leadership. The more senior TULF leaders had been brought up under Chelvanayakam's tutelage as adherents of Gandhian principles and apostles of non-violence. TULF fought the 1977 elections seeking a mandate for Eelam, and party spokesmen have construed its performance at these elections as vindication for Eelam. As the TULF leader Amirthalingam put it:

I consider the verdict of this (1977) election as a mandate that the Eelam Tamil nation should exercise the sovereignty already vested in the Tamil people and become free.¹⁵

This claim was of dubious validity; TULF did win 17 of the 22 seats which it contested, and made a clean sweep of all seats in the Northern Province. But it was the UNP which won the majority of the seats (7 out of 12), in the Eastern Province, which TULF considered to be an integral part of Eelam. TULF obtained 69 per cent of the votes in the Northern Province but only 32.9 per cent in the Eastern Province.¹⁶ TULF ranks in the Eastern Province were further depleted by the defection to the UNP of the TULF member for Pottuvil in December 1977. In such a context, the TULF leadership was constrained to adopt a low profile on the Eelam issue and on 17 December 1977, even expressed its willingness to have a dialogue with Prime Minister J.R. Jayewardene on matters relating to language, education, economic development and decentralisation. Such an attitude was diametrically opposed to the approach of Tamil militancy. A party Youth Front resolution to appoint a national council to draft a constitution for Eelam was rejected at the TULF's second Regional Convention in July 1978, and later, in September, Tamil youths disrupted a meeting in London at which Amirthalingam himself was a speaker. In February 1979, Amirthalingam dissociated himself from a youth boycott of schools organized in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.¹⁷

Government Deals Firmly with Terrorists

The inability or failure of the TULF leadership to stem the tide of Tamil terrorism was further demonstrated when an Air Ceylon Avro passenger aircraft was blasted by a time-bomb while grounded unoccupied at Ratmalana airport near Colombo on the very day that the Second Republican Constitution was promulgated by the Jayewardene Government on 7 September 1978. When, in July 1979, Inspector Gurusamy of the Jaffna Police was murdered by terrorists, the Government decided to enforce law

and order in the North with a heavy hand. A state of emergency was declared in the Northern Province, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) law was enacted, and regulations under this law were promulgated giving the Police and armed services wide powers of arrest and search, and restricting movement of persons in this province. Attempt to overthrow the government by illegal means was made an offence punishable by death under these regulations; it also imposed censorship of publications inciting persons to mutiny, riot or civil commotion. At the same time, Brigadier Tissa Weeratunga of the Sri Lanka Army was commissioned by the President, as Commander of the Security Forces in Jaffna, "to eliminate in accordance with the laws of the land the menace of terrorism in all its forms in the Island, and more specially from the Jaffna District," using "all the resources of the state" before 31 December 1979.¹⁸ These measures appeared to have taken the edge off the terrorist movement.¹⁹ In the wake of the emergency regulations, TULF leader Amirthalingam reiterated that "our doors are always open for negotiations and peaceful solution in keeping with the honour and self-respect of our people," and reaffirmed his party's commitment to the Gandhian principles followed by Chelvanayakam. But his role as party leader and his relations with the UNP Government were not without ambivalence.

Amirthalingam was leader of the Opposition as well as the leader of TULF, and he had become, in a sense, a part of the parliamentary establishment. He could not have been blind to the fact that the Jayewardene Government had attempted to ameliorate Tamil grievances short of acknowledging the principle of a separate state, and had gone further in this regard than any previous government since independence. The standardisation rule was abolished, for example, and a new formula for university admissions was instituted.²⁰

1978 REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION CONCILIATES TAMIL LEADERSHIP

The 1978 Republican Constitution declared Sinhala to be the official language of Sri Lanka, but at the same time raised Sinhala and Tamil to the status of national languages. The use of the national languages in Parliament and by local authorities and the right of a person to be educated and sit for public and competitive examinations in either of the national languages was statutorily guaranteed. The official language was declared to be the language of the courts throughout Sri Lanka, subject to the proviso that the language of the courts exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces shall also be Tamil and their records and proceedings shall be in the Tamil language. The article, according to Buddhism "the foremost place", subject to free exercise of all religions, was retained unchanged in the 1978 Constitution. But this Constitution did away with the implied distinction which existed between citizens by *descent* and citizens by *registration*, and stated that there shall be one

status of citizenship known as "the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka." Besides raising Tamil to the status of a national language, the 1978 Constitution gave statutory recognition to the use of the Tamil language *also* as a language of administration and as the language of the courts, a considerable advance on the previous constitutional position, under which the regulations framed under the 1958 Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act were regarded as subordinate legislation and could in no way be regarded as being provisions of the Constitution.

Even more significant, from the Tamil point of view, was the Government's enactment of the District Development Councils Act in August 1980, which sought to decentralize administration and effect a devolution of power on a district basis to partially elected Councils in the 24 administrative districts of Sri Lanka in a range of 15 subjects including education, health services, land use and land settlement, employment, agriculture, agrarian services, animal husbandry, food, fisheries, housing, rural development, small and medium industries, local irrigation works, co-operative development and cultural affairs. Elections for the DDCs are yet to be held; thereafter, they will consist of the Members of Parliament of the district plus the elected members who would be in a minority except in three specified districts which returned only one MP,²¹ with an elected member as Chairman of the Council and the District Minister as Chairman of its Executive Committee. In as much as the DDCs would be functioning as legislative bodies with power to pass subsidiary legislation, subject to approval of Parliament, besides performing all local government functions within the district except where municipal councils or urban councils existed,²² they strengthened, as Prime Minister Premadasa who piloted the Bill in Parliament explained, "the representative character of the democratic system by grafting on to it a scheme for self-management by the people of a district."²³ The TULF leadership welcomed the Bill, despite strong protests from its youth element, as a "general scheme of decentralisation of the administration of the country" which would enable Tamils to "work for the economic development of the Tamil-speaking districts."²⁴ At the same time, Amirthalingam emphasised that it was not meant to be a solution to the ethnic problems of Tamils or an answer to the demand for a separate state.²⁵ In an entirely different milieu in Madurai in South India, Amirthalingam reiterated TULF's commitment to the idea of a separate state for the achievement of which his party would "fight to the end" and, not unlike other dissident Sri Lankan Tamil politicians, seeking support for their cause in neighbouring Tamil Nadu, charged that Tamils in Sri Lanka were being neglected, that nothing was being done to improve their lot, and that rights offered to Tamils under the new 1978 Constitution were only on paper and intended to block their agitation.²⁶

ATTEMPTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE TAMIL PROBLEMS

These comments were made in the course of the Fifth International Tamil Research Conference convened in Madurai early in January 1981, and which was attended by TULF politicians, Tamil scholars from Sri Lanka as well as by two Tamil ministers from the Jayewardene Government (the CWC leader and Minister of Rural Industries, S. Thondaman, and Minister of Regional Development, S. Rajadurai), besides the Muslim Speaker of Sri Lanka's Parliament, Bakeer Markar. Specific grievances adduced by Amirthalingam included allegations that Tamils were being "humiliated" by the Government for using their language, that some Sri Lankan universities had closed down their Tamil medium sections, that Tamils were being discriminated in public sector employment, and that President Jayewardene had failed to summon a promised all-party conference to find a suitable solution to the Tamil problem.

Attempts to internationalize the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka have become a familiar tactic of the TULF leadership, and Amirthalingam's Madurai speech must be construed as made specially for the enlistment of sympathy and support from the Tamil Nadu public and Tamil Nadu political parties. Commenting editorially, *The Hindu* contrasted the attitude of Amirthalingam and his TULF supporters with that of a few months earlier, when they appeared to be convinced about the efforts of President Jayewardene to solve the problems of the Tamils in a "fair and just" manner. They had then declared that it was meaningless to adopt a hostile attitude towards the government and even extended their support to the District Development Councils. But *The Hindu* also concluded that "there could be no more propitious time than now" for President Jayewardene to hold the All-Parties Conference he had promised, "to thrash out the problems of Tamils" and to scrutinise to what extent the concessions granted to Tamils in the spheres of language, public employment and admission to higher institutions of learning were in fact being adhered to in spirit.²⁷

The difficulties of having an All-Parties Conference in Sri Lanka on the Tamil issue could not have been unknown to Amirthalingam. Quite apart from the exigencies of domestic party politics, which has always in the past precluded a bipartisan approach to Sinhala-Tamil relations, no Sri Lankan Government in power could negotiate with the TULF so long as the latter remained committed to the goal of a separate state. For both sides, Eelam is not negotiable; but while language and other concessions granted to Tamils by the government are genuinely meant to bring Tamils into the mainstream of public life in Sri Lanka, for the Tamil leadership these are merely steps towards the realization of the separate state. Hence deadlock was perhaps unavoidable, as also the desire of the TULF leadership to overstate their case and exaggerate alleged acts of discrimination, when the blame lay largely with this leadership for their lack of willingness to accept successive Sri

Lankan Constitutions for what they were worth, and to co-operate with successive governments to improve the lot of the Tamil people.

CONCLUSION : TAMIL NOW ENJOYS NATIONAL STATUS

Indeed, far from Tamils being humiliated for the use of their language, Tamil now enjoys a status in Sri Lanka which is unparalleled in other parts of the Tamil-speaking world. Tamil, a regional language in India, is a national language in Sri Lanka, and its free use in the Sri Lankan National Parliament, in the Northern and Eastern provinces, in all public records, on radio and television, on postage stamps, currency notes, in public correspondence initiated by Tamils in the Tamil language, and as a medium of instruction at all levels of education, is an established fact. Early in December 1980, more than a month before the Madurai Conference, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Public Administration had liberalised procedures for gaining proficiency in Sinhala by Tamil public officers, giving new-entrant officers six months leave with full pay to acquire such proficiency, exempting minor employees from the requirement of acquiring such proficiency and granting old-entrant officers who had lost the benefit of salary increase by virtue of the operation of the second language requirement, the facility of confirmation in their posts and restoration of increments before retirement for the purpose of eligibility for pensions and gratuities.²⁸ During the Budget discussions in Parliament, TULF spokesmen conceded that the Ministry circular on language was "far-reaching", and a source of relief to Tamil public servants.²⁹

As regards the closure of Tamil streams of instruction in universities to which reference was made at Madurai, the University Grants Commission did terminate Tamil medium streams in all faculties in Colombo University and the Tamil Language Department in Kelaniya University, but this decision was taken concurrently with the requirement that instruction in the Tamil medium be given in all faculties in the prestigious Peradeniya University in Sri Lanka. The Sinhala section of Jaffna University had permanently closed down after the August 1977 riots, and Jaffna University now functions as a full-fledged Tamil university with faculties in Arts, Science and Medicine. A university campus in Batticaloa (Eastern Province), affiliated to Peradeniya University, with faculties in Science and Agriculture, teaching in Tamil is scheduled to open in October 1981. There is no evidence to indicate that these changes have been made other than for reasons connected with staffing exigencies and numbers of Tamil medium students registered for courses in Colombo University and in the Tamil Language Department in Kelaniya University. Nor can it be held that they are inconsistent with section 21(2) of the Constitution of 1978, which lays down that where one national language is a medium of instruction in any course, faculty or department of a State-financed university, the other national language shall also be made a medium of instruction in such course, department or faculty

for students who had previously been educated in the Tamil medium, *except* in instances where like courses, departments or faculties existed in any other campus or branch of the same university or of any other university for the alternative national language.

The gravamen of the TULF however, was that the government had failed to provide the personnel for the implementation of the constitutional provisions which recognised Tamil as a national language and as a language of administration in the North and East; that is, that adequate numbers of Tamil-speaking people were not being recruited to certain categories of public service employment and that recruitment to the armed services and police force was highly discriminatory to the Tamils. The charge made by Amirthalingam that not more than 5 per cent of new recruits in the Police Force, and 2 per cent of new recruits in the Armed Services, were Tamils since 1977, was not denied during the Budget Debate. It might however be contended that the Sri Lanka Army, recruited and trained as it is mainly for counter-insurgency activities in the island, might find itself equally disadvantaged fighting counter-insurgency both in the North and South with Tamil cadres in its fighting arm, while the low Tamil recruitment to the Police Force and the alleged inadequacy of Tamils serving in police stations in the North could hardly be without relevance to the spate of killings of Tamil police officers and the consequent reluctance of Tamil policemen to serve in this area.³⁰ A more legitimate Tamil grievance pertained to recruitment to other categories of the public service, where it was shown that out of 4289 persons appointed to certain categories of the service between February 1977 and the end of 1980, only 5.73 per cent were Tamils and 1.9 per cent Muslims; the lowest incidence of Tamil recruitment during this period being in the Government Clerical Service and the Sri Lanka Administrative Service.³¹ Arguably in these services, too, recruitment policy could hardly have been uninfluenced by considerations of the usefulness of Tamil public officers in a transferable service who might have an inadequate knowledge of the official language, or who might, with or without political instigation, display an unwillingness to acquire the required proficiency in such language. Again, the question may be simply asked: Is the Tamil political leadership to blame for the plight of Tamil public servants today?

The Madurai Conference was in the nature of a setback to the TULF's continuing efforts to internationalize support for their separatist cause. The DMK under Karunanidhi, an erstwhile supporter of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause, dissociated itself completely from the Conference, while the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran, in the course of his own conference speech administered a rebuff to the TULF, objecting to references to the so-called Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, and declared that the Conference would not allow itself to be used as a platform for anyone to propagate any political ideology, nor did Tamil Nadu want to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. Ramachandran emphasized that the government and people of Tamil Nadu always wanted to maintain the best of relations with the govern-

ments and peoples of other countries, particularly with those of their neighbours.³²

World Tamil conferences have customarily tended to aggravate Sinhala-Tamil tensions and differences by injecting political overtones to discussions which are intended to be basically academic. Amirthalingam's changing attitude at Madurai may perhaps be understood in this context, but leaving aside the rhetoric of his argument a hardening of the TULF's relations with the Government can be discerned, which Prime Minister Premadasa's February visit and tour of Jaffna, in connection with the inauguration of a model village in Udupiddy as part of his Village Re-awakening Programme, might have done something to mollify but which, in the long run, bodes ill for the future of Sinhala-Tamil relations.

In August 1977, post-election mob violence (now becoming endemic after general elections in Sri Lanka) took a communal turn when latent anti-Tamil hostility was vented against the community accompanied by looting and arson of Tamil shops, with the inevitable repercussions in the North. The riots, the worst since 1958, actually started with a clash between the police and a Tamil crowd at a school carnival in Jaffna, leaving four Tamils shot dead and one policeman wounded. From here they rapidly spread southward in the wake of rumours, mostly false, that Buddhist temples had been burned and Sinhalese people murdered in the North. The Government was constrained to clamp down a prolonged curfew starting on 18 August, accommodate nearly 40,000 Tamil refugees in camps in Colombo and Kandy and airlift Tamils from the affected areas in the South to Jaffna because transit by rail and road had become hazardous. By 22 August, when the curfew was lifted, 125 persons—97 Tamils, 24 Sinhalese, 1 Muslim, and 3 unidentified—were officially listed as killed in the riots. A government communique of 29 August accused the SLFP by implication of responsibility for these events. "Though these criminal acts appeared on the surface to be a communal conflict," it said, "it is believed that there was a political conspiracy behind it." But the SLFP leader, Mrs Bandaranaike herself accused the government of failing to maintain order and said the riots were a logical outcome of the post-election riots, in which hundreds of her supporters had lost their property and at least 30 had been killed. For the TULF leader, Amirthalingam, however, the violence "vindicated to the hilt" the demand for a separate state: "If we do not have some place of safety, we shall have to live eternally in refugee camps."³³

The August riots of 1977 demonstrated, again, the combustible nature of the present Sinhala-Tamil relationship. To have hoped that this would diminish with the dawn of a separate state was only wishful thinking for it may be surmised that the issue of the separate state itself had now become a discrete factor bearing upon the tensions in this relationship.

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NOTES

- 1 The Sinhalese, concentrated in the Western, Southern, North-Central, Central, North-Western, Uva and Sabaragamuwa Provinces numbered 9, 147,000 (71.9 per cent of total population) in 1971, and are themselves of ancient Indian origin.
- 2 See the author's *Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence* (Colombo, 1965).
- 3 *House of Representatives Debates* (1966), Vol. 64, col. 128.
- 4 *House of Representatives Debates* (1958), Vol. 31, col 932.
- 5 See *Times of Ceylon*, 17 June 1964.
- 6 See S. Suntheralingam, *Ceylon: The Beginnings of Freedom Struggle* (Columbo, 1967).
- 7 *The Sun* (Colombo), 4 May, 1967. Even the depressed castes in the North expressed themselves to be opposed to the idea of District Councils. *Ceylon Daily News*, 21 November 1967.
- 8 Under the same provision, the President appointed Ministers without cabinet rank for specific subjects which might be delegated by any Cabinet Minister. Such subjects so far include the Colombo Group of Hospitals, Coconut Industries and Regional Development, the last being assigned to a Tamil Minister.
- 9 *Constituent Assembly Debates* (1972) Vol. 1(2), col. 2084.
- 10 See W.I. Siriweera, "Recent Developments in Sinhala-Tamil Relations," *Asian Survey*, (Berkeley, CA), September 1980; also leading article in *Ceylon Daily News*, 5 July 1979.
- 11 See the evidence of Brigadier S.C. Ranatunga and Police Superintendent, J.D.M. Ariyasinghe, before the Sansoni Commission, as reported in *Ceylon Daily News*, 3 July and 12 July, 1979.
- 12 Tamil students, who had accounted for 40.7, 40.8 and 31.1 per cent of total admissions to the faculties of Engineering, Medicine and Science, respectively, in Sri Lanka for the year 1970-71, numbered 14.1, 17.4 and 21 per cent, respectively, for these same faculties in 1975. The corresponding figures for Sinhalese admissions were 55.9, 53.7 and 65.3 per cent in 1970-71 for Engineering, Medicine and Science, and 83.4, 78.9 and 76 per cent, respectively for the same faculties in 1975. The increasing percentage of Sinhalese students gaining admission to these faculties is explained by the availability of better educational facilities for Sinhalese students in hitherto less-developed areas of the country as well as by the operation of standardisation. The drop in Tamil admissions to the prestigious faculties in Sri Lanka universities is significant, but percentage-wise it still compares favourably with the percentage of Sri Lanka Tamils in the total population which was 1 per cent in 1971.
- 13 Reported in *Ceylon Daily News*, 7 July 1979.
- 14 A parliamentary furore was caused when Industries Minister, Cyril Mathew alleged that Tamil examiners in a science subject in the GCE (Advanced Level) April 1977 examination had overmarked certain answer-scripts of Tamil medium students in a particular question. When Tamil parliamentarians charged that Minister Mathew was indulging in "baseless allegations," he reiterated in a letter of appeal addressed to the President, that university admissions should be based on a racial quota in conformity with population proportions as "the only fair, just and equitable way in which the problem of university admissions could be solved...." Text of letter in *Ceylon Daily News*, 19 July 1979.
- 15 *Ceylon Daily News*, 5 October 1977.
- 16 In the Puttalam constituency in the north-west too, the winning candidate was UNP, and the TULF candidate trailed a poor third.
- 17 Siriweera, n.10, p. 906.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 911.
- 19 According to the Inspector-General of Police, there were no bank hold-ups and no killings by hand-bombs in 1980. Political and communal violence in the year was also virtually non-existent. *Ceylon Daily News*. 1 January 1981.

- 20 The GCE (Advanced Level) examinations still remained the qualifying examination for entrance to the University, but admissions were now based on a quota of 30 per cent for merit, 55 per cent allocated on a district-wide basis, and 15 per cent reserved for backward areas.
- 21 Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya.
- 22 Town Councils and the ancient institution of Village Committees will disappear with the implementation of DDCs.
- 23 *Parliamentary Debates*, 8 August 1980 Vol. 11, ccl. 408-09.
- 24 *Ceylon Daily News*, 18 August 1980.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 *The Hindu* (Madras), 9 January 1981.
- 27 Ibid., 10 January, 1981.
- 28 *Ceylon Daily News*, 5 December 1980
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid., 28 November 1980 and 5 December 1980.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 *The Hindu*, 9 January 1981.
- 33 See *Keesings Archives*, 7 October 1977, p.28-590. The Report of the Sansoni Commission which investigated these events is still awaited.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY : UNITY AND SOLIDARITY A DISTANT DREAM

By B. VIVEKANANDAN*

IN the aftermath of the Second World War, the founding fathers of the European union movement, like Jean Monnet, envisaged that a new united Europe should be built up around a community concept. The functional approach which was adopted in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, and subsequently in the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) too, aimed at the promotion of a new outlook of mutuality and trust, transcending the traditional barriers of nation states, in Europe. The founding fathers hoped that by unifying Europe through consent internecine quarrels among European nations could be brought to an end and the continent insulated from becoming a theatre of another world war. In a way, the bringing together of France and Germany, under a broad common economic framework like the EEC, has certainly minimized this fear. Therefore, one has to concede the fact that the community concept of the EEC has contributed significantly to the promotion of reconciliation between these two traditional rivals of Europe. Similarly, the European Economic Community, with its twin basic features of a free trade area and a customs union, has enabled the convergence of the economic activities of nine countries of Western Europe.

CONFLICT OF NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY CONCEPTS

Nevertheless, these limited achievements during the post-war period should not obscure the challenges the European Community faces today. Although originally the Treaty of Rome envisaged a steady advancement towards European integration, the progress made in this direction so far seems to be an optical illusion. Behind the apparent unity, the Community is virtually torn between conflicting desires of various member countries. In fact, most of them remain almost totally self interested, even going to the extent of breaking the Community laws when they find obstacles to the promotion of their self interests. Therefore, behind the facade of unity, fierce and incessant economic battles are being fought among the European Economic Community member countries to promote their own narrow national interests.

Common Agricultural Policy Results in Disunity

On various vital issues, the members of the European Community give

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the impression that they are on a war of attrition raising serious doubts over the enduring character of the Community. One such issue which has an explosive potential is the working of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It may be pointed out that the Common Agricultural Policy is the major course of action which the European Economic Community has adopted so far to promote economic integration among the member countries. But it appears that instead of promoting integration it has the potential to promote disintegration among the members of the Community. Indeed, in recent years, it has operated in a manner which resulted in a serious drain of the resources of certain member countries to the net benefit of others who have a larger farming sector. Indeed, by its very nature the CAP is bound to promote imbalances between the member countries' budget contributions and the reciprocal advantages they derive from it. This is partly because of the varying sizes of the farm sectors of member countries and partly because about 65 per cent of the Community budget is earmarked to support EEC's 8 million farmers.¹ Moreover, the CAP incurs a lot of wasteful expenditure since the agricultural subsidy under its auspices has been utilized to produce a lot of surpluses; the butter mountain sold abroad at prices far below the cost, is an example.² Moreover, the policy props up market prices at artificially high levels.

The latent troubles for the EEC over the question of budget contributions can be seen from how the British contribution to the Community budget grew heavier as years passed. The contribution Britain has had to make to the European Economic Community budget, until the recent agreement, has certainly been disproportionate to the benefit it could expect in return. Against the French contribution of 702 million Francs, the British contribution in 1980 was to the tune of 9,000 million Francs.³

It is quite obvious that the imbalance in Britain's net contribution to the Community budget is partly due to the farm levies of the EEC (Britain still imports a large quantity of cheap food from outside the EEC) and partly because of the Common Agricultural Policy. Indeed, a country like Britain which has only a small farming sector (2.5 per cent of the labour force), unlike France and West Germany, could hardly think of any benefit from the Common Agricultural Policy, especially when the major share of the EEC budget goes to agriculture. In 1979, for example, in a budget of about £9,000 million, the share of agriculture was about £6,800 millions. Naturally, therefore, members with large agricultural sectors would be the beneficiaries. If, then, the CAP remains unaltered it would inevitably continue to suck up the resources of members with small farm sectors to the benefit of countries with larger farming sectors. Britain was peeved over this prospect and the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, complained in November 1978 that the British contribution to the EEC budget was "clearly out of balance" and that if the budgetary imbalances "were to remain uncorrected it would do long-term damage to the Community as a whole as well as Britain."⁴ His successor, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, also said in October

1979, that Britain "simply cannot go on being Europe's biggest benefactor" and expressed her determination to secure a cut in Britain's contribution to the Community budget.⁵

The budget issue has seriously harmed the Community concept. At the Dublin Summit of the EEC Heads of Government in November 1979, Mrs. Thatcher demanded a cut of £1,000 million in Britain's net budget contribution for 1980.⁶ When others rejected this demand, she warned that her country would not hesitate to "precipitate a crisis" if it did not receive satisfaction.⁷ Following this, demands were made in Britain for studying the option of its withdrawal from the European Economic Community. The National Executive of the Labour Party passed a resolution stating:

In view of the lack of progress to meet Britain's demand at the Dublin Summit, Britain should immediately cease paying all EEC taxes, stop Ministers attending EEC meetings, and decide to undertake a study of options open to us, including amending section 2 of the European Communities Act and withdrawal from the EEC—and to prepare alternatives for Britain.⁸

Besides, a strong impression was given that the British Government was engaged in the preparation of contingency plans to leave the EEC and that senior civil servants were studying the possible effects of a British withdrawal from the Community.⁹ Subsequently, on 18 March 1980, Mrs. Thatcher said that Britain would have to consider withholding its Value Added Tax (VAT) contributions, about £800 million, to the EEC budget if there was no equitable solution of the problem of Britain's contribution.¹⁰ If this had been implemented it would have been in violation of the Community law. Two days later, on 20 March 1980, on the question of CAP, farm prices, etc., the House of Commons witnessed an acrimonious expression of deep disenchantment in Britain towards the EEC.¹¹ Although subsequently a temporary solution to the problem was found by deciding to refund to Britain about £1,577 million in 1980 and 1981 in return for an agreement for a 5 per cent increase in the EEC farm price, the problem cannot be treated as solved.¹² The solution has only temporarily shifted the major burden from Britain to West Germany which is expected to make a net payment of £1,050 million to the European Economic Community budget in 1980.¹³

What is significant is that the budget settlement has done nothing to correct the basic imbalance in the Community spending—the major share, i.e. 64.5 per cent, is still for the Common Agricultural Policy. On the other hand, what the budget settlement has done is to impose a further strain on the Community's budgetary system. The cost of refunds to Britain during the next two years and the increases in agricultural expenditure will almost exhaust the Community's existing resources by the end of 1981. This would inevitably lead the EEC to a financial crisis,

which could be overcome either by substantial modification of the CAP or by increasing the VAT above 1 per cent.¹⁴ Since France, as a big food exporter, makes its main gain from CAP it has little interest in any thorough reform of the system. Although there is talk of "structural changes" of the budget to prevent "the recurrence of unacceptable situations," one cannot be sure of its nature. However, under the new arrangement, by which Britain would be insulated from the budget problem in the next two or three years, Germany would bear the main cost of any increase in the agricultural spending.¹⁵ EEC's expansion with Spain and Portugal will make further calls on its own loaded financial system, mainly in the agricultural sector. Whether the CAP will survive further expansion of the European Community is a big question.

French Ban on Lamb Imports Violates EEC Rules

There is a marked tendency among the members of the European Community to violate its regulations and pursue a defiant path even if it slightly infringes a member's narrow national interest. This is especially notable in the manner in which France had imposed an illegal ban on the import of British lamb meat disregarding the Treaty of Rome and the findings of the European Court. Indeed, this has also done great damage to the Community concept. Fortunately, all other EEC members had opposed the French action. In June 1980, France announced that in addition to the total ban on lamb imports from Britain, they were also cutting back lamb imports from Belgium, Holland, West Germany and Ireland to 70 per cent of the tonnage imported in May 1980. At a meeting of the EEC Agriculture Ministers on 17 June 1980, protests were made by the Germans and the Dutch, who characterised the French move as a violation of the Community's free trade rules. Finn Olav Gundelach, EEC Commissioner for Agriculture, said that he was "very disappointed" by the French attitude.¹⁶ The Anglo-French "lamb war" ended in October 1980, following the introduction of a new lamb and mutton policy which opened the French market to Britain's sheep farmers.¹⁷ Similar was the recent refusal of three member states—Belgium, France, and West Germany—to make their contributions to financing the 1980 EEC Supplementary Budget. As a result, Gaston Thorn, President of the European Commission, had to take the harsh step of threatening the defaulters with legal action.¹⁸ What these developments indicate is that if countries resort to unilateral national remedial measures, the Community would remain no more than a common trading system.

Evolution of Common Fisheries Policy Unsuccessful

The failure of the Community to evolve a new agreed common fisheries policy also shows how difficult it is for EEC members to pull on together. The

fisheries policy adopted by the Community in 1970 was based on the principle that the Community's fishing grounds should be equally accessible to the trawler fleets of all member states. No revision to this free-for-all policy took place after the enlargement of the European Economic Community in 1973. For the last five years this problem remains unresolved. Britain and Ireland have viewed this indifference of the Community as an attempt to impose upon the new members an obligation to give other member countries the right to unlimited access to the fish stocks of Ireland and Britain. Although some minor modifications were made in the earlier policy which introduced limited national fishing zones from 3 to 12 miles off coast lines of member states, they were not intended to be a permanent settlement as this policy was also intended to be phased out by 1982. Britain has argued that as 60 per cent of all fish caught within 200 miles of the coast of EEC member countries are from British waters, any common fisheries policy should give weight to this fact. Britain wants that a 12 mile coastal belt should be kept for its own exclusive fishing and from 12 to 50 miles for a "dominant preference" for British fishermen. Although in early 1980, the nine Community members made certain moves in the direction of formulating a common fisheries policy by agreeing to total allowable catches for waters within 200 nautical miles of Community coasts, the sensitive question of quotas of fish catches for each state has not yet been decided.¹⁹ The EEC Commission had earlier proposed that Britain should get only 31 per cent of the total fish catch of the Community as against the British claim for 45 per cent.²⁰ Many in Britain felt that the Commission's proposal was unfair to Britain.²¹ In December 1980, a settlement of this problem appeared to be in sight, but the negotiations broke down as France instructed its delegation not to yield on the issue of "access"—i.e. the right of coastal states to reserve some waters wholly or partially for their own fishermen. The French delegate insisted that the existing limits on fishing by other member-states within 12 miles off the British shore must give way after the end of 1982 to "free access" upto the beaches. Britain, on the other hand, insisted that waters within a 12-mile belt off Britain must be permanently reserved for its own fisherman. On the question of the share of fish catch, Britain was offered over 36 per cent of the main species which would have been acceptable for Britain as part of a package settlement.²²

Little Progress Towards A Monetary Union

The European Community has also made little progress towards the currency union although several European leaders have often called for a single European currency and a centralized monetary policy. It is important to note that controls over the exchange rate and the money supply are among the most important functions of modern governments and the national governments are extremely reluctant to surrender their individual

control over these policies to any supra-national authority. This would mean loss of national control over certain vital aspects of macro-economic policy. In view of this fear, the prospects of a monetary union seems to be very slim. Added to this, the line of thinking in certain countries like Britain is how to restore to the National Government the powers which it has lost to the Community. Peter Shore, Britain's shadow Foreign Secretary, for example, said in the House of Commons on 24 March 1980 that a Labour Government would want to redress "the loss of rights by this House to the EEC."²³ Obviously such restoration would entail a number of changes, including amendment of the European Communities Act of 1972 and an agreement that the judgements of the European Court would deem to be only advisory. These are important matters with a lot of potential posing question marks to the endurance of the European Community. However, it is extremely unlikely that Britain would join the European monetary system in the foreseeable future. The Foreign Office in Britain is totally opposed to the idea. Further, with the expansion of the EEC as a result of the entry of Spain and Portugal, the chances of a monetary union are likely to recede further.²⁴

PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENCE ON THIRD WORLD

Vulnerability of Community Members due to Dependence on Oil

The other set of EEC problems are centered round the potential threats to its essential supplies like oil and raw materials and to markets. It is a well known fact that in general, the industrial complexes of European Economic Community countries are designed to operate with cheap oil as the energy source. Therefore, it is not easy for them instantly to switch over to a new energy base, whether solar, nuclear, wind or tidal wave. In the situation, the oilimporting countries of the European Economic Community are in a weak position and may go to any extent, not necessarily collectively, to keep up the flow of oil to their individual countries. Indeed, the overwhelming dependence of the EEC on imported oil at once reveals its inherent weakness because these countries could easily be pressurized if the oil-producing countries make oil increasingly costly or if they are denied access to oil sources. Assuming that these countries might make efforts to reduce their dependence on oil by increased utilization of coal and nuclear energy, it is estimated that by 1990, given average economic growth, EEC's energy requirement could be 50 per cent more than what it is today. Even if alternative sources of energy play a larger role, the EEC would still be dependent on imports for half of its requirement, which according to one estimate, would be between 470 and 570 million tonnes of crude oil.²⁵ Therefore, it is obvious that the 1980s is going to be a crucial decade for all industrialized countries of the European Economic Community since no alternative to oil could be meaningfully used in the current decade.

They would be most vulnerable to any disruption of oil supplies. Perhaps, Britain may be an exception. Indeed, a scramble for the little oil available can heighten tensions, with serious implications for the Community.

Dependence on Raw Materials

Similar is the extent of dependence of the European Community countries on the import of raw materials and minerals. It may be noted that throughout the fifties and the sixties the interdependence between the developed and the developing countries was not obvious to the latter. The focus was more on the dependence aspects of the developing countries on Western loans, investments, aid and markets. The underdeveloped countries could hardly envisage a situation in which they could exert countervailing pressures on the developed nations. But the early seventies demonstrated the vulnerability of the developed nations to the pressures of the developing countries; the successful moves of the OPEC since 1973 to raise oil prices have really scared the developed nations of the west. It provided confidence to other third world countries which possessed raw materials that they too had the potential to apply pressures on the West if need arose.

Countries of the European Community depend heavily on the underdeveloped countries for their vital commodity imports; about 55 per cent of their raw material are imported from the underdeveloped countries. In the case of important products like minerals, this dependence is likely to increase in future. However, the uninterrupted supply of raw materials is quite vital for the health of the economies of the European Economic Community countries. In fact, none of the developed countries could fill the gap if these supplies were to be cut off. Therefore, if the prices of these commodities were to be pushed up or if supplies were disrupted, it would have a crippling effect on the EEC countries which depend upon them.

Trade Patterns not Directed to Development of Third World

Although the formation of the European Economic Community helped the member countries to increase the size of their domestic market for the 250 million people outside the Community, especially in the underdeveloped countries, the markets have not widened in any appreciable manner partly due to the absence of improvement in the purchasing power of these countries and partly due to the capacity of some of these countries to produce certain high quality consumer items. The continuing poverty in the underdeveloped countries, with about 60 per cent of population lacking effective demand and purchasing power, keeps world trade 60 per cent less than it otherwise would have been. Unless the purchasing power of this vast section of the world population in the underdeveloped countries is increased, and thus stimulate demand, it would reduce the scope to

have a larger market for EEC countries in the third world. But this process cannot be harnessed in any meaningful way if the developed EEC countries concentrate more and more on arms trade with the third world, bereft of any real transfer of resources, in exchange for the purchases they make from the latter countries. It is true that in recent years the wealth of the European Economic Community countries has been drained substantially towards the oil rich countries of the Middle East and the Gulf. To recycle this wealth back to the EEC, some of them have resorted to greater arms trade. Of course, all the major countries are engaged in arms trade; the United States and the Soviet Union, as per the figures available for 1978, lead the rest with arms exports worth \$5,800 million and \$4,000 million respectively. In the Community, France leads with \$2,000 million worth arms exports, followed by Britain with \$660 million and Italy with \$620 million.²⁶ Indeed, this pattern of trade relationship cannot promote the development of the developing countries since a substantial portion of their resources keep getting squandered on armaments alone. Along with aid, trade should also be directed towards the developmet of the third world.

Protectionist Measures not Conducive to Healthy Relationship

The European Economic Community's protectionist measures, imposing tighter controls on imports from the most competitive developing countries, are also not conducive to the promotion of the development of the third world in any meaningful manner. Pertinently, the Community's present Generalised System of Preferences ended in 1980, and the new system, which has a provision for review every five years, is expected to run for another 20 years. Under the GSP, the European Economic Community allows developing countries duty free entry for their industrial exports, within specified limits, and partial exemption from duties for their agricultural exports. Under the EEC Commission's new proposed rules the very competitive countries would be subjected to new rules limiting their export to the EEC of sensitive goods which are likely to undermine the livelihood of the latter's own producers. However, whatever the reasons put forth to justify protectionism, the protectionist measures of the Community have not helped to develop a healthy relationship between it and the developing countries.²⁷ Since the third world has essential resources which the EEC countries need, they can also unite and bargain effectively as the OPEC has done in recent years. In this connection, it is interesting to note that when the Community asked Australia in 1980 to reduce its import of sheep meat to 8,000 tonnes against 25,000 tonnes last year, Australia had threatened the EEC with a trade ban, which would have meant a loss of exports worth about £500 million a year.²⁸ A similar step by the third world countries of Africa and Asia would be disastrous for the Community.

While the EEC has resorted to protectionism against imports from the developing countries, its own domestic market has been threatened by the industrial and technological advancement of the United States and Japan. The automobile industry, for example, is seriously threatened by Japanese imports; Japanese cars have become highly competitive in the EEC open car market partly because they are cheap, reliable and popular and also partly because in the context of the oil price hike Japanese small cars are in greater demand than the big indigenous cars produced by the Community countries. In 1979, Japan exported 2,13,000 cars to Britain and 1,84,000 cars to West Germany. Italy has restricted the Japanese car imports to 2,300 a year. In 1980, efforts were made to introduce a voluntary curb by Japan in its car exports to the European Economic Community, especially Britain. Although demands have been made to impose import controls against the Japanese, the EEC Commission had refused to act in this regard.

APPRAISAL : EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WEARS THIN

All these factors clearly indicate that the European Community's problems are many and serious. Beyond the statutory union of domestic markets under the Treaty of Rome, the people of the nine constituents are yet to develop a sense of belonging and purpose that would bind them together. Torn between conflicting desires of member countries the EEC seems to have no direction. In fact, the member countries seem to have their own independent ideas about their final destination. Of course countries with a proud heritage and different perceptions are brought together to give an impression of European solidarity. But they are there for different reasons; the Benelux countries, for whom the EEC is the available avenue to maximise their political influence and economic prosperity; France, because it promotes the interest of French farmers and condemns it when the Community obligation threatens the French sheep farmers or requires France to compromise its political sovereignty. On closer scrutiny, then, Community solidarity wears very thin.

The creation of an Economic Community of Nine has not succeeded in the effective handling of the problems of the member countries. The high hopes with which certain countries joined the Community remain shattered. Britain, for example, which joined with the hope of finding a solution to various economic problems, is simmering with surging discontent. Opinion polls conducted by Market Opinion and Research International (MORI) reveal that there is a progressive decline in public support for British membership since the 1975 Referendum in which the British electorate had voted by two thirds (67 per cent) in favour of Britain's continued membership in the EEC.²⁹ In October 1977 this majority had come down to 53 per cent; in May 1978, it had further come down to a minority 47 per cent while 53 per cent registered their opposition to Britain's continued

membership. In July 1980, the size of opposition to Britain's membership had grown to 70 per cent with only 30 per cent supporting it.³⁰ The visionaries who hoped for a powerful revival of British industry also remain disappointed. In fact, many in Britain believe that British membership in the European Community was a disaster. It is true that for Britain membership has resulted mainly in the escalation of food prices, loss of jobs, crippling effects on the balance of payments and a ruining effect on its economy. In 1979-80, Britain was faced with a trade deficit of £2,500 million with the EEC of which £750 million was accounted for by textiles alone.³¹ Britain's trade deficit in manufactured goods with the Community was to the tune of £4,000 million per annum causing a rise in unemployment.³² Moreover, within the EEC the British share of exports has fallen from 13.7 per cent in 1963 to 8.6 per cent in 1977.³³ Although the European Community could not be blamed for all of Britain's ills, it certainly has made things worse for Britain. The Community's Common Agricultural Policy contributed considerably to Britain's budget deficit and inflation through increased food prices. British industries under Britain's EEC membership, have been reduced in their ability to stop import penetration. The Labour Party has openly come out with the proposal for Britain's withdrawal; the Party's annual conference, held in October 1980 in Blackpool, passed a motion by a two-thirds majority, urging it to make Britain's withdrawal from the Community a priority in the next elections. The motion urged the Party to disengage Britain from the Community institutions and to work for peaceful and equitable relations between Britain and all the countries of Europe and the rest of the world.³⁴ In the circumstances, even a section of the Conservative Party has come to a similar conclusion that Britain should withdraw from the EEC as soon as possible, since the whole exercise of its membership was a disaster.³⁵ A document from the Conservative Political Centre noted a general feeling of growing disenchantment among the British "with the whole concept of Europe."³⁶ The fact that only 32 per cent of the British electorate had turned out to vote in the elections for the European Parliament is indicative of this disenchantment.

One major cause of disenchantment in certain EEC capitals is the uneven manner in which the CAP has operated till now. In the absence of simultaneous development of the regional and industrial policies of the EEC, which could extend benefits to more industrialised countries of the EEC also, the CAP cannot remain as it stands today without destabilising the Community itself. At the same time there is little prospect of a revision of the CAP since France, which is currently the biggest beneficiary, has declared that it would oppose any attempt to water down the policy. The French Cabinet has taken the stand that under the Treaty of Rome only the EEC Council of Ministers, acting unanimously in response to proposals from the European Commission, could take such a decision.³⁷ It appears that France would firmly oppose a revision of the CAP and also a further expansion of the EEC with countries like Spain and Portugal, apprehending

that their entry might result in its collapse. The former French President, Giscard d'Estaing, had already indicated that there should be a pause before the Community was enlarged, to include Spain and Portugal, because some new members were still not fully integrated.³⁸ However, if by force of circumstances the CAP were to be abandoned, and each member asked to manage its own farming sector and food requirements, the European Economic Community would instantly be reduced to more or less a predominantly industrial free trade area. There is a distinct possibility of such a development in future. It is doubtful whether a system which compels countries with small farming populations to support the farmers of other countries with large farming sectors to produce enormous surpluses, and keep the food prices artificially high, can sustain itself for long.

It appears that after toying with the idea of a community concept for some time, nation states in the European Community have started asserting themselves and pulling apart before they were to be further enmeshed into a process from which they would be unable to pull out easily after some time. However, it is obvious that during the 24-year life of the Community even the economic union of the member countries has not progressed much.

The European Community's further expansion on 1 January 1981, with Greece as its tenth member has not minimized its problems. Even though the country's government led by George Ellis took Greece into the Community with the hope that it would bring economic advantages,³⁹ the fact that all major opposition parties in Greece had boycotted the celebrations organized by the Government in connection with its entry showed that the nation was deeply divided.⁴⁰

In a broader perspective, these developments indicate that the vision of a united Europe, nurtured by the founding fathers of the movement, has considerably faded. For those who viewed the establishment of a Common Market as the first step towards the unification of Europe, modelled on the United States of America, the goal seems to be still a distant dream. The national governments in the EEC countries have shown extreme reluctance to transfer any more of their power to the supra-national European institutions; they zealously guard their position as the fount of authority and the ultimate repository of sovereignty. Certainly, this trend is not in tune with the cause of European unification. Fundamentally the spirit of oneness is conspicuous by its absence.

One external factor which needs special mention in this context is the potential threat to the European Economic Community emanating from the recent Soviet moves in Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean. It appears that one of the major objectives of these moves is to gain control over supplies like oil, raw materials and minerals vital to the developed countries of Western Europe. Through a series of politico-economic and military moves the Soviet Union seems to be trying to suck into its orbit as many countries of Asia and Africa as possible. Since 1971 it concluded friendship

treaties with a number of strategically important countries of Asia and Africa; in the Middle East alone it has concluded such treaties with five countries although some of these did not produce the desired results for the Soviet Union. The underpinnings of economic collaboration in all these friendship treaties are of considerable significance in this context. The Soviet aim in these moves seems to be to choke oil supplies from the Gulf and also the vital supplies of raw material and minerals from Africa and thus ruin the industrial complexes of the EEC nations which depend heavily upon these supplies. Certainly, under the present conditions of over-whelming dependence on oil and raw materials, developments in Africa and Middle East can affect the European Community as closely as developments at home. However, if the Soviet moves succeed, without resorting to a war of weapons and waging just an economic war, the Soviet Union can impose its dominance on West European countries and reduce them to thralldom. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the deployment of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean have placed the USSR in a stronger position to dominate Iran and the Gulf and thereby to threaten the vital flow of Middle East oil to Western Europe.

The cracks in the original scheme of the European Economic Community and the multiple challenges from outside create doubts over its enduring nature. The issues thrown up around the budget controversy have raised doubts in the minds of certain EEC countries that rush for integration would not result in the enduring cohesiveness of the Community and might prove a costly mistake. Moreover, it is obvious that despite the formation of the European Community, the fusion of the destinies of the Nine is still not in sight. Their efforts to keep up appearances of unity can hardly conceal the fact that the Community concept has not acquired much depth among the member countries. Indeed, the Community remains a house deeply divided, and, at times, gives the impression that individual country's move in different directions, each one suspicious of the other, while pretending on the surface some desire for a unified approach. Early in 1980 an important French leader, Jacques Chirac, had gone to the extent of openly saying that it was time for Britain to be told to leave the European Community.⁴¹ In this context, one may agree with a ponderous observation James Callaghan, British Prime Minister, made on the Community three years ago. He said: "With hindsight, we can see that perhaps the founding fathers were paying too much attention to the finished spire of the cathedral and too little to the foundations."⁴²

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NOTES

- 1 *The Times* (London), 11 July 1980.
- 2 In April 1980, EEC decided to sell 20,900 tonnes of butter to the Soviet Union at a price of £670 per tonne which cost the EEC £1,738 per tonne. *The Times*, 2 May 1980.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 11 March 1980.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 14 November 1978.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 6 October 1979.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 30 November 1979.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 1 December 1979.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 20 December 1979.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 8 December 1979.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 19 and 21 March 1980. Britain's estimated gross contribution to the EEC budget for 1980 was £2,000 million.
- 11 United Kingdom, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Session 1979-80, Vol. 981, cols. 652-80.
- 12 According to one estimate, 5 per cent increase in farm prices would cost the British housewives an extra £200 million a year. *The Times*, 2 October 1980.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 16 June 1980.
- 14 According to Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, in a properly balanced Community, the budget should be "at least of the order of 2 to 2.5 per cent of the Community's GNP", (compared with 0.8 per cent now). He suggested that the ceiling of the Value Added Tax (VAT) should be raised from the present 1 per cent and new revenue sources such as levy on imported oil coupled with a tax on oil production should be created. *The Times*, 21 November 1980.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 3 June 1980.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 18 June 1980.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 1 October 1980.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 13 January 1981. The Supplementary Budget contained provisions for extending aid to the Italian earthquake victims and for an increase in spending in the regional and social spheres, beyond what had been approved by the EEC Council of Ministers.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 16 June 1980.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 11 September 1980.
- 21 The House of Lord's Select Committee for the European Community's affairs said that the proposal was unfair to Britain.
- 22 *The Times*, 18 December 1980.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 6 June 1980.
- 24 Since 1978, the European Monetary System (EMS) is in operation. In the present form it is only an arrangement designed to limit currency fluctuations among the eight full members of the EMS. Britain is not a member of the EMS, nor is likely to be one in the near future. *Ibid.*, 14 November 1980.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 3 June 1980.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 19 February 1980.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 8 March 1980.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 17 July and 16 September 1980.
- 29 According to Enoch Powell, the decision to join EEC was an observation. *The Times*, 1 October 1980.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 21 November 1980.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 17 April 1980.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 6 June 1980.
- 33 *Financial Times* (London), 26 March 1980.
- 34 *The Times*, 2 October 1980. According to Enoch Powell, outside the EEC Britain could be stronger, more prosperous, more confident and could have better relations with its continental neighbours.

- 35 Ibid., 30 August 1980.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 *Financial Times*, 10 November 1979.
- 38 *The Times*, 6 June 1980.
- 39 Ibid., 30 December 1980.
- 40 Ibid., 6 January 1981.
- 41 Ibid., 14 March 1980.
- 42 Ibid., 15 November 1977.

DRAGON KINGDOM'S URGE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE

By MANORAMA KOHLI*

DURING the year 1979, on a couple of occasions in a few statements of the Bhutan ruler and its National Assembly, one could sense that landlocked and sheltered Bhutan was in for a major change in its role as a sovereign and independent state. Many in India were ready to assume that to meet the growing aspirations of Bhutan for an "international role" the Treaty of 1949 may have to be revised. Article 2 of the Treaty in particular, under which Bhutan is to be guided and advised by the Government of India in the conduct of its foreign relations, it was felt, may have to be abandoned altogether.¹ The Druk Gyalpo (ruler), Jigme Singye Wangchuk in a Press conference in Bombay in September 1979, stated that the Treaty of 1949 needed to be "updated."² To many it sounded that Bhutan was not fully satisfied with the existing pattern of its relationship with its southern neighbour.³

Only a month earlier, some members of the National Assembly of Bhutan had held that Article 2 of the Treaty did not bind Bhutan to accept all advice rendered by India; it only obliged it to seek the latter's advice and guidance.⁴ A somewhat similar interpretation had been made a couple of times earlier also,⁵ but read along with a "candid" demand of the Druk Gyalpo for "updating" the Treaty of 1949 it sounded a little different.

Even more disturbing from the Indian point of view was the impression that Bhutan was seeking to have direct talks with Beijing on the question of boundary delineation between the two countries.⁶ The Druk Gyalpo's statement, "to leave the border undemarcated would be to the disadvantage of Bhutan in the long run," was inferred as an attempt to initiate some diplomatic moves to have talks with China for the settlement of the boundary dispute which had been hanging fire ever since the days of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Though the Druk Gyalpo denied having any intention of establishing diplomatic contacts with China since he called it "utter nonsense,"⁷ the opening of some limited communication with China could not altogether be ruled out.

At the Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in August 1979 at Havana, Bhutan took a stand on the issue of the admission of Kampuchea which was found to be not only different from that of India but which fell in line with that of China. While India favoured leaving the seat vacant, China supported the claims of the ousted Pol Pot regime of Kampuchea.⁸ Bhutan, earlier in the United Nations and in the non-aligned conferences had voted differently from that of India, as for example, on the issue of the rights of the land-locked countries, but the Kampuchean issue was too serious a

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subject, of immediate concern to India and its position in Asia. Therefore the fact that Bhutan should become a supporter of Chinese strategy in the whole of Southeast Asia was viewed very seriously by the then occupants of South Block, causing quite a "flutter in the dove-cots."

In any case, the specific issue of the revision of the Treaty of 1949 was closed when in November 1979 the Druk Gyalpo said that he did not see any need for the revision of the Treaty.⁹ Nevertheless, the larger issue remains very much alive and therefore needs proper examination. If the Dragon Kingdom wants to play a larger role in the wider issues of regional and international importance, the question would be asked as to what extent this role is consistent with the existing status and power position of Bhutan? The answer to this question will have to be formulated in the context of the perception of the Bhutanese leadership, of their "national interest," and of the altered status of the kingdom as a member of the international community. From the decision of Bhutan at Havana and the statements of the Druk Gyalpo and National Assembly members it seems that there is an urge for an "international role" on the part of Bhutan.

At times one tends to think that these expressions are merely of a demonstrative character. These are impulsive reactions, one may argue, of a people who lived in a state of isolation for centuries together, and now that the barriers were broken there was an outburst of new hopes and aspirations. Therefore what was very important for Bhutan was that its recently acquired sovereign status should be made known to as many countries and peoples as possible and what it was unable to have for hundreds of years it should now have in a few decades. Such a demonstrative urge sometimes makes the people overlook the physical limitations of their kingdom.

But notwithstanding the demonstrative aspect, few will be able to hold that Bhutan's political and legal status as a polity has not witnessed a tremendous change since the Treaty was signed in 1949. What therefore the National Assembly or the ruler is asking for is the consequence of that change. Even the exhibitive urge is a reflection of the growing awareness of the people that as a community they must be evaluated in the context of this change, indeed as a "sovereign and equal" member of the family of nations which Bhutan claims to be. It is therefore imperative that such a status must be conferred upon it both in formalistic diplomatic terms as well as in the structure and process of decision-making in the international bodies. The Kampuchean issue at Havana or the voting pattern of Bhutan in the United Nations forums are individual examples of that quest of Bhutan as a "state".

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN BHUTAN

It is well known that even after the formal recognition of Bhutan and Nepal as independent states, the British did not allow or encourage them

to participate in matters even of direct mutual interest to them. To keep them isolated from the outside world, as well as apart from each other, was indeed the principal objective of Britain's imperial policy as followed by it in the entire Himalayan region. India, on the other hand, after independence rejected such an approach as Nehru and the Congress Party were determined to abandon the entire imperialistic model of Britain in the Himalayan neighbourhood, as elsewhere.¹⁰ An indication of such an approach was given when in 1947 at the Asian Relations Conference both Nepal and Bhutan along with Tibet were invited.¹¹

Treaty of 1949 Ushers in a New Era in Bilateral Relations

Consistent with India's anti-imperialist attitude therefore, while concluding the Treaty of 1949 with Bhutan replacing the earlier agreement of 1910, some changes of a subtle nature were made. The Treaty substituted the word "Maharaja" as used in 1910 by "Druk Gyalpo" for the ruler of Bhutan. This was done to hold the Bhutanese Head of State distinct from the rulers of princely states in India who were normally designated as "Maharajas".¹² Difference could also be discerned in the relevant provisions of the Treaty of 1949 defining the procedure and machinery for the settlement of disputes between India and Bhutan arising out of the application and interpretation of the Treaty.¹³ The surrender of an area of about 32 square miles in the Dewangiri region to Bhutan was also motivated by India's desire to "set right the inequality of the British rule left as a legacy to the Government of India."¹⁴ To quote Dr. Nagendra Singh, the signing of the treaty "ushered in a new era in the legal status of Bhutan leading ultimately to the emergence of Bhutan as a modern state fully equipped to become a member of the United Nations."¹⁵

Events in the Himalayas Precipitate Opening of Bhutan

Yet it is not only in purely legalistic terms that India showed a positive response to the emergence of Bhutan as a sovereign state. India also played an active role in the birth of modern Bhutan in the wider political sense. Indeed, India was as much responsible as the then Maharaja of Bhutan in deciding to end the closed status of Bhutan which was partly a self-imposed condition. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the opening of Bhutan was precipitated by the events in the Himalayas, which were so close to the borders both of India and Bhutan, during the decade of the 1950s. The occupation of Tibet by China during 1949-51 and the subsequent Tibet Revolt in 1959 convinced both India and Bhutan that a closed Bhutan was only an invitation to subversion from China and a gap in the defences of India in the eastern sector.¹⁶ Therefore, following the historic visit of Pandit Nehru to Bhutan in 1958, the forbidden Buddhist Kingdom in the Himalayas

decided to open its doors to the outside world under the imaginative and farsighted leadership of Jigme Dorji Wangchuk.¹⁷

BHUTAN ENTERS COMITY OF NATIONS

With the ending of isolation therefore, it was inevitable that Bhutan should awaken to a new outlook and to a new experience.¹⁸ The process of internationalization of Bhutan as a sovereign and independent country started unfolding itself slowly and gradually but in decisive terms. It began with the admission of Bhutan to the Colombo Plan in the early 1960s when as its member it became eligible to receive necessary aid and assistance.¹⁹ Seven years later, in 1969, Bhutan became a member of the International Postal Union. This was Bhutan's first admission to a regular international organization of a world-wide character.²⁰ But the decisive breakthrough for Bhutan came in 1971 when India sponsored its admission to the United Nations.²¹ Bhutan got a seat in the prestigious third world body, the non-aligned movement, in 1973 at the Algiers Conference. As a consequence Bhutan's dependence on India, which at one time was almost its exclusive diplomatic channel, was substantially reduced.²² It would therefore be highly unrealistic to believe that the change was without any impact on the perception of the rulers in Bhutan and their diplomatic interests; they now were more enthusiastic on further enlargement of their foreign contacts. As an Indian diplomat with wide experience in Bhutan and Sikkim, wrote in 1969 :

Once Bhutan has abandoned her isolation and established contact with the rest of the world, she will inevitably be drawn into the mainstream of world events and before long she will claim her place in the community of nations.²³

Changes in the international status of Bhutan necessitated some adjustments in the pattern of Indo-Bhutanese bilateral relationship also. On the surface they might appear to be merely symbolic, but when examined in depth they speak of the new consciousness of Bhutan, of its altered position. It will therefore be too simplistic to take these adjustments as only of a superficial nature.

Diversification of Bhutan-India Relations in the Seventies

In 1963, the Bhutan ruler got his title changed from "His Highness" to "His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo." The change certainly indicated a new emphasis on a distinct identity of his "Bhutanese designation."²⁴ In 1968 the "Residency," the office through which India's dealings with Bhutan and Sikkim were conducted, was re-designated as "India House". The name Residency, it was argued, smacked of British colonialism since for all political

purposes the British Viceroy in India did not consider Bhutan more than a "dependency."²⁵ The same year, Bhutan agreed to have a special officer from India "to coordinate, expedite and facilitate the implementation of various Indian-aided projects in Bhutan as well as a Liason Officer of the Government of India with the Government of Bhutan for all other matters of mutual interest." For the first time "Bhutan permitted a Resident Representative of another country on their soil."²⁶ These seemingly minor changes in Indo-Bhutanese relations however marked the beginnings of diversification of Bhutan's bilateral relations more or less on formal lines. The next change which took place in 1971 was consistent with Bhutan joining the United Nations; Bhutan's representation in India and vice versa was raised to the ambassadorial level.²⁷ A full-fledged External Affairs Ministry was created in Bhutan in June 1972.²⁸ Thus by the mid-1970s, as a member of the Colombo Plan, International Postal Union, United Nations and subsequently of the non-aligned movement and with fullfledged diplomatic contacts with India and partial contacts with the other countries through international organizations, Bhutan was on the threshold of breaking new ground in terms of its role as a "nation state."

In the year 1978, presumably at the request of the Bhutan Government, the Bhutan Mission in New Delhi, as it was known till then, was renamed as the Royal Bhutan Embassy. Commenting on the change in the nomenclature of the Bhutan Mission, a leading Indian daily wrote: "the revised nomenclature is not without significance, especially since it should logically lead to a qualitative change in the Indo-Bhutanese connexion."²⁹ The change at any rate, underlined the "manifestations of the land-locked mountain kingdom striving to acquire a more distinct personality in the comity of nations."³⁰

EXPANSION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

This quest of Bhutan became manifest in further expansion of its diplomatic relations in the economic field outside the Colombo Plan and the United Nations, independent of and beyond India. By virtue of an agreement signed between India and Bhutan in 1978, the latter was permitted to sell its exportable surpluses to third countries provided India was not in a position to buy them.³¹ Till then Bhutan's trade contacts were exclusively with India except those under the aegis of the Colombo Plan which permitted only limited contacts with countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan etc.

Bhutan opened diplomatic relations with Dacca in Bangladesh in 1979. This is the first country after India with which Bhutan now has full-fledged ambassadorial relations.³² That further diversification is on the cards may not altogether be ignored. The keenness with which the Druk Gyalpo has been pursuing the case for the establishment of an air base in Bhutan ever since 1978 is an index of the desire for diversification and opening up the

country. Air links are vital for the people of a land-locked country in which the development of a circulatory system both in internal and external fields is handicapped by its geographical features. In 1980 New Delhi accepted this demand of Bhutan.³³

WIDENING HORIZONS OF A NEWLY EMERGENT STATE

Bhutan's rising urge to play an independent role in foreign matters must also be attributed partly to the internal developments in Bhutan and the growing sense of nationalism among its people. The number of people who are now more conscious of a "state idea" is larger today than twenty years earlier although the state's socio-economic structure continues to be predominantly feudalistic. The geophysical characteristics of Bhutan with high, impassable mountain peaks and torrential water streams dividing the country into a number of valleys has helped in cultivating a sense of self-sufficiency and distinctness among the inhabitants. The absence of transportation and communication lines contributed to exclusiveness among different tribal communities who chose to live in different valleys, each developing its own distinct language, customs and way of life. A sense of security which some of the loftiest Himalayan peaks in the region engendered among the people as a whole did not let them feel the relevance of a strong national government.³⁴ In sum, Bhutan till very recently was without strong national sentiments overriding their local and tribal loyalties. Except for the theocratic institution of monarchy there were hardly any functionaries or institutions with nation-wide activities and jurisdiction.

Communication Network Breaks Down Social and Cultural Barriers

With the decision to end the secluded status of Bhutan, a process of internal development and modernization of the so-called state machinery had also to be launched. Following Nehru's visit to Bhutan in 1958 and talks with the then Druk Gyalpo, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, the first Five Year Plan for Bhutan was formulated. Financed entirely by India, to the tune of rupees seventeen crores, the main emphasis was on road building projects in Bhutan of which there were hardly any till then. But today there are four main highways already completed as a consequence of which the major towns in Bhutan like Thimpu, Paro, Tongsa and Tashidzong have been connected with the plains region in West Bengal and Assam in India. Besides, they also help interlink different valleys in the country. As a matter of fact many of these roads have quite a good amount of traffic, both of goods and passengers, being carried through the state-controlled transport system. Needless to say that these roads have played a major role in destroying barriers among the people which existed at one time almost in absolute terms. With more intercommunication a sense of common nationhood, a necessary ingredient of a "modern state system," is likely to grow further.

While on the one hand these communications facilitate people from remote corners to reach areas of economic and industrial activities, they also break down and erode cultural and linguistic barriers. The development of educational programmes are also likely to usher in similar results.³⁵

Economic Progress Generates Parallel Political Changes

Above all, Bhutan's political system has also witnessed quite a few changes and innovations. Although it is said that the first Maharaja of Bhutan, Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, had drawn a blue print of road building activities and other reforms for Bhutan,³⁶ it is Jigme Dorji Wangchuk who is regarded as the "Father of modern Bhutan". It was he who conceived the entire idea of the socio-economic development of Bhutan and decided to end the policy of isolation, also it was during his regime that the political system was given a "new look". The country's governmental system was democratized; in 1965 he established an Advisory Council to advise him in all matters of national importance. A Council of Ministers to help the King discharge state administrative and executive functions was established three years later.³⁷ The Council can be compared to a body of ministers with each member incharge of a major department of the Government. In 1969 the Tsongdu,³⁸ the National Assembly of Bhutan which had been in existence for almost half a century, was given more powers than it enjoyed hitherto. On a proposal initiated by the Maharaja it was converted into a "sovereign" body since its decisions did not require approval of the Druk Gyalpo in order to be effective.³⁹ In 1968 the first ever banking institution was introduced in Bhutan.⁴⁰ The following year, the High Court of Bhutan came into existence marking a great step forward towards the separation of the Executive from the Judiciary. Indeed, Thimpu which is the seat of all these institutions with a secretariat building and buildings of the UN Aid and Indian Embassy, plus a three star hotel run by the Government, a fairly modern shopping complex and quite a few towering public buildings, has become the symbol of the change in this traditional, medieval Buddhist Kingdom, and all this within a short span of about two decades. A national museum which has more recently been set up at Paro, is yet another illustration of the nation-state idea which helps a people seek an identity of their own in the outer world. While it is true that the idea has not yet taken root in the hearts and minds of average Bhutanese who still cling to the traditional way of life, one cannot at the same time deny the fact that the ruling elite, the royalty and the princely class and quite a few well educated and Western oriented families have been sufficiently exposed to these ideas and also articulate them in terms of policy decisions and state behaviour. What is therefore called a quest for an international role is nothing except a parallel movement in politics which emerges out of economic progress and emancipation and manifests itself in the assertion of national character and widening horizons of a newly

emergent nation.⁴¹ As the compulsions for economic modernism increase a horizontal expansion in Bhutan's external contacts is understandable.

Tibetan Developments

One of the determinants of the external behaviour of any state is the impact of its immediate environment and its perception by the leadership. Bhutan's environment, needless to say, is the South-Asian sub-continent and within this it is the Himalayan sub-region which affects it most intimately and in a variety of ways. An event therefore leading to a major shift in the geo-political and strategic conditions in the Himalayas must have a direct and enduring influence on Bhutan. As such the role which it will play in the changed environment should directly be related to the perception that the ruling groups formulate of the situation. That it was the developments in Tibet, first during 1949-51 and in the following ten years or so, were the most decisive factor in making Bhutan give up its policy of isolation must again be cited as a case even at the cost of sounding repetitive. Perhaps after the Younghusband Expedition in Tibet in 1903-04⁴² this was the most important event in the history of the Himalayan region during the present century. It affected the power configuration not only in the region but as the subsequent Sino-Indian clash came to prove, in the entire Asian continent as well. Ever since the "loss" of autonomous status of Tibet, the Himalayan heartland, the Kingdoms and territories of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were exposed to a challenge, the size and magnitude of which had not been witnessed earlier in the entire historical memories of the people of the area. The sealing of the borders between Bhutan and Tibet was one consequence which flowed directly from this event.⁴³ A new window which would enable Bhutan to get out of this sealed status was necessary. If therefore a single factor explanation has to be offered justifying the end of the closed door policy of Bhutan, then it must be found in this event of the 1950's.

REGIONAL FACTORS FACILITATING EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ROLE

Nepal's New Role Worthy of Emulation

Ever since the loss of Tibet, other changes, though not of an equal dimension, from the point of view of the changing role of Bhutan in foreign matters, have taken place. First, the emergence of Nepal from a position of "special relationship" with India to that of "equidistance" between India and China and later, as a "balancer" between two giant neighbours might have left a pattern which the ruling elite in Bhutan found relevant for imitation. That Nepal's role in the Himalayan region may be described as that of "pace-setter" in this respect, need not altogether be lost sight of even though Bhutan has not the same potentialities in terms of size,

location and development, etc.⁴⁴ Therefore the policy of diversification which Kathmandu adopted in the earlier phase might indeed be a model for Bhutan also in the years to come. Besides, since the two kingdoms share a common geographical environment they are likely to formulate an identical strategy as far as the protection and promotion of their interests are concerned. This has already been witnessed in regard to the question of the rights of the land-locked countries.⁴⁵ Also being more experienced in terms of its diplomatic relationships Nepal can see the advantage of bringing Bhutan to its side and presenting a joint strategy for the sake of securing some concessions from India, both economic and political.⁴⁶

Sikkim's Merger with India Heightens Insecurity

The second factor of intra-Himalayan significance was the joining of Sikkim as a state in the Indian Union. There was a pronounced unfavourable reaction in Bhutan and Nepal; both of them behaved in an assertive manner in their external relations. The event was viewed by them as a loss of "cultural identity" of a neighbouring Himalayan kingdom. A reaction defined purely in instinctive terms was that of the protection of the traditional identity of Bhutan as well as Nepal. The urge to widen Bhutan's contacts with the countries in Asia and even outside can therefore be ascribed to a sense also of insecurity which got heightened after the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union. The occasion of the coronation of Jigma Singye Wangchuk was in fact utilized for consecrating the sovereign status of Bhutan through "recognition" by the Great Powers. The festivities on the occasion and the list of the invitees, including the Super Powers, was "an attempt by Bhutan to assert itself as a sovereign nation."⁴⁷ In particular Bhutan utilized this opportunity to invite China. It was after a gap of almost sixty-five years that an official delegation from China visited Bhutan.⁴⁸ Although the Druk Gyalpo negated all apprehensions of Bhutan seeking to establish regular official links with China,⁴⁹ this could certainly be interpreted as a beginning in the "normalization" of Sino-Bhutanese relations.

China's New Diplomatic Role

No discussion on Bhutan's changing role as a nation state is complete without reference to China. Chinese policies and strategies adopted in the context of the Himalayan region and with the neighbouring states will always be watched very closely by Bhutan. Therefore any actual or perceived change in China's behaviour will also lead to some adjustments and alterations in Bhutan's policy approaches and strategies. Ever since the occupation of Tibet, China's consistent objective has been to wean the Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim away from India. Till mid-1960s China tried to achieve this through "aggressive diplomacy." But after it failed

it has adopted the "diplomacy of sweet neighbourliness and equal friendship." To this end, the Chinese leaders found it pertinent to play upon the independent sentiments of the ruling elites in these states. This was an added thrust of Chinese diplomacy with which it also approached Bhutan. Thus while visiting Bhutan in 1974, the leader of the Chinese delegation, Ma Mu-Ming took special note of the desires of the Bhutan Government to rely on their own efforts in developing their economy and safeguarding their sovereignty and economic self-reliance.⁵⁰

Bhutanese Elite Takes Advantage of Political Changes in India

Last, but perhaps the most important regional factor in Bhutan's external role is India and its position and status in the sub-continent. Being a small state and handicapped by its land-locked position, Bhutan must look towards India for the widening of its contacts with the third countries. The Dragon Kingdom's capability in international matters therefore will depend upon the concessions and advantages it is able to extract from India.

During the Janata rule, Indian leadership pursuing the policy of what is called "beneficial bilateralism" chose to maintain a "low diplomatic profile" towards all the neighbouring countries.⁵¹ Taking this as a favourable factor the Bhutanese sought to have as many concessions as possible from the new Government.⁵² Thus it was during Janata rule that Bhutan was allowed to diversify its economic and political contacts. The echoes for the revision of the treaty also became louder during Janata rule.

But when no less a person than Druk Gyalpo himself voiced concern for "updating" the treaty New Delhi was going through a period of extreme political uncertainty. A lame duck government such as which obtained in New Delhi during the second half of 1979, could have been looked upon as a "weak India" by Bhutan; indeed the Bhutanese ruling elite seem to have made a concerted effort to further Bhutan's position of vantage. From a comment which the Druk Gyalpo made about India's role in the Havana Conference such an impression appears obvious. Speaking of Bhutan's stand on the Kampuchean issue at the Havana meet, he said :

India took no position at all. Can you blame us if we took one and can our stand be described as being in opposition to India ?⁵³

A Chandigarh daily reacted to this :

Perhaps it was the vacuum in power in Delhi that led the Royal Government to seek changes which would have increased its scope for establishing independent contacts with foreign powers.⁵⁴

Yet another factor which cannot be ignored is the policy of normalization of India's bilateral relations with China which was a part and parcel of

India's policy of "beneficial bilateralism." An apprehension that a condition of growing detente between the two big neighbours of Bhutan might erode India's interest and its involvement in the economic development of Bhutan, could also have accentuated the assertive and independent tone of Bhutan vis-a-vis India. This is how the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tsering, summed up the deliberations of the National Assembly in which some members spoke of the need to establish direct communication with China. He said :

Some National Assembly members felt that if China and India became friends Bhutan would lose all importance to Peking and New Delhi. They thought we should make our own efforts to develop ties with China or be left out in the cold.⁵⁵

CONCLUDING REMARKS

One may conclude this analysis by saying that Bhutan has undoubtedly come a long way ever since the signing of the Treaty of 1949. Both internally and externally it has acquired many traits of a modern nation state. What is, therefore called its quest for an international role is but an articulation of that "state idea." A document which was signed in 1949 sounds outdated in the context of the altered environment of Bhutan. As a matter of fact it has already been re-interpreted. In the 1960's it appeared to Bhutan that it was "not hundred per cent independent." But the position that is now taken is that the advice which the Government of India gives to Bhutan "is entirely optional and it is upto Bhutan to follow it or not."⁵⁶ Bhutan's current behaviour is obviously in conformity with this interpretation of the Treaty. India has evidently accepted this interpretation as there is no contradictory official statement nor has it placed any impediments in the externalization of Bhutan as a sovereign and independent state.

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NOTES

- 1 For the text of the Treaty see *Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1949-1959*. Lok Sabha Secretariat (New Delhi, 1959) 2nd. edition, pp. 17-19.
- 2 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 11 September 1979.
- 3 See the Editorial, *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), 27 November, 1979.
- 4 *Sunday Standard* (Chandigarh), 27 August, 1979.
- 5 Talking to Indian newsmen in June 1960, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, the then Bhutan ruler had stated, "We don't consider ourselves to be the protectorate of India. We consider ourselves independent. But we are not hundred per cent independent because of the 1949 Treaty." *The Hindu* (Madras), 3 June, 1960. In 1964, the acting Prime Minister of Bhutan, Lhendup Dorji told a Press Conference, "there is no bar to Bhutan's participation in independent foreign relations." *The Hindu*, 10 August, 1964. In 1974, Jigme Singye Wangchuk said that Art. 2 of the Treaty "did not impinge upon Bhutan's right to

- conduct its relations with foreign countries." *Hindustan Times*, 7 June, 1974. The Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tsering, in a news conference at Thimpu in June 1974 said that the "advice given to Bhutan by India in foreign policy matters is entirely optional and it is upto Bhutan to follow it or not." *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 7 June, 1974.
- 6 Bhutan has almost a four hundred km long common boundary with Tibet. Due to vague delineation the boundary is disputed in places. Ever since the emergence of the Sino-Indian border dispute the Indian approach has been to include the Tibeto-Bhutan sector also in its border talks with China.
 - 7 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 11 September, 1979.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, 5 September, 1979.
 - 9 *Statesman* (New Delhi), 9 November, 1979.
 - 10 Partly due to the bilateral approach which India followed and partly in the absence of a clear policy statement by India a confusion persists even today on account of which it is often contended that India after independence also has sought to preserve the old "colonial rights" in these States. For details of this view see Srikant Dutt, "India and the Himalayan States," *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol. XI, Part I, February 1980, pp. 72-78.
 - 11 The Conference was not officially convened by the Government of India but since the Government rendered every possible assistance in the holding of the Conference and the aims and objectives of the Conference were in conformity with the views of Jawaharlal Nehru, it can be cited as a case of India's official point of view. For details see A. Appadorai, "The Asian Relations Conference in Perspective," *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 18, No. 3, July-September 1979, pp. 275-285.
 - 12 Nagendra Singh, *Bhutan: A Kingdom in the Himalayas*. (New Delhi, 1972), p. 137.
 - 13 See Article 9 of the Treaty of 1949.
 - 14 Nagendra Singh, *u.* 12, p. 135.
 - 15 *Ibid.*
 - 16 Pradyuman P. Karan and William M. Jenkins, *The Himalayan Kingdoms : Bhutan Sikkim and Nepal* (Princeton, 1963), p. 49. It is believed by some writers that Bhutan's immediate response to Nehru's proposal to modify its isolationist policy was non-committal as the then Maharaja feared that this would involve the Himalayan Kingdom in big-power confrontation. Nevertheless, the circumstances of 1959-60 were such that Bhutan was left with no choice and decided for closer relationship with India. See Leo E. Rose, "Bhutan's External Relations," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 47, No 2 Summer 1974, p. 195.
 - 17 At least one Indian author, Nari Rustomji, who served as Adviser to the Government of Bhutan at one time gives credit for ending the policy of isolationism to the then Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji. For details see his *Bhutan : The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* (Delhi, 1978), pp. 10-12.
 - 18 V.H. Coelho, *Sikkim and Bhutan* (New Delhi, 1970), p. 98.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
 - 20 Nagendra Singh, *n.* 12, p. 148.
 - 21 *Statesman* (New Delhi), 24 December, 1971.
 - 22 Leo E. Rose, *n.* 16, p. 202.
 - 23 Coelho, *n.* 18, p. 74.
 - 24 Nagendra Singh, *n.* 12, p. 137.
 - 25 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 10 May, 1968.
 - 26 Nagendra Singh, *n.* 12, pp. 139-140.
 - 27 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
 - 28 *Statesman*, 19 June, 1972.
 - 29 *Ibid.*
 - 30 *Indian Express*, (Chandigarh), 16 August, 1978.
 - 31 *Ibid.*, 30 March, 1978.
 - 32 *Statesman*, 30 December, 1979.
 - 33 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 26 February, 1980.

- 34 Bhutan experienced for a very long time civil war conditions on account of different warring factions led by provincial leaders of Bhutan. In 1885 when the then Tongsa Penlop Ugyen Wangchuk emerged as the strong man the civil war came to an end. In 1907 Ugyen Wangchuk was installed as the Maharaja of Bhutan with the help of the British Indian Government. This was the beginning of the dynastic rule in Bhutan; the present Druk Gyalpo is fourth in the line of succession.
- 35 According to official reports, till the close of the year 1977-78, Bhutan had one hundred and twenty two educational institutions of which one was a "junior college," two teachers' training institutions and two technical training establishments. As many as one hundred and thirty three students had gone to India and abroad to receive higher education. For details of the statistics in developmental activities of Bhutan see *Statistics At a Glance, 1977*, Planning Commission, Bhutan, Central Statistical Organisation (Thimpu, 1978).
- 36 Archival records indicate that J.C. White, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan in 1906, suggested to the then Government of India to undertake the road building projects in Bhutan. (*Foreign Deptt. Secret E. Consultations*, June 1907, No. 637). Sir Ugyen Wangchuk not only evinced interest in the proposal but also expressed keenness to develop the resources of his country (*Enclosure, Foreign Deptt. External. A Consultations*, December 1908, No. 41).
- 37 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 139.
- 38 The Tsongdu is an old Bhutanese institution but in its present form and character it was revived by Jigme Dorji Wangchuk in 1953.
- 39 Ram Rahul, *The Himalayan Borderland* (Delhi, 1969), p. 112.
- 40 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 145.
- 41 Sunanda K. Datta Ray, "The Awakening of the Dragon," *Statesman* (New Delhi), 4 April, 1978.
- 42 Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, during his term of office, initiated a Himalayan policy which is often described as the "forward policy." Within the framework of this policy he wanted the British Government to extend their sphere of influence right upto the borders of the Himalayas so as to prevent any other foreign power asserting its supremacy in the region. Since he perceived that Russia was on its onward march towards Tibet, after prolonged and persistent appeals to Whitehall he was finally able to procure consent to send a mission to Lhasa the objective of which, as put on records, was to have some trade concessions from Lhasa. But as his private correspondence reveals, the real motive was political. At the end of the expedition a convention called the Tibet Convention was concluded in 1905. This is how the well-known British policy of conferring buffer status on Tibet and the bordering states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim reached its apex. For a detailed account of the expedition see Parshotam Mehra, *The Younghusband Expedition : An Interpretation* (Bombay, 1968); Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia : Road to Lhasa* (London, 1960), pp. 275-317.
- 43 Bhutan's trade links with Tibet were as frequent and old as those with India. To Tibet, the main supply from Bhutan was that of rice. When the Bhutan-Tibet border was sealed and all trade contacts between the two came to a stop it caused a serious economic strain on the Bhutanese polity. It was partly to meet this strain that Bhutan had to launch its developmental activities in 1961. For details see Rahul, n. 39, pp. 123-127.
- 44 Nepal's experience of having been able to have "a more positive international image abroad" has also brought in focus some constraints of such a policy model. For the argument see Rose, n. 16, pp. 198-199.
- 45 Dutt, n. 10, p. 76.
- 46 In August 1980, Nepal's National Assembly urged upon the Government to pursue vigorously their policy of developing close ties with all the South Asian neighbours including Bhutan with which the need to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations was also expressed. *Times of India* (New Delhi. 14 August 1980).
- 47 *The Times* (London), 30 May, 1974; Dutt, n. 10, p. 76.

- 48 The last time when an official Chinese delegation had visited Bhutan was in 1908.
- 49 *The Hindu* (Madras), 7 June, 1974.
- 50 *Indian Express* (New Delhi) 18 June, 1974.
- 51 For an interpretation of Janata's style of non-alignment see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Towards Good Neighbourliness," *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 17, Nos. 3-4, July-December, 1978, pp. 463-474.
- 52 It is however said that a "low profile" image which the Janata Government chose to follow towards the neighbouring countries of India was a failure in the ultimate analysis. For this view see S. D. Muni, "India's Beneficial Bilateralism in South Asia," *India Quarterly*, (New Delhi) Vol. XXXV, no. 4, October-December, 1979, pp. 417-433.
- 53 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 11 September, 1979.
- 54 See the Editorial, "Relations with Bhutan," *The Tribune*, (Chandigarh), 27 November, 1979.
- 55 *The Tribune*, 5 November, 1979.
- 56 See n. 5 above.

DYNAMICS OF CONFRONTATION: TARAPUR AND INDO-US RELATIONS

THE hard reality of today's nuclear world is based on the Super Power fallacy that there can only be two options on the nuclear issue—that a country can either be a nuclear-weapons state (NWS) or a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS). In view of the decline in other sources of energy, however, the importance of a third option—the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—has increased considerably over the last few decades. Since the line between the technological research required for the peaceful exploitation of the atom and weapons technology is very fine, the Super Powers, particularly the United States, are suspicious of any country which has advanced independently in the field of nuclear research. And this suspicion is especially directed at non-aligned nations, which may develop into independent nuclear power centres or may upset the precarious balance of terror which has been achieved through the “mutual deterrence” tactics of the two major power blocs. The Super Powers, however, have not been able to stop the emergence of a number of medium Powers, who have demonstrated or undemonstrated nuclear capabilities. Although they have not opted for nuclear weapons, they are not likely to surrender their independence on the question of decision-making on nuclear issues. The growing shortage of traditional sources of energy, the kaleidoscopic changes in international affairs, especially in South-West Asia, and the intransigent attitude of the Super Powers, therefore, point to the fact that nuclear issues affecting international and bilateral economic and security relations among technologically advanced and technologically advancing countries are likely to become increasingly significant in their foreign policy calculation in the decade of the eighties. A recent example of an extreme case of action taken on the basis of a country's threat perception is the pre-emptive strike by Israeli planes on an Iraqi nuclear plant. The case of Tarapur, though less dramatic, is equally important as a study of the dynamics of confrontation of the nuclear policies of a major nuclear weapons state and a developing nation which despite its capability, has rejected the nuclear weapons option without surrendering its independence on nuclear decision-making.

The Tarapur Atomic Power Station symbolizes India's advancement in the field of nuclear technology. However, it also symbolizes the effects of dependence on another country for its basic requirements. As a necessary price to be paid for the rapid development of nuclear technology, India bound itself by an agreement, signed in 1963, to operate the Tarapur station only on special nuclear fuel (U-235) supplied by the United States. In exchange for American technological assistance and the supply of enriched uranium, India also submitted the Tarapur plant to inspections and pledged to account for all fissile material. In January 1971, it was placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards through a trilateral agreement. There was no hitch in Indo-US co-operation on the Tarapur

plant till 1974, although the Indian position on international controls over nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear power had diverged widely from that of the United States from the very beginning. Then, on 18 May 1974, India detonated a peaceful nuclear device at Pokhran and shocked the "nuclear club" into a new perception of threshold countries. The United States increased its commitments to the IAEA to enable it to have more control over the diversion of nuclear supplies for "non-peaceful" purposes. In addition, a meeting of 15 major nuclear suppliers was held at London to work out, among other things, stricter guidelines for the control of the end-uses of exported nuclear materials and technologies and the application of IAEA safeguards in places where they were not already in operation. And India, the "offender", came in for special arm-twisting by the United States because not only had India demonstrated its independence in nuclear decision-making and had acquired considerable technological know-how through foreign assistance and indigenous experimentation, it had also consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would have opened all its plants and research work to international inspection and therefore, interference. According to the American viewpoint, the technology required for a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) was the same as that for a "non-peaceful" one, and therefore, India was subverting the cause of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by insisting on the right of NNWS to experiment with PNEs. The fact that this argument was blatantly discriminatory, since the Super Powers continued to perfect their weapons technology, was glossed over. India's weak point, at this juncture, was its dependence on America for its supply of nuclear fuel for Tarapur, and powerful interest groups within the United States did not hesitate to use the fuel as a hostage in an attempt to pressurize India into toeing the American line on its nuclear policy. The intensity of American intransigence has not been merited as India has not broken any of its contractual obligations with the United States. But it appears now that because of the American attitude, both countries, are moving towards an "amicable" termination of the Tarapur Agreement which was to be in force till 1993.

AMERICAN NUCLEAR CONSIDERATIONS

The fact is that the 1974 explosion suddenly brought a highly contentious issue to the foreground. India and the United States had always looked at the nuclear question from completely different angles. Although both countries opposed proliferation, the United States promoted horizontal non-proliferation alone, while continuing to increase its own stocks of nuclear weapons. India, however, believed in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and opposed both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. It also believed that it should not be a party to any international agreement which was discriminatory and pursued the goal of curbing proliferation only at a horizontal level.

The twin considerations of America's nuclear policy have been nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation. In the context of the bi-polar world which it has helped to create, its primary focus has been on nuclear deterrence, which entails the massive stockpiling of nuclear arms. By implication, therefore, it is restricted from promoting vertical non-proliferation, as this would cut into the very foundations of its security perceptions. Non-proliferation, it must be pointed out, was a later consideration. In the beginning most nations had neither the resources nor the technological know-how to go in for nuclear armaments. It was only after the French voiced their intention to acquire nuclear weapons with or without American assistance in the late fifties, that the grave possibilities of the proliferation of nuclear weapons acquired significance for the United States. Non-proliferation became an obsessional issue with the American Government in the 1960s. In his Inaugural Address, John F. Kennedy stated that both the United States and the Soviet Union were "rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom."¹ Later, in his State of the Union Message, he reiterated that "we must prevent . . . [the] arms race from spreading to new nations, to new nuclear Powers . . ."² The primary concern of the United States was that weapons proliferation would complicate its nuclear policy, which was essentially suited to a bi-polar world. The creation of new nuclear nations would upset existing alignments and increase the danger of a nuclear war through an erosion of predictability which was one of the basic facts of mutual deterrence. The United States also feared that if even a single additional country joined the so-called "nuclear club", other threshold Powers would be tempted to choose the nuclear option, if not for anything else, for security purposes alone. This was actually an extension of the theory of communism to nuclear issues. One additional factor may have been the economic monopoly that the United States and other members of the nuclear oligopoly held over the non-nuclear weapons states, and would continue to hold if these states were permanently kept in their stranglehold through discriminatory treaties. The United States was ready to share its "atoms for peace" but only on its own terms.

SUPER POWERS AND NPT

It is interesting to note that the United States and the Soviet Union began to co-operate seriously on the issue of non-proliferation only after a third uncertain element—China—broke into the bi-polar system in 1964. It is also significant that the NPT which emerged as a result of prolonged Super Power negotiations mainly guarded the vital interests of the Super Powers: it neither forbade the proliferation of weapons or exchange of technological know-how among nuclear weapon-states nor did it subject these states to international controls. What it actually did was to try to limit nuclear weapons technology to only these states, while banning non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons, or "other nuclear explosive

devices." It further obliged NNWS signatories to accept IAEA "safeguards" so that these states would not be able to divert "nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."³ It was essentially aimed at curbing horizontal proliferation, while by-passing vertical proliferation altogether. Its discriminatory nature was aimed not only at limiting weapons technology to those who already possessed it, but also at banning NNWSs from experimenting with peaceful explosive devices. This would, by inference, relegate signatory NNWSs to a position of permanent technological inferiority.

INDIA'S VIEWPOINT

The Indian position on nuclear issues has been quite different. India's primary concern has been to use nuclear energy to help it overcome its economic problems and disadvantages. The Indian Government has consistently stressed that India is interested only in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to Nehru, "The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like India, that is to say, in a country whose power resources are limited, than for . . . an industrially advanced country . . ."⁴ As a follow up, India is also opposed to the idea of using nuclear technology for weapons purposes. The American view of nuclear deterrence is against the Indian concept of disarmament. Thirdly, India has also always maintained its right of independence in decision-making on nuclear issues. As early as 1948, the Indian representative to the United Nations General Assembly, Mrs. Vijaylakshmi Pandit, told the Assembly that while India was willing to give the International Atomic Development Authority all power necessary to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it firmly opposed the idea of giving it any authority that might restrict its national sovereignty over the peaceful utilization of atomic energy resources.⁵ Finally, although India has always opposed nuclear proliferation, it has constantly attacked the discrimination inherent in non-proliferation treaties promoted by the Super Powers. India's position is that horizontal non-proliferation can be justified only if it is accompanied by vertical non-proliferation. Otherwise what might occur is "atomic colonialism" by nuclear "haves" over nuclear "have-nots". Thus, despite its highly principled posture on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, India has consistently refused to sign the discriminatory NPT.

POST-POKHRAN DEVELOPMENTS

Till 1974, however, the United States concentrated on Super Power nuclear diplomacy and paid scant attention to the Indian stand on nuclear issues probably because it did not really expect India to explode its peaceful device. India had however, given fair warning of its nuclear capability. The United States did not draw any line of distinction between a peaceful

explosion and nuclear-weapons testing. Powerful interest-groups immediately jumped to the conclusion that if the NPT was not vigorously enforced, the American conjectures regarding nuclear weapons proliferation may actually become *fait accompli* in the near future. The fact that there has been a significant increase in the number of states which have a near-weapons capability in recent times, served to increase its apprehension. Further, India too added to its special fears by entering into bilateral agreements with a number of non-nuclear weapons states for the promotion and exchange of nuclear technology. Although there is no actual evidence to prove this point, this factor has probably weighed high in its economic and security threat perceptions. Its subsequent actions show that the United States may allow proliferation but again only on its own terms. Its less than adequate response to Israel's surgical strike on Iraq's nuclear plant, its continued nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel despite their known nuclear weapons capabilities, and more significantly the bid to bend the Symington Amendment so as to give massive doses of military aid to Pakistan, which is not a signatory of the NPT, all show that the United States is discriminatory even in its attitude towards horizontal non-proliferation.

However, with regard to India, the American attitude has been very uncompromising. It has indulged in a display of power in which the discontinuation of further supplies of enriched uranium to Tarapur has been held as a "big stick" over India. The period 1974 to 1981 can be analytically divided into four stages, the first leading to the change in government in India in 1977, the second covering the tenure of the Janata party and ending with the Afghanistan crisis in 1979-80, the third comprising President Carter's last year in office, and the fourth beginning with Ronald Reagan's election. Although there has been a definite continuity in the policies of both countries, certain attitudinal differences can be marked in each of the stages. These have been shaped by domestic factors and unexpected regional changes. In the first three stages, the Administration supported the cause of continued supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur, although it stepped up its pressure on India to accept the NPT. Various lobbies and pressure groups in Congress and elsewhere, however, opposed it. In the final stage, there was a shift in the attitude of the Administration as well.

First Phase

Shortly after the Pokhran experiment in 1974, doubts were voiced in both Houses of Congress about India's professions of peaceableness and its assertion that no material supplies by the United States had gone into the PNE. Demands were made for a complete review of the nuclear assistance arrangements between the two countries. The focus was on Tarapur in particular, but the aim was to curb India's sovereignty in nuclear decision-making. The basic question was, as Representative Stanford Parris

put it, "If the nuclear development programme is peaceful . . . why does [India] refuse to sign the NPT?"⁶ The Administration, however, accepted India's assertions and maintained that India had not violated any of its contractual obligations to the United States as set out in the Tarapur Agreement.

The first real challenge came in March 1976. The Center for Law and Social Policy, a private organization, initiated a petition for a right to intervene in the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proceedings on Tarapur. It was acting on behalf of three scientific and environmentalist groups, the Sierra Leone Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Natural Resources Defence Council, which demanded that the United States should withhold further supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and the possible diversion of the end products of U-235 for the production of weapons. The environmentalists also voiced their concern over the disastrous ecological effects of nuclear installations, but this was merely a hypocritical cover-up of the real intentions. The main objection to the supply of enriched uranium was that India had neither signed the NPT nor renounced its right to experiment with peaceful devices. It was pointed out that if America continued to supply enriched uranium to India, it would lose its leverage with other nuclear-exporting nations like France and Germany in asking them to withhold nuclear technology from NNWS's like Brazil and Iran. If India were to sign the NPT, however, these objections would turn out to be invalid.

At this stage, the State Department, the Justice Department and the NRC's own professional staff recommendations opposed the demands of these groups because of the contractual obligations of the United States. It was against American interests to actually terminate the Agreement at this point because not only would it lose its leverage with India, but such an act would jeopardize America's credibility as a nuclear exporter. During the NRC hearings, the State Department explained that "... our supply performance...will... strongly influence our reputation with other nations [who] would unquestionably view with great seriousness any interruption of the fuel supply ... to a nation which has violated no undertaking to the United States The predictable and inevitable consequence of any such US action will be to assure and accelerate further the development of sources of supply of enriched uranium and nuclear equipment independent of the United States...."⁷ The NRC was finally persuaded to clear one shipment of enriched uranium for Tarapur but deferred its decision on further shipments.

Morarji Desai : A Deviation in Policy?

The second stage in this power game began with the Janata victory in India in March 1977. The new Prime Minister declared that no explosion was required for experimentation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

He further stated that if such experimentation proved to be absolutely necessary, "we can always do it in consultation with other people,"⁸ without naming who these other people were. This made the task of the Carter Administration much simpler, for here was an Indian Administration which was more or less forswearing further nuclear testing. The State Department could push its case for continuing fuel supply to Tarapur, although it warned that another nuclear explosion, peaceful or otherwise would automatically result in the suspension of all American supplies. It is significant that along with his aforementioned policy statement, Morarji Desai also announced that a license for 12 tons of enriched uranium had been cleared for Tarapur, shortly before, on 29 June 1977. Although he assured that his policy change was not a pre-condition for the supply of fuel for Tarapur, he added a suggestive note when he clarified that "there is an understanding that discussions would be held between US and India on the large question of nuclear proliferation."⁹ Whether the Prime Minister was bending India's nuclear policy as a result of American pressure, is not known. It must be pointed out in all fairness, however, that the Desai Government remained firm on the question of not signing the NPT and thus not accepting international safeguards for its other nuclear plants which it had developed without foreign assistance.

This, however, had been the American aim from the beginning. Since the Desai Government had bent one of the basic foundations of India's nuclear policy, the United States increased its pressure to make India accept international control over all its nuclear facilities. President Carter tried to persuade the Janata Government to accept full-scope safeguards during his visit to India in January 1978. Later in 1978, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was passed by both Houses of Congress in the United States. This was an example of "full-scope" pressure tactics. It required that in order to qualify for the export of nuclear materials, a country must agree to full-scope safeguards on its entire nuclear establishment within 13 months of the bill becoming law. By implication it meant that India, if it wished to remain a recipient of nuclear fuel from the United States, would have to accept full-scope safeguards by March 1980. The Act is another instance of Super Power bullying, because in international relations the domestic laws of one country should not affect the contractual obligations of bilateral agreements signed prior to the passage of the domestic law, without the consent of both countries. The Indian Government has, therefore, correctly maintained that India cannot be bound by the restrictions implicit in the 1978 Act and that the Tarapur Agreement cannot be subjected to conditions extraneous to that Agreement.

State Department Versus Congress

The third stage marked a certain urgency on the part of the Carter Administration to improve relations with India. As a result, fuel supply to

Tarapur became a priority issue in Indo-US relations, more so, because the 18 month grace period ended in March 1980 and with it pressure mounted in both Houses of Congress for the immediate suspension of further supplies. The main consideration in the Carter Administration's attitude in this period was the precipitation of the Afghan crisis in December 1979. The importance of India and Pakistan as necessary factors in the American foreign policy calculations, increased with the expansion of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Although it was felt that India had pro-Soviet sympathies, the Carter Administration wished to promote better relations with both India and Pakistan in order to counter the perceived Soviet threat in the region. The new government of Mrs. Gandhi helped matters by condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and expressing hopes of improvement of bilateral relations with Pakistan. Thus, despite the fact that she resorted to the old line on nuclear policy and expressly declined to rule out the possibility of "peaceful nuclear experiments" by India, the Carter Administration thought it expedient to overlook the statement and consolidate relations with India by pushing for the release of licenses ensuring continued supply of enriched uranium to Tarapur. Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, explained to the Foreign Relations Committee that "a refusal at this time to fulfil our obligations under the supply agreements would cast a long shadow on overall relationship with India... [whereas a] positive decision on Tarapur will encourage India in the long term to act in ways consistent with our interests, as it faces up to the new situation posed for South Asia by the prospect of a prolonged Soviet presence in Afghanistan."¹⁰ He added that the Soviet Union was sure to exploit the situation if the United States were to refuse further supplies, to the extent that it "...[may well] supplant us as the source of Tarapur fuel." The fact that Pakistan rejected an American aid offer of \$400 million on 5 March 1980 as "peanuts" may also have enhanced India's importance in the strategic perceptions of the United States.

Thus, President Carter issued an Executive Order on 19 June 1980, authorizing the export of 40 tonnes of nuclear fuel, despite an unanimous recommendation by the NRC on 16 May, that export licences should not be granted to India as it had not accepted full-scope safeguards by March 1980, and was not likely to do so. The Administration's argument was that India had applied for the stated 40 tonnes well before the expiry of the grace period and the NRC had adopted a very restrictive interpretation of the 1978 Act with regard to India. The State Department, however, faced considerable opposition in Congress when the Executive Order came up for debate in September. It is significant that the Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses as well as the main body of the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly in favour of the stoppage of supplies. It was only through a very narrow margin in the Senate (48 to 46) that one consignment of 19.8 tonnes could be cleared. This, too, came after massive persuasive efforts by the State Department which pointed out among other things, that a termination

of the Agreement would also release India from its obligations. The Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie stated at a Press Conference that India would be well within its rights to claim that if the United States breached the Tarapur Agreement, it would not be bound by the Agreement in regard to the accumulated plutonium wastes at Tarapur. He added that plutonium was used for constructing weapons, "and if the Tarapur fuel is removed from international safeguards, a precedent would be set that strikes at the heart of our nuclear non-proliferation policy."¹¹

Reagan and His Hardline

Ronald Reagan's electoral victory signalled the end of the third stage. His perception of American strategic interests in South and South-West Asia relegate India to a place of lesser importance than had been accorded it by the Carter Administration in the preceding year. In its annual military posture statement for 1981, the Reagan Administration clearly stated that it intended to improve its military balance in "South-West Asia", a relatively new geopolitical construction of which Pakistan is a part. This involved "support for friendly regional governments against politically and potentially hostile states and groups; limitation of Soviet power and influence throughout the region and deterrence of direct Soviet military intervention."¹² The United States required "in any event access to local and *en route* facilities... to ensure force sustainability."¹³ In the context of the developments in South-West Asia, and Reagan's evaluations, Pakistan is the ideal geo-strategic partner in the region. The United States requires a friendly state which might sign formal agreements allowing it to set up its own military bases in pursuance of its policy of containment of the Soviet Union. Pakistan, on its side, needs a strong ally against the perceived threat from its Northern borders. India, meanwhile, purchased military equipment from the Soviet Union, at what American sourcees, called "sweetheart rates" in 1980. This in American estimation, presumably placed India further inside the Soviet camp. Thus, to promote its own interests, the United States has stepped up its arms aid to Pakistan on the one hand, and de-accelerated its pressure on the Congress to continue the suply of nuclear fuel to the Tarapur plant. In April 1981, high level talks were held between H.N. Sethna, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Eric Gonsalves, the External Affairs Secretary and Alexander Haig, the United States Secretary of State. The sharpest disagreements were on the question of fuel supply to Tarapur. The United States more or less notified India of its decision to terminate the Tarapur Agreement because it had not agreed to full-scope safeguards, but it insisted on maintaining safeguards over the end products of the nuclear fuel supplied to Tarapur. It also wanted a say in India's reprocessing of the spent fuel because of the clause of "joint determination" in the Tarapur Agreement. Sethna rejected the very idea of maintaining safeguards or any other obligation after the termination of the Agreement. An official delegation is

expected shortly in Delhi, presumably to negotiate the major steps in the termination process. The Indian Government, however, still keeps its options open. As an authoritative source sees it, the United States is applying the ultimate kind of pressure to make India bend, but it would surely not like to cut its final lines of communication with India on the question of India's nuclear policy by stopping all supplies to Tarapur.¹⁴

Whatever the future may hold, it is important to note the lesson Tarapur has taught us. The moral of the story is that any country, developing or otherwise, which is dependent on another nation especially a Super Power, for the supply of its basic needs in nuclear technology, is vulnerable to pressurization. The one saving grace in the Tarapur affair was that India was not totally dependent on the United States for all its supplies. From the beginning it cultivated diverse ties for nuclear co-operation with Canada, France, the United Kingdom and more recently, with the Soviet Union. It must be pointed out, however, that on the question of nuclear issues, the other Super Power is equally severe. India's treaty with USSR specifies that any disagreement regarding safeguards or any other treaty obligation between New Delhi, Moscow and the IAEA would be referred to the International Court of Justice or its appointed nominees and their decision would be final and binding on all parties. Under the circumstances, it is in our interests to strive for complete autonomy. We have been pursuing the goal of self-sufficiency, specially since Canada terminated its Agreement with India and the first delays in nuclear fuel supply from the United States began to occur in 1976. India has large deposits of uranium and thorium and an alternative fuel technology using mixed oxide fuel is being perfected. This can be used even at Tarapur, when the stock of fresh fuel finishes in two or three years. As long as the Super Powers keep to their limited discriminatory attitude on nuclear issues, it is India's duty to break out of their stranglehold. In a free world, we can not do otherwise.

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NOTES

- 1 John F. Kennedy, *The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1961* (Washington D.C., 1962), p. 2.
- 2 Ibid., p. 26.
- 3 For the text of the NPT, see J.P. Jain, *Nuclear India* (New Delhi, 1974), Vol. 2, pp. 204-10.
- 4 See *Lok Sabha Debates* (Government of India), Vol. 5, part-2, 10 May 1954, col. 7036.
- 5 See Jain, n. 3, Vol. 1, pp. 15-16.
- 6 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 19 October 1979.
- 7 *Statesman* (New Delhi), 26 March 1976.
- 8 *Hindustan Times*, 14 July 1977.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 29 July-4 August, 1980, pp. 15572.
- 11 *National Herald* (New Delhi), 17 September 1980.
- 12 Excerpts from the *Annual US Military Posture Statement, Middle East/South Asia*, 7 February 1981, (USICA, New Delhi, 1981).
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Interview with undisclosed source, 10 June 1981.

NEHRU'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ENVIRONMENT MOVEMENT

THE object of this study is to briefly analyze the contribution of Jawaharlal Nehru to the global environment movement and world order based on global harmony of mankind. Currently progressing the world over, the ostensible purpose of this movement is to ensure the continued progress of our civilization based on the establishment of harmony of man with man and with nature. The degradation of global environments is the result of policies pursued by states in disregard of the ecological requirements of man and global society. In this respect, our analysis here is directed to the contribution Nehru made to the scientific temper of our age, to promoting policies for the design of world harmony, and to evolving an equilibrium in the international system based on the synthesis of ideas of the East and West. In this process, he produced a synthesis of knowledge which indeed is the object of science. Einstein pursued a synthesis of the laws of nature. Abdus Salam, another Nobel laureate, is continuing this synthesis. Nehru attempted to create harmony between the social and natural environments and suggested removal of social tensions through the planning process. Nehru's scientific mind reveals a pre-established harmony with the global environment with which he seemed to have applied his mind to the solution of some general problems of international society. Indeed, Einstein himself applied his mind to the general problems of science with a pre-established harmony. As he said in honour of Max Planck in his famed address in 1918:

The longing to behold that pre-established harmony is the source of the inexhaustible perseverance and patience with which Planck (and we may add here, as throughout Einstein), has given himself out to the most general problems of our science, not letting himself be diverted to more profitable and more easily attained ends.¹

Nehru had indeed made the world his field of thought and action. His pragmatism goes with Einstein's relativism. His emphasis on life's values of faith, creativity, love, non-alignment, attitude to nature, reflect his quest for world harmony. He in fact, attempted to impart a unified view of global life which he thought was needed for this civilization to function. Indeed his views need our attention and analysis in the context of problems of global environment and the emerging world order of the 21st century. He had the experience of practical life as well as the genius to reflect upon his experiences. As Arnold Toynbee says: "...history cannot be written effectively unless the writer has acquired an outlook that can be given only by actual experience of practical life."² Nehru's views therefore on human affairs in general, and on science, creativity, nature, spiritualism, progress, global culture, history and synthesis reveal a continuous beam of harmony which is undoubtedly of great essence when we examine the global environment movement of our times.

ATTITUDE TO NATURE, ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE

Nehru had the grasp of nature's unity in diversity; his love of nature and the world at large stemmed from this basic philosophy of nature. This was also the basis of his approach to the philosophy or the temper of science. He noted the harmony of nature and its processes. Like Tagore, he believed in growing with and into the environment; this indeed was his religion and faith. "In the final analysis, one has to rely on some kind of a basic faith in the future of man," he stated to a Shantiniketan audience in 1957.³ This basic faith originated from his harmony with nature. He also had a beautiful view of the world which he expressed in his letter to children. "I would love to talk to you about this beautiful world of ours, about flowers and trees and birds and animals and stars and mountains and glaciers and all the other wonderful things that surround us in this world," he wrote.⁴ With this inward joy and beauty he went about in life with an open mind. In his address to the University of California on 31 October 1949, on "The Age of Crisis", Nehru reflected on the problems facing mankind. He said: "I am no prophet nor have I any magical remedy to suggest. I have tried to grope my way, to think straight and to coordinate, as far as possible, action to thought... I am convinced that any policy, any ideology, which ignores truth and character in human beings and which preaches hatred and violence, can only lead to evil results."⁵

ON SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Nehru laid the foundations of a modern scientific structure for India. He created the temper of science for India and its people. On a recent visit to India, Nobel laureate, Abdus Salam, stated: "He [Nehru] was ahead of his time."⁶ It needs to be adequately emphasized that Nehru himself was deeply rooted in the philosophy of science; his background and thinking reflected a scientific mind. This can be noted in his understanding of international and national affairs. Indeed, in his approach to the study of human affairs his scientific thinking, unique in a way, is apparent in his blending of science with other disciplines like history, planning, international relations, economics, etc. Almost all the doctrines that he propounded, even non-alignment, had a deep-rooted scientific philosophy behind it; his approach and background was completely objective and analytical. This is indeed his greatest contribution to twentieth century thought and world order. This entitles him to be called the leader of renaissance India. Nehru was also an internationalist who imparted scientific values of truth, cooperation, freedom, and progress to international relations. His intellectual and moral sweep was profound as it helped transform the whole colonial system to a free enterprise between nations based on scientific equality and dignity.

Nehru's philosophy of science is based on the creativity of human mind.

While speaking on "The Spirit of Science", he said: "Science...does not merely repeat the old in better ways or add to the old but creates something that is new to the world and to the human consciousness."⁷ Further asking the question—What is the spirit of science? he said:

It means many things. It means not only accepting the fresh truth that science may bring, not only improving the old but being prepared to upset the old if it goes against that spirit. It also means not being tied down to something that is old because it is old, because we have carried on with it but being able to accept its disintegration; it means not being tied down to a social fabric or an industrial fabric or an economic fabric if it goes against the new discovery.⁸

Nehru therefore believed that "a nation cannot progress if it merely imitates its ancestors; what builds a nation is creative, inventive and vital activity. I seek the creative mind."⁹

Nehru was in favour of maintaining values which had timelessness. He keenly followed the progress of science and technology in the world and kept his mind open in regard to its application in the global and Indian spheres. Indeed, he expressed his caution on the unrestrained use of science and technology in his address to the University of Delhi on 6 December 1958. He said :

While discarding the old mysteries, we live at the edge of a new kind of mystery. The reaction of people to this varies. A few are driven to deeper thought and enquiry and a search for ultimate values, but most others, finding it too difficult to make any sense out of this confusion, relapse into cynicism and negative attitudes, rejecting the old patterns and standards and evolving no new one.¹⁰

Nehru in fact, was keen to balance the culture of technology with a wider vision. He posed the problem and sought its solution as follows:

~ It has become inevitable for us to fit in with the modern world of science and technology and it will be dangerous for us to imagine that we can live apart from it. It will be equally dangerous for us to think that we should accept technology without those basic values which are of the essence of civilised man.¹¹

Nehru's vision of science and technology was thus for the creative understanding and development of our society. He did not want to subordinate human values to technology. This is of vital interest in the planning of environment, and, in the overall pursuit of the scientific temper. In environmental planning, such a composite view of science and technology is important for maintaining wholesome human environments and harmony with nature. As Tagore said that the highest purpose of this world is not

merely living in it, but comprehending and uniting with it.¹² So did Nehru believe in developing human mind and personality along with scientific, creativity and comprehension in a scientific world.

IN SEARCH OF PROGRESS

Nehru's creative mind was always in search of progress which he tried to define in many ways. In the global environment movement we have at the moment a kind of dialogue between leading thinkers and scientists on this subject. How should progress be defined? Should there be limits to scientific research on subjects like DNA, and the like? Should science and technology seek harmony with nature? Is progress related to the progress of spirit of man? Indeed we find an undercurrent of opinion in scientific thought that whereas we may not put limits to basic scientific creativity, man should however, maintain harmony with nature.¹³ Einstein also appeared to imply that his motivation for scientific research was for improvement of knowledge about the universe, and therefore of man.¹⁴

Nehru believed that progress was of human spirit, the international universal spirit of man, to which Tagore also had drawn attention.¹⁵ Scientific research could help the growth of this universal spirit of man. Toynbee points out the dichotomy of man's progress in intellect and not of spirit which is of greater well-being.¹⁶

The approach to progress, according to Nehru, was therefore based on consent, cooperation and love; it was an evolutionary process. Evolution, as Rene Dubos, a contemporary biologist of repute, says, is a creative process.¹⁷ Indeed, Huxley defines reality as one gigantic process of evolution.¹⁸ So Nehru's endeavours for progress are to be seen in this perspective of evolution; it was based on consent, it was pragmatic, and flexible depending on time and context. One cannot therefore see any determinist approach to progress.

Recalling Gandhiji, Nehru indicated that he gave directions and left decisions to be taken by one's own motivation and consent. He had a quality of sensing change and through love and consensus he changed the minds and hearts of people. With great feeling, Nehru assessed Gandhi as "essentially a man of God (who) walked on the soil of India and sanctified it by his penance. He sanctified not only the soil of India but changed the minds and hearts of our people."¹⁹ Man had been accepting changes and developing in history. Nehru thought "The whole course of history has fascinated me.... On the whole what has fascinated me really is the story of man developing himself wherever he might be."²⁰ Co-operation was a necessary requisite for the progress of man. It was more important than competition. As he said in his Azad Memorial lecture on "India Today and Tomorrow" on 23 February 1959: "We have to evolve a high order more in keeping with modern trends and conditions and involving not so much competition but much greater co-operation."²¹ Competition, to him, was not a kind of struggle for

existence, but a co-operative enterprise for progress. Indeed Darwin's theory on the struggle for existence is now reformed by leading biologists of our time, such as Rene Dubos and Julian Huxley. According to them, evolution is no more genetic but is psychological involving a co-operative sense among men. Darwin also suggested that man was a higher being in the natural order, possessed with moral and reflective powers needed to promote common happiness.²²

Nehru has drawn our attention in the international system to the spirit of international co-operation of man and his moral and reflective powers for evolving a progressive global society. He felt that law and legal principles should also embody moral and ethical values.²³ Such values, Nehru believed, were important for historical progress. Addressing Columbia University on this theme on 17 October 1949, he said that a statesman had to act in reality, but truth should always be kept in view. India, he said, was trying to combine idealism with its national interests.²⁴ How was progress to be judged? Nehru was looking for a standard of value to judge progress. There could be a humanist or a scientific approach to judge progress, but not a dogmatic approach. He was in favour of a scientific approach but, he said, he did not want to limit progress to science and technology. Rather, he was in favour of an integrated view of life as propounded by the Buddha or Plato,²⁵ but not an acquisitive society for mankind.²⁶ The ecological problems of world society are now being appreciated as arising out of man's great ambition for material progress. Nehru seems to have foreseen this as he said: "I begin seeking for something deeper than merely the physical aspect of civilization. I find that my mind is more interested in what Plato or the Buddha said, which has a timelessness about it."²⁷

ON PLANNING AND FUTUROLOGY

In the global environment movement planning and reflections on futurology are important considerations for the welfare of mankind. In history, it is the first time that man is living in a single global community because of integration through science and technology. Also it is the first time that science and technology is having an impact of global dimensions on the environment. The UN Declaration at Stockholm in 1972 recalled this aspect:

A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences. Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm to the earthly environment on which our life and well-being depend. Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser action, we can achieve for ourselves, and posterity a better life in an environment more in keeping with human needs and hopes.²⁸

With this perspective on planning and futurology, Nehru applied his genius

to planning in India. Addressing an important session in Parliament on 14 March 1961, on the subject of the importance of tomorrow, he said:

There is another thing I should like the House to think about. Shall we not also think of our tomorrows sometimes? Or, must we invariably lose ourselves in our todays! I cannot ignore today, obviously. But so far as I am concerned, I must confess to you that the morrow is slightly more important to me than today. If we are thinking in terms of progress, we have to build for a tomorrow that will make progress possible.²⁹

In planning also, Nehru looked obviously to progress. He was a thinker who, like Einstein, thought of the eternal tomorrow. Planning provided to him a whole scenario for the nation and the need to chalk out frontiers of progress. As Arthur Koestler says: "The principal mark of genius is not perfection, but originality, the opening of new frontiers. . . ."³⁰ Nehru's creative genius lay in opening new frontiers of scientific and social progress in the country. He tried to maintain harmony between the goals of progress and the quest for their realisation. Writing about harmony in the pursuit of creativity, Tagore said: "We realize that creation is the perpetual harmony between the infinite ideal of perfection and the eternal continuity of its realisation; that so long as there is no absolute separation between the positive ideal and the material obstacle to its attainment, we need not be afraid of suffering. . . ."³¹ Therefore Nehru was keen to follow the ideals of progress in a planned way. He believed that the Planning Commission was necessary where people could think freely and in an integrated way.

Prediction in human affairs is not easily possible, says Toynbee, but reflections on the future are.³² With the available knowledge of the past and the present, one can think of tomorrow and plan for it to some extent. Addressing Columbia University on 17 October 1949, Nehru said:

In this world of incessant and feverish activity, men have little time to think, much less to consider ideals and objectives. Yet, how are we to act, even in the present unless we can know which way we are going and what our objectives are? It is only in the peaceful atmosphere of a university that these basic problems can be adequately considered.³³

Planning enabled the capacity to think aside, free from the tensions of the present and to prepare for a better tomorrow. So said Einstein about his motivation for research, which can be compared with the longing of "a town-dweller, in his cramped quarters which pulls him towards the silent, high mountains, where the eye ranges freely through the still, pure air and traces the calm contours that seem to be made for eternity." With this inward urge, Einstein believed, goes the positive commitment of the scientist, the speculative philosopher, the painter and the poet, each trying in his own way to overcome the world of experience by striving to replace it by a lucid

and a simpler image of the world which knowledge would bring.³⁴ It is again a question of that pre-established harmony of mind with which Einstein and Nehru saw the processes of planning or scientific research. Planning meant to Nehru a positive commitment for a better tomorrow. In the age of crisis, future planning provided a hope, a positive hope for mankind. This he said while addressing the University of California: "The past crowds in upon me and standing at this razor's edge of the present, I try to peep into the future."³⁵ Nehru, therefore, had great faith in the younger generation because in them he found a glimpse of the future. He inspired the younger generation with his genius and intelligence. Inspiration, as J. Krishnamurti says, is contained in intelligence, and intuition is the highest point of intelligence.³⁶ Indeed even science is an imaginative process which connects phenomenon in a rational sense. The scientific imagination dreams of explanation and laws.³⁷ To Einstein, "Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience correspond to a logical system of thought."³⁸ Planning and futurology for Nehru were therefore a combined exercise in scientific and rational planning for progress.

EVOLVING A GLOBAL CULTURE

Culture is a part of the global environment. Environment affects culture and the latter in turn affects environment. A technological culture has indeed produced an adverse impact on environment particularly in view of armaments. Culture is therefore a way of life which has evolved over time. Nehru's view of culture was all that was best for man to possess in the world. It involved a refinement of the mind, morals, tastes and enlightenment of civilization. He said, "no one section of the community in India can lay claim to the sole possession of the mind and thought of India;"³⁹ culture must have depth and dynamism.⁴⁰ To be dynamic and creative, he added one needed a higher view of culture. According to poet Iqbal, man is not a closed mind and is capable of absorbing external forces. He is assimilative in nature. A good life, according to the poet, must be creative and original leading to beauty and order.⁴¹ A higher view of culture is therefore of tolerance and synthesis of values and traditions. This holds true in the traditions of India. To this Nehru makes reference with great feeling. He says: "I lay stress on the unity of India, not merely the political unity which we have achieved, but something far deeper, the emotional unity, the integration of our minds and hearts, the suppression of feelings of separatism."⁴² This spirit of unity and toleration by Indians is of great essence to the development of a harmonious world culture. Arnold Toynbee, in the Azad Memorial lecture on "One world And India", said: "I am speaking, as you will realize, of the movement, now astir in all mankind, to live together, for the first time in human history, as a single family." Again, referring to India's traditions of tolerance and synthesis, he stated: "India's special contribution, as I see it, will have been her large heartedness and broadmindedness. This will have been a gift of

priceless value to mankind in the new age into which mankind has now been launched by the West's special contribution to the unification of the world."⁴³

A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY

Nehru had a new vision about the role of history. He was a pioneer in promoting international co-operation and harmony in international relations. He wanted to see that history should balance global forces for creating world harmony. Conflicts of the past were to be forgotten for a better world of today and tomorrow. He in fact, had a faith in the future of man. He saw man evolving and developing inspite of obstacles and problems. Why did he like history? In his address to the Asian History Congress, he said:

"I never studied history in the formal way but informally. I have been greatly interested in history chiefly because of my seeking to understand the past rather in terms of the present and even of the future to come. I have approached it as a developing drama, leading up to the present and making me wonder where it will lead to in the future."⁴⁴

Further, he added: "The whole course of history has fascinated me... on the whole what has fascinated me really is the story of man developing himself wherever he might be."⁴⁵ "I try to think of history as a process that leads man to higher and better stages of progress."⁴⁶ He liked H.G. Wells' approach of a social man in history. Stating that historians could put things in perspective, he wondered whether they could pierce the veil of the future unless they became great seers.

Nehru's historic vision for world harmony and peace was obvious in the movement of non-alignment and Panch Sheel. The present global environment movement is in line with Nehru's ideals of global harmony of man and man and with nature. In contemporary history, international co-operation was needed to move towards progress and development of man and global society. Scientific creativity can be harnessed further for realizing new goals and frontiers of knowledge about the universe. Towards this aspect of scientific understanding of international life, Nehru laid great stress. His approach to history was therefore, like Toynbee's; that of a student of human affairs. He participated in it and balanced it himself and helped in shaping it for future generations.

TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER EQUILIBRIUM

Nehru provided synthesis to the ideas of the East and the West. He interpreted the East to the West and vice-versa. He advocated unity in diversity which has been the basis of India's philosophy through ages. Speaking about Nehru, Kabir said: "It is the combination of contrariness that gives richness

and complexity to genius."⁴⁷ Nehru's genius lay in grasping the manifold traditions of India and the West. He believed in an open-minded approach. Speaking of non-alignment, he said, it was a positive and a vital policy which flowed through India's struggle for freedom and out of Gandhi. In an age when power blocs and alignment between states was the order of the day, it was hard and difficult to explain non-alignment which was a part of his spiritual and ethical philosophy for presenting Gandhiji's message of non-violence in the world. The futility of the armaments race has only proved him right. The contemporary global urge among nations to re-awaken the spirit of non-alignment as a moral force for world harmony vindicates Nehru's vision for a peaceful and creative world order. Panch Sheel was another message of Nehru for unity in diversity of global life. It meant non-interference among countries which may have different systems of progress, but a common aim of promoting good life. Indeed he imparted to the international system a moral and spiritual touch which was in keeping with the line of great *rishis* and seers of India. Nehru was a modern *rishi* who interpreted the melody and the philosophy of India to the world to evolve a stable global equilibrium. Indian life was of contemplation, he said in an important address in Washington on 18 December 1956.⁴⁸ (III, p. 48.) Toynbee makes a reference with much concern while advocating this contemplative habit of India. He says:

This is, I believe, the greatest lesson that India has to teach the present day world. Western Christendom did recognise and practice the virtue of contemplation to some extent in the Western Middle Ages. Since then we have almost entirely lost this spiritual art, and our loss is serious, because the act of contemplation is normally another name for the art of living. So now we turn to India. This spiritual gift, that makes a man human, is still alive in the Indian soul. Go on giving the world Indian examples of it.⁴⁹

Much of the global tension is related by biologists and psychologists to the lack of a contemplative habit. It was this trans-rational faculty of man which Toynbee referred to as of great importance for stability and harmony of the world order. It relates to the inner equilibrium of man and is an aid to reality. Mrs Indira Gandhi has described the synthesis of science and spiritualism in the Indian tradition:

Whereas the West believes in rational thought as either the only or one of the main tools in its search for the ultimate reality, for us the tool has been the whole of consciousness, comprising the rational mind, reflective intellect, intuition, perception and emotion. It is extensive and comprehensive, including rationale though as one of its components.⁵⁰

Einstein, among modern scientists, advocated the trans-rational and the

intuitive approach to the understanding of truth and reality. For this reason modern scientific philosophers are able to find common spirituality of mankind emerging out of common beliefs and values to which Nehru and Gandhi, for example, among others, gave an impetus for evolution. Julian Huxley, for example, said at an international UNESCO conference that there is need for synthesis of ideas and beliefs of social and personal values for a common psychosocial system struggling to be born.⁵¹ Again, at a recent international conference in New Delhi, the speakers emphasized the need for evolving universal principles of jurisprudence and not segregating it into narrow Hindu, Muslim or Roman compartments.⁵²

Thus, Nehru's non-alignment, Panch Sheel and decolonization were eminent concepts to impart a dynamic and creative image to international society to attain the universal brotherhood of man, and to free global environment for the development of man as a creative being in modern history.⁵³ This is his great contribution to the contemporary global environment movement struggling to see the armaments race curtailed and eager to promote conservation of resources and harmony with the natural environment in a unified technological world order.

CONCLUSIONS

We have analyzed Nehru's mind and his manifold contributions for the promotion of harmony of global environment. Nehru created an international movement and consciousness for a common brotherhood of man within and across national frontiers. Non-alignment is one such movement. Global harmony is another. Synthesis of science and spiritualism is yet another great contribution for the unification of mankind. All these ideals put together promote conservation of man and environment. In this whole process, Nehru's genius lay in combining different patterns of thought, and in providing a synthesis for the global order. The planning process was a part of his dream of looking to a better world of tomorrow. His vision of futurology was implicit in all the plans he made for the establishment of a scientific temper in India to which Nobel laureate Abdus Salam paid warm tributes recently. Nehru's great vision is seen in his discourses on planning, futurology, science, philosophy, history and international relations. He once again produced an image of the philosophy and culture of India and the world. This synthesis in modern times has been his greatest contribution to the harmony of global society. The consciousness that he and Gandhiji have produced towards the spirit of common brotherhood and spirituality of mankind augurs well for the success of the global environment movement whose major purpose is to promote harmony of man with man and with nature.

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NOTES

- 1 See G. Holton, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler To Einstein* (Massachusetts, 1973), p. 377. This is from a summary of the distinguished lecture by Einstein in honour of Max Planck in 1918 in which Einstein gives his motivation for scientific research.
- 2 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1948) Vol. 10, p. 106.
- 3 See *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*. Publications Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1958, Vol. III, p. 436 Hereafter referred by Volume and page number. There are four such volumes covering Nehru's speeches from 1946 to 1963.
- 4 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol II, pp. 435-36.
- 5 *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 419
- 6 Abdus Salam in conversation with B.M. Udgankar of Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, See Sunday Review of *Times of India* (New Delhi), 25 January 1981, p. 1.
- 7 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol II, p. 364
- 8 *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 364.
- 9 "Dynamic Life", Address to the University of Saugar, 30 October, 1952. *Speeches*. Vol. II p. 431.
- 10 "Towards a New Equilibrium," Address to the University of Delhi in *Speeches*. Vol. IV, p. 168.
- 11 *Speeches*. Vol IV, p. 170.
- 12 Rabindra Nath Tagore, *Creative Unity* (Calcutta, 1971), p. 49.
- 13 This is the impression one gathers from discussions held by some leading scientists. See "Limits of Scientific Enquiry" (*Daedalus*, 1978). See also B.D. Nag Chaudhuri and S. Bhatt, "Man Out of Harmony With Nature : Some Reflections from India on The Global Environment Movement," *Eastern Journal of International Law* (Madras), Vol. 10, 1979, pp. 297-303.
- 14 Einstein in *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein*. n. 1.
- 15 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol III, p. 437.
- 16 Arnold Toynbee, *Civilization On Trial* (New York, 1948), p. 262.
- 17 Rene Dubos, "Man And His Environment," *Britannica Perspectives* (Chicago, 1980). Vol. 4, p. 235.
- 18 T.H. Huxley. Cited in *Ibid.*
- 19 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol IV, p. 433
- 20 *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 177 in his address to the Asian History Congress, New Delhi on 9 December 1961.
- 21 *Speeches*. Vol. IV, p. 5.
- 22 Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (London, 1952). p. 592.
- 23 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol IV, p. 425
- 24 *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 393
- 25 "Basic Wisdom," Address to the University of Ceylon, 12 February 1950. *Speeches*, Vol. II, pp. 423-24.
- 26 *Speeches*. Vol III p. 54.
- 27 n. 20, p. 179.
- 28 See United Nations Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, Annex II, pp. 2-6.
- 29 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol II, p. 557.
- 30 Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (London, 1964), p. 402.
- 31 Rabindra Nath Tagore, n. 12, pp. 15-16.
- 32 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History: Reconsiderations*. Vol. 12 (London, 1964), p. 4.
- 33 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. II, p. 391.
- 34 Einstein, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought*, n. 1.
- 35 n. 33, p. 420.
- 36 See *The Mind of J. Krishnamurti* by L.S.R. Vas (Ed.), (Bombay, 1971), pp. 81-82.
- 37 C.S. Pierce, *Essays In The Philosophy of Science* (New Delhi, 1975), p. 197.

- 38 A. Einstein, *Out of My Later Years* (Connecticut, 1975), p. 98.
- 39 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. III, p. 418.
- 40 *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 357.
- 41 K.G. Saiyidain, *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy* (Lahore, 1954), Introduction and p. 124.
- 42 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. III, p. 37.
- 43 Arnold Toynbee, see publication *One World and India* by Indian Council of Cultural Relations (New Delhi, 1962), p. 50.
- 44 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. IV, p. 177.
- 45 *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 177.
- 46 *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 179.
- 47 Toynbee, n. 43, p. vi.
- 48 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. III, p. 48.
- 49 Toynbee, "One World And India," n. 43, p. 113.
- 50 Indira Gandhi, "*Times of India*", (New Delhi), 3 February 1981. The Prime Minister was speaking on the synthesis of science and spiritualism in the context of the tradition of Indian philosophy.
- 51 Julian Huxley in *Science and Synthesis*, A UNESCO Symposium on 10th Death Anniversary of A. Einstein and Tielhard de Chardin (New York, 1971), p. 29.
- 52 Speakers were participating in an international seminar on "Islam's Contribution to the Culture and Civilizations of the World with Special Reference to India. See *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 31 January 1981.
- 53 Indeed Tagore and Einstein, while discussing the nature of reality, agreed that the ideal for man would be to realise, in one's individual being, the universal human spirit. See "The Nature of Reality", a dialogue between A. Einstein and Rabindra Nath Tagore, in *A Tagore Reader* (Ed), by Amiya Chakravarty, (New York, 1961), p. 113.

BOOK REVIEWS

INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965

A Review Article

TWO years ago, Air Marshal (Retd) M. Asghar Khan, former Commander in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force and now head of the Tehriq-i-Istiqlal party, set down his impressions of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. He had retired from service shortly before that conflict but nevertheless, played a part in it as a self-appointed co-ordinator of military supplies. His book first published in Britain in 1979 is now in an Indian edition.*

I doubt if it was a coincidence that the book appeared shortly before the General Elections that were to have been held in Pakistan last year. Whatever the motive, it provides a first-hand account of how that country was run at a critical period in its history.

At the outset, the airman-turned-politician, whose original home was in Kashmir, refers to the 1965 war as one that "appears now to have been fought for no purpose." His regret is not that the war was fought but that it did not succeed. Otherwise, he fully supported the plan, code-named *Operation Gibraltar*, to foment armed uprisings in order to oust India from Kashmir. He commends as "bold and imaginative" the Army General who thought up the scheme and records that it was acclaimed by President Ayub Khan and his top civilian and military advisers, of whom presumably he was one. A further cause for disappointment was his own inability to play a direct part in the conduct of the war.

Asghar Khan has plenty to say about the operation, and the manner in which it was launched. It was, to begin with, strictly a Foreign Office-Army affair. The Navy and Air Force were left out of it. This might have made sense if the Army's actions were to be limited to training guerillas and infiltrating them into Indian territory, but when regular troops and armour were to be used, as they were in the Chamb sector, then it is strange indeed that the possibility of a general conflict was not foreseen. Yet that was the case. Judging India's likely response from its lacklustre performance in a territorial dispute in the Rann of Kutch earlier in the year, Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister, is said to have persuaded Ayub Khan to accept the notion that India would not go to war to defend Kashmir. *Operation Gibraltar* was mounted on this ingenuous, and as it proved, false premise.

For those who maintain that a Supreme Commander is essential to the efficient conduct of war the example of Field Marshal Ayub Khan should provide a corrective. He combined in himself the roles of President, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defence. In Asghar Khan's evaluation of him, the Supreme Commander's thoughts and actions ran mainly along Army lines, with little understanding of the capabilities of the

* M. Asghar Khan: *The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965* (Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Sahibabad, 1979), xx, 146 p., Rs. 35.

Navy and the Air Force. From what I can make out, the Supreme Commander did not have the benefit of advice from a responsible inter-Services body, such as a Chiefs of Staff Committee. Frequent and regular meetings of the Chiefs would have been difficult to arrange in any case, for the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs were based at Rawalpindi, Karachi and Peshawar respectively. When the war began there was no clear idea of where the Supreme Command should be located, or for that matter, how the diverse activities of the three services should be controlled. Asghar Khan dismisses General Musa, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, as a nonentity and says that the war on the ground was run by a couple of Brigadiers and a Lieutenant Colonel, while he became unofficial adviser to the Supreme Commander on air warfare and co-ordinator of war supplies.

At this point it is worth recalling that the Indian Army tried to contain the troubles in Kashmir on its own, and continued to do so even when the Pakistan Army crossed the border at Chamb. It was only when Pak armour broke out from Chamb towards Jaurian and the Jammu-Srinagar highway on 1 September, that the Indian Air Force was asked for air support. From then on events moved rapidly. The Government of India approved a general offensive against West Pakistan; the Army and Air Force mobilized their forces and the first Indian troops crossed the international border on 6 September with the Indian Air Force attacking deep inside Pakistan. East Pakistan was specifically excluded from these operations in the hope that matters could be settled in the west.

Both sides went to war without any long-term plans and clear-cut military objectives, with forces assembled in haste against ill-defined targets and with insufficient information. The two pounded away at each other until Pakistan, with fewer resources to back up its effort, was forced to call a halt. A cease-fire was proclaimed on 23 September ending a war in which neither side won a decisive victory, though India could at least claim that it had foiled Pakistan's attempt to annex Kashmir by force.

Operation Gibraltar foundered on the rocks of conceit and military incompetence. Underlying these Asghar Khan also espies a conspiracy. The ground for this is laid by Altaf Gauhar, who was at the time of the War Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. In his Foreword he avers that the Foreign Office and General Headquarters of the Army deliberately embarked on the enterprise after Asghar Khan had retired from service, for had he remained in command of the Pakistan Air Force "he would (have given) the *Operation* a positive and decisive complexion, because of his devotion to the cause of Kashmir and his whole attitude toward war with India." Asghar Khan is more outspoken in his assertion of a conspiracy. He accuses Bhutto of misguiding Ayub Khan in the expectation of Pakistan suffering a military defeat. "This", he writes, "would result in Ayub Khan being ousted and in the confusion that would follow he, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would be the obvious person to negotiate a settlement with India and then take over as Pakistan's President." Such a

statement from anyone other than a member of the erstwhile Pakistan establishment would have carried no weight, but in the present context it deserves attention if for no other reason than that it gives some idea of the tortuous politics of that country.

The popular belief in India has always been that Pakistan is forever ready to go to war with it. Certainly in 1965, when Pakistan was receiving military aid from both the United States and China, and supplementing it with its own purchases, it was thought to be a power to reckon with. It is a revelation, therefore, to learn that its armed forces were short of supplies when *Operation Gibraltar* escalated into a full-scale war. Having spent two days advising the Supreme Commander and the Pakistan Air Force Chief on how to wage the air war, Asghar Khan set off on visits to China, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran in search of "urgently required equipment and stores." This was done largely on his own decision, says Gauhar, though I cannot help thinking that he may have been encouraged to do so by those whom he sought to advise. The meetings with Chou En Lai, President Soekarno, President Gursel and the Shah produced mostly sympathy. Indonesia alone promised to help with hardware, some of which arrived after the fighting had stopped. It is worth noting that in spite of the United States being an ally, no American equipment was made available to Pakistan once the war began, either directly or via Turkey or Iran. Tracing the history of Pakistan's relations with the United States from the early '50s to 1965, Asghar Khan sees the bright prospects of US military aid being used against India gradually grow dim. He is critical of the aid given to India after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, following which there was growing mistrust of American intentions. Asghar Khan goes so far as to say that the Americans most probably knew of India's plan to attack West Pakistan, and even hoped that the fall of Lahore "would have a favourable effect on (Pakistan's) conduct of international affairs...." The 1965 war was obviously a turning point in US-Pakistan relations; they have been going different ways since.

President Ayub Khan realized soon enough that *Operation Gibraltar* had miscarried. His armed forces were in no position to wage a protracted war. He therefore favoured a British proposal for a cease-fire. Asghar Khan was against it. He maintains that though the Pakistan Army had done poorly the Pakistan Air Force had more than held its own. The Indian advance had been stayed and with the supplies expected from abroad he thought the tide could be turned. He was for continuing the war because "the Indians were in an even more unsatisfactory situation than we were, and a prolongation of the struggle might have serious consequences for their over-stretched resources in logistics and communications ... and their morale was not as good as ours."

The Indian situation was in fact not bad. Except for a Pakistani incursion into the Rajasthan desert, Indian forces were well inside Pakistan, advancing on Sialkot and Lahore. Pakistani counter-attacks had been repulsed, notably so at Khem Karan where a sizeable armoured force was wiped out.

As we now learn, this caused Ayub Khan much distress and made him amenable to a ceasefire. The Indian Air Force was attacking targets as far as Rawalpindi and Peshawar, compelling the Pakistan Air Force to restrict its activities mainly to the defence of airfields and other strategic points. Military supplies were plentiful and their transport to the fighting front by road and rail, and where necessary by air, was no problem. And the higher command organisation was just about getting into its stride when the ceasefire was declared. Morale was high throughout the 17-day war, for there was never any doubt about its outcome.

Every fighting service needs its heroes and tales of derring-do. The war provided the setting for both. The former Air Chief records several stirring events. But his account is modest compared to that of a British journalist who was commissioned to write a history of the air war. John Fricker likens it to the Battle of Britain in World War II, when so much was owed by so many to so few. As described by him, India would have over-run Pakistan but for the Pakistani Air Force. This is not the place to examine such a claim. It has been done elsewhere; those interested should see *New Delhi* magazine, dated 24 December 1979.

This slim, well-produced volume should more appropriately have been called "The Second Round", for the first, as I recall, was fought in 1947-48. Another inexplicable feature is that a couple of photographs of Indian fighter planes appear where, from the text, one would expect to see a map of Pakistan. For good measure, the book contains the author's views on a variety of subjects, ranging from the selection of military commanders to international relations. It also includes two appendices: one is the text of a lecture on the defence problems of Pakistan, and the other purports to be an historical analysis of the 1965 war. The latter, translated from the Urdu original, begins with the arrival of Islam on the Indian sub-continent some 1,200 years ago and in six short pages leads up to the military successes of 1965. It ends with a glowing reference to the unity of East and West Pakistan; this in 1979!

Despite such oddities, meant perhaps for the voter, Air Marshal Asghar Khan has rendered a service to students of Pakistan affairs by revealing the manner in which the abortive war of 1965 was fought. He indicts Bhutto, who cannot answer the charge, for conspiring to bring about Pakistan's defeat. A contributory factor, if not the principal one, was the absence of a sensible system of higher command under a Supreme Commander who had absolute authority but limited ability. Another was the shortage of military supplies which became the author's close concern. Nothing came of his visits to friendly states to obtain supplies. It is significant that no appeal was made to the United States, Pakistan's ally and principal source of military hardware; by 1965, their relations had soured with the bitter realization that the United States did not favour independent action by Pakistan, and no support could be expected from it against India.

Throughout this brief testament runs a deep distrust of India. The possi-

bility of an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute has no place in such thinking. If those who govern Pakistan are of like mind then, regrettably, another round may have to be fought one day!

March 1980

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REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

A Review Article

ONE of the most conspicuous developments in the field of international organization since World War II has been the proliferation of regional organizations. In some respects, the post-war regional system could be regarded as an extended version of the concept of military alliance which is virtually as old as the institution of war between political communities; yet it is significantly different. The regional organizations not only cover security agreements but also deal with a broad range of economic, social and political problems. An additional difference is that the regional organizations are not only multilateral but also highly institutionalized in terms of regular meetings of the state-parties, operating budgets and a permanent secretariat staff. These regional groupings bear long and often awkward names including such traditional labels as "league", "organization" and "association" but they are increasingly getting supplemented by such designations as "community" and "union". Although sometimes more accurately reflecting aspirations than reality, the new nomenclature suggests the revolutionary impact of science and technology which has tied together all the peoples of the earth in an unprecedented intimacy of contact, interdependence of welfare and mutuality of vulnerability.

The proliferation of regional organizations indicate that although "one world" has not yet been achieved, there is no denying the existing reality of global interdependence. Indeed, the issue is : Are regional organizations preferable to the global ones for promoting international peace and security, economic and social well-being, human rights and other important goals sought by the international community? Are the activities of universal and regional organizations complementary or conflicting when they pursue their respective objectives in areas where their functions overlap?

A study, or rather a collection of studies, undertaken by the United Nations Institute of Training And Research (UNITAR), *Regionalism and the United Nations*,* provides enough material for scholars to find an answer to the question. This study, as is characteristic of all UNITAR publications, attempts no definite conclusions of its own. But an overall impression which one gets is that the two—global and regional organizations—are really complementary to each other. This is true to an extent, but the issues involved are too complex and related developments too tortuous to yield a simple answer.

Let us have a look at the United Nations Charter provisions and related developments during the last more than thirty years. To go into historical details would be too involved; nevertheless, the general aspects must be noted.

*Berhanykun Andemicael, (Ed.): *Regionalism and the United Nations*, (Oceana Publications, New York, 1979), xx, 603p.

REGIONAL GROUPINGS AND "DEFENCE" ARRANGEMENTS INITIATED

During the Second World War, while planning a framework for postwar organization, both the United States and the United Kingdom, two of the three chief architects of the United Nations had, at the initial stage, shown preference for regional security arrangements.¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt was of the view that big Powers should play the policeman's role, collectively or singly "policing" different regions. Winston Churchill fully shared Roosevelt's views and urged the creation of regional security arrangements through which the Great Powers might exercise their policing. He envisaged three regional councils for Europe, Asia and the Western Hemisphere respectively.

What eventually turned the scales in favour of global organization was perhaps the realization by US policy planners that after the war, the United States was going to be the most powerful nation and the only one for some time to come capable of playing a global role. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull feared that the "isolationist" groups in the United States might seize the idea of autonomous regional agencies to advocate American participation in a Western Hemisphere Council on condition that the United States remain outside the other Council. Thus, the Roosevelt Administration eventually came round to the global concept and supported it all through the various stages of the formation of the United Nations. The State Department memorandum of 11 August, 1943 attempted to bury all doubts in this regard and categorically stated the United States official views as follows: (i) that the basis of postwar international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; that there are grave dangers involved in having the world-wide organization rest upon the foundations of previously created, full fledged organizations; and (ii) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.²

At the Dumbarton Oak's Conference, on British insistence, regional security arrangements were extended recognition as auxiliary but subordinate to the general security system.

In San Francisco, there was much pressure from the Latin Americans, the Arab League members, the British Commonwealth, as well as from France for greater recognition of regional arrangements in matters dealing with peace and security.

What finally emerged was that while the general principle of subordination of regional arrangements to the principles of the Charter was retained in the final text of the Charter, the position of regional arrangements and agencies was also strengthened. Pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements was to be encouraged and in case of acts of aggression, "the inherent right of individual or collective self defence ... until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures ...," was also recognized.

Welcoming the Charter provisions, the United States representative, Senator Arthur Vandenburg noted: "We have found a sound and practical formula for putting regional organization into effective gear with global institutions. We do not thus substract from global unity of the world's peace and security; on the contrary, we weld these regional king-links into a global chain."³ However, "Article 51 foreshadowed the possibility of the regional tails wagging the global dog, rather than acknowledging the directing superiority of the universal organ."⁴

In presenting its report to the President of the United States, the country's delegation made a pertinent point. It argued that "concessions to regional pressures should not establish a precedent which might engender rivalry between regional groups at the expense of world security."⁵

The ink had hardly dried on this report, when the United States took definite initiatives leading to those very kind of regional groupings and rival interactions. The Brussels Pact followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in turn led to the establishment of Warsaw Pact Organization, marked just the beginning. Scores of such "defence" arrangements followed. Again, the second time, the chief architect of the global organization was letting down its own creation.

CONTRADICTIONS IN THE OPERATION OF SUBORDINATE REGIONALISM

The first serious conflict situation which pitted the global concept against the regional one was the Guatemala Question in June 1954. The United States was determined to see that the Government of Guatemala (a democratically installed one), which had turned "hostile" to US economic interests, should be toppled. To achieve its objective, the United States engineered what it referred to as a civil war; insisted that any questions involving peace and security could only be considered by the Organization of American States (OAS). In a situation where Guatemala's capital was under heavy air-attack, and its government was seeking protection from the United Nations Security Council, its representative was not even granted a hearing—thanks to the manipulation, arm twisting and threats of the American representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, who also happened to be the then President of the Security Council.⁶ Indeed, developments relating to Guatemala, Hungary, the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia are some of the glaring instances which indicate how the two Super Powers have successfully carried out their acts of "criminality" in the name of regionalism. Theoretical justification advanced by the two Super Powers in the respective situations were interestingly identical and amounted to an open defiance of the basic premise of universalism of the United Nations—that threat to peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression in any part of the world is a concern of the international community as a whole. The United States, for instance, had contended, in justification of its action in the Dominican Republic, that the despatch of US troops to any country in the Western Hemisphere

was justifiable if that country seemed to be slipping out of the fold of the non-Communist Inter-American Community and that the United States forces could be used whether such intervention was requested by the Government concerned or not. Further, the United States maintained that what was happening in the Dominican Republic was a matter for hemispheric action alone. On this occasion, the Soviet Union, of course, stood for globalism, the universal concept of collective security, the letter and spirit of the Charter, principles of non-interference etc. and condemned the United States action in the Dominican Republic in the strongest terms, as it did earlier in Guatemala. But three years later, the Soviet Union, in justifying the five-Warsaw-Power invasion of Czechoslovakia, echoed the very same argument. It claimed the right to use force to protect its ideological community against an encroachment by an alien ideology or sphere of influence not congenial to it and insisted that events in Czechoslovakia were a matter of concern to the States of the Socialist Community alone and outside the purview of the United Nations.

It was Guatemala and Hungary over again, but repercussions were likely to be more serious since a repetition amounted to buttressing a concept which was the very negation of the global concept of collective security.

This, in a way, is a sordid tale of so-called co-operation and compatibility between regionalism and United Nations globalism.

The book under review, however, has conveniently ignored these developments. There is, of course, passing reference to Guatemala and the Dominican Republic in the context of OAS relations with the United Nations (pp. 147-224). They are, however, mentioned only in the context of the position taken by different governments on these conflict situations and the conclusions (leading to action or inaction) reached by the Security Council. Hungary and Czechoslovakia do not figure in the entire set of studies on regionalism contained in this book. The editor has explained that collective security arrangements, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even though they have a regional core, have not been included for various reasons. And the reasons given (p. 4) are so unconvincing as to raise the question of academic integrity.⁷ But one should not carry this line of criticism too far. UNITAR and its research fellows have their own limitations; of course, some advantages too. As regards the later aspect, one may quote the foreword by the Executive Director of UNITAR. It says:

In preparing these articles, the authors have drawn upon archives and documents which are not easily accessible to outside scholars and some have obtained additional data from interviews with national delegates and officials of the organization concerned. (p. xvi)

Hardly any scholar working outside the closed circles of the United Nations could have the benefit of consultation and comments of delegates as well as officials. On the other hand UNITAR's research fellows suffer from a

serious constraint. They are obliged not to write anything which would reflect value judgement on the actions and policies of any of the member governments.

It is true that an author of a study sponsored by UNITAR is said to express his views "independently" and as such his views do not reflect those of the staff and the trustees of UNITAR, but the fact remains that the research fellow/author is funded by the Institute and the Institute in turn is dependent on voluntary contributions from member states and other sources and that its activities (including publications, of course), are subject to review by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. As such, controversial issues have to be handled gingerly—names not mentioned and specific instances not cited when a critical reference is made. It is not surprising therefore that some of the analyses and arguments in UNITAR studies are left hanging in the air and the treatment at places is drab.

In an attempt to avoid UNITAR getting into troubled waters, great care is taken, so it seems, in selecting research fellows to author its studies. Academic/research experience, and over-all competence are, of course, given due weight, but sometimes "nationality" and "official status" are also taken into account. For instance in this collection of studies under review, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the United Nations" is authored by L.I. Lukin who has "impeccable credentials" for writing on this theme. A citizen of USSR, a graduate in Economics from the Moscow Economic and Statistical Institute (where he was also a lecturer), he has served as an expert in the Soviet Planning Commission, etc., etc. Presently he is a counsellor in the Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Who else could have a better insight into the functioning of the CMEA to tell us how its activities contribute to the "achievements of the goals established in the United Nations Charter." [?] (p. 449) It is a fairly comprehensive study on the structure of the CMEA and the evolution of its relations with the United Nations and gives us all the relevant facts within in a small compass, but only that much which the author would like a reader/ student to know. We are told that the CMEA is one international organization which does not recognize "juridical division of states into greater and lesser Powers" and that it "*strictly* observes the principles of equality among member states." (p. 450) That is to say Albania, for instance, was considered fully equal to the giant USSR during Albania's membership which lasted from 1949 until October 1961, when it ceased to be its member. One should not be surprised to note that the author finds CMEA an ideal organization. There is not a word of criticism in some forty pages of the study. Let us examine another valuable study entitled "The League of Arab States and the United Nations." Who else could do a better job than Hussein A. Hassouna. He is "a legal adviser to the Foreign Minister of Egypt and was previously a member of the Egyptian Permanent Mission to the United Nations." (p. viii) It is pertinent to note here that until the developments

that flowed from the Camp David Agreement (1979), Cairo was the headquarters of the Arab League and an Egyptian used to be its Secretary General. It should also be noted that this article is based on extracts from the author's study published by UNITAR in 1975.⁸ Interestingly the author's conclusions are that the Arab League is an ideal regional organization "which has always cooperated with the United Nations and that an increased reliance of the United Nations in the peace and security field, a development that is actually taking place," (p. 328) calls for an elaborate and effective League mechanism and to that extent makes some pertinent suggestions to improve the functioning of the League. However, in the entire presentation the author skillfully avoids criticism of the League or its member-states. There is hardly any discussion, for instance, of Yemen where two members of the Arab League—Saudi Arabia and Egypt—fought a "proxy war" in the mid-1960s, or of inter-member territorial disputes (e.g. Gulf States) or of the Morocco-Algeria conflict regarding erstwhile Spanish Sahara.

Yet another important study on the question of regionalism and the United Nations in the peace and security field is in regard to the role of the Organization of American States (OAS). Its author is Aida Luisa Levin, an American who earned her doctorate from Columbia University, New York, specializing in Latin American Studies. Her piece (pp 147-224), is exceedingly rich in material but lacks incisive critical analysis. It presents a factual survey of conflict situations—including that of Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic—and records the views expressed by various member governments on the issues involved and also consequential action/inaction of the United Nations on each occasion in the context of larger issues involving regionalism versus globalism. However, in doing so she presents a narrow one-sided picture, skilfully steering clear of those aspects which would present a critical view of the United States position. It is an open secret that the United States had, time and again, used the OAS to camouflage its unilateral action by providing it a regional garb and sometimes in clear defiance of Article 53 of the Charter.

Indeed, on certain points, this study conveys half truths which naturally lead to a distorted version. For instance, the author notes that the Government of Cuba had recognized in 1960 the competence of the OAS to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic, but then in January 1962, what the author calls "an about-face" position, Cuba strongly protested when the OAS imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. (p. 167) The author fails to tell the reader that when OAS action against the Dominican Republic was taken in August 1960, Cuba had abstained. Further, she also fails to tell us how the situation in Cuba differed from that of the Dominican Republic and that the limited action taken against the latter was withdrawn within a "couple of months." She makes no mention of a chain of Cuban complaints, beginning July 1960s, both to the General Assembly and the Security Council of acts of hostility by the United States, nor of the character of the new Cuban governments that had

come to power in 1959. In fact, the name Fidel Castro, does not figure anywhere in this study.

What is, perhaps, more disturbing is that the author not only fails to discuss the United States hegemony over OAS and consequential dangers inherent in the regional system but also finds justification for the special status the Organization enjoys on the ground that it

...includes several medium-size states as well as a *Super-Power* and therefore *does not seem to require material assistance from the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security* as some other regional organizations (e.g., the OAU) do. (p. 193) (Emphasis added).

EVALUATION

Notwithstanding the criticism noted above, this collection of essays provides—in terms of factual information—a fairly exhaustive study and through case analysis, a basis for full-scale appraisals of the relationship that has evolved during the past three decades between the United Nations and some of the regional organizations. The main focus is, to quote the editor, “on the roles played by the United Nations and the regional bodies in helping to solve problems of peace and security, to promote economic and social development, and to foster intra-regional and inter-regional economic co-operation in regions divided by political and ideological differences.” (p. 3)

The volume is divided into four parts. The first containing two contributions, one by Sir Peter Smithers and the other by Davidson Nicol provides an introductory analysis of different forms of regionalism existing today and the problem of institutional proliferation within and outside the United Nations. While Sir Peter concentrates on providing a theoretical framework on the nature of inter-governmental organizations and of the United Nations itself, Davidson Nicol examines the role of the Commonwealth as an illustration of inter-regional coordination within the United Nations.

Part two contains three contributions analyzing the roles of comprehensive regional organizations as they relate to the role of the United Nations in the peace and security field. On this aspect, besides the two papers, one on OAS and the other on the Arab League referred to above, there is a study on the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the editor himself. It presents a summarized and updated version of his book published in 1976.⁹ Here again, there is all praise for the OAU which in terms of its principles and purposes, the author believes, qualifies the African Organization as a regional agency under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. (pp. 226-232) The author raises pertinent questions, provides the factual information on such critical issues as that of Western (Spanish) Sahara and Djibouti but skilfully skips from indulging in any criticism of the OAU or casting value judgement on the role of African states involved in the conflict situation.

Parts III and IV are devoted to studies on economic regionalism. It is interesting to note that while part III consisting of two articles—one by Parley W. Newman and the other by Michael Haas—is devoted to economic organizations in the developing areas, Part IV is concerned with economic organizations in Europe.

Newman brings to focus the role of the United Nations Economic Regional Commissions in the three continents—Africa (ECA), Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), West Asia (ECWA), and Latin America (ECLA). The other contribution by Haas takes up an analysis of Asian “Non-UN Intergovernmental Organizations” and examines their relationship with the United Nations. He examines only three such “organizations”—Colombo Plan, Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)—out of some two dozen in existence. (p. 398) That Haas is arbitrary in his “selection” is very obvious. The rationale and explanation provided (pp. 398-402), is not at all academically convincing. Why select APO and not the oldest sub-regional organization, i.e. South Pacific Commission (SPC)? Perhaps, an analytical study of SPC would bring out the reality, more than any other institutional arrangement, that almost all regional/sub-regional organizations in Asia have been imposed by the former colonial Powers. Likewise, the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) is not taken into account because the author might get himself into troubled waters since RCD is a product of the Cold War era—an off-shoot of the Baghdad Pact/CENTO.

Part IV dealing with economic regionalism in Europe contains, besides a piece on CMEA (by Lukin) referred to above, a study of Council of Europe by A.H. Robertson and one on EEC by John de Gara. Both these themes are competently handled by their respective authors and are in line with UNITAR’s traditional approach. Mention in particular should be made of John de Gara’s study of EEC and its relations with the United Nations. Its analysis of policy co-ordination of the nine EEC members and their voting pattern in the plenary sessions of the General Assembly (p. 571), for instance, speaks about the amount of research work that has gone into it. Indeed, all these essays contain a mine of information which would prove extremely useful to students and scholars concerned.

It is intriguing to note that while the developing world of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the context of economic regionalism is grouped into one section, the European world is treated in a separate section. Such a framework extends recognition, and rightly so, to the great divide of our time between the rich and the poor, the newly emerging nations representing 72 percent of the earth’s surface and 69 per cent of its populations and the old colonial Powers constituting the European world. The former constituting the periphery and the latter the centre of power in the existing international economic order.¹⁰ Thus, while tacitly accepting the great divide between the north and the south, this collection of studies, running to more than six hundred printed pages adroitly avoids mentioning the words “the North”

and "the South". Again, nowhere has this volume published in 1979, mentioned the phrase "the New International Economic Order" (NIEO).

This study, in order to be comprehensive, does include a study on inter-regional co-operation but it is found more "convenient" to pick up the role of the Commonwealth and not the OECD. An explanation could be advanced that while the Commonwealth has acquired "observer status" and that it attempts to function within the United Nations system, the OECD has made no attempt to do so; yet, the fact remains that in the field of international economic relations OECD plays a crucial role, as NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers do in the field of peace and security. A study which keeps out of its purview OECD, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers on a theme like the one covered by this volume could well be compared to presenting *Hamlet* without the King of Denmark.

But then let us face the reality and not expect too much of UNITAR which has its own constraints. It has to pick its research fellows not by academic competence alone, but on recommendations by those who count *politically* in the United Nations system and who also contribute funds to UNITAR. On the other hand, we should express gratitude to UNITAR for providing us—the students/scholars and laymen—with authentic analytical information which would not have been easily available from any other source.

This collection of studies bears the point.

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NOTES

- 1 For details, based on primary sources, see Ruth Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington D.C., 1958), pp. 92-122. Also Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations* (New York, 1953); and K.P. Saksena *The United Nations and Collective Security* (Delhi, 1975), pp. 28-36.
- 2 US Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945* (Washington D.C., 1950), p. 553.
- 3 Cited in Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organizations and the United Nations" *International Organization* (Madison) VIII, May 1954. p. 2.
- 4 Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organization," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.) VIII, January 1956, p. 239.
- 5 Cited in K.P. Saksena, n. 1, p. 34.
- 6 For details see Ibid., pp. 121-134 and Inis L Claude, "The OAS, the UN and the United States," *International Conciliation* (New York), March 1964.
- 7 The most objectionable point is that this UNITAR study, in justifying exclusion of such institutional arrangements as NATO, Warsaw Pact, etc., from its purview, refers to them as "Collective Security arrangements" and goes on to argue (p. 4) that:

Even though these arrangements do have a regional core, they have been established as defence alliances or ideologically homogeneous groups rather than as regional bodies; they are thus linked to the United Nations either through Article 51 of the UN Charter (NATO), or the exception to Article 53 concerning defence against the resurgence of aggression by enemy states of World War II (Warsaw Pact), both of these collective measures independently of the Security Council, subject to the requirement of subsequent reporting. In practice, these collective security arrangements have had hardly any direct contact with the Security Council, though the significant impact of their policies and actions upon the functioning of the Council might be regarded as a form of indirect relationship.

- 8 *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts* (New York, 1975).
- 9 *The OAU and the UN : Relations between the Organization of African States and the United Nations* (New York/London, 1976).
- 10 The Brandt Commission Report bears the point. Also see, in particular, K.P. Saksena, "The North-South Conflict and the United Nations" in M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguli, (Eds.), *Great Power Relations and the Third World : Essays in Memory of Sisir Gupta* (New Delhi, 1980), and K.P. Saksena, "The EEC and the Third World : Interactions at the United Nations," in K.B. Lall and H.S. Chopra, (Eds.), *The EEC and the Third World* (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 62-81.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

SHRIDATH RAMPHAL : Selected Speeches of the Commonwealth Secretary General, 1975-79. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, xxxiv, 444p., Rs. 80.

THIS is a volume of selected speeches, statements, and writings of the Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath S. Ramphal from January 1975, when he became Commonwealth Secretary General, until March 1979. There is an introduction by Barbara Ward, the distinguished economist and outstanding writer on development issues and international co-operation.

Dr. Ramphal, now serving his second term as Secretary General, was formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs and Justice of Guyana. He has a rich background of involvement in the affairs of third world countries; his most recent being as a member of the Brandt Commission, whose report is currently the subject of a good deal of discussion and debate.

Ramphal's speeches delivered to a variety of audiences in far flung areas of the world, dwell on matters which are of great importance to the developed and developing world, including India.

The chapter headings give some indication of the sweep of his thinking—

- (a) Redressing Human Disparities: Global Need for a New Order.
- (b) An Agenda for the South.
- (c) Serving a wider Commonwealth.
- (d) Dismantling Racism in Africa.
- (e) The New Dynamic of Regionalism.
- (f) The Professions as Agents of Change—Science, Law, the Press, Management and the Universities.

In surveying the situation existing in both the rich and poor countries, the Secretary General emphasizes the need for collective thinking and for an approach which makes inter-dependence imperative. It was this consideration that made the United Nations call for a new International Economic Order in 1974, setting in motion a whole series of debates and negotiations that is the North-South dialogue. The Commonwealth, because of its composition and geographical distribution had, of necessity, to get involved in these discussions which were not only about development but about human conditions the world over. The mutual interest of all countries is involved in the creation of a less unequal and less unstable world.

Two of the speeches included in the first part reflect the broad purpose of his message. One was a statement made in Bonn when the Brandt Commission was inaugurated in December 1977. He put his finger on the nub of the

problem when he stated:

As we approach the end of the 20th Century we need no special insights to warn us if our global society cannot save the many who are wretched, it is unlikely to protect the few who prosper—or itself to survive.

Another important presentation was made by Ramphal to the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. In this, the Secretary General argues that in the new order sought by the Third World there would be no losers. A new order in all the principal areas under negotiation—commodities, credit, industrialization, aid and debt relief—would yield benefits both to the rich and the poor.

The second set of speeches includes one which Ramphal delivered to the Indian Council of World Affairs in December 1977, under the title "What Next?" The main burden of these speeches is a call to the South to assume its specific responsibility for resolving imbalances. The dialogue between North and South, he says is, one about change in attitudes, in mechanisms and in systems. While the South demands various changes in the North, the South has to take action in regard to its own conditions—a point also forcibly canvassed by the Brandt Commission. These changes, Ramphal goes on to add, revolve around taking action in individual countries to advance *real* development, to remove inequality, to enlarge the area of co-operation between developing countries, to sustain the unity of the South so that it strengthens its capacity to negotiate with the North. He echoes what has been emphasized by the Non-Aligned Conference since the 1970 Lusaka meeting—self-reliance for individual countries and collective self-reliance for the Third World.

The third collection of speeches relate to the Commonwealth which, in spite of pessimism and gloomy forebodings, has continued not only to survive but to grow from strength to strength and to expand its activity. This indefinable institution has puzzled many who are outside its pale and has meant different things to different people. This reviewer recalls two such reactions. At a function in Peking in April 1956, to celebrate the First Anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai toasted the British *Charge d'Affaires* on the advantages of the English language which was a unifying factor in the Commonwealth. In 1971, during the Bangladesh crisis, the Head of an Arab State suggested that "India was a member of a military Pact," because we were in the Commonwealth.

In his speeches, Ramphal explains the mystique of the institution and the factors that bind such disparate countries—rich and poor, big and small with differing ideologies, members of NATO and the Non-Aligned movement, the goals these widely differing nations hold in common, and what brings about their collective commitment, and wherein lies the Commonwealth's validity and its role.

The fourth Chapter contains speeches dealing with racism in Southern

Africa and the denial of self determination which threatens the peace and security of the world. Apartheid in South Africa forms one of the main themes and there is unambiguous condemnation of this inhuman method of governing a country. What he calls Western passivity is criticized. Apart from hurting all the oppressed people of Africa, it also hurts the people of the West "whose credentials not just of goodness but of civilization it impugns." Dr. Ramphal forcibly advocates the freedom of such countries as Namibia and Zimbabwe. [The latter, since independent].

The fifth Chapter of the book deals with the growing dynamics of regionalism. The basis of Ramphal's thinking is his own effort towards regional integration in the Caribbean as is exemplified in the formation of CARICOM, which now constitutes "an important element of the progressive forces in Latin America." In this context he expresses his pride in being a West Indian. He suggests that regionalism is a move towards internationalism and discusses the many issues which regionalism poses. He is not unaware of the tensions which develop between nationalism and regionalism. Scattered as it is over many continents, the Commonwealth also is moving towards an awareness of the value of regional arrangements.

The speeches in the final chapter remind us that to effect the changes which must take place today, both nationally and internationally, the participation of all segments of society is needed. Talking to scientists, he highlights the disparity in the world of the distribution of scientific and technological resources and the need to harness these in the service of rich and poor alike. Lawyers, normally associated with upholding the status quo, are requested not to forget their commitment to justice and equity. Journalists and other media people should use their tools of trade to facilitate enlightenment and change. Managers have a special responsibility for the right kind of economic change, and educators, particularly in the universities, should be more constructively involved in development.

This collection of speeches written in very forceful and elegant language is bristling with ideas on a wide variety of subjects of contemporary interest. It is indispensable reading for all those interested in the problems of change and development.

Barbara Ward, in the Introduction, gives 'an admirable summing up of what the volume is all about. "Varied as are the subjects and occasions of these addresses, they have, without exception, an underlying sense of direction." Indeed, the phrase "sense of direction" conveys too cool an impression. What they express with urgency and eloquence is a dedication, a personal commitment, a passionate concern for what Ramphal calls our "inseparable humanity."

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I.J. BAHADUR SINGH

D.P. SINGH: *American Attitudes Towards the Indian Nationalist Movement*.
Munshi Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1974, xiv, 362p., Rs. 55.

THE present work makes an important contribution to the growing literature on Indo-American relations. The book has grown out of a doctoral dissertation originally presented to the University of Hawaii. The use of the words "American attitude" in the title leads one to expect much more than is actually the case. The author himself would like to delineate the word "American" to "official American" and the term "attitude" to imply a settled mode of thinking, whereas what the study does is to give American official "opinion" on significant developments in the Indian National Movement during the period 1905-1929. The work also includes in its scope the struggle the Indian nationalists waged in the United States for the freedom of their motherland, thus bringing into the limelight new information on the Ghadar Movement and the activities of Lajpat Rai.

The sources consulted by the author are fairly extensive. The materials of the United States Department of State available in the American National Archives and other materials in the Library of Congress in Washington have been read. He has relied mainly on the despatches and reports sent to the United States Government by American consuls resident in Bombay and Calcutta and these cover mainly political and economic questions. Though these reports are a valuable source, they are exposed to the risk of reflecting the local bias of the consuls. They were in close touch with British officials and the European commercial community in India on a social level and this and the opinion of the pro-British Press in India could not but influence their views. The author is aware of this risk and is careful to make his own assessment. But what comes out strikingly is the fact that these consuls had maintained a balanced outlook on the Indian National Movement and indeed helped to correct some mistaken notions formed in the United States on the basis of prejudiced reports emanating from the American Embassy in Britain. One glaring instance was the suspicion created in the American official mind by British sources that there was a growing Bolshevik menace to India during 1917-22 and was strengthened by the utterances of some Indian revolutionary emigres in the United States and Europe. On being requested by the United States Secretary of State, the American consuls in India sent reports which helped to dispel doubts about it as they said that there were no signs of Bolshevik adherence in nationalist circles in India. We know from other sources that the consuls were correct.

But the question is what weight did the rulers in Washington attach to the consular despatches from India? We know that more often than not they shut their eyes to them and seldom replied even on issues raised by such important movements as Swadeshi, Boycott and Non-co-operation.

Here and there the author has done well to compare the official view and the non-official view (for instance on pages 123-24). It is significant that the impact of non-official opinion on American policy towards Indian aspirations

for Swaraj was neither deep nor far-reaching. Whereas, by and large, the official view tended to appreciate British policy in India, may be from their own economic point of view rather than the Anglo-Saxon race considerations, the non-official view, on the whole, tended to sympathize with Indian national aspirations. The section on President Theodore Roosevelt in the book shows how he had the "White man's Burden" approach to British rule in India. Even in the Wilsonian days of high idealism, American opinion did not prove very vocal—even far less effective. Sir Subramania Aiyar wrote to President Wilson in 1917 but his letter was ignored. Later, B.G. Tilak wrote to him appealing to him to apply the principle of national self-determination to India. The reply from Wilson's Secretary assured that the matter of self-determination for India would be taken up in due course by the proper authorities. (p. 225) That was perhaps the more appropriate expression of the United States Government's attitude towards India. In subsequent years also, American policy on British imperialism was one of lip sympathy but without effecting action or intervention.

The volume includes within its compass several significant aspects of the Indian National Movement, namely, the Swadeshi and Boycott movements, revolutionary activities of the Indians in America and Europe, efforts of other Indian emigres in America, and American response to them, Gandhi and the non-cooperation movement. The story is brought down to 1929 when, in the opinion of the author, there was a definite capitalization of American attitude and policy as regards the early realization of India's destiny within the British empire as a self-governing dominion. Thus the principle of self-determination was to go hand in hand with Montagu's declaration of progressive realization of self-government within the Empire.

Unfortunately the book has a number of spelling mistakes of names, etc., which could have been avoided.

The book is undoubtedly based on painstaking research and is full of copious footnote references. Further, it is a good contribution, not only in respect of American opinion and policy on Indian questions during the formative phase of the national moment but also on various aspects of the movement itself.

New Delhi

AMBA PRASAD

R.R. SHARMA: *A Marxist Model of Social Change: Soviet Central Asia 1914-40*. The Macmillan Co., New Delhi, 1979, ix, 256p., Rs. 60.

THE purpose of Dr. Sharma's study, to quote him, was his "sincere endeavour not merely to record the socio-economic history of modern Soviet Central Asia but rather to attempt a sociological interpretation of it." (p. viii) The reader will have no doubt that he has been quite successful in this attempt.

The author begins with an account of the socio-economic conditions of what was known as "Turkestan" of the days before the October Revolution and which later became known as Soviet Central Asia, comprising the republics of Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan and Tadzikistan. He explains how in the 19th century, Russian capitalism resorted to the policy of horizontal expansion and annexed Turkestan linking the Fergana Valley, the rich cotton growing area with Central Russia in the process. In this period "money economy" replaced the natural economy. On the eve of the October Revolution, "Turkestan" had become a "Cotton Colony" of Russian capitalism. The relations of production used to be dominated by the *Beiys* or the landlords. On the cultural scene, the traditional elites known as *Khadimists* were the all powerful group and were allowed to remain predominant as that satisfied the criterion of dependence of this region to the Russian centre.

The author then embarks on an evaluation of the strategy of development of Soviet Central Asia after the revolution. The "non-capitalist path of development," inunciated by Lenin as a solution to overcome the social and economic backwardness of the region, as the "least painful" form of transition from primitive condition to the socialist mode is explained in detail. While translating this doctrine into reality, as the author explains, the aim of the Soviet policy was to do away with the feudal capitalist structure and substitute it by a socialist system of management of the economy and social forces.

The problems of the region, mainly in the economic arena during the war of communism, that resulted in total instability in the economy and disaffection among people, comprises the content of the next phase of the study. In this connection, the author has narrated clearly how practical steps were taken during the NEP period to combat these distortions both at the base and at the superstructural level. But, as is well known, NEP created increasing differentiation among peasants not only in the Russian mainland but also in this region with *Beiys* and *Kulaks* becoming all powerful.

While discussing the issue of agrarian reforms, the author has shown clearly that its first phase was over by the end of 1925 with the creation of the land fund and completion of land distribution. Hired labour was also totally liquidated by this time. According to the author, these steps helped in "sharpening the 'social consciousness' of the people." (p. 109) The most important phase of transformation of agriculture came next with collectivisation. This policy was put into effect in 1929 and the decision was to complete its implementation by the end of 1933-34. The most important feature of collectivisation, as the author points out, was to "eliminate *Kulaks* and *Beiys* as a class." (p. 132)

In his account of industrial reorganization, the author shows that by 1922-23 the state sector started to assume the "commanding heights." (p. 148) There was a conscious effort in the next phase for levelling the differences between Central Russia and Central Asia in the levels of development.

That is why the policy of the "eastward movement" was given so much prominence. The author has also proved, supported by data, that in the absence of a comprehensive central economic plan the development of the region during 1917-40 of the order actually achieved would not have been possible.

Finally, the author has tried to provide a sociological balance sheet of the overall development in the region in the period under review. This development was instrumental in crushing the dominant role of the traditional elite (*Khadimists*) and also the other influential minority group (*Jadidists*) with regional bourgeois aspirations. In the task of transformation at the superstructural plane the author has made a very interesting point. Not only a minority among the intelligentsia with nationalist and leftist leanings but also a section of the small trading community and even some from among priests assumed leading roles in "initiating socio-cultural, political and economic change." (p. 192) One of the instruments of this change was a massive educational programme to help in the creation of a socialist intelligentsia. (p. 201) Through the emergence of this intelligentsia during 1917-40, as the author points out, a new cultural climate was created resulting in a changed attitude to patterns of family and structure of society that could get rid of the objective basis of the social inertia of the past. (p. 218)

There is no doubt that the present study is not only one of the most comprehensive accounts of social change of Soviet Central Asia in the English language, but it is also an extremely valuable document for students and researchers in the field. Questions however may arise in the minds of readers to which the author has not given adequate answers. Firstly, the author has talked about "coercion, pressure and force" in implementing the collectivisation programme. But he has not mentioned the behaviour of *Kulaks* and *Beisys* as a class vis-a-vis the peasants on the eve of collectivisation. Was there intense class struggle in the villages in this period? Secondly, the author is of the opinion that revolution reached "Turkestan" on a barren socio-economic soil "by cable" only. (p. 194) Does the author mean that revolution and then Socialism came to "Turkestan" by annexation alone? Then this action of Soviet power could only be supported if one believes in the truth in the aphorism of Lukacs, "the worst of socialism is better than the best of capitalism."

An extremely important point in the study that the reader is advised to note in connection with the author's examination of the theory of the "non-capitalist path of development" is his contention that this theory would have remained theory alone if the fourteenth congress of CPSU had not dismissed Preobrazhenskii's plan of socialist accumulation through an exploitation of Soviet Central Asia by Soviet Central Russia for making the socialist state mightier so as to enable it to thwart any evil design of world capitalism. (p. 142)

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Society and International Law

HERMANN MOSLER : The International Society As a Legal Community.
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1980,
xix, 327p.

GENERALLY titles of books need explanation. Certainly this needs one otherwise readers would not know what is intended in a book entitled—"The International Society as a Legal Community." The author, Hermann Mosler, a distinguished German international lawyer and currently a judge of the International Court of Justice, knew too well that he owed to his readers an explanation of this title, for, he says, "International Society is a legal community to the extent that it is able to live according to legal rules." (p. xvii) Having set out such a hypothesis, the author proceeds to examine on the basis of classical rules, state practice and judicial dicta to what extent international law rules govern the conduct of state in transnational relations. Herein, he seems to be influenced by the classic works of Charles de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*. (Translated by P.E. Corbett)

The author, no doubt, conceives of international law as a product of historical development, but his history dates from medieval Europe, and does not relate to the ancient civilizations of the East. Such an approach is bound to deny modern international law its pedigree in terms of the contributions of the East. International lawyers of India may recall here the pioneering contribution of Prof. C.H. Alexandrowicz to universal historiography.

Even so, this is a work worthy to be studied and pondered over by Indian international lawyers. Where does one find international law? The author discusses this question in two chapters under the headings of "Formation of International Law" and "Evidence of International Law." Between them they deal with treaties, customs, general principles of international law, judicial decisions, and teachings of publicists, in other words, the Art. 38 sources. He finds that the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases on custom as "inflexibly worded." His criticism is particularly directed against the way the Court sought to identify the *opinio juris* in the North Sea Cases. He is of the view "that the acts of governments and their agents in relation to an evolving rule are indicative of that State's conviction that it must comply with a legal duty. But the existence of such a conviction cannot be expected in the early stages of evolution of a custom. To require otherwise would be to insist upon the paradoxical need for a belief of a legal obligation as a prerequisite for its actual creation." (p. 113) This criticism of Judge Mosler suffers from the same deficiency which he discerns in the Court's reasoning. For his reasoning that *opinio juris* cannot be expected in the early stages calls for explanation—what is meant by "early stages"?

The author legally analyzes the role of the United Nations in the making of international law and its contribution to its progressive development in various sections under several chapters. But being a positivist as he is, he doubts whether resolutions of the General Assembly can be an independent source of international law. In his words, "they can contribute to the emergence of new rules by providing *evidence* that the general consensus is about to emerge or they may *state existing law* by defining and interpreting it." (Italics that of the author, p. 90) This is rather taking a limited view of the potential of the General Assembly resolutions as a source of international law. Not that this viewer holds every resolution of the General Assembly as a source of international law.

It is interesting to note that the author regards the doctrine of *acta jure imperii* as a minimum international standard guaranteeing immunity from jurisdiction to states. So conceived, *acta jure gestionis* becomes merely optional. This interpretation avoids the absolutist or restrictive theory of sovereign immunities of foreign states.

The author's treatment of the chapter on economic relations reflects his general predisposition towards classical legal framework that has little use for the bold new approach of the modernists. Economic factors, he regards are not enough for the creation of legal obligation. Article 38, he finds as inadequate for generating norms relevant to international economic issues. Indeed, he concludes that the changes which have so far been made in the international economic order have not centrally replaced the traditional rules in this field. Given the author's frame of reference, one could hardly join issue with the author on these points.

International lawyers the world over now, know too well that there is little scope for extending contentious jurisdiction of the International Court for Justice. It is reassuring to take note that Judge Mosler holds a similar view. This reviewer agrees, though, with his plea for extending the Court's advisory jurisdiction. The principal judicial organ of the United Nations must be more effectively used. Finally, the author in taking note of the usefulness of national digests of international law expresses that so far no digest of digests has been produced. It's an idea whose time has come!

Bangalore

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Nuclear Technology Growth

P.B. SINHA AND R.R. SUBRAMANIAM : *Nuclear Pakistan : Atomic Threat to South Asia*. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980, vii, 164p., Rs. 55.

BRIJ MOHAN KAUSHIK AND O.N. MEHROTRA : *Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb*. Sopan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 228p., Rs. 75.

THE subject of these two studies by scholars of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses—namely acquisition by Pakistan of nuclear-weapons capability—has to be viewed in the perspective of two developments which have taken place after their publication. They are, one, the tripartite report submitted by the United States, USSR and Britain to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 31 July 1980, saying that “significant new ground” had been broken “in international arms limitation efforts” with particular reference to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; secondly, a *New York Times* report on 20 July 1980, quoting Soviet officials, that Moscow shared Washington’s “interest in preventing any further growth in the world’s nuclear club.”

These would dispel the impression that while the United States is hell bent on preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons states the Soviet Union might not be so concerned about it. Reports appear periodically in the Indian Press, that the Soviet Union has offered heavy water or enriched uranium, or both, without insisting on IAEA safeguards, which are not true. There is nothing to choose in this respect between one member and another of the so-called London Club with its comprehensive trigger list, barring perhaps France which has had commercial dealings involving nuclear material—fuel, equipment as well as know how—with Pakistan and Iraq, both of which are said to be engaged in making the bomb. When it comes to the crunch, France too, will fall in line with the rest.

The prospect of Pakistan arming itself with nuclear weapons has been engaging the attention of politicians, policy-makers and publicists in several countries, including our own. The danger of Pakistan embarking on a weapons programme was foreseen by a Hudson Institute study of 1974 which visualised a kind of domino phenomenon with country after country, starting with India, followed by Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, going nuclear. That some of these countries like Iran and Iraq are signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty proves that the NPT is no serious impediment to horizontal proliferation also, once capabilities match intentions and the circumstances demand it.

Of the two publications, the second is a more balanced assessment of the problem, and it studies in some depth the geo-political and security aspects of the larger issue of nuclear weaponry. But for the cogently argued Foreword by P.R. Chari, the then Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, the former would read like an *expose* of Pakistan’s

cussedness in going nuclear on the sly, hoodwinking the rest of the world. The authors also contend that Pakistan's policy in this respect is independent of developments in India like the Pokhran blast.

Chari, on the other hand, unemotionally examines the Pakistan situation, sifting intentions from capabilities, and concludes that it is the elite perception that nuclear weapons enhance national security and/or prestige which propels countries towards the weapons option. He also concedes that the Pokhran blast "added another dimension" to Pakistan's threat perception. For the rest, the book is a narration of the steps taken and progress achieved by Pakistan for fulfilling its nuclear ambitions, supplemented by technical data on uranium reprocessing and enrichment processes. For an academic study, the book exudes value judgements not all of which can pass muster.

It is also difficult to agree with the authors that the Western Powers could be creating the bogey of a nuclear Pakistan to make India subscribe to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in the light of the limitations of the NPT explained earlier and the shared interest of both Western and non-Western Powers to prevent more countries from going nuclear. Chari has a more plausible explanation when he sees in it a Pakistani ruse to secure military and economic aid from outside.

Kaushik and Mehrotra, on the other hand, have rightly traced Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to Field Marshal Ayub Khan's attitude of treating the West as "friends, not masters." Contrary to what the authors have surmised, Z.A. Bhutto was then a comparatively junior minister handling oil and natural resources. His contribution to Pakistan's foreign policy in those days was largely declaratory because there was no love lost between Bhutto and Manzur Qadir who headed the Foreign Ministry. The same was the case subsequently when Mohammed Ali Bogra was the Foreign Minister.

The review of Pakistan's voting behaviour at the United Nations on the nuclear issue, made by the authors, is interesting. It brings out the diverse motivations behind Pakistan's gamble with weapons capability. The authors lucidly explain the qualitative difference between the positions of India and Pakistan. The latter still belongs to the category of "static" threshold nuclear Powers, i.e. a country without technological thrust to go nuclear, while India remains a "dynamic" threshold nuclear Power, with the technological capacity to acquire weapons capability.

In this context, the authors significantly stress "the thrust of technology" as a factor driving countries to go nuclear. They add: "When a country has developed an adequate technological and industrial base that can sustain a meaningful civilian nuclear programme, there is bound to be the temptation for and demand on the decision-makers to go in for nuclear weapons."

After describing the development of a political "will" in Pakistan to go nuclear, the authors voice their scepticism about Pakistan's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. While taking the plutonium route to a bomb option, Pakistan has obtained French technical assistance for its reprocess-

sing plant, though it entailed stringent IAEA safeguards. The authors explain this "contradiction" by pointing out that to reduce the time-technological lag between India and Pakistan "the latter had no (other) choice but to borrow the technology, even if it necessarily entailed international safeguards. Perhaps the decision-makers in Islamabad had deliberately decided on a path that had the contingency plan of coming out of the safeguards agreements after Pakistan had developed a real technological option to make the bomb...."

Nevertheless, the authors point out that the Pakistani nuclear programme "suffers from many 'ifs' and 'buts' ... If the Pakistani effort is to have a 'bang' like the one India had in 1974 it might well succeed. But the Pokhran explosion did not make India a nuclear-weapon Power. A similar effort on the part of Pakistan would fail to graduate Pakistan to the nuclear status. In both the cases it is nothing more than squandering of the limited resources on wrongly determined priorities."

Finally, Kaushik and Mehrotra candidly say "the theme of Pakistan's bomb has been blown up by the bomb lobbyists in India....," who forced Mrs. Gandhi to go in for the Pokhran explosion.... They were having a tough time during Morarji Desai's regime." Their plea to the Government is to avoid succumbing to such pressure but to take the initiative for a *modus vivendi* with Pakistan.

Very few Indian writers on the nuclear issue have shown themselves capable of such an unemotional and rational approach as the two above authors. It is, therefore, odd to find a statement in the book that the "origin" of the problem of nuclear proliferation was the development and use of nuclear weapons by the United States in 1945. It is like tracing all the ills of mankind to the eating of the forbidden fruit by Adam. Can it be claimed similarly that if the Soviet Union had not obtained the weapons technology through espionage—to which, incidentally, there is no mention at all in the book—there would have been no proliferation because technically the United States would have been the only nuclear Power?

With or without the Hiroshima bomb, the technology would have spread, just as with or without the NPT the number of nuclear weapons Powers would not stay frozen at five!

New Delhi

G.S. BHARGAVA

Foreign Policy

BISHESHWAR PRASAD : Foundations of India's Foreign Policy: Imperial Era, 1882-1914. Naya Prokash, Calcutta, 1979, x, 596p., Rs. 125.

WHEN it became independent in 1947, New Delhi was heir to a long, and not undistinguished, legacy of friendly intercourse with its neighbouring lands. A decade earlier, Burma had been separated and was now

well on its way to a sovereign, independent statehood. Relations with Tibet were cordial and the 14th Dalai Lama (still a boy) and his government looked up to its powerful, and populous, neighbour to the south for friendly advice, with favour but without fear. Nepal albeit securely within the Indian orbit, functioned well-nigh completely independently of any overt or covert control, much less interference in its affairs. The King of Kabul was supreme over the land he ruled and even though he had his small quarrels over guns and gold, relations with New Delhi were far from unfriendly. That, in broad outline, was the shape of things and all said and done, it was as good a start as any one could have wished.

The time-worn adage that a nation, or an individual for that matter, can ignore the past only at its peril is nowhere more apt than in the domain of foreign policy. It is therefore of the utmost importance for the mandarins in South Block, as for the lay observer outside, that the origins as also the evolution of our external relations are studied with the utmost care. It is here that every detail, however minor, in our past dealings becomes relevant; all data, however cumbersome, grist to the mill.

With this laudable objective before it, the Indian Council of World Affairs sponsored a four-volume study of "The Foundations of India's Foreign Policy." The first in the series bearing that title, and spanning the years 1861-1882, came out almost a quarter century ago, in 1955, to be exact. It was written by Professor Bisheshwar Prasad and appears to have made a good impact. To be authored "jointly" by him and S.C. Desikachar, the remaining three volumes were to follow "at yearly intervals;" they were to cover the years 1882-1907 (Vol II), 1908-30 (Vol III) and 1930-1947 (Vol IV). Even though the sponsorship has now changed and the ICWA's place taken by the ICHR (Indian Council of Historical Research), the volume under review would appear to be the second in the series.

The principal topics with which the study deals are relations with Afghanistan—they take up nearly two thirds of its bulk—Persia (Iran) and the Gulf, Tibet, the Pamirs and Burma, the last under the high-sounding "British Imperial Interests is South East Asia."

However tempted one may feel to go into a detailed treatment of individual subjects, more so when there are many a bone to pick, one has to resist the temptation; it would, in the present compass, be impractical to say the least. A word on the conceptual framework however, may be in order. To start with, while the Introductory Chapter on the "European Diplomatic Scene" is not strictly relevant, what is has been completely ignored. And this is the contemporary Asian scene. The emergence of Japan for instance and the gradual decline of Manchu China, the conflict over Korea, and Mongolia, are of first-rate diplomatic importance not to say of utmost relevance to any worthwhile discussion of Imperial India's legacy in the domain of foreign relations.

Another factor that appears to have escaped the author is a broad conspectus of the post-Lytton scenario in India. The dominant personalities

here—and not only in the domestic sphere—are those of Dufferin and Curzon. For a proper perspective in Afghanistan and Tibet, not to say Persia and the Gulf, Curzon even more than Dufferin bestrides the political stage like a Colossus. An understanding of the man and his political and social mores—and there is no dearth of good literature on the subject including his own, not inconsiderable yet perceptive writings—would have helped immensely in providing the necessary framework of reference for most of what is germane in delineating the foreign policy contours during these thirty odd years. He is the indispensable touchstone; and there is always the temptation, and indeed the necessity, to refer to the pre- as to the post-Curzon facet of a problem.

To be more specific, a large bulk of the “Problem of the North West Frontier” (Chapter V), “Fresh Tensions in Indo-Afghan Relations” (Chapter VII), “The Re-orientation of Forward Policy” (Chapter VIII), “The Treaty with Habibullah” (Chapter IX), “British Imperialism in the Persian Gulf Region” (Chapter XII), “Clash of Imperialisms in the North” (Chapter XIII), lose meaning and content without an intimate understanding of the one man whose books, despatches and private papers hold the key to what has been retailed here. And without a fresh breath of life the detail itself appears somewhat fatuous if also devoid of meaning.

A sad lapse is the complete neglect of the serious clash of interests of imperialisms if you choose—between British India and the Chinese Empire. The latter’s penetration into the Assam Himalayas in the aftermath of the expedition to Lhasa led to a series of developments culminating in the tripartite Simla Conference. Barely mentioned, the treatment meted out to this important theme is scrappy and one hates to say, singularly superficial. Two recent studies on the subject: Alastair Lamb’s *The McMahon Line*, 2 Vols, 1966 and this reviewer’s *The McMahon Line and After*, 1974, appear to have escaped notice.

A serious omission has been the relative innocence which the narrative reveals of the excellent books and monographs on the subjects with which it deals. It may be useful to list just a few. Thus on Afghanistan, Ludwig W Adamec’s *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History* (Berkeley, 1967); Donald Wilber, *Afghanistan—Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, 1962); and Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton, reprint, 1978), furnish fresh insights into Indo-Afghan relations. On Persia and the Gulf there are, among others, Rose Louise Greaves, *Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892* (London, 1959); F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914* (New Haven, 1968) and, for background J.B. Kelly’s *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1785-1880* (Oxford, 1968). On Tibet, apart from the reviewer’s *Tibetan Policy, 1904-37*, 1976, there is the slender yet authoritative Tokan Tada’s, *The Thirteenth Dalai Lama* (Tokyo, 1965), B.J. Gould’s *Jewel in the Lotus*, (London, 1957) and Peter Fleming’s extremely well-written account of the Younghusband expedition in *Bayonets to Lhasa* (London, 1961). On the Pamirs, no study of the conflict may be deemed

complete without reference to G.J. Alder's *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-95* (London, 1963) and John Keay's much more recent, *The Gilgit Game* (London 1979).

Further, in the book under review, expression is sometimes involved and meaning hard to come by. Two instances picked up at random may suffice.

In his letter of 17 February 1893, the Amir explained the reasons for his inability to fix any date for the receipt of Robert's Mission and desired the mission to meet him. (p. 141)

Later on p. 221, we have:

Replying to the Amir's letter of 9 January 1889, in which Abdur Rahman had, with reference to Russian General Tremenoff, communication regarding the extension of railway line to Kushk, and expressing his grief at this development, asked for the Viceroy's advice regarding the reply which might be sent to the Russian officer. Curzon while advising the Amir not to reply to the letter, used this opportunity to ventilate his 'opinion as to the steps which should be taken in view of the completion of the Russian railway to Kushk and of the manner in which it may affect the relations of harmonious alliance that exist, between the British and Afghan governments.'

Printing errors are a legion. Kimberly (pp. 141-2, 540), for Kimberley; Turki (pp. 400-1), for Turkey; Broderik (p. 415), for Brodrick; Maskat (p. 416), for Muscat; Grey of Falloden (p. 520), for Grey of Fallodon; Jordon (p. 529), for Jordan; Linchen Shatra (p. 530), for Lonchen Shatra. Alstair Lamb (p. 467), should read Alastair Lamb; Tsapon, W.D. Shakabfa (p. 469), Shakabpa, Tsepon W.D.—the last word is Shakabpa, *not* Tsepon. Richardson's *A Short History of Tibet* (p. 467) is, in fact, *Tibet and its History*; Tieh-Tseng Li (p. 469), is more correctly rendered Tieh-tseng Li. McMahon has been mangled almost beyond recognition—there being such variants as MacMahon (p. 532), and McMohan (pp. 164-5, 244 and index, p. 593). Similarly Randolph (p. 540) is Randolph (Churchill).

And pray what does Grover *Sikkim India* (p. 455) signify? To be sure the author is B.S.K. Grover and the work, *Sikkim and India*, but in all fairness to Professor Prasad the dust jacket lists *Sikkim India* ! Horror of horrors, the same holds true in the case of the book under review. Is it, one wonders, *The Foundation of India's Foreign Policy* (dust jacket), or *Foundations of India's Foreign Policy* (title page)?

For a volume of this size, a little over six hundred pages (including the prelims), a good index is an important, indeed indispensable desideratum. And herein the present study leaves a lot to be desired. Such entries as "Anglo-Indian circles" (p. 587); "Minute", 4 September 1899 (p. 593) followed by three other such "Minute" (s); "Lumsden's Camp" (p. 592);

"Mansion House Speech" and "No Man's Land" (both on p. 593) leave the reader a-guessing.

Nor is that the end. We have, for sure, "Pan-Slav Circles," "Petala Agreement," "Russian Czarism" (all on p. 594), "Indo-British Government" and "Indo-British policy" (both on p. 591), exciting the reader's curiosity. Again, without specifying the dates or initials, what would "Anglo-Chinese Convention," "Anglo-Chinese War" (both on page 587), "Churchill" (p. 589) and "Jung Bahadur" (p. 592), stand for?

A grave, indeed crippling, handicap for the intelligent reader is the absence of a bibliography. Needless to say for any serious work of scholarship a comprehensive bibliographic note is not only not a luxury but an indispensable necessity; it enhances its value and furnishes the researcher necessary leads for a follow up. Apart from a general bibliography, what the present study calls for are well annotated reading lists appended to each chapter. A pity they are all conspicuous by their absence!

One is constrained to say all this more in sorrow than in anger; to bemoan the fact that a great opportunity has been missed. As the title spells out here is a daring, combative subject calling for great imagination. More, in execution, it demands breadth of vision and an indepth understanding; utmost care, meticulous supervision, scrupulous attention to detail. Much more in fact was called for than the volume under review appears to have received. This is all the more necessary where institutional sponsorship and its inevitable concomitants, a public image and public funds are involved. They are a sacred trust or ought to be. One would only hope that the remaining volumes, which may well be in the pipeline, find in the ICHR a more acute awareness of the doughty challenges that the task poses and, in their author, a more adequate response.

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PARSHOTAM MEHRA

VED PRATAP VEDIK : *Bharatiya Videsh Neeti, Naye Disha*. National Publishing House, New Delhi 1980, 187p., Rs. 40.

P.K. MISHRA : *India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh : India as a Factor in the Intra-Regional Interaction in South Asia*. Sundeep Prakashan, 1979, viii, 286p., Rs. 70.

THE titles of both these books are misleading to a certain extent. While claiming it to be "the first original work on India's foreign policy in Hindi," the central theme of the book by Dr. Vedik is a discussion of the Janata Government's foreign policy. One could however, concede the fact that the study is based on a wider perspective of India's foreign policy rather than limited to the period of the Janata Government's rule, and that it displays a fair and impartial analysis of the Janata Government's declared

policy of "genuine" non-alignment, and also makes a comparison between the "genuine" and "fake" non-alignment policies pursued by the Janata Party and the Congress governments preceding the Janata Party's coming to power.

The title of P.K. Mishra's *India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh*, carrying the sub-title "India as a Factor in the Intra-Regional Inter-action in South Asia" is misleading in the sense that it is basically a study of Pakistan-Nepal relations from 1947 to 1978 in which India is brought in only occasionally. To be more precise, it is the author's M. Phil thesis on "Pakistan-Nepal Relations" submitted to the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1972, which he has retained *verbatim*, only adding two chapters on Pakistan-Nepal relations from 1972-78 and Nepal-Bangladesh relations from 1972-78. Even the wordings of the first sentence of the introduction of this earlier M.Phil dissertation have been retained in the published work. His justification for that is that the concluding observations which he had made in his M.Phil dissertation had not been disturbed "because some of the predictions about the future scenario in South Asia have been found to be correct in the alignments and re-alignments in the region." This is much too tall a claim. To say that the intra-regional relations between the countries of South Asia during 1972-78 were merely a continuation of the relations between Nepal and Pakistan before 1971 would mean ignoring the sea-change that took place within these countries, on the one side, and in the international system, on the other, deeply affecting these relations during the period.

Vedik has devoted separate chapters to the study of India's policy towards neighbouring countries, Southeast Asia, West Asia, Super Powers, non-alignment, China, nuclear policy, etc. Using *cliches*, he describes the Janata Government's foreign policy towards the neighbouring countries as a kind of "sweet illusiveness," towards Southeast Asia as one of "indifference," towards West Asia as one of "too great a dependence," towards China as one of "complete surrender," and towards nuclear weapons as "double-faced." He has tried to support his description of these policies by facts and figures picked up from the time that the Janata Government was in power; his main thesis being that the claim of "continuity and change" in the country's foreign policy made by Atal Behari Vajpayee was correct only in the sense that it indicated "continuity" with the policies pursued by the Congress governments earlier but that it was wrong so far as any basic "change" was concerned.

The competition with Pakistan, according to him, continued, with the result that Pakistan tried to make the atom bomb secretly, purchased larger and more powerful weapons from the United States, raised the Kashmir question in several Islamic Conferences and entered into an agreement with China for the construction of the Karakoram road. While Pakistan was bent on strengthening itself against India, the latter was so deeply absorbed in its attitude of faith in Pakistan that it did its best to secure the latter's admission in the group of non-aligned countries. In the case of Nepal,

Vedik thinks that India's policy was that of aligning itself with the King of Nepal rather than with its own national interests, with the result that Nepal was able to pursue a policy which was not quite in tune with that of India—and illustrates it by the fact of Nepal declaring itself as a zone of peace. The Janata Government's policy towards Bangladesh has been described by the writer as one of "sterile liberalism," towards Sri Lanka as one in which "fears and misunderstandings continued," towards Bhutan as one of "exclusiveness," towards Burma as one of "ineffectiveness," towards Afghanistan as one of complete "loss of balance" and towards Iran as one of "short-sightedness."

Vedik has discussed in details Indo-Soviet and Indo-U.S. relations. While making some "genuine" effort to steer the policy of non-alignment on "correct" lines in the earlier months, the Janata Government started swearing by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1979 within four or five months of its coming to power. Prime Minister Desai, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Foreign Minister Vajpayee all went to Moscow and discussed with Russian leaders the question of developing co-operation in the field of defence. While the American Government welcomed the installation of the Janata Government at Delhi and talks took place a number of times between Vajpayee and Cyrus Vance, the differences between the two governments continued to remain. Vedik is particularly critical of India's China policy as verging towards "complete surrender." The failure of India's policy towards China became clear when China attacked Vietnam during the period when Vajpayee was on a visit to Beijing. Vajpayee had been a strong critic of Nehru's policy with regard to Tibet, but during his foreign ministership, he never did anything to raise the question of Tibet with China.

To put it briefly, Vedik has examined India's foreign policy during the Janata Government term from a particular viewpoint, which he has made clear in Chapter IX, where he has tried to work out an alternative foreign policy. The attempt, however, is subjective rather than one based on the contemporary political scene nationally and internationally. Vedik thinks that non-alignment, whether "genuine" or "fake", is not enough for a country. It has a very limited field of action. It does not envisage the concept of carrying on any activity outside the Super Power politics, with the result that it continues to react to the foreign policies of the Super Powers and is not able to take any initiative. He thinks that non-alignment has no roots in the country's national interests; it is quite another thing that it might be able to secure national interests on occasions. He compares India's policy of non-alignment to a male peacock's dance. The peacock has weak and dirty feet, but it spreads its beautiful wings and dances—in sheer showmanship. In short, Vedik has failed to understand the genesis of India's policy of non-alignment. Belonging to a generation for which Nehru is a figure fading out into past history, he is critical of Nehru's policy as one of trying to build moral power and ruling out the necessity of military power. This is certainly a very short-sighted view of Nehru's foreign policy which could be regarded

as extremely successful in securing India's national interests between 1947 and 1957.

A brief chapter on "Cultural Foreign Policy"—a refreshing contrast to the routine discussions of foreign policies—expresses the writer's deep concern with the lack of a cultural approach in India's foreign policy as a whole, including the foreign policy of the Janata Government, even though it was steered by Vajpayee who was the first person to raise his voice in favour of India's developing cultural relations with other countries. He is correct in saying that India's External Affairs Ministry has limitations in its understanding of the actual situation in the non-English-speaking countries, since the information it receives about them is sifted through English newspapers. This leads to its inability to fully grasp the foreign policies of three-fourths of the countries of the world which are not English-speaking. He illustrates it by such facts as our inability to anticipate the revolution in Peru in 1968, which led Indira Gandhi to cancel her Latin American tour in the middle, our inability to understand how weak Daud's hold was in Kabul, with the result that while we received him with great grandeur in India in March 1978, he was forced to give up power in April. Vajpayee had to cut short his visit to China because he had no idea that China's attack on Vietnam was imminent and could have been anticipated only on the basis of a deep study of Chinese literature. Iran was our close neighbour, but even after an intensive public agitation lasting for a year we had no idea that Khomeini would come to power. He is also correct in thinking that we can establish better relations with the Third World countries only if our foreign policy is not restricted to our study of world affairs through English newspapers published largely in the United States and Britain.

One might come to the conclusion that while Vedik's foreign policy analysis, directly of the Janata Party and indirectly of the previous Congress governments, is basically correct, he has been somewhat hasty and rash—guided, one might say, by a journalistic fervour—in drawing his conclusions. He takes pride in the fact that he has examined India's foreign policy from Kautilya's, or for that matter Morgenthau's, so-called "realistic" point of view which, after all, has a limited validity in the contemporary world situation (even though Morgenthau jumped in his chair in an international seminar held at Jaipur in 1966 when someone compared him to Kautilya and said, 'I was waiting for someone in India to make that remark').

As regards P.K. Mishra's book, one may not challenge the commonly held view, which he has adopted, namely, that the relations of Pakistan and Nepal in the pre-1971 period and those of Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh in the post-1971 period had been governed by an obsession with India, but to say that there was absolutely no other strand in the foreign policies of these countries, or that the foreign policies of these countries were absolutely limited to their relations with India would hardly be a tenable thesis. Pakistan's efforts in the early years to build close ties with the Islamic world, however futile those efforts might have been, were, based on the conception of

Pakistan's leaders that they had a special role to play in the Islamic world—envisioned by the poet Iqbal—and not so much on the fact that they wanted to use solidarity with the Islamic world as a defensive weapon against India. Pakistan's relations with USA, USSR and China also, though *partly* due to what the author describes as its "obsession" with India, cannot be *wholly* attributed to this factor. Nepal, in its efforts to seek closer ties with Communist China was not merely thinking of balancing its relations with India but also of building for itself an individualistic existence in the international system—the one craved by every nation-state, however small it may be in size. The same would apply to the foreign policy of Bangladesh during its post-independence period. Bangladesh, like Pakistan and Nepal, suffers from an obsession of India but that alone cannot explain the entire gamut of Bangladesh's relationship with the other countries of the region like Pakistan and Nepal. India being the dominant power does influence the foreign policy-thinking of its smaller neighbours but that cannot be taken as a complete analysis of the foreign policies of these countries.

The claim that India has been included in the book as a factor too is misleading because the book has been written completely from the points of view of Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh and the changes in India's policies towards these countries under the pressure of domestic political forces or the international system have not been discussed with any thoroughness. It might, therefore, have been better if the author had retained the title of his M. Phil dissertation "Pakistan-Nepal Relations" for this book. One also notes that the book is journalistic rather than scholarly. The dissertation as well as the two chapters in the postscript are based, more or less, on newspaper articles and reports and the author has not cared to distinguish between the views of a newspaper in the editorial columns, or of writers in their articles, from the views of governments. The book certainly gives a detailed account, in a strictly chronological order, of the intra-regional relations between Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, and as such would be useful to anyone who wishes to have a broad look at these relations, but the writer has nowhere tried to analyze these relations in depth or given his considered views on where these relations went wrong or what could be done to put them on the right path.

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ESCOTT REID: *Envoy to Nehru*. Oxford University Press, 1981, x, 301 p.
Rs. 100.

THE author of this work served in India during 1952-1957 as High Commissioner for Canada and has since visited the country three times. His last visit during 1978-79 extended over several months and was devoted

wholly to research and to a review and re-examination of his earlier assumptions and conclusions. During his tenure he was widely regarded as a keen and well-informed student of India's problems who took interest in many aspects of our national life and was in tune with Indian aspirations and attitudes towards democracy, development and peace. In preparing his book, Escott Reid has had the advantage of drawing on official documents, including correspondence and his own reports to his government and specially to such outstanding persons as Mr. Pearson and Mr. St. Laurent who held office at the time respectively as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Canada. Then, as now, the author's choice of words was careful and his analysis penetrating and, whether one might agree or disagree with him on a particular point, there is no question that his writing derives its quality from conviction and concern.

The central theme of the book is the "special relationship" between India and Canada which seemed to be blossoming in the early fifties and how, through events not wholly within the control of either country, this relationship came to be gradually "eroded" until the two countries were drawn far apart from each other.

Several circumstances had strengthened understanding between India and Canada: many shared attitudes on world affairs, mutual respect and consideration among the leaders of the two countries, membership of the Commonwealth, a measure of detachment on the part of Canada from extreme views which tended to gain sway from time to time in the United States, co-operation in relation to the armistice in Korea and, for a period, common service on the International Control Commission in Vietnam. Gradually, the "special relationship" weakened under the shadow of American arms for Pakistan, differences of outlook on Kashmir, Canadian reservations on Indo-Soviet co-operation, marked differences on Hungary and in lesser degree, on Suez and, above all, clearly different perceptions in relation to many of the international policies of the United States. More recently, the nuclear explosion in India in 1974 added to the distance. If India was too far, Canada was perhaps too near, to take a sufficiently dispassionate view of the dominant foreign policy urges of the United States.

There is room here for two passing thoughts. First, outstanding individuals may sometimes serve as bridges and sometimes widen the gap that separates nations. In either case, in retrospect, as one tries to understand the deeper forces at work, their role turns out to be smaller than had appeared either to themselves or to their contemporaries. Secondly, one may ask whether, in the absence of close and continuing links across the board (as in arrangements for regional co-operation based on mutual need), "special relationships" between sovereign nations, which are far removed from one another and inevitably respond to different impulses, challenges and opportunities, are not themselves products of circumstances which cannot but change over the years.

The author has presented his own point of view in a degree of detail which

adds to our insights in the period, but he would be the last to suggest that he has made a complete or final evaluation and that there may not be a number of other considerations which must be put side by side with those he has advanced before we can come to a just view either of the policies or of the attitudes expressed directly or by Krishna Menon and others on behalf of Jawaharlal Nehru. Here, we must note a limitation. None of the leading officials on the Indian side, who are still with us and with whom the author had his main contacts, will either be able to draw on the kind of official materials that he has had at his disposal or have the inclination to enter into minute rebuttals on numerous matters touched upon in the book. Therefore, it is fair to say that while the book is a significant commentary on the period covered, nevertheless, it remains a partial account. On important issues of international policy, many a decision is taken by statesmen on incomplete information and on the surmises and judgements of the day. To get at the whole truth we have to be willing to wait longer for historians to fathom deeply and question one another at some length. Yet, Escott Reid's account of his period in India should suggest to Indian scholars several issues which they too have a duty to examine and re-examine more thoroughly than they have yet attempted to do. On many vital aspects of post-independence history, Indian scholars can no longer afford to be content with expository studies.

Several reviews of Reid's book published in India have focused less on his main theme and more on his pen portraits of Krishna Menon, Panikkar and some others. These are interesting and well-written but, necessarily, those who have known the various individuals personally would have something to add and also something to subtract. Nevertheless, it is useful to learn how they appeared to an observer who listened intently and could sketch their expressions in his mind's eye.

The author's very genuine interest in the economic and social well-being and progress of India is apparent from the Epilogue of the book under the title "Reconsideration." He makes pertinent observations on a variety of general topics: poverty, population and production, social advance, administration, domestic politics, comparison between India and China, and future prospects. One does not have to agree with them in detail, for these are vast themes on which there is a great deal to say. Yet, Reid has done well to point to several problems like land reform, the rural poor, and the quality of administration, to which as a nation, we have not yet given adequate answers. This is not because the answers are beyond our capacity or the capacity of our social and political system, but because we have not been completely honest with ourselves and have not yet tried hard enough to turn *directions* of change into the *substance* of change in the lives of vast numbers among our fellow-citizens.

New Delhi

TARLOK SINGH

H.S. BHATIA: Portrait of a Political Murder. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1979, 176p., Rs. 35.

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO was one of the most colourful but complex personalities of the Third World during the past two decades. As a man as well as a statesman he remained a controversial figure. As a person, while he was suspicious, capricious, intolerant, arrogant, temperamental, indulgent, vindictive and unpredictable, he possessed several qualities which elevated him to the highest offices in Pakistan. Bhutto was a highly ambitious, intelligent, diligent and determined person possessing a wonderful knack of public speaking which enabled him to become a man of the masses. As a politician, if he has been branded as a ruthless dictator who ruined the country, caused the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and brought the remaining half to the brink of disaster, then there would also not be few who would acclaim him as the saviour of a broken and demoralised country who, inspite of coming from a rich aristocratic land-owning family, was inspired by socialist ideals and determined against all odds to create a modern industrial society. By his astute diplomacy and statesmanship Bhutto helped Pakistan and himself in securing a respectable position in the Third World, especially among the Islamic countries.

As Bhutto's whole political career so also the manner in which he met his end, has been highly controversial. His deposition in July 1977, his trial in the Lahore High Court on charges of having ordered a political murder, his appeal to the Supreme Court against the conviction, the petition to the Supreme Court for a review of his appeal and, finally, his execution in April 1979 have been hotly debated issues. Thereafter, there was understandably a furious spurt of literature on Bhutto. One category of such publications is biographical (which includes Bhutto's autobiographical statements—*If I am Assassinated*—) and the other is where attention is focused on Bhutto's trial and execution—*Bhutto's Trial and Execution* by J.C. Batra, *Bhutto Trial and Execution* by Victoria Schofield, and the present book.

Bhatia has chosen the judicial proceedings starting with Bhutto's trial in the Lahore High Court and ending with his hanging as the main theme of this book. The first six chapters however, form an introduction wherein the author has attempted, albeit through quotations, from Piloo Mody's *Zulfi—My Friend* and Bhutto's own writings, including *If I am Assassinated*, to present a portrait of Bhutto as a man and a politician.

Bhatia has rightly asserted that "for the first time in the history of Pakistan," Bhutto "made the visible support of the people a source of legitimate power." (p. 12) Bhutto, in the first three years of assuming power in December 1971, "did a job of mass healing which has few parallels. A country which could have died of the shock of amputation became a whole person once more." (p. 12) Highlighting the other side of Bhutto's contradictory personality, the author correctly remarks that the late Pak Premier used the coercive authority of the State "to silence and suppress the dissenting opinions of

people." (p. 40) "Apart from murder, the machinery of government and the instruments of State power were used extensively for the abduction, arbitrary detention and wrongful confinement of refractory political dissidents." (p. 40) But this otherwise interesting portion of Bhatia's book is marred by several inaccuracies which reduce its value. The date "December 77" (p. 10), when the PPP is claimed to have done well in elections in West Punjab and the Sind Provinces is, obviously, a serious printing error. Further, one fails to comprehend how *Zulfi—My Friend* can be called Piloo Mody's "autobiography." (p. 10) Referring to the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the statement that "General J.S. Aurora captured General Tikka Khan in Bangladesh with two million soldiers in a single sweeping attack," (p. 23) is patently inaccurate. But, then, it can be said in defence of the author that these chapters do not constitute the main part of the book.

The Bhutto case, even before it was finally disposed off, had aroused keen interest and lively controversy because the principal accused happened to be the top executive of his country not long before, and because of the motives, real as against the professed ones, for putting Bhutto in the dock. It has been said that once Gen Zia-ul-Haq ousted Bhutto from power, the General had no options left. It was either his neck or Bhutto's. Some, including Bhutto himself, saw the hands of CIA behind all this, while those in authority took refuge in the sanctity of the "rule of law." Analysts have however pointed out more deep-rooted socio-economic and personal factors which, in their views, made Bhutto's sudden fall inevitable.

From a purely juristic angle, too, the legality, justness, propriety and fairness of Bhutto's trial has been questioned to the extent that the whole process is dubbed by many to be a "judicial murder." The manner in which the case was proceeded with through various stages really does give the appearance of a suspect or unfair trial. Why was it necessary that the Bhutto Case should have been tried in the Lahore High Court by a particular bench against whom Bhutto and his counsels had strongly levelled the charge of bias and prejudice against the principal accused? The hearing of the prosecution case in the open and that of the defence in camera was *prima facie* unfair though it could have been justified on extra-judicial considerations. The Bhutto trial was clearly in violation of the maxim—Justice should not only be done but it should also appear to have been done.

Then, the whole prosecution case was based on principally hearsay and circumstantial evidence. The principal accused, Bhutto, was at best the prime abettor. He neither committed the murder nor was he actually present at the site of the occurrence. The person who died as a result of the conspiracy was not the targeted man. Is it always necessary for a convict to specifically pray for commutation of his sentence while proffering an appeal? Should not an appellate court, of its own, take into account the question of reduction of punishment on the basis of attenuating circumstances, if any?

These and several other points cast doubt, if not on the technical legality of the trial and judgment, then of their propriety and justness at least. But a

reader vainly looks for illumination on these vital issues in the presentation of the Bhutto case in the book under review. The author has reproduced extracts from judgments of the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court without caring to make interpretative or analytical comments. The net result is that while it fails to satisfy the requirements of men in the legal profession, it remains largely incomprehensible to a layman because of its legal terminological verbiage.

The central figure in the book is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But the title of the book is *Portrait of a Political Murder*; the political murder which had been the cause of action was of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan, father of Ahmad Raza Kasuri. In that sense, centrality of Bhutto in the theme and the title are not connected with one another unless we believe that the author means Bhutto's execution to be taken as "a political murder" which, obviously, does not seem to be his intention. A misleading and confusing title would not have however mattered much had the contents of the book been otherwise substantial and useful. Nevertheless, the book under review, may prove helpful to those who want to have some idea about the developments which led to the execution of Bhutto.

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ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN: *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global*. Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, 295p., Price not mentioned.

RUBINSTEIN is among the most eminent of the vast army of American Kremlinologists, with a prodigious academic output on various facets of Soviet foreign policy, both at micro and macro levels. A new book by him qualifies immediate academic attention. His latest book, under review, bears the characteristic stamp of his erudition, scholarship and painstaking research with a mastery over facts in a terrain of over two decades' familiarity.

The book is "intended to provide a concise, comprehensive account of the evolution, aims and impact of Soviet foreign policy, primarily in the period since 1945; and to establish a foundation for in-depth exploration of the rich specialised literature that has been published over the past generation.... The approach is eclectic, historical, policy-oriented and analytical. It focusses on the USSR's actual behaviour and on the external consequence of its policies, and not on the possible motivations and decisional inputs that produced the behaviour. It pleads no theory, no fashionable model...." Rubinstein defends his methodology and deliberate absence of a theoretical framework: "...inevitably interpretative evaluations have been made, where

it is not feasible to examine in detail the domestic determinants of policy and all possible options available to Soviet leaders at any crucial period. No doubt policy differences and conflicting perceptions of unfolding situations exist; yet once a policy is adopted, it acquires a life of its own and is the proper unit for examination...."

Some of Rubinstein's generalisations emerging from the study—which also form the basis of the author's projections of Soviet behaviour in the eighties—though logically viable, appear somewhat trite; an unavoidable limitation of the application of behavioural methodology to the realm of policy sciences. "Sterile empiricism"—as some uncharitable critics might overstate their scepticism of the explanatory, and hence prescriptive, potentials of this methodology. For example, when Rubinstein asserts that "...Russian nationalism is egocentric, exclusivist, intolerant" (p. 285), he is at best describing the typical characteristics of all nationalism, Russian or otherwise. Similarly, the author's assertion that "the Soviet leadership believes in the utility of force as a means of preserving or promoting strategic interests," or, "the Kremlin is not embarrassed by its power" and "Soviet leaders respect power and correlate power with diplomatic moves; they disdain weakness or equivocation. They are not captivated by appeals to friendship and humanitarian ideals. What motivates Moscow is a restless search for strategic advantages;" such characteristics have more general validity than what Rubinstein implies by imputing them exclusively to the Soviet leadership. A whole school of Western scholarship—from Clauswitz to Morgenthau—is based on this general assumption.

But unlike many other western scholars who implicitly or explicitly accept the "convergence" theory—whether a Bell with his *End of Ideology* or Galbraith with his *Post-Industrial State*—Rubinstein concedes that "the Soviets have a different set of values which feeds the all-pervasive political and strategic rivalry." If so, one would have expected the author to pursue his characteristically competent empirical investigations of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of the "set of values" emerging from its socialist ideology; or by a more direct approach to the evolution of the ideological perspective in the context of Soviet *realpolitik* than what the author has opted for by his implicit, but tangential, approach to the problem. If foreign policy, as Rubinstein rightly asserts, "is a function of domestic politics," Soviet Socialist ideology has an important bearing on its foreign policy. In any case, "Socialist" domestic politics has more dimensions to it than merely grappling with the problem of shortages in consumer-durables or even of food, high technology and energy sources, notwithstanding their undoubted importance; and, foreign policy of a socialist state is shaped by more important factors than merely the subjective perceptions of the policy-makers (*a-la* "Decision-Making Theorists") and their court intrigues, or their age-group and educational qualifications. This is hardly true even of the non-socialist countries. Besides, since the author concedes that "...ideologically derived perceptions shaped the behaviour of Western leaders to a greater extent than they

did Soviet policy," his empirical researches would perhaps have enabled more meaningful conclusions if they were conducted within the overall theoretical perspective of their divergent ideologies. This may have thrown more light on his "facts", and depth to his conclusions, particularly with regard to the chapter on "Soviet-American Relations," in a way that would have been different from the conventional Cold War historiography on the subject. In which case, he may have persuaded himself to reconsider repeating such terms as the "Brezhnev oligarchy" or "Soviet imperial system in East Europe" (p. 283), to his own academic advantage. Such avoidable legacies of Western Cold War historiography, which have crept into Rubinstein's undoubted scholarship—perhaps unwittingly—are a pointer to the limitations of his empirical approach based on the "rich specialised literature published over the last generation." This point is made here only to underscore that even the best products reveal the limitations of a purely empirical approach; and the validity of a methodology has to be judged from among its best specimens, like the present volume.

The author approvingly cites the "fallacies" of Western scholarship (p. 286), on the Soviet Union as enumerated by Raymond A. Garthoff: "When in doubt assume the worst;" "never assume intentions, only capabilities;" "assume that Soviets always (or never) have the same perception and aims as their Western counterparts;" "assume that they never (or always) mean what they say;" "consider Soviet capabilities to be larger than are needed—or than they believe are needed—for deterrence;" "assert a Soviet intention to seek military superiority;" "believe that the 'facts' speak for themselves ignoring selection and definition of data." While Rubinstein refreshingly avoids most of these stereotype "conceptual traps" of western scholarship on the Soviet Union, he willingly renounces an explicit theoretical framework by opting for an approach where "facts" "speak for themselves;" he even makes a virtue of this, which is not entirely convincing. In the process, his scholarship is vindicated, but not his methodology.

Some of the author's most perceptive comments relate to his search for the roots of Soviet behaviour, in a hostile world, beset with a sense of insecurity; such comments have enduring relevance. He dismisses the Bolshevik commitment to peace—which they "neither desired nor dared to break"—as part of "demonstrative diplomacy" without making any moral judgement on the relative merits of the commitment to "peace" and to "global military containment." Do these two commitments reflect the social milieu of their respective "set of values", shaped by their varying political economy?

Since "the Bolsheviks had to face up to the realities of an international system of which they were inextricably a part," the Brest-Litovsk crisis, according to the author, convinced Lenin that "a revolutionary outlook was not incompatible with *realpolitik*." Out of this crisis emerged the main contours of Soviet foreign policy: a strong Red Army to resist foreign aggression and the inevitable attempt of the capitalist world to undermine its security; and to view the success of the Soviet revolution and the advancement

of world revolution in a dialectical relationship. According to Rubinstein, "this dualism—the furthering of revolution abroad and the quest for national security—has remained a salient feature of Soviet foreign policy." Rubinstein provides sound reasons for the Soviet assumption of capitalist hostility. Allied "interventionist adventure" (1918) ; Churchill's call to "strangle the infant Bolshevism in its cradle;" the forged (by British intelligence), Zinoviev Letter (1924) leading to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain; American withdrawal from the League of Nations despite Soviet commitment to collective security; unsuccessful Soviet attempts to invoke collective sanction to resist aggression in Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia; "suspicion of Moscow running (sic) too deep in the West;" "Stalin watched Hitler's success, the West's surrender, and the Soviet Union's growing isolation," till his hopes disappeared after Munich; "twice within a generation Soviet leaders were engaged in a struggle for survival."

"Lenin sought to strengthen the Soviet state and safeguard it from a feared coalition of capitalist Powers bent on its overthrow. In the diplomatic field, the end of isolation was a key objective. This was accomplished first in Europe, then in Asia." "For Soviet leaders... there has always been a discernible relationship between security in Europe and security in Asia. Fear of attack from both directions had been a Soviet nightmare ever since the Allied intervention of 1918-1919." Even after the Second World War, the Soviet Union continues to be haunted by this knowing sense of insecurity, made worse by the American nuclear monopoly, the ending of the Lend-Lease Agreement, refusal of soft loans for post-war reconstruction, continued American presence in Europe, Churchill's Fulton speech, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the officially-inspired domestic cult of "anti-communism" in the United States in the form of "McCarthyism."

The "roots of Cold War," according to Rubinstein, lay in the "fundamental conflict between incompatible conceptions of security, and in the worst-case assessments that each side made of the other's moves and intentions." This surely was the consequence; the cause being the more fundamental conflict between the two ideologies; which makes it more imperative to study their foreign policies within the respective ideological framework, without which, like all researches based on behavioural approach one can describe, perhaps interpret, but never explain. The validity of the historical approach lies in answering the "whys" as much as the "whats"; which is where the behavioural methodology remains short of the requirements of policy sciences.

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HERBERT PASSIN, *Ed.*: *A Season of Voting: The Japanese Elections of 1976 and 1977*. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1979, 199p.

THE continuance of conservative rule in Japan since World War II, except for a brief one year Socialist-Conservative Coalition rule in 1947-48, and since 1955, the one party rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, might present a very unexciting and uninteresting picture of the Japanese political scene. The people's mandate for conservative rule might also seem to give evidence of the innate "conservatism" of the Japanese people. Why does the dynamism of the Japanese people and their penchant for change not get reflected in their political behaviour? There is no dearth of reports about the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people on the inability of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to solve the various problems brought about by a policy of rapid economic development. The indignation of the people about the "structural corruption" in the ruling party is also expressed in various ways. Yet, these do not get reflected in election results. Why is it so? A deeper study of the elections reveals the gradual changes in the people's attitudes, the realignment of various political forces and also gives an insight into the working of the Japanese political system. Herbert Passin and his associates have undertaken this task of presenting the underlying complex pattern of the Japanese political system, which is not visible through a glance of the neat figures of seats and percentages of votes gained by the political parties. The study is limited to an analysis of two national elections, namely, that of the House of Representatives of 1976 and that of the House of Councillors of 1977. However, the analysis based on the classification of the electoral districts by the degree of urbanization or through a five-point classification based upon the percentage of the labour force engaged in the primary industrial sector brings out clearly the effect of rapid industrialisation on the electoral behaviour of the Japanese people. The conclusions are based on a wealth of statistics which makes this a good source book. An index to the tables in the book would have been helpful.

The operation of "money politics" in Japan, which intrigues any student of the Japanese political scene is discussed in a separate chapter. However, it is limited to the ways of funding parties and the legislations in this regard. A discussion of the various methods adopted for utilisation of the money to enhance the influence and support of individual political leaders, as well as the power which this gives to a faction leader, would have given more interesting insights into the working of Japanese politics.

In the introduction, Passin points out that the October 1979 Election results were found to be entirely consistent with the general directions in the book. Although it was not possible for Passin to have foreseen the fall of the LDP Cabinet through a no-confidence resolution in the Diet a few months after the formation of a new government, the intensity of the factional struggle within the LDP and the inability to achieve a consensus revealed in the

nomination of two candidates by the ruling party as Prime Minister, merited some discussion. The double elections held in June 1980 both for the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors reveal that the Japanese voted back the Liberal Democratic Party with absolute majority in the interests of political stability. The hope that the 1980s would bring in an era of a coalition government formed by the LPD has not materialized. The present international situation seems to have given a sense of crisis to the Japanese people and they have shown their reluctance to try out a new experiment of a coalition government.

As pointed out by Passin, the lack of sensation and drama through the absence of radical changes, should not lull us into a state of disinterest about the Japanese political scene. In fact, a continuous analysis of the Japanese political system is necessary to keep us abreast of the underlying changes, so that we would be prepared for the cumulative effect they would have on the policies of Japan. From this point of view, the book is a valuable addition to the library of those who are doing research on Japan. A suitable bibliography of Japanese language sources could have been included. The lucid style of the book would also appeal to any general reader interested in Japanese politics.

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SAVITRI VISHWANATHAN

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN INDIA

Profiles of Social Change

BIMAL GHOSH: *Profiles of Social Change*. Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, viii, 198 p., Rs. 75.

THE Second Development Decade of the United Nations was not far advanced when the oil-producing countries made their unexpected and seemingly irresistible attack on the West. The crisis was given a constructive turn through the combined efforts of the less developed countries and the more far-sighted among the developed when the United Nations Assembly made its declaration at the end of 1973 for a New International Economic Order. The series of international conferences which followed—on employment, on food, on population, and others—created a mood of hope and optimism that a new era was possible and the world community was developing the earnestness needed to achieve it. The essays which Bimal Ghosh has brought together in *Profiles of Social Change* have been prepared against this world view and the author's own deep conviction that the future for the rich and the poor alike can only be secured by co-operation between the more

and the less developed nations and social change within nations, especially the poorer nations.

The book consists of sixteen essays covering a wide range of subjects. A few of them derive from the primary concerns over many years of the ILO, with which the author has been long associated, such as those in humanisation of work and occupational and other hazards associated with modern technology, workers' participation in industry, management and education. These advance sound propositions which will bear cogent restatement. However, the more significant parts of the book centre on the issue of international equity, the problems of poverty in Asia and specially in India, and the place of basic needs in national and international development strategy. On these questions, the author stays close to the accepted line of the agencies of the United Nations. He builds his main argument around the notion of interdependence between rich and poor countries based on the need of the rich for ever larger markets and of the poor for better flows of resources and technology. The case for greater justice and assurance of basic needs within countries is founded on the same essential considerations as are urged by the less developed countries in relation to the more developed. The author drives home both aspects of the case with equal conviction and consistency. There are, however, some difficult questions which might have been pursued, or whose solutions cannot be taken for granted.

At the international level, partly because of inflation and oil and continued unemployment, nations endowed with resources and technology, the more developed countries seem now to have little heart in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor and in preparing for a more equal world. Therefore, they stop short at polite gestures and go on raising procedural difficulties, while the distance between word and action even tends to increase. Ghosh's essays do not discuss the implications of this harsh reality of the present-day world. But, within the poorer countries also, through the seventies, the political will to bring about fundamental changes has weakened compared to the sixties and the earlier years of freedom. The author is conscious of this and clear enough about what needs to be done. Yet, perhaps as an international civil servant, he has felt constrained to speak lightly of our own self-created impediments to rapid economic and social changes. For this reason, his pleas for assuring basic needs, full employment and manpower utilization, and organization of the poor, do not gain the force inherently due to them as an integral part of a well-conceived national development strategy. Nevertheless, both at the national and international level, the book offers perceptive approaches presented in the spirit of world citizenship alongside a genuine concern for Asian and Indian dilemmas, on which a great deal of new thought and action has become more urgent than ever.

New Delhi.

TARLOK SINGH

J.R. KAMBLE: *Rise and Awakening of Depressed Classes in India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xii, 327 p., Rs. 75.

THIS is the first comprehensive work in a historical perspective on a subject that has been a matter of concern for social scientists, public leaders and administrators in recent times. The author seeks to combine his skill as a historian and experience as an activist in this context. This is, indeed, a most difficult combination. However, in the treatment of the subject it is seen that it is the historian who scores over the activist.

The title of the book, however, is somewhat of a misnomer. If we look at the contents we find that it is about the rise in the consciousness of the Scheduled Castes in India. Depressed Classes, on the other hand, comprehend a much wider entity and include, besides Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the denotified communities and certain other very poor and backward castes which do not figure in the schedule. In addition to this, the term "class" assumes a possibility of upward or downward mobility. This is not true for the Scheduled Castes as such. Located at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, their position is more or less fixed and so long as they are within the bounds of the Hindu system there is no possibility of a change. Even if a particular group is no longer considered untouchable, the stigma remains and the social distance between that group and other castes continues. It is a pity that some present-day social scientists are still carrying on with the term initially used by some British administrators.

The author begins with the sad plight of the Untouchables under British rule. He deals thereafter with the impact of western ideas and the Indian renaissance movement in the 19th century, which subsumed both religious movement and the impact of social reform. In this connection, the author brings out the controversy between those thinkers who held social reform to be more important than the struggle for freedom. To Tilak, it was the political injustice of foreign domination that had to be tackled first while to Agarkar, the primary task was to break the chains of social injustice and tyranny. However, in other parts of India, particularly among the radical leaders at the time of the Congress split in 1907 this question of priority was not too important. Bipin Chandra Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai advocated social reforms along with radical politics.

It was under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, that the political entity of the Depressed Castes was first recognized and provision was made for their representation in the Central and Provincial legislatures through nomination. When the Simon Commission came, Dr. Ambedkar submitted a classical memorandum to it for safeguarding and protecting the Scheduled Castes. A number of other representations were also made on their behalf from different parts of India. At that time, Ambedkar demanded joint electorates with reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes; he rejected nomination as a method of representation. The discussions then ushered in a new awakening among the Scheduled Castes; it was believed that political power was

associated with the development of political consciousness. Ambedkar did not wish to perpetuate untouchability by conferring upon it a separate inferiority complex.

The Round Table Conference ushered in a bitter controversy between Mahatma Gandhi and Ambedkar on the issue of the representation of scheduled castes. Ambedkar's strong advocacy and valiant fight projected in bold relief in the conditions of the Untouchables in India. It was also made clear that no future Constitution of India could ignore the claims of the Untouchables. Among the Untouchables themselves, it led to the rise of political consciousness on an unprecedented scale. The basic difference between Gandhi and Ambedkar was that while to Gandhi freedom came first and the uplift of the Untouchables later, for Ambedkar, the emancipation of the Scheduled Castes came first and the freedom of the country next. The Communal Award announced in August 1932, provided for separate electorates for the Scheduled Castes. This came as a great shock to Mahatma Gandhi who undertook a fast unto death on this issue. Ultimately the Government had to relent and towards the end of September 1932, the Poona Pact was signed setting aside the Communal Award and separate electorates, instead, more seats were reserved for the Scheduled Castes. Although Ambedkar signed the Pact, he was not at all happy with it; from then on both the Congress through the Harijan Sevak Sangh and Ambedkar through the Scheduled Castes Federation carried on the movement for the advancement of the Scheduled Castes.

Ambedkar made it absolutely clear, that as between the country and himself, the country would have precedence, so also between the country and the Depressed Classes, the latter would have precedence. He did not view the problem of scheduled castes merely as a social problem; to him it was fundamentally a political problem of the minority versus the majority groups. When he became the Labour Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council in July 1942, he got the unique opportunity of organizing the Scheduled Castes all over the country. Year after year the Depressed Classes Conference was held bringing together large numbers of scheduled caste leaders and workers. He advised his followers to educate, agitate and organise; to him it was a battle for freedom for the reclamation of human personality. In all his statements, Ambedkar demanded separate electorates, since it was only through these that the Untouchable could elect true representatives of his community. However, the influence of Ambedkar was largely confined to Maharashtra and more particularly to the Mahar community to which he himself belonged. The result was that his party was badly defeated in the 1946 and in the 1952 Elections.

Mahatma Gandhi in his own way made a significant contribution to the awakening of Scheduled Castes in India and also to rousing the conscience of caste Hindus against the injustice done to the former. His tours all over the country brought out the inequities of the social system. Even without giving up the *Chatur Varna* system, he decried untouchability as

an excrescence of Hinduism. He completely identified himself with the oppressed. The great concern that he showed for the Scheduled Castes whom he gave a new name—"Harijan"—had a lasting impression upon the fathers of the Constitution. The conscience of the Hindu was challenged by leaders like Ambedkar who put the Untouchables on the political and social map of India while the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi weakened the defence of Hindu orthodoxy.

The author deals in some detail with the mass conversion of lakhs of scheduled caste people to Buddhism under the leadership of Ambedkar. However, recent studies have shown that Ambedkar's hopes were not fulfilled as the neo-Buddhists still meet the same treatment by society as before. The stigma of untouchability continues, self-respect has eroded and the community has to depend upon government aid as before.

The Constitution of India, of which Ambedkar was a founding father, provided a number of safeguards for the Scheduled Castes. Later untouchability was abolished and its practice made an offence. Enormous sums of money have been provided for their welfare. Reservations have been made for them in services, legislature and educational institutions. Although political democracy has been established in the country, social democracy is still a far cry. The Scheduled Castes have not emerged as a political force in India since they are divided into many national parties and they have not been able to come together on a single issue. The political party founded by Ambedkar is scourged by splits and has rapidly lost influence. The influence of the Dalit Panthers, a militant body of educated scheduled castes, is largely confined to the Maharashtra area.

The author is of the view that reservation in the legislatures made for the Scheduled Castes should be abolished as it perpetuates class divisions and promotes hatred between one community and the other. Reservations in legislatures on caste basis and democracy are untenable. The major task therefore is to help these people to raise their economic levels so that they would be able to stand on their own feet. However, the question has a psychological aspect too. The inferiority complex long ingrained in them has to be wiped out. Among the caste Hindus, at the same time, the prejudice against the Scheduled Castes must be systematically removed through special in-built methods in the educational system. The ultimate solution is in their merging with other poverty stricken people and organizing themselves on class lines rather than on caste. So long as they cling to caste for privileges they would never be able to muster courage and strength to counter exploitation and oppression.

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SACHCHIDANANDA

Y.C. SIMHADRI : *Ex-Criminal Tribes of India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xiv, 185p., Rs. 55.

THE Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 is one of the little known black acts of the British Indian Government. In a speech at Nellore in 1936, Nehru condemned this act as "out of consonance with all civilized principles of criminal justice and treatment of offenders." For the reason that certain communities had a somewhat high percentage of habitual criminals, the whole lot of them, irrespective of whether they were criminal or not were branded as criminals and subjected to the indignity of registering themselves with the police and reporting their movements to the latter. Not all the people so stigmatised were tribes. Some of them, such as the Kallars of Tamil Nadu, were middle level Hindu castes. The Rajah of Pudukkottai and several rich Zamindars of Southern Tamil Nadu belong to the Kallar caste.

The literature on the so-called criminal tribes of India is vast, but most of the writers were British police officers who generally were incapable of going beyond the law and order aspect of the problem and oblivious of the human angle. Perhaps under the conditions prevailing in the country in the mid-nineteenth century, steam-roller methods of dealing with hardened criminals reared in a sub-culture of crime was necessary to control their anti-social activities. Such groups as the Thugs were indeed a tough lot. When it was found that crime rates did not go down, the Criminal Tribes Act (C.T. Act) of 1871 was amended in 1897 and 1908. Under the Act of 1908, settlement of the criminals in colonies and their reclamation was begun. Indian public opinion was against the harshness of the C.T. Acts. The harshness of the Acts was made still worse by the corrupt police who were administering them and it was but natural that soon after independence, the C.T. Acts were all repealed and the stigma of general criminality removed forever from about 136 so-called criminal castes and tribes numbering over 4,000,000.

The book under review is misleadingly titled. It does not deal with the ex-criminal tribes of India as a whole, but only touches on them summarily in the first two chapters on the theoretical and historical perspectives. It is in fact only a study of one of the many ex-criminal tribes of India, namely the Yerukulas of Andhra Pradesh and that too, of a small number of them at a settlement in a village—Dharmapur (a pseudonym) in Andhra Pradesh. The interesting general problems of the cultures of crime and how crime became a way of life for groups among these people have been discussed briefly but unsystematically.

When we come to the remaining chapters of the book we find them to be of absorbing interest. In the first place it is difficult to gather data about crime from the criminals and their relatives and friends. The frankness with which they spoke about themselves to the researcher is a measure of his success and skill in establishing rapport with the people he studied. A word

of appreciation is due to him especially on this point. The reviewer knows from his own personal experience how close and refractory criminals usually can be in a researcher-subject situation.

The criminal tribe settlement studied here is one of the three such in Andhra Pradesh. It is the largest one of its kind and was set up exclusively for the Yerukulas in 1914 by the Salvation Army. The latter got employment for a good number of Yerukulas in the Indian Leaf Tobacco Depot. The number of Yerukulas settled here in 1914 was about 400. About 2023 acres of land was assigned to the settlement by the Government. The ownership of 883 acres was made over to the settlers in 1943, the rest remained in the possession of the Salvation Army but was tilled by the Yerukulas. (p. 70) The Salvation Army opened schools for the children of the Yerukulas, provided medical facilities and in conformity with their evangelising goals, converted most of the settlers to Christianity. After 1952 the Salvation Army is no longer responsible for law and order, but works as a social welfare agency.

The social structure and the demography of the Dharmapur village are discussed in Chapter IV. Among the usual compliment of castes, there were in this village four families of Yerukulas who, unlike the settler Yerukulas who were brought to the village in 1914, were free from any criminal taint and had basket-making as their chief occupation. Now the settlers numbering over 2000 are as prosperous as the Reddis of the village and they lead in literacy and in the high percentage of men with white-collar and blue-collar jobs. The settlers though Christians still maintain their identity as Yerukulas and in their interactions with the rest of the village behave as a caste, served by the washerman, barbers, Malas and Mādigas. Their transition from a tribe to a caste is explained in Chapter VI.

A reliable history of the Yerukulas is yet to be reconstructed. I have not come across any detailed study of the Yerukula language though it is vaguely said it resembles Tamil. We are not sure how long back in time their history of criminality can be traced. In southern Tamil Nadu they are known as Koravas, and in North Arcot they are known as Koracha. The name Yerukula has reference to their women's occupation of fortune-telling. According to some reports, the Yerukulas were engaged in carrying salt and rice from the plains to the interior. There were four sections of Yerukulas named: 1. Yeddu Yerukulas who used bullocks for transport of goods; 2. Gadida Yerukulas who used asses as pack animals; 3. Kothula Yerukulas who gained a living with performing monkeys and 4. Eata Yerukulas who made mats with palmyra and date leaves. They lost their occupation as carriers when road and rail transport was established. It is likely that they turned to crime when more honourable means of earning a livelihood went off their hands.

The life of crime must have been a hard choice for the Yerukulas and once the choice was made, it must have been even harder to give it up. Help to change and reform came late and that too in dribblets. In Chapter

VI, the author describes the types of crime and analyses changes that took place in recent years. It is a pity that both blue and white collar crimes persist among them. Modern politicization and the low level of morale of the local police contribute to the malaise of the situation. It is reassuring to know that non-criminal families in the settlement have done better than criminal families.

Though interesting in many ways, the book could have been made more readable if the presentation had been better organized and a little more attention paid to avoid crudities of language. Howlers such as "limbs of purushasukta" (p. 98), are avoidable.

Madras

A. AIYAPPAN

Studies in Rural Development

G. THIMMAIAH, *Ed.* : *Studies in Rural Development*. Chugh Publications, Allahabad, 1979, vii, 223p., Rs. 65.

IN a country like India where the rural population accounts for close to 80 per cent of the total population, rural development acquires special significance and urgency, especially when planning efforts over a quarter of a century have not changed this proportion. The theory of growth failed in this major respect. Development of rural areas was assumed to be linked with the development of the economy as a whole; concern was therefore shown for overall capital/output ratio, the investment/income ratio, profit/capital ratio and the like. Preoccupation with zero marginal productivity of labour, abundance of labour that could be transferred out of agriculture, once again focused attention on growth outside agriculture and hence outside rural areas. Raging scarcity of food coupled with "Libes-tenian type of food-related increasing returns" enlarged the focus of the economic theory to include food and hence growth of agriculture. But till then little was known about the behaviour of agriculture and much less was understood regarding responses of peasants to economic stimuli. This accounts for near neglect of direct attention, in theory of sectoral development. Input-output tables used for planning changed little the basic position in theory. The policy options were viewed in absence of specific guidance from the theory, in terms of institutional reforms. While the goal of such reforms directly was growth, their impact on income distribution was accepted as a useful by-product. The search for direct action to combat the malaise of unemployment and poverty was actively undertaken after the findings of "Poverty in India" became known. The subsequent policy measures like SFDA, MFAL and "Food for Work" reflect this concern. The book under review is to be viewed in the above background. The publication brings together empirical findings that relate to varied aspects,

mainly of agriculture. Behaviour of marketed (and marketable) surplus (M.V. Nadakarni), impact of irrigation (A.R. Rajpurohit, Mabel Koipillai and Abdul Azil), role of cropping pattern (M. Prahlad Char) and distributional effects of rural development strategies (G.P. Mishra), the last one dealing mainly with dairy industry, discuss in broader context the behavioural aspects of agriculture. They form Part I of the book, which is devoted to micro level studies. Part II, titled "Macro-Studies" is devoted to development issues. Of them "Dimensions of Rural Poverty in India" (H.G. Hanuappa), and "Employment Planning for the Rural Poor" (P. Hanumantha Rayappa and Deepak Grover) concern the measurement, "Some Reflections on Inter-area migration" (N.D. Kambale) deals with an emerging phenomenon, mainly analyzing the behavioural aspect.

Thus the bulk of the contributions to the book relate to behavioural analysis. These contributions though, valuable in themselves, belong to the periphery of the need to develop a theoretical construct dealing with rural development in the context of economic growth of a nation. The contributions of V.M. Rao and G. Thimmaiah however, are in a different category. They need to be considered individually. Contribution of social overheads (known alternatively as infrastructure, which overlaps in part with basic needs) to economic growth is well acknowledged. The theory allots a critical role to minimum level of a key input to propel the economy to growth. Rao pursues further that idea, without claiming its theoretical linkages. Couched in theoretical context, questions he raises would be : What is the key input in rural infrastructure? Where and in what form can it be injected? His search leads him to develop what he terms "primary groups" (of villages) which may vary in size and internal homogeneity. "Primary groups" have only a generic link with the "growth center" concept, borrowed from the discipline of geography. Rao goes beyond spatial location and imparts development content to the concept. Economic distance, rather than space, should be the target of development strategy, providing propelling power to the rural habitats. Rao puts it thus: "they (villages) share the common fate of being mere recipients of development, lacking initiative and weighed down by a sense of utter dependence and helplessness in relation to the wider world." Behind this descriptive statement is the strong economic logic, viz "minimum degree of inhabitability" (Rao's own expression), i.e. the economic force, that not only holds them together through famines and other calamities, but in the changed context of development, puts them on the path of growth (with equality). Whereas the force that helps them to survive can be identified on the basis of historic facts, the force that pushes them forward needs to be identified, with equal care but meagre facts. The known infrastructure of communication links, services etc, identified by Rao in Tumkur district is only a starting point. Whether we admit it or not, the development stimuli will not always be inside the "primary group." The efforts of an economy would be to develop links between the local initiative and vaster (outside) surges, so that no one

location with sufficient potentiality to grow is bypassed by the processes of growth. While individual effort to adapt and that of the community to evolve adaptive technology, have a role, the central effort to evolve a new technology common for use in a vaster area has a larger contribution to make to the process of growth. The concept and logic developed by Rao needs to be pursued. In a dynamic context many non-market decision-making processes and their institutional links will have to be accommodated within the model. Empirically, a powerful variable of inter-area migration in rural areas and away from it, will have to be studied to explore its behaviour. Migration would shift and reshape the infrastructural strategies.* G. Thimmaiah's views on the Gandhian approach to growth with decentralization, stress the complex situation of inter-dependence that inevitably arises consequent to economic development. The unequal resource-base would lead to unequal growth and unequal economic benefits. Rural-urban tiers, would make the latter non-development identity dependent for existence on the former if rural development through self reliance is aimed at. Both the views of the author are well taken, but they are partial. Gandhiji's views on mechanisation are known. Functioning of transactional economy (in a limited sense market economy) is not un-Gandhian. The stress on subsistence or self reliance by Gandhi was on basic needs, and was in the context of political and economic independence, what may be called in the present context, inner economic strength to have a stronger bargaining power. What Rao has in view for "primary groups" is in line with decentralisation, viz. local initiative, and not populist politics, to be a substitute of economic independence of initiative and achievement as a part of a bigger policy.

The publication has varied contributions with a common theme which makes it germane to the present phase of economic thinking. Its publication therefore is a welcome addition to the literature on rural development.

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C.H. SHAH

DAN A. CHEKKI, *Ed.*, : *Participatory Democracy in Action : International Profiles of Community Development*. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 306p., Rs. 125.

THIS is a collection of papers related to community development edited by Professor Dan A. Chekki of the University of Winnipeg. There

*Working on an allied theme, though viewed from the political angle, Guttman develops a theory, to explain the economics of providing public goods at micro-level. Joel M. Guttman, *Can Political Entrepreneurs Solve the Free-Rider Problem?* The Center for Agricultural Economic Research (Rehovot. Israel, 1980) Mimeo.

is an introductory chapter by Professor Chekki on Participatory Democracy in the context of community development, which gives an excellent overview of the various issues connected with participatory democracy and community development. This is followed by five sections in which papers have been grouped and presented. These sections are Planning and Development, Innovations and Mass Media, Self Help in Community Problem Solving, Towards Citizen Participation and Issues and Future Trends. The Epilogue consists of a paper by Chekki on Community Development and Social Research.

The context in which most of the contributors have written is that of advanced industrial countries of the West having small pockets of rural/tribal populations. Though the book purports to present, what the subtitle calls, International Profiles of Community Development, the experiences documented in the papers brought together in this volume relate almost entirely to the United States and Canada. There is one paper on Australia and another on India. It is clear that community development programmes are closely linked with socio-economic conditions, cultural ethos and the level of technological development of people. It is, therefore, unlikely that experiences of industrially advanced countries of the West can provide any guidance to those engaged in community development work in developing countries. These experiences can at best be of some academic interest. However, even from the academic points of view the articles are of limited significance, since they are descriptive rather than critical. There is little attempt to state the problems and difficulties encountered in the course of community development efforts and to evaluate their strength and limitations.

There seems to be an underlying assumption that community development and participatory democracy are one and the same thing. The paper on Community Development in India by Dr. K.D. Gangrade mentions the Panchayati Raj institutions set up for promoting community development. It is debatable if these institutions could be regarded as ushering in the era of participatory democracy in rural India. It is well-known that power in panchayats is vested in a few persons and the community, by and large, remains quite uninvolved in either planning or execution of schemes effecting its development and welfare. Dr. Gangrade's article makes no reference to "Gaon Sabhas" which could become focal points for the growth of participatory democracy but which have remained ineffective so far.

The book suffers from poor editing and contains many printing errors.

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M.P. PANDEY : The Impact of Irrigation on Rural Development : A Case Study. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, 191p., Rs. 40.

IRRIGATION has been practised in India from times immemorial. Since independence a number of projects have been taken up in different parts of the country. However, there are very few studies indicating their impact. The case study by M.P. Pandey, Registrar, A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna is, therefore, timely and useful.

The book contains a lot of data and analysis about the socio-economic conditions in six villages under the command of Kuil-Chandan-Badna Projects in Bihar. An indepth study has been carried out about the size of holdings, types of crops grown, yields, inputs of fertilizers, credit and various other data including agricultural labour, particularly landless labour. The book also analyzes the types of irrigation projects, their reliability and their shortcomings.

Of considerable interest to readers is the fact that inspite of the projects being executed by a government department, there is considerably faulty construction of distributaries and field channels. It also brings out that there are practically no extension services available to the farmers; institutional credit is almost absent.

The author has rightly laid great stress on the importance of the consolidation of holdings for greater efficiency. He has also drawn attention to the lack of communication and marketing facilities.

Another interesting fact got out in this book is that small and marginal farmers have proved as good, if not better, as the big land owners in yield rates, inspite of their obvious limitations of finance, input and other difficulties. It has highlighted that people remain more employed in irrigated villages than in unirrigated villages.

The book has also brought out the fact that land holdings of bigger farmers should be scaled down as the bigger farmers do not show interest in developing all their lands.

A good index plan of the three project areas would have made the book more interesting and useful. The selection of villages should have been done by the author and this would have led to a better appreciation of the true situation. But even as it is, the study is very detailed, systematic and analytical. The book should, therefore, prove of great interest and useful to all those associated with irrigation development.

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K.S.S. MURTHY

P.T. GEORGE and V.B.R.S. SOMASEKHARA RAO: Land Reforms, Production-Productivity : A Study in Andhra Pradesh. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, 82p., Rs. 12.

"LAND REFORM" is no longer considered so irrelevant to-day as it was in the mid-sixties. The limited success attained by the new agricultural production technology in bringing the entire cropped area within its fold and raising farm output and employment, has prompted many social scientists to renew their short, suppressed interest in land reforms in recent years. In fact, the unfinished task of accelerated agricultural growth is now thought to be hopefully completed with the help of progressive land reform measures that could step up agricultural productivity and prove to be a friend rather than foe of any agricultural development programme. This exploratory study of land reforms by George and Rao has excellently brought out this fact and made a pioneering effort to measure the impact of land reforms on farm production, productivity and employment quantitatively, although by using less sophisticated tools and techniques.

The study pertains to one of those areas (Miryalguda and Devarkonda blocks of Nalgonda district) in Andhra Pradesh, where a large number of tenants were conferred ownership rights and surplus land above ceiling (although of relatively inferior quality), was redistributed among small and marginal farmers. The farms were classified and studied in five groups, viz., (i) Large Farms Above Ceiling (LFAC); (ii) Large Farms Below Ceiling (LFBC); (iii) Farms of Tenants who were conferred ownership right under 38E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Labour Act (TCOR); (vi) Farms where tenants were cultivating on oral contract and not subject to Protection (TOOC) and (v) Small Farms arising from the distribution of land (SFDL). Since Miryalguda and Devarkonda represented wet and dry areas respectively, the authors could also compare the results obtained under two different types of agricultural situations. Furthermore, the authors have provided details about land ownership and operation, asset formation, credit utilization, cost and return in crop production, employment and productivity under each category of farms in both the zones.

In both wet and dry zones, the average size of holding was highest for LFAC, followed by LFBC, TCOR, TOOR and SFDL respectively. While TOOC had highest intensity of cropping in both the zones, the SFDL in dry zone and LFBC in wet zone were only next to TOOC in this respect. The high intensity of cropping for TOOC has been attributed to the fact that these farms were under pressure to exert more, so that they could pay the high rent to the landowners and that the land owners had a good say in influencing the cropping pattern on such farms. The small farms had relatively higher cropping intensity than the large farms above ceiling in both the zones. Similarly, the value of farm implements and machinery was found to be more in the case of TOOC as compared to TCOR and

SFDL in both the situations. This, however, looks absurd, as according to the economic theory of risk and uncertainty, protected tenants (TCOR) should have shown higher values than that of TOOC because of the relatively more stable position of the TCOR in the agricultural occupation. Besides, the authors have ignored giving any satisfactory explanation for such an unexpected result. It is also significant to note that TOOC had also to depend mainly on money lenders rather than on institutional sources for any borrowed capital and paid high interest charges. As far as investment on more durable items was concerned, the TCOR and SFDL gave a better account of themselves than the other categories. Considering all fixed and variable costs, in the dry land zone, the net returns per-hectare of area held and cropped were highest in the case of LFAC, followed by TCOR and TOOR, mainly because of higher profitability of extensive cultivation under un-irrigated conditions. In the wet land zone however, the net returns per hectare held and cropped were highest for large farms below ceiling. The TCOR had shown relatively higher net returns per hectare cropped than TOOC under both dry and wet conditions. Also, the TCOR farms had an edge over TOOC in terms of net returns per rupee invested in both wet and dry land zones and even SFDL reaped higher profit than LFAC under wet conditions. The productivity per labour manday was highest in TCOR farms in the wet land zone, followed by LFBC.

Thus, the study reveals that TCOR and SFDL farms which represent the main beneficiaries of tenancy reform and land distribution measures, performed better in many respects under both irrigated and unirrigated conditions, indicating thereby the positive effects of land reforms on agricultural production and productivity. However, since the study covered only a small area and the data collected and used were limited to a single year, the authors were careful enough not to draw any bold conclusions on the basis of the results obtained. On the whole, the study appears to be more informative than conclusive.

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B.C. MUTHAYYA, K. KRISNAMA NAIDU and M. ANEESUDDIN: *Behavioural Dimensions of Rural Leaders*. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, 72p., Rs. 20.

THE book under review is a study of psycho-social characteristics of elected leaders of Panchayats in relation to informal leaders and non-leaders in elected villages of two blocks each in two districts—Thanjavur and Ramanathapuram of Tamilnadu—the first selected for its intensive agriculture development programme, and the second for being an under-developed drought-prone district. The purpose is to understand the nature

and style of village leadership as a help in predicting their behaviour in the implementation of development programmes. The study covers a total of 275 respondents consisting of 112 elected leaders, 81 informal leaders and 82 non-leaders from eight villages and two town panchayats.

Chapter 3 of the book details the personal and socio-economic characteristics of these respondents while Chapter 4 describes their attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. Both chapters together contain 25 tables which give further quantitative details.

Since involvement of the people in various development programmes is the main method of rural development, an understanding of their (leaders') disposition and behaviour can be of great help to local planners in devising strategies in such areas of development in which securing people's participation is a must. Similar periodic studies of leaders in different socio-economic regions and at different levels can facilitate this task. This book can serve as a guide to teams undertaking such studies.

Institute for Village Planning,
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SATISH CHANDRA

ABDUL AZIZ: *Organizing Agricultural Labourers in India—A Proposal*.
Minerva Associates (Publications) Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1979, 72p., Rs. 30.

IN recent years, quite a few economic and sociological studies have emphasized the need for organizing agricultural labourers in India. While some of these studies are based on empirical investigation, Dr. Aziz, assuming that any organized effort generally improves the working conditions of agricultural labourers, has aimed mainly at identifying a suitable type of labour organization for rural India. According to him, since our social and political workers could effectively form agricultural labour organisations only in a few pockets of the country and since there may be a possible collusion between the bureaucrats and the landed gentry against trade union activities in general, there is need for Rural Labour Co-operatives (RLC) as an alternative. "These co-operatives are to put in a low key the trade union philosophy but are expected to serve more effectively the purpose that a conventional trade union might serve." Also because "our agricultural labourers are illiterate and lacking in class consciousness, the chief initiative for organizing such labour co-operatives should come from the state."

Aziz has long experience of working on various aspects of labour economics, but the present work seems to have been influenced more by his strong imagination than by practical knowledge. Knowing well that labour unions in Kerala have played a significant role in improving the working conditions of rural workers in the state, the author disapproves any further move for organizing agricultural labourers on trade union lines on the grounds that social

and political workers who could successfully establish agricultural labour unions are found inactive in states other than Kerala and that landed gentry and bureaucrats might indulge in acts of reprisals on the unionised workers. The author could as well have suggested to our social and political workers to become more active in other areas and thus avoided talking about the formation of labour co-operatives which in the absence of any binding thread like ideologically propelled class-consciousness on the part of the workers, would only be a poor substitute for trade unions. Besides, in the existing socio-political system of India and particularly when our labourers lack education and class-consciousness, the State represents at best the landed gentry and certainly not the agricultural labourers in rural areas. In such a situation, organization of labour co-operatives by the Government would only act against the interest of the labourers. Of course, if any government stands on the support of the rural labourers and organizes them along class or co-operative lines, such an association might work as efficiently as any other trade union. But in that case the difference between labour co-operatives and labour unions becomes more a matter of nomenclature than otherwise. Thus we may be left with the same product, although under a different label. Moreover, the author's contention that there may be a possible collusion between the bureaucrats and the vested interests against trade union activities may be true more in the case of labour co-operatives than labour unions. The author's assumption that RLC being a government patronised institution, "would take much of the wind out of the sails of the landlords and the bureaucrats," is highly unrealistic in as much as it overlooks the fact of intimate relationship between government bureaucracy and the landed gentry. No doubt the author likes the co-operatives not to be run by the government and once these are started by the government, labourers should take over charge. But in reality this would remain only a good piece of the author's imagination.

However, the chief merit of labour co-operatives, according to the author, is that it would "take up contracts of work from government and semi-government agencies to employ its members during lean seasons for wages. In the process, it is also expected to eliminate the private contractors. When its members have exhausted all avenues of employment and would be sitting idle, the co-operative is expected to create self-employment by engaging them in productive work, the product of which is to be sold later and proceeds distributed among the members who produced it." This is certainly a wise proposition and may help the labourers to solve the problems of unemployment in an organized manner. But before initiating any such new programme on a large scale, the Institute for Social and Economic Change, in which the author works, may select a local village or block and organize the agricultural labourers there as an operational unit for the purpose. If successful, it would have its spread effect elsewhere. However, leaving aside some of these points, the book is well written. Various problems that arise in the process of organizing agricultural labourers have been duly highlighted. Besides,

the bibliography contains a long list of books and papers on different problems of agricultural labourers in India.

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T. HAQUE

District Administration

S.S. KHERA: *District Administration in India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xx, 359p., Rs. 100.

COLONIAL rule in India was primarily interested in revenue collection; to achieve this basic goal the colonizer had created an administrative chain in which the District was the most important unit. The District Collector was the kingpin of colonial administration and the traditions developed in that phase have survived in spite of many transformations in post-independence India. In fact, the Collector's office has assumed many more functions after independence.

The author, Mr. Khera was a practitioner of administration, and he has ventured to reflect on the actual functioning of Indian administration in the framework of "continuity and change."

A book of nineteen chapters is divided into four parts—public administration, district administration, law and order, and revenue, economic and social administration. This second revised edition of Khera's earlier attempt is very exhaustive. His approach is descriptive as well as prescriptive. He provides details of the system, and makes suggestions to improve its functioning with a view to adaptation of the system to new demands. The author is a believer in the role of administrative leadership and co-operation between politicians and administrators at the district level. As a product of the British administrative culture in India, he refers to the British practices also.

Khera's satisfaction with the system is reflected in the following statement:

By and large, however, it will appear that the particular overall pattern of district administration as it has evolved to the present is probably the most convenient one for our circumstances. It has the great merit of containing within itself certain built-in safeguards against too much disruption, or too much adventurism; it has provided a vehicle, a mode of government in the field, which has enabled in the past, and will probably enable in the future, different political textures within which the country's governance is contained to operate in the field viably and coherently.

Like many volumes written by former civil servants, Khera's book lacks in analysis, and he is reticent in questioning the basic premises of the system.

Once the system is accepted, modifications are marginal. However, this revised edition is a marked improvement over the first edition.

Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

C.P. BHAMBHRI

M. SHIVIAH, L.S.N. MURTY, K.B. SRIVASTAVA and A.C. JENA: Block Level Administration: An Analysis of Salient Dimensions. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, 185p., Rs. 40.

THE monograph consists of commentaries on various aspects of block-level administration in India, followed by extracts from various central and state reports. Apart from a historical narration of the evolution of block administration, the themes covered include organizational dynamics, personnel, special programmes, planning and finances.

It is not quite clear how such a compilation would be useful to practical administrators; the study is insufficiently analytical and overtly pedantic, it is unlikely to illuminate any of the critical issues of contemporary rural administration, nor provide any clue to its future developments. To mention just one: since the development block has no historical antecedent, its perpetuation could be justified on the basis of scalar economy of the various functions that are considered critical at that level. No such study has been attempted before justifying the suitability of block as a viable unit of administration. Secondly, the jurisdictional hiatus between the block administration and the proposed *mandal panchayat* might force the panchayati raj institutions to be self-contained in terms of personnel and finances. In such an eventuality, reducing the block to its size may not be quite a disaster, as it has been made out. Thirdly, the artificial distinction between regulatory and development administration, which heralded the birth of the block, may not have been really useful in the long run and the present attempt to relate these at the district and *mandal* levels through the panchayati raj institutions leaves the option of either relating the block administration, closer to the sub-district administration at the sub-division or the tehsil level or else to reduce its size so as to function as an auxiliary support system to the *mandal* panchayats. The third option for the block is to wither away. Which of these options would be relevant in the post-Mehta II era remains an open question; unfortunately, Shiviah and others are silent on these eventualities.

Indian Institute of Public Administration,
New Delhi.

ABHJIT DATTA

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—*Managing Editor*).

ALI, Rahman: *Art and Architecture of the Kalacuris*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1980, xiv, 207p., Rs. 170.

Ph. D. thesis discusses the contributions made by the rulers of the Kalacuri Dynasty to early mediaeval art and architecture in Northern India. Contains figures and plates.

DATTA, Aswini Kumar: *Bhakti Yoga*. Tr. from Bengali by Gunada Charan Sen (Bhavan's Book University, 59). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, xix, 217p. Rs. 20. (Paper) Third revised edition.

EMINENT CONTRIBUTORS, (*Pseud*): *How Goa Came Into My Life*. (Bhavan's Book University, 204). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980, vi, 104p, Rs. 8. (Paper)

Collection from the writings of saints and seers. They describe how God transformed their entire being and oriented it to Himself.

GHOSH, S.K.: *Protection of Minorities and Scheduled Castes*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 181p., Rs. 50.

The author discusses the handicaps of the weaker section, the suppression of minorities especially religious and linguistic, the exploitation of the lower segments, socio-economic backwardness and hierarchical and stratified nature of our polity. In the light of the grievances of the minority groups about the dual standards of enforcement, police prejudices and apathy, the author deals with the question of equal justice under the law to the minority groups. Constitutional Safeguards (for minorities and weaker sections), Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, The Untouchability (offences) Amendment And Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1973 and the Criminal and Election Laws Amendment Act, 1969, are given in the appendices.

GOPALAKRISHNAN, S.: *Political Movements in South India 1914-1929*. New Era, Madras, 1981, vii, 289p., Rs. 80.

Deals with the contribution of South India—directly administered, extensive British territory of the Madras Presidency, excluding the princely states of Travancore, Cochin, Mysore and Hyderabad—to the growth of nationalism in the country in the period 1914-1929. The author discusses the rebellion of the Mappillas in Kerala and that of Alluri Sitaramaraju in Andhra Pradesh, role of Justice Party in non-Brahmin politics and role of South Indian liberals in the national movement. A chapter is devoted to "Swaraj Constitution."

GYAN, Satish Chandra: *Sivananda and His Ashram*. (Series on Religion, 23). Christian Literature Society (On behalf of the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society), Madras, 1980, xii, 172p., Rs. 17. (Paper)

Abridged version of Ph.D. thesis. Traces the growth and development of the Divine Life Society from its inception in 1936 to the present, and examines the life and teachings of Swami Sivananda, the founder of the Society. It explains the Society's ideology, spirituality and ideals as a religious movement within the Hindu Community. The thesis treats the Divine Life Society as a revitalization movement within the context of the Hindu tradition. It is a significant contribution to the study of modern or neo-Hinduism.

ITYENGAR, A.V.K.: *Inventory Management*. (Institute for Financial Management and Research Publication, 27). Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiv, 137p., Rs. 40. (Paper)

Based mainly on a survey of inventory practices of companies in India.

JAIN, Naresh Kumar (Ed.): *Muslims in India : A Biographical Dictionary* vi: (A.J.). Manohar, New Delhi, 1979, xliii 256p., Rs. 150.

It contains a total of 362 entries, covering Muslims from various fields over a period of 120 years from 1857 upto the 1970s. The entries provide the socio-economic backgrounds of persons and other personal details, career, publications, etc. Every entry gives the sources of information.

KESHAVA, N: *Autobiography of an MP*, Vichara Sahitya Private Ltd., Bangalore, 1981, vi, 252p., Rs. 15. (Paper)

Life of a Lok Sabha Member (1952-1962) from the Bangalore Constituency.

MUDALIAR, N. Murugesu: *Traditional Hinduism and Social Development : An Enquiry*. Christian Literature Society, Madras, 1978, v, 48p., Rs. 3. (Paper)

On sociological aspects of Hinduism; comprehensively reviews the achievements, failing and potentialities of Hinduism in respect of social change.

MUKHOPADHYAY, Arun K. and SOMASEKHARA RAO, V.B.R.S. : *Small Farms—Resource Use and Technology : A Study in Maharashtra*. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1980, 63p., Rs. 10. (Paper)

Study of utilization of resources by small farms as production units under minor irrigation schemes and adoption of new technology by them in their farm operations. The study area is the Small Farmers' Development Agency Block of Patan in Satara District in Maharashtra.

PALKHIVALA, N.A.: *India's Priceless Heritage*. (Bhavan's Book University, 243) Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980, xi, 39p., Rs. 4. (Paper)

Based on "The Prakasam-Govindarajulu Memorial Endowment Lectures delivered by the author under the auspices of the Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati in 1980.

PATEL, Vallabhbhai: *Sardar's Letters— Mostly Unknown: Pt. 2 : Years 1947-48*. (Post-Centenary, VI). (Ed.) by G.M. Nandurkar. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Bhavan, Ahmedabad, 1980, xxx, 296p., Rs. 30.

Complementary to the volumes published in the series "Birth Centenary Series." These letters highlight the Sardar's role in the Constituent Assembly, his inspiring role as a constructive worker and a labour leader, his pioneering work for the reorganization of the Services and for the revitalization of our economy. The letters are grouped under five parts viz.: (1) Towards Consolidation of Freedom, (2) For Revitalization of Indian Economic Life, (3) Defence and External Affairs, (4) As Constructive Congress worker and Some Letters of Varied Interest.

RADHAKRISHNAN, S.: *Towards a New World*. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980, 152p., Rs. 25.

Philosophical exhortation to achieve a world without barriers of race, creed, culture, nation or state. The great Indian philosopher and statesman explains the ideology of peaceful co-existence of man with man—i.e. the concept of "one earth one family."

RAJENDRAPRASAD, B.: *Art of South India Vol. 1: Andhra Pradesh*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1980, xi, 239 p., Rs. 200.

Replete with illustrations, drawings and photographs, it introduces the art and architecture of Andhra Pradesh. It discusses the political, religious and architectural developments till the 3rd century B.C. The emergence of the Satavahanas as a major political power, the rise of Buddhism and the growth of internal and external trade ushered in the finest expression of stupa architecture and art. These are clearly defined and explained. The rock-cut temples of Buddhist and Brahmanical affiliation are also studied in detail.

RAMACHANDRAN, Challa: *East India Company and South Indian Economy*. New Era, Madras, 1980, x, 215p., Rs. 80.

Analyses the economic policy of the Company in the fields of land revenue, agriculture, irrigation, currency, banking, communications and industry during the period 1784-1858 in the Madras Presidency. The author establishes that the real reasons for the failure of the Company to promote Indian economic development was not due to the belief of the Indian Officials in the 19th century economic doctrines and the resultant theory of so-called drain, but due to the "indifferentism" or lack of interest on the part of the administrators (who were also the policy-makers of India), in promoting economic development.

RAMDAS, Swami: *At the Feet of God*. (Bhavan's Book University, 223). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan (on behalf of Anandashram), Bombay, 1977, xii, 72p., Rs. 4. (Paper)

SAKSENA, Jogendra: *Art of Rajasthan : Henna and Floor Decorations*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1979, xxiii, 241p., Rs. 180.

A writer, scholar and specialist in folk arts discusses in this work the physical features, archaeology and the people of Rajasthan; cultural history of folk designs; the purpose and meaning of women's art; *mehndi* and *mandana* arts and their connection with science and *tantra*. Illustrations are given with explanations.

SEN, Sunil Kumar: *An Economic History of Modern India: 1848-1939*. Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1981, 368p., Rs. 75.

Documented survey deals with government policy, forms of economic organization and economic changes which occurred between the two world wars. It is divided into four parts. The first part discusses economic policy during 1848-1926. Economic change during 1926-1939 is discussed in the second part. Third and fourth parts are devoted to agriculture and labour during 1848-1939, respectively. Some of the subjects discussed in this book were treated by the author in his previous book *Economic Policy and Development of India. 1848-1939*.

SHARIF KHAN, Mohd. and SALEEM KHAN, Mohd.: *Educational Administration*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xi, 107p., Rs. 35.

Text book useful for B. Ed., M. Ed. and M.A. (Education) students.

SHASHI, S.S.: *The Nomads of the Himalayas*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1979, vi, 213p., Rs. 125.

The well-known social anthropologist analyses and depicts the tribal life of nomadic people, particularly the Gujjars, the Bhotiyas, the Gaddis and other sheep or cattle rearing tribes of the Himalayan region. The author also refers to the nomadic tribes of the world, like Romas (Gypsies) of Central Europe and USSR in one chapter. Description of the Western Himalayan region, Mussoorie and Chakrata, the Simla Hills, Dalhousie and Chamba, and Kashmir is given in the appendices.

SHIVIAH, M. etc.: *Panchayati Raj : Elections in West Bengal 1978: A Study in Institution-Building for Rural Development*. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1980, 145p., Rs. 35.

Based on the analysis of empirical data, the study discusses the nomination process and election campaign, perceptions about the role of Panchayati Raj institutions in rural development, voting behaviour, sense of political efficacy, the issue of party-based contest, aspects of political recruitment and the emerging elite.

MICRO-DEPENDENCY : THE CUBAN FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By ALI A. MAZRUI*

We accept the proposition that the worst kind of dependency lies in North-South interaction. But emphasizing this dimension should not go to the extent of ignoring other dimensions. It is simply not true that all forms of international dependency concern interactions between the Northern Hemisphere and the South, or between industrialism and sources of raw materials. There are important forms of dependency among industrialized nations themselves. Increasingly, there are also forms of dependency between one country in the Third World and another; or between one region of the Third World and another. Dependency is a form of political castration.

For the purposes of this essay, dependency between one country in the Northern Hemisphere and another or between one industrialized state and another, is categorized as macro-dependency. This involves variations in power within the upper stratum of the world system. Macro-dependency is thus upper-horizontal, involving variations in affluence among the affluent, or degree of might among the mighty.

Micro-dependency for our purposes here concerns variations of technical development among the under-developed, or relative influence among the weak, or degrees of power among those that are basically exploited. The dependency of some West African countries upon Nigeria, or of some of the Gulf States upon Iran or Saudi Arabia, are cases of micro-dependency. We shall return to this level more fully later, but let us first begin with the phenomenon of macro-dependency.

Two inter-related events in the twentieth century have helped to shape the nature of variations in power among countries of the Northern Hemisphere. These were complex events rather than single occurrences. One was World War II and its aftermath, resulting in a resilient bi-polar system involving two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The other factor was itself in part an aspect of the aftermath of World War II. The second factor behind variations in power has been the collapse of the old European Empire and the relative political shrinkage of Europe as a global force.

Both the First World of the West and the Second World of the Soviet Bloc evolved complex hegemonic relationships. With Europe shattered by the war, and seemingly vulnerable to desperate ideological solutions, the United States embarked on a major economic programme for the reconstruction of Europe. In the devastation of the war, Europe definitely had

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surplus need of the United States and was experiencing deficit control over its own destiny. On 5 June 1947, the Second Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, in an address at Harvard University, proposed a plan of American aid to help European rehabilitation and recovery. The United States seemed almost frightened by the gap in power between itself and European countries; but it was even more afraid of the implications of that gap for the survival of liberal democracy in Europe.

The aid that Marshall proposed included the condition that European states should act together in estimating their needs and in planning their rehabilitation. Sixteen European states (later joined by the Federal Republic of Germany) set to work to draw up an inventory of requirements and resources. They then applied to the United States for loans and gifts of over 21 billion dollars for the period 1948-52. The stage was set for one kind of macro-dependency, though the Marshall Plan itself seemed in part to reduce European dependency on the United States by enabling Europe to recover from its own devastation.

Another form of macro-dependency came with the establishment of the North Atlantic Organization within a year of launching the European Recovery Program under the Marshall Plan. On 4 April 1949, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States signed a treaty in Washington, D.C. for collective security. The alliance was later joined by Turkey and Greece, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The American nuclear power umbrella provided patriarchal protection for the Western World as a whole.

The third aspect of macro-dependency involved relations between the United States and Japan following the American occupation of Japan. The original security treaty between Japan and the United States was signed with the peace pact in 1951, and was designed for what Article 1 described as "the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." The original version was even more blatantly based on dependent relationships for it provided no prior consultation with Japan should American forces, based in Japan, be used on military assignment outside the country. The treaty has since been modified to reduce the more blatant aspects of macro-dependency. But on the whole the de-militarization of Japan has meant *de facto* American hegemony in the military field.

This relationship was stabilized by the rather unusual and controversial Chapter 2, Article 9, of the Constitution of Japan. Under this provision, the people of Japan would aspire to peace and "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." The Article was originally interpreted to mean that Japan would not maintain any land, sea or air forces, or permit other war potential on its soil. But subsequent constitutional usage has permitted minimal forces of self-defense. However, Japan is on the whole a case of self-castration in the military field.

Lenin did not recognize any distinction between subjugation of one industrialized country by another (macro-dependency) and imperialist subjugation of an underdeveloped country by an industrialized one (vertical dependency). Kautsky had asserted:

Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capital. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger areas of *agrarian* territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions.¹

Lenin rejects this formulation as "utterly worthless because it... arbitrarily and *inaccurately* connects this question *only* with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions."

Lenin continues to emphasize that the dialectic of imperialism included a striving for annexation, but it was not simply a case of industrial states seeking agrarian colonies.

The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex not only agrarian territories but even most highly industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium, French appetite for Lorraine)....²

This was a rejection of any clear distinction between vertical dependency and macro-dependency. Others later on might have referred also to the Soviet Union's appetite for the Baltic States, or for portions of Poland and Finland. Lenin mistook the dynamic of imperialism for the dynamic of capitalism. In the history of the West, the two were indeed inter-connected; but history has since proved that the abolition of capitalism in a major Power was no guarantee that that Power would not become imperialistic.

But Lenin was at least on the right track in assuming a logic of interaction between vertical colonization of agrarian countries by industrial countries and horizontal colonization of industrial countries by other industrial states. Lenin did not fully understand the nature of the interaction between vertical dependency and horizontal macro-dependency, but it was a step in the right direction to assume a profound linkage between the two.

We shall return to other aspects of this linkage subsequently in our analysis. For the time being let us now turn our attention to problems of sub-hegemonic relations between countries in the Third World itself.

OF DEPENDENCY AND MICRO-DEPENDENCY

Quite simply, international micro-dependency arises in a situation where one section of the under-developed or under-privileged world is disproportionately reliant upon another or disproportionately influenced by

another. The other side of the coin of micro-dependency is micro-imperialism or what is more often referred to as sub-imperialism. The power of Saudi Arabia in the rest of the Arab World has become micro-imperial. The role of Nigeria in Africa is slowly taking a similar direction.

Micro-dependency could be either *congruous* and natural, or it could be *in-congruous* and unnatural. Congruous micro-dependency arises where a much larger country, or a much richer country in the Third World, acquires undue influence over a smaller or poorer neighbour. When Brazil begins to exercise greater influence on Uruguay, for example, the relationship would have a natural and congruous dynamic. If Nigeria already exercises disproportionate influence on Niger, that again is a case of congruous hegemony by Nigeria and congruous micro-dependency on the part of Niger.

An incongruous or unnatural micro-dependency arises when either the bigger is dependent on the smaller or the richer upon the poorer, or the well-informed upon the ignorant.

Thus a situation in which a particular Caribbean island becomes dependent on the African continent for support in order to realize liberation from American hegemony would be a case of natural international micro-dependency. On the other hand, a situation in which it is Africa that is dependent upon the Caribbean for fundamental areas of its own continental liberation would be clearly a case of incongruous or unnatural international micro-dependency.

It should be emphasized at this stage that to describe a certain form of sub-dependency as natural is not necessarily to accept it as inevitable. After all, historically important areas of both private and public morality have required subordination of what is natural to what is right. Civilization has often developed on the basis of both exploiting nature and controlling nature. That side of civilization which is concerned with values and principles has inevitably required the taming of nature. While therefore it might well be natural that the bigger should have excessive influence over the smaller, or the richer over the weaker, or the well-informed over the lesser informed, this could still be an aspect of nature which needs to be subjected to the modifying calculus of morality.

Of the three continents of the Third World (Africa, Asia and South America), Africa contains the highest number of the least developed countries and the continent as a whole has the lowest per capita income. Africa's potential in terms of resources is of course considerable, but the degree to which those resources have for the time being been adequately exploited, or the benefits equitably distributed, is still very modest.

Partly because Africa is in this sense the least developed of the three continents of the Third World, it has been particularly susceptible to micro-dependency. Africans in the twentieth century have much more often been followers than leaders, responsive rather than innovative. For much of Africa the twentieth century is a century of both cruel exploitation by others and voluntary initiation of others. Imperialism and dependency continue to

flourish even in those countries in Africa that are now nominally sovereign.

But while vertical dependency upon northern metropolitan countries has basically been dysfunctional to the interests of African societies, micro-dependency upon other parts of the Third World has at times served liberating functions for Africa. This micro-dependency was at times also a form of solidarity however asymmetrical. And yet the question could still be raised as to whether Africans needed to be followers so often even in the politics of the Third World.

Evolving African Micro-Dependencies

The three forms of solidarity in the twentieth century have been: first, the Afro-Asian movement; secondly, the politics of Afro-Arab alignments; and more recently the emergence of Afro-Latin collaboration, involving special areas of contact between Africa and Latin America.

In addition to these three forms of solidarity implicit in Afro-Asianism, Afro-Arabism and Afro-Latinism, there is the broader Third World movement as a whole, including its latest platform of struggle for a New International Economic Order.

As between the older alignment of Afro-Asianism and the new collaboration of Afro-Latinism, there has been a shift in favour of the new in matters concerned with *liberation*. The role of Cuba as an Afro-Latin country is particularly crucial with regard to this shift.

But while Afro-Asianism has indeed declined as a basis of solidarity, Afro-Arabism as an overlapping sub-category of solidarity has become stronger in the 1970's.

The evolving African micro-dependency upon the Arabs is mainly economic and to some extent cultural; whereas African micro-dependency upon Latin-America is partly military and to some extent ideological. The Arab role in the years to come could be vital for Africa's development; while Cuba's role has already become significant in Africa's liberation.

The old solidarity of Afro-Asianism arose primarily from a sense of shared racial humiliation among the non-white peoples of Africa and Asia. The racial humiliation had included the shared experience of colonialism in Africa and Asia. But while some parts of Asia were never directly annexed by Europeans, and while Ethiopia and Liberia were permitted at least nominal sovereignty by the European Powers, all Africans and Asians had indeed experienced in some degree or another a form of racial humiliation. The struggle against racism and the struggle against colonialism were at the heart of Afro-Asian solidarity.

While the solidarity persisted, it was clear that leadership came primarily from the Asian part of the alliance. The most important meeting of that phase was held in Bandung in Indonesia in 1955. There was very modest African representation then, partly because the bulk of the continent of

Africa was still under colonial rule. Ten years later President Sukarno hosted another meeting in Indonesia, and partly celebrated the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the first Asian country, the Peoples Republic of China.

The doctrine of non-alignment was also born in Asia. Jawaharlal Nehru was virtually the founder of the movement, and remained its most important spokesman until the 1960's. One African country after another on attaining independence, embraced at least the rhetoric of non-alignment in its conduct of foreign relations.

India under Nehru also led the way in voluntary membership of the (British) Commonwealth. When their turn came, one African country after another, previously ruled by Britain, decided to follow India's precedent and accede to the Commonwealth. Later on, the People's Republic of China also became influential in Afro-Asian circles, though by no means as universally popular as Nehru's India had been for at least a while.

But then things began to change. By 1965 even the prophet of Negritude, President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, could say:

For my part, I think Afro-Asianism has been superceded, for this form of solidarity should be extended to Latin America and to the *tiers monde* in general.³

A few months later an unusual conference took place in Havana. Cuba was host to an Asian-African-Latin American Conference of Solidarity, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. The Conference went on from 3-15 January, 1966. Eighty-two countries were represented. The outcome was the creation of the Tri-Continental People's Solidarity Organization, with an Executive Committee provisionally in Havana. The Committee was to consist of four representatives from each of the three continents, with an Executive Secretary. There was also to be a Liberation Committee.

The conference in Havana was primarily of radicals. Its impact on world affairs was negligible. Yet it probably qualifies as an important landmark in the evolution of the concept of the Third World.

Also a landmark at the governmental level was a conference which had taken place two years earlier in Geneva. This was the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Latin America, Asia and Africa had confronted the developed countries of the world—and demanded a transformation of the international trade system in the direction of better terms for producers of primary products and more concern for the needs of the underdeveloped world at large. The idea of "collective bargaining," which had vastly changed the lives of the poor in the industrialized countries themselves as part of the history of labour unions, was now being tried for the first time at the level of inter-state relations. For a brief period in 1964, the poor of the whole world had formed a global "trade union"—and were

bargaining away at a conference table in Geneva. A groping had started for some kind of collective answer to a shared economic weakness.

That is why the concept of the Third World signified a major shift in self-conception among the countries concerned. As we indicated, Afro-Asianism had been a solidarity of a shared humiliation as *coloured people*. But the concept of the Third World is an attempt to transcend the bonds of colour and to emphasize instead the bonds of shared poverty. Mamadou Dia, the former Prime Minister of Senegal, called the first section of his book "The Revolt of the Proletarian Nations." Ideas of Afro-Asian solidarity were still implicit in much of Dia's discussion, but the emphasis was moving from pan-pigmentationalism (the affinity of colour) to pan-proletarianism (the affinity of being economically under-privileged). Almost as if he was defending this shift of emphasis, Dia quoted Gabriel Ardant's powerful line that the "geography of hunger is also the geography of death." And the bonds of a joint struggle for survival came to re-define the frontiers of allegiance among the nations concerned.⁴

Contribution of Latin American and African Intellectuals

But although leaders of thought in Africa, like Dia and Senghor, were indeed pointing to the shared predicament which binds Africa with the rest of the Third World, most of the initiatives in the struggle were coming from outside Africa.

Latin America's contribution has been partly intellectual and theoretical. The whole body of literature on dependency was born out of the womb of Latin America's experience. Much of the literature on *dependencia* is still in Spanish and Portuguese and therefore inaccessible to the bulk of African intellectuals and writers, but some of the writers that have influenced Africa have themselves been influenced in turn by the Latin-American experience. Andre Gunder Frank, widely regarded in the English-speaking world as "the Copernicus of the new paradigm" was intellectually transformed by greater contact with Latin-America's experience.

...Frank admits this quite explicitly: he went to Latin-America a liberal, and rapidly became a revolutionary in response to various circumstances, above all the Cuban revolution.⁵

Since then African writers and analysts have made their own contribution to the literature on dependency. Among the most influential of the African economists of this school is Samir Amin. As a reviewer in the *Canadian Journal of African Studies* put it: "In theoretical perspective and prolific output, Samir Amin has become Africa's counterpart to Latin America's Andre Gunder Frank among the radical anti-imperialists."⁶

The link between paradigms in the social sciences on the one side, and

ideology on the other, can be very close. The theoretical formulation of the Latin American school of dependency may not be all that far removed from the ideological formulation of Frantz Fanon, another Latin American benefactor of Africa. Fanon, a Martiniquan, who immersed himself in the Algerian war against France and formulated brilliant theories on the necessity of bloody revolution, was destined to capture the imagination of young radicals in much of the black world. French-speaking Africans were among the first to respond to Fanon's stimulation. Some of the observers of the rebellion in Zaire (then known as the Congo) in 1964-65, even suspected that Fanon, along with the Algerians and the Chinese, constituted part of the total external influence on the techniques of that rebellion. Roger Anstey, the British historian, put it in the following terms:

Ferocity in war is known well enough in Africa, but the continuing calculated murderousness of the rebellion seems to have about it some imported revolutionary method It is at least credible that such methods should stem from Chinese and Algerian techniques of revolution, whilst it may also be relevant to recall the vogue currently enjoyed in some French-speaking circles by the late Frantz Fanon⁷

In Fanon we have the attempt to formulate strategies of national liberation and revolution. Unlike Marx and Engels, Fanon put his faith not in the proletariat but in the peasantry. From an African point of view, Fanon's success in reinstating the peasantry in the mainstream of history has to be put alongside his achievement in reinstating race into the mainstream of radical social analysis. Fanon wants us to look at Marxism again against the background of the salience of race in the colonial experience. After all, within the colonial situation, "it is neither the act of owning factories nor estates, nor a bank balance which distinguishes the governing class, the governing race is first and foremost those who come from elsewhere, those who are unlike the original inhabitants, 'the others'."⁸

Fanon goes on to argue that the colonial world is divided into compartments inhabited by "two different species." There were indeed economic realities, in terms of who owned what, but there were also human realities in terms of who *was* what:

When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world begins with the fact of belonging or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies economic sub-structure is also a super-structure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem.⁹

The ideas of Frantz Fanon when appended to the theories of dependency

emanating from Latin America, have together constituted part of the intellectual leadership of Latin America in the whole struggle for liberation in the Third World. The Latin American structuralists have been inspired in their theories by the neo-colonial experience in Latin America itself. Frantz Fanon, on the other hand, is a *culturalist* in his interpretation of the colonial predicament. To understand the realities of the colonial experience, both the structural and the cultural dimensions have to be understood. Latin America as a region of the Third World provides virtually a paradigm of structural dependency; while Africa provides a striking paradigm of cultural dependency. It is the more fitting that structuralist writers like Gunder Frank have based their sharp formulations on Latin American experience, while Frantz Fanon has used Africa as his ultimate paradigm of racial and cultural subjugation.

But while Africa has inspired the ideas of Fanon, as well as provided his racial ancestry, Africans have once again been followers rather than leaders. Intellectual micro-dependency continues to manifest itself in the African response to these theoretical and ideological traffic indicators provided by the other parts of the Third World.

In addition to theorists of dependency, and the ideas of Frantz Fanon, there is also the ideological experiment of Castro's Cuba. This last completes the triumvirate of intellectual examples that Latin America has provided to the African continent.

We mentioned earlier that behind Gunder Frank's radicalization was the experience of the Cuban revolution, just as behind Frantz Fanon's radicalization was the experience of the Algerian revolution. The two revolutions together merged into a heritage of radical Afro-Latinism. But unlike Algeria, Cuba has continued to command revolutionary admiration. For Africa it does provide an organizational miracle. There is a possibility that Cuba might now influence organizational changes in a country like Angola. Cuban lessons might include efficient ways of organizing limited medical services, more relevant ways of giving the masses a sense of participation, more solid ways of constructing an egalitarian society.

Nevertheless, two things remain uncertain. Can Cuba's organizational success be adequately transplanted onto African soil? Secondly, can Cuba's organizational success adequately survive the island's economic re-integration with the rest of the Western Hemisphere in the years ahead? Can Cuba's austere socialism survive a new invasion of American businessmen and tourists?

These are still unanswered questions. To that extent we are still uncertain as to whether the Cuban paradigm might turn out to be an effective organizational contribution from Latin America to the African continent. If that were to happen, once again a form of imitative micro-dependency of Africa upon Latin America might re-emerge.

CUBA'S MILITARY INTRUSIONS IN AFRICA

On 16 February 1965, following the bombing of two Ugandan villages by Congolese planes of American manufacture, three ministers of the Uganda Government publically submitted a protest to the American Embassy in Kampala. The first two demands made in the protest note were that the United States should stop giving military aid to the Congo and should "withdraw the Cuban rebels from the Congo." Castro's adversaries in exile seemed to be easing their frustration by offering themselves as mercenaries to Tshombe's regime.¹⁰

This was only one aspect of these initial Cuban intrusions into African affairs. An earlier aspect was Cuba's participation in the events which led up to the Zanzibar revolution. In historical terms it is perhaps too early to be sure—but it seems very likely that the example of the Cuban revolution helped to influence the shape of the Zanzibar revolution of January 1964. John Okello might indeed have been the spearhead of the revolution—and Okello was not a plausible Marxist. Yet the revolution did take a Marxist orientation soon after it occurred—and Okello was ousted before long. The legation that Abdul Rahman Babu, the Zanzibari Marxist, had established in Cuba well before the revolution, and the training of Zanzibari militiamen that probably took place on the Caribbean island, must have affected the shape of things to come in Zanzibar. Indeed, the very fact that Cuba was an island made it a plausible paradigm for revolutionaries from Zanzibar.

The act itself of overthrowing the Sultan's regime had probably had no connection with Cuba. There was a widely publicized report that Cuban militiamen were among the Zanzibari revolutionaries. But Michael Lofchie's theory about the source of the confusion is persuasive. It is probable that the Cuban rumour was due to the presence of several trade union leaders who had joined the Zanzibari revolutionaries early on the first day of the new year. Lofchie points out that:

Many members of the group had adopted the Cuban style of dress and appearance, and even employed the Cuban cry 'Venceremos' (We Shall Conquer) as a political symbol. Their Cuban type of uniform set them off clearly from the (Afro-Shirazi Youth League) members and was probably the base of the report that the revolutionary army contained Cuban soldiers.¹¹

Yet even if the overthrow of the Sultan's regime had nothing to do with the Cuban revolution, the direction of change following the royal ouster of Zanzibar might well have been inspired by the momentous precedent in the Caribbean more than five years earlier.

In fact, the impact of Cuba on the whole concept of the Third World has probably been crucial. Until the Cuban revolution Afro-Asian radicals

found it hard to identify themselves with Latin America except within the restricted boundaries of literary nationalism and of empathy for the Blacks and Indians of the American hemisphere. But the Cuban assertion of independence from the hegemony of the United States dramatically widened the area of Afro-Asian identification with Latin America. At first Castro was regarded as the first symbol of militant non-alignment in the Western hemisphere. He even attended the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned in 1961, along with a less militant Brazil. Castro's drift into military entanglement with the Soviet Union later disillusioned his non-aligned friends, but the impact of his defiance of the United States, and the social transformation he implemented at home, gave Cuba the youthful status of "a new state"—and continued to give Castro himself the rank of a crucial revolutionary of the new age. In short, Castro was part of the credentials for Latin America's admission into the fellowship of the Third World.¹²

In some cases later on, Cubans allowed themselves to be hired as the equivalent of the Swiss Guard for the Pope—soldiers to help maintain the viability of particular African palaces. Regimes in Africa which have used Cubans over the years have ranged from the Government of Sierra Leone to the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Now it is the Government of Ethiopia. But the most dramatic Cuban intervention in African affairs came in 1976 in the course of the final stages of the Angolan civil war. The Cubans arrived in Angola on the side of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

As against the rival movement of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), there seems to be little doubt that Cuban support for MPLA was decisive in tilting the balance, though there were additional factors which helped the MPLA. Among these additional factors was the support that South Africa temporarily gave to Agostinho Neto's enemies. UNITA's flirtation, especially with South Africa, was disastrous for the movement from the point of view of its standing in African circles. While many African states had previously been ready to push for a coalition government they later decided to give moral support to MPLA in reaction against UNITA's flirtation with South Africa.

It remains to be seen if Cuban troops would be used in Namibia or against South Africa's apartheid. It must not be forgotten that there was no Cuban army to help the liberation of Angola for as long as the Portuguese were still in occupation. MPLA fought the Portuguese for two decades without getting the active support of Cuban troops and without an adequate supply of advanced heavy weaponry from the Soviet Union. It was only after the Portuguese left Angola in November 1975—and the war had become primarily one among Africans themselves—that the Cubans were suddenly available for Angola's liberation, and the Soviet Union was at last willing to supply war planes and heavy artillery.

The conclusion is irresistible—neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba wanted

to fight the Portuguese colonialists and risk confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They did not fight Ian Smith in Rhodesia either.

Have the Soviet Union and Cuba now acquired enough confidence to move directly into Namibia and help SWAPO throw out apartheid and South Africa's domination? Again, there is still no adequate evidence that Russian and Cuban liberators are prepared to risk such a direct confrontation with South Africa. Are they once again waiting until "the natives" begin to fight each other before moving in with an army to help one of the factions?

What about Zimbabwe? Did Cubans and Russians move in to help the Patriotic Front? The prospects for Soviet-Cuban support against Smith in Zimbabwe were no brighter than prospects for such support being available against Botha in Namibia, let alone in South Africa itself. On balance there seems little doubt that the Russians and Cubans normally *prefer* to wait until the war is directly a conflict between Blacks themselves before they go to the extent of providing war planes to one of the factions or importing an additional army to back their favourites.

Once again, while not denying the impressive difference Cuba has made to prospects for liberation in Southern Africa, the timing of the Cuban intervention in Angola raised questions about the extent of Castro's commitment to African liberation. In Ethiopia, it raised questions about Castro's commitment to the national integrity of African States.

There has been a suggestion in some circles that Cuba's intervention is in fact a kind of renewed validation of Pan-Africanism. After all, Cuba's population is at least forty per cent black in one sense or another. In the streets of Mexico City I have myself known the excitement of being mistaken for a Cuban. It gave me a feeling about the wide distribution of people of African descent in the Western hemisphere.

In his effort to legitimize Cuba's intervention in Angola, Castro himself has emphasized the African blood flowing in the veins of many Cubans. In his rhetoric he has even suggested it was flowing in his own veins, though that seems to be a statement made more in response to the exigencies of the Angolan situation than in response to the boundaries of genuine biological self-definition.

At the Second General Meeting of the African Association of Political Science held in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1976, a relative of President Neto of Angola also attempted to legitimize Cuba's participation in an African civil war on the grounds that Cuba was "an Afro-Caribbean country." But if the United States were to start describing itself as fundamentally an "Afro-Caucasian country" would that help to give Washington legitimacy to participate in a future African war? Is the presence of people of African ancestry in a country outside Africa an adequate basis for the intervention by that external country in an internal African conflict?

Nevertheless, there were positive aspects also to Castro's claim on the

issue of race. After all, under his revolution, Cuba has witnessed remarkable changes in race relations. A correspondent for the *New York Times*, David Binder, explored this issue even before Cuba's involvement in the Angolan civil war. He interacted with a Cuban poet of mixed ancestry from the eastern part of the island—Nicola Guillen—Guillen, a man who began writing verse in the 1920's and soon turned to themes of race and racial oppression, captured the change in Cuba in the following terms:

My revolutionary feeling was awakened by the struggle against racism in Cuba. I was considered black. There was a clearly defined color line in Cuba, a product of 400 years of colonialism that included 60 years under United States influence, particularly the southern United States. No blacks were allowed in American hotels here and the Havana Yacht Club wouldn't even admit President Batista, who was considered a mulatto. Now racism is severely punished with fines and jail sentences. It hasn't disappeared altogether, but we do have lots of mixed marriages now.¹³

The correspondent for the American newspaper noted that at the Hotel Havana Libre, mixed marriages were much in evidence among the young Cuban couples "honeymooning on the upper floors." Nor did there seem to him to be any district of Havana or any enterprise or school where darker or lighter Cubans predominated disproportionately.

On balance therefore, there is a good record on the side of Castro with regard to the issue of race. But such a good record does not make Cuba's intervention in Angola or Southern Africa a case of Pan-Africanism. Much more relevant would be the question of who made the decision to intervene, what is the actual structure of political power in Cuba as between black and white, and what was the composition of the actual men who were sent to fight in the Angolan civil war. If the United States were to send an army consisting entirely of black Americans to participate in a conflict in Zaire, that would not make the black American intervention a case of Pan-Africanism. One would have to investigate the race of those who made the decision to send those black Americans, the structure within which such decisions were made, and whether or not the motives for the intervention were inspired by a solidarity based on shared African ancestry. It is still an open question whether the Cuban intervention qualifies as a kind of Pan-African venture, just as it is still a point of debate whether intervening in 1976 proved commitment to liberation more than intervening before the *coup* in Portugal in April 1974 would have been. After all, Cuban intervention before April 1974 would have been a direct challenge to Portuguese imperialism itself. No such intervention occurred.

As for the arguments that Cuba's intervention in Angola was a case of responding to the legitimate government of the country, that surely would be to beg the question. After all, none of the factions could yet be deemed

to be the legitimate government of the country. The fact that MPLA controlled the capital city was not an adequate assertion of legitimacy—any more than the previous Portuguese control of the capital was such a validation. Africa had also before witnessed situations where the capital city—like Kinshasa in Zaire—was controlled by a regime which many in Angola itself under MPLA regarded as illegitimate. In previous times the capital city of Zaire was even controlled by Tshombe, with even more limited credentials for legitimacy.

There seems little doubt that the decision in Havana to back MPLA with an additional 12,000 troops drastically tilted the balance in favour of MPLA—and therefore decided the issue for Angolans. UNITA is still kept at bay with Cuban troops.

As it happened, MPLA was probably the best qualified of the three movements to rule a newly liberated country in Southern Africa, situated in close proximity not only to Namibia but, in the ultimate analysis, to the land of apartheid itself. Southern Africa did need a relatively radical Angola if the liberation of the region was to be accomplished. In this case the argument we are putting forward regarding Cuba should not be interpreted as an expression of preference for MPLA's rivals within Angola. This author is quite satisfied that for the time being at any rate there is no evidence to dispute MPLA's superiority in terms of organization and moral purpose, and in terms of potential effectiveness as a base for the liberation of Namibia and one day as an ally in the struggle to liberate South Africa itself.

The point we are raising here, once we accept the superiority of MPLA as against UNITA and FNLA, is whether this kind of issue should have been decided ultimately by a Caribbean factor introduced into a delicate balance of forces. Was the Cuban tail once again wagging the African dog?

Cuba threw out Somali troops from the Ogaden! Was Cuba the new policeman of Africa? Was it the conscience of the OAU?

CONCLUSION

The sub-Saharan sector of the African continent has important areas of linkage with Latin America. Those linkages include the following factors.

First, there is the *black factor* in the racial composition of Latin America. There are millions of people of African ancestry resident within Latin America. Among these are a sizeable number of Cubans, as we indicated. There are also millions of black Brazilians.

A second factor which links sub-Saharan Africa with Latin America is something which will gain in importance in the years ahead—the presence of the Portuguese language in Africa. Brazil is to Portugal what the United States is to Britain—a child that grew too large for the mother. In the case of the United States, it had by the second half of the twentieth century firmly overshadowed Britain in world affairs. Brazil by the second half of the twentieth century is also firmly overshadowing Portugal in world affairs.

Just as the importance of the English language now in the world is increasingly derived from the stature of the United States, the importance of the Portuguese language is increasingly derived from the stature of Brazil. Brazil's future relations with Lusophone Africa with special reference to Angola, but also Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and the islands, may become a major factor in the years ahead.

The third factor that makes black Africa have some kind of linkage with Latin America is the nature of its dependency relationship. Latin America is to the United States what Africa is to Western Europe. Western Europe became the colossus of the North for Africa, the United States the colossus over Latin America.

The fourth factor linking Latin America with Africa is the nature of their fragmentation. The two continents fragment into multiple countries, many of them of very limited size and influence.

The fifth factor is the comparable mineral resources. These may sometimes provide a future opportunity to create producer cartels or organizations that might help to influence the nature of the world economy. OPEC is one striking precedent. But for the moment Zambians, Zairians and Chileans do not have much leverage with regard to copper, since the price is well down. But the fact that they are forced together by a shared mineral concern could have repercussions on the future.

Sixthly, these are comparable agricultural economies. Whereas copper has gone down, coffee is still riding fairly high. What might link Uganda, Kenya and Brazil on the coffee front, could have possibilities later of both co-operation in price-fixing and competition in marketing.

In Third World politics, the two main changes of the 1970's have been the rise of Arab economic influence and the rise of Cuba's military influence in Africa. In East-West relations a major change has been the expansion of Soviet diplomatic leverage in Africa. Through petro-power Afro-Asianism had been strengthened via the Arab connection. Afro-Latinism as a form of solidarity between Africa and Latin America has been strengthened mainly through the Cuban connection.

What is also clear is that relations between the world of socialism and the world of underdevelopment entered a new phase when the Soviet Union began to feel confident enough to tilt the balance in Angola and Ethiopia. Castro's Cuba and Africa's castration created new inter-relationships at the levels of both vertical and micro-dependency.

Once admitted into Third World fellowship, the Latin Americans generally have been among the leaders in intellectual and ideological formulation behind the struggle of the Third World for a more just global system.

Brazil is also slowly becoming a contender for some kind of leadership in the politics of the Third World, and to some extent some level of sub-imperialism within Africa. The fact that Portuguese-speaking Africa for the time being constitutes part of the most radical element in the African continent, while Brazil itself remains one of the paradigms of capitalist

reaction—these two facts together have resulted in a divergence between Portuguese-speaking Africa and the largest Portuguese-speaking country in the world, Brazil. But the size of Brazil, and its growing industrial potential, are likely to make a difference sooner or later in Mozambique's and Angola's response to Brazilian overtures. Socio-linguistic links might in time compensate for ideological differences.

In the meantime, Brazil has at least taken the lead in a few economic initiatives affecting the Third World. African producers of coffee have reason to be grateful to Brazil for the high prices enjoyed by coffee in the second half of the 1970's. At first, it was a case of frost affecting Brazil's production and reducing the world's supply of coffee. But by the second half of 1977 it had become a clear and open policy of Brazil to keep the prices of coffee high even if it meant its buying up large supplies of coffee on the international market. Brazil's leadership in getting a good price for this popular beverage of the affluent societies heralded Brazil's future function as an originator of Third World initiatives. Struggling economies partly based on coffee looked to Brasillia in 1977 for economic salvation. Even Idi Amin's Uganda managed to stagger along a few economic steps further partly because the prices of coffee continued to be buoyant.

What all this means is that micro-dependency by some Third World countries upon others in the Third World helps to make more effective the struggle of the Third World as a whole for a better deal in the global system. Cuba's role in Africa is thus a case-study.

From this point of view, Afro-Latinism is on the one hand an asymmetrical alignment between Africa and Latin America, involving Africa's micro-dependency on Latin American initiative; but on the other hand Afro-Latinism is also an alliance for liberation, a merger of forces among the exploited, a partnership in the quest for a just world order. Castro's Cuba has for the time being been cast in precisely such a role.

Yet the temptation to make fun of the political eunuch is often great. That temptation is a special case of exploitation. It remains to be seen if Castro will resist the arrogance of *machismo* at Africa's expense.

May 1981

NOTES

- 1 *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, 2, Vol. 32, p. 909, 11 September 1914. The emphasis is Kautsky's.
- 2 Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, pp. 783-784.
- 3 See *Africa Diary* (New Delhi), 19-25 June 1965.
- 4 See Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity*. (Translated by Mercer Cook) (London, 1962). Ardant is quoted on p. 19.
- 5 See Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," *World Development* (Oxford) Vol. 4, No. 2, March 1976, p. 176. Aidan Foster-Carter argues that if "Frank is the Copernicus of the new paradigm, then Baran is surely its Aristarchus—an older visionary that apprehended the same truth, but was for a while far less influential." See Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York, 1957), and Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1969). A helpful critical survey of the Latin American structuralists is P.O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency" (Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, March 1973, Mimeo).
- 6 The reviewer is quoted on the cover of Amin's book, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (New York and London, 1973).
- 7 Roger Anstey, "The Congo Rebellion," *The World Today* (London), Vol. XXI, No. 4, April 1965. Fanon's most influential work has of course been *The Wretched of the Earth* (Translated into English by Constance Farrington) (New York, 1963).
- 8 *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 33.
- 9 Ibid, p. 32.
- 10 See *New York Times*, 18 November 1964; *Uganda Argus*, 17 February 1965; *Uganda Argus*, 19 February 1965.
- 11 Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton, 1965), p. 276.
- 12 This part of the paper has been borrowed from Mazrui, "Africa and the Third World," *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship* (London, 1967), pp. 224-229.
- 13 David Binder, "Cuba Seems to Vanquish Racism," *The New York Times*, October 9, 1974.
- 14 Ibid.

THE "ISLAMIC BOMB" AND INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

By ASWINI K. RAY*

The periodic "bomb" debate has again been launched in India, predictably, as always, spearheaded by a section of sophisticated military-strategists. As in the mid-sixties, this time again the debate has been triggered off by a strategic perception of external threat : earlier, as a fall-out of the Lop Nor explosion, and now of the anticipated "Islamic Bomb". This paper attempts, firstly, to question the adequacy of the military-strategic approach to provide the basis for a viable concept of national security ; it argues the case for the primacy of the political and economic component of any concept of national security for meaningful policy-prescriptions, especially for underdeveloped post-colonial societies. It also pleads for the importance of political and diplomatic responses to meet any such threats to India's national security as may be posed by the "Islamic Bomb."

NATIONAL SECURITY : MILITARY STRATEGIC VIEW

The military-strategic view of national security, with its *a-priori* assumptions about the inadequacy, even irrelevance, of a diplomatic or political response to any threat to the integrity of the country—whether from external sources or internal disaffection—has a built-in preference for military responses to such threats. A strategic counter-offensive against any security-threat essentially, often exclusively, consists of measures to strike a technological balance in one's favour over the logistics and fire-power of the sources of such a threat. This simplistic perception of national security, despite its populist appeal from the standpoint of the quantitative logic of military hardware, has historically been proved to be inadequate, often counter-productive, as, among other examples, American experience in Indo-China, or the Pakistani military-bureaucratic clique's experiences in the erstwhile East Pakistan, would bear out. In both these cases, it was the superior military adversary that was defeated—even militarily—by the impact of political, diplomatic and ideological factors that have often remained outside the reckoning of a traditional, technocratic, view of the strategic environment. Contemporary global strategic offensive of the United States, particularly after the Vietnam war, and its "anti-insurgency operations" in its client-states, manifests an acknowledgement of the importance of the political, economic and diplomatic component of national security. The inadequacy of the military-strategic approach to national security, and the need to give primacy to its political, economic and diplomatic component, have also been continuously underscored in India's North-Eastern frontiers,

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as well as in the northern frontier. Lenin's defence-mechanism for the fledgling Soviet state was, to begin with, diplomatic¹ and, subsequently in the phase of the interventionist civil war, he made judicious use of ideological and political factors along with the military. Similarly, Stalin's immediate response against the threat of Nazi aggression was diplomatic,² and, throughout the war and its immediate aftermath, the political, ideological, and diplomatic component of national security always remained in the forefront. The entire population of Stalingrad and Leningrad was ideologically motivated to a level of patriotism that the Nazi war machine, despite its technological superiority, could not match. Till at least the launching of the Cold War, the Allied Powers' military strategy gave due primacy to the political and diplomatic component of the war efforts. Throughout the Cold War, Soviet counter-offensive strategy against the global military superiority of the Western Powers gave primacy to political and diplomatic measures, as it has tended to do whenever perceiving any threat to its national security, whether in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or now again in Afghanistan and, in a different sense, in Poland. In fact, throughout the period beginning with the American nuclear explosion in 1945, the Soviet Union has successfully met the threats to its national security caused by the armament-gap primarily through diplomatic and political counter-offensive. The Western Powers, initially ensnared by the tantalising attractiveness of a policy of global military "containment," took some time to appreciate the relevance of such components of strategy. Even George F. Kennan, the author of the policy of "containment," regretted in his memoirs the misinterpretation of his theory by America's post-war "power elite" from the "military-industrial complex" to suit their subjective version of "national security," for reasons not under discussion here.³ But characteristically most military-strategists of the "Third World" seem to derive their inspiration from the "strategic environment" approach of American foreign policy of the early Cold War years that their American counterparts are now revising.

Inadequacy of Military-Strategic View

However, despite its historically proven inadequacy, the military-strategists' uncritical faith in the primacy of the technocratic version of the strategic environment is acknowledged the world over. Hence this propensity—often a professional hazard of narrow technical excellence—is sought to be institutionally countervailed in many countries by blending the military-strategic approach to national security with the perceptions of other relevant groups in the society before policy-options are decided upon at the highest political level. This concept of national security is built in the organizational structure of all apex institutions for national security, whether the National Security Council of the United States or their counterparts in the Socialist States. Such institutionalised co-option of the military-strategic viewpoint, within the decision-making apparatus based on a

comprehensive concept of national security, apart from improving the quality of decision-making on questions pertaining to national security, also helps in making the military-strategists a little less righteous and more responsive to the other dimensions of national security. People from the Armed Forces, benefiting from such political and diplomatic insights into their strategic perceptions are many; for example, Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, or even Haig, in the United States; Smuts and Mountbatten in Britain or de Gaulle in France; people like Zhukov or Malinovsky in the Soviet Union; Chu Teh and Lin Piao in China, or Giap in Vietnam. Similarly, but for their political and diplomatic insights into the strategic environment, it is doubtful if people like Kennan, Dulles, MacNamara or even Kissinger in the United States; or Lloyd George and Churchill in Britain; Mao Tse-Tung or Chou en Lai in China, Ho Chi-Minh in Vietnam or even Kim il-Sung or Castro in Korea and Cuba, all in their own way, would have been able to meet the perceived threats to their respective national security. A purely military-strategic view of national security has very limited relevance for prescriptive formulations in any society, even in situations of actual war and much less for perspective planning for national defence.

Need for Political Checks

While there is a case for some form of institutionalized co-option of the military-strategic view of national security within the overall framework of national decision-making, there is a much stronger case to provide for political checks against its natural propensity for excesses. Under normal circumstances, in democratic countries such checks are provided by the built-in primacy of the political process. The absence of such checks, in the military or civilian dictatorships of various hues contributes to the primacy of the military-strategic perception of national security. The consequence of such a development for the country are borne out by the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and the Shah of Iran, or the regimes in our neighbourhood, and in some parts of Asia, Africa and most of Latin America.

In most countries, there is in fact an inverse co-relationship between the relative primacy of the military-strategic perception of national security and the strength of its democratic political institutions. Even in the United States, with its relatively developed democratic institutions, the high level of post-war militarisation and global military expansion, emanating from a military-strategic perception of threats to national security, had to be legitimized by a moratorium on its democratic institutions through Mcarthyism.⁴ Paradoxically, while the democratic institutions in the United States re-asserted themselves at a subsequent stage, most post-colonial "Third World" countries, forced to opt for policies based on similar perceptions of national security never recovered from the dent caused to their weak democratic institutions and, consequently, were condemned to be ruled by a surrogate class of military-bureaucratic elite, as in Pakistan. The so-called "Cabinet

of Talent" in Pakistan in 1954, consisting of its military-bureaucratic elite, with its military-strategic perception of "threat" to national security from "Soviet expansionism" and "India's aggressive designs," directly paved the way for military rule to which the country has been condemned since 1958.⁵ The brief Bhutto interlude was only possible when the ruling clique was thoroughly discredited after the disintegration of the country resulting from such technocratic perceptions of national security. Such sources of danger, emanating from a purely technocratic perception of national security, remains thinly-veiled in most contemporary post-colonial societies, particularly in the context of the high stakes with which Super Power global diplomacy continues to be played.

In other words, in most post-colonial societies, a technocratic version of the "strategic environment" approach to national security, not only involves simply the quality of decision-making, but also involves the fate of the democratic political process. It also involves a level of militarisation of the economy, society and polity that could only be sustained by a military-bureaucratic technocracy that has historically been proved, in such societies, to be parasitical, sociologically and intellectually. In such an eventuality, the thin line of distinction between external and internal threat, an endemic existential reality in most contemporary post-colonial societies faced with the global designs of the Super Powers, is likely to disappear altogether, again, as the experiences of the countries in our neighbourhood would bear out.

Economic Consequences of "Strategic Environment" Approach

Unlike in some capitalist democracies in specific situations, the "strategic environment" approach to national security has little relevance for post-colonial societies on more important political grounds than would be considered necessary to consider by our military-strategists. The case for such an approach is still weaker on economic grounds. In many such capitalist democracies, the level of their post-war militarisation had, and continues to have, deep-seated economic roots which has provided considerable political legitimacy to a concept of national security that reflected the economic complementarity between defence and development. Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of President Truman's International Development Advisory Board, recommending the Mutual Security Act (1953), reported to the United States Congress : "The more we have explored the relationship of economic development to defence, the more impressed we have been with how truly inseparable they are."⁶ Baran and Sweezy in their study of the United States economy have pointed that "the difference between the deep stagnation of the 1930s and the relative prosperity of the 1950s is fully accounted for by the vast military outlay of the fifties," and that between 1939 and 1961, unemployment fell from 17.2 per cent to 6.7 per cent, only because of the difference in US military spending, so that if the military budget were

reduced to the 1939 level, unemployment would have also reverted to the same level.⁷ According to another study, "the sharp increase in military spending and its percentage of the Gross National Product at the time of the Korean War is associated with a marked increase in the GNP and a marked decrease in the rate of unemployment. The cut-back in arms expenditure in 1954 was, in turn, accompanied by a standstill in the GNP and a sharp rise in unemployment."⁸ In any case, documentation to establish the economic basis of post-war American militarisation is now comprehensive enough to leave much scope for debate on the subject.⁹

Unfortunately, empirical studies on the economic consequences of the rate of military spending in such of the post-colonial societies that still maintain their democratic structure, is not so comprehensive. But even from the sketchy literature that is available, some co-relationship between high military spending and the political economy of underdevelopment is possible to establish. Firstly, most such post-colonial societies, with a high level of defence budget emanating from a military-strategic perception of national security are under one or other form of military or civilian dictatorships as in countries like Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan or some of the Latin American countries. Secondly, almost all of them have, what may be described as, surrogate political regimes managing satellite economies of one or the other Super Power, as in the aforementioned regimes, as well as in some oil-rich West Asian countries. Thirdly, most such countries' high military outlays, ostensibly against "external threat", are very often investments to defend unpopular regimes against internal discontent caused by mass poverty sustaining a narrow social base of enormous personal wealth and ostentatious consumption, sought to be rationalized by state-sponsored clergies and intellectuals. Allied to this politico-economic reality in many such countries, is the absence even of the basic minimal level of social transformation and/or political mobilisation that is an essential component of economic development of such countries. Fourthly, and following from the aforementioned characteristics of the political economy of such countries, is the feature of most such countries in which the apparent levels of prosperity in its pockets of wealth, or its GNP, is no true indicator of the abysmal depths of mass poverty, hunger, malnutrition or unemployment. The GNP in most West Asian countries, inflated by their oil wealth, do not even indicate these countries' potentials for development within the existing social structure, and hence the petro-dollars have had to be recycled. Phenomenon, like "Brazil is becoming richer, and its people poorer," could be generalised about many such countries. There are other paradoxes in such countries, as in Saudi Arabia which has equipped itself with the most modern fighter-aircraft but, in the absence of the necessary technological base, has to run and maintain them with foreign personnel, ostensibly to defend the country against external threat.

The consequences of such heavy military spending for national security is not far to seek. Swinging Teheran of the Shah of Iran, or his mighty

military machine—built on a social base of mass poverty—did not require any external aggression to collapse. With all its wealth and sophisticated armaments, the Saudi Monarchy has to depend upon foreign palace guards to provide security against internal disaffection.

The moral sought to be underscored by these examples is, that, for any underdeveloped post-colonial society, the concept of national security has to have a built-in predominance of its social and economic component; and that, any temptation to opt for the soft option of a purely military-strategic perception of national security, involving heavy defence outlays, is fraught with positive hazards. In such societies, actually faced with external threat, the military-strategic option could only be an option under duress, and not of preference. It is within the framework of these principles that the case for the Indian "bomb", in the context of the threat posed by the "Islamic bomb," should be viewed.

II

THE BOMB DEBATE

It is of course true that India is not exactly comparable to many of the countries from which generalised conclusions about the salient features of the political economy of underdevelopment have been derived. It is different in terms of the socio-economic base of its technology, its level of sophistication, or in terms of the socio-economic base of its political elite or the resilience of its democratic institutions. Further, it is also true, that within the framework of the concept of post-colonial underdevelopment there are variations in levels of post-colonial legacies and of underdevelopment. But to the extent that India's achievements in these regards have been unique—though it could easily be exaggerated—they are in no small measure accountable precisely to a strategy of national security espoused by the Founding Fathers which gave due emphasis to its social, economic, political and diplomatic dimensions, despite the pressures of military strategists, domestic and foreign. Whether the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 signified a failure of this perspective of national security, or a political and diplomatic failure to withstand the pressures of the military-strategic perspective, in a specific conjuncture of national and international politics, are questions which still remain to be resolved with the requisite rigour of scientific documentation. But in any case, the war of 1962 gave the first major set-back to the political legitimacy of this Nehruvian perspective of national security, as it has to the other spheres of the country's developmental perspective.

Since then, through the two rounds of war with Pakistan, our military-strategists and their foreign counterparts have had a field day in this country, crying for blood, as it were. Only, our strategists distinguish themselves from their foreign counterparts by their demand for the Indian "bomb". The demand was first raised when the cumulative impact of the three rounds of war, among other factors, contributed to a considerable distortion of

the country's developmental perspective and the first potential threat to the fledgling democratic structure after the death of Nehru. The most intense phase of the "bomb" debate in India coincided with the political hegemony of the so-called "Syndicate" and an economic crisis leading to the country's surrender to the World Bank-dictated devaluation in 1966.

The re-assertion of centralised political authority in the country particularly since 1969, again put the military-strategists and the "bombwallas" on the defensive till at least the war of 1971. Even more than the three rounds of the Kashmir war, this war for the liberation of Bangladesh was the first real confrontation between two alternative concepts of national security; the Pakistani military regime's technocratic version of a purely military-strategic concept of national security and India's concept of giving primacy to the political "ideological" and diplomatic component. In the ultimate analysis of the outcome of the war, and our admiration for the valour and fighting qualities of our Armed Forces, the importance of diplomatic factors—like the Treaty with the Soviet Union—and political factors—like the role of the Awami League leaders, the Mukti Bahini and the liberal public opinion in the West—could easily be under-rated. The 1971 war was a significant example to demonstrate the superiority of the Nehruvian concept of national security, as also of the hazards involved in a post-colonial society's exercise of military option, even under duress. While the war, perhaps like never so decisively after the death of Nehru, established the primacy of political process in the country and of centralised authority within the democratic structure,¹⁰ the economic consequences of the war in an underdeveloped, post-colonial, society were far-reaching. As earlier in 1966 after the three rounds of war, it contributed to scarcity, runaway inflation and economic chaos which, now provided the socio-economic base to the JP-movement, the Nav Nirman Samiti and the most organised political challenge to the central authority of the country. Significantly, it is in the midst of this serious economic and political crisis in the country, in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, that the political decision for the Pokharan "implosion" of May 1974 was taken, thereby providing further grist to the mill of our technocrats and military-strategists basking in the reflected glory of the nuclear feather in the cap of our political leadership.

Impact of the Bangladesh War

The morally and politically legitimate military support provided by India to the war of national liberation of Bangladesh—for which our military-strategists have taken unjustifiable credit—is a clear case of doing the right things for the wrong reasons. The content of our political sympathies—at least at the highest political level—for national liberation *per se*, had been proved in the mid-sixties when a groping leadership opted to remain understandably "pragmatic" during the American bombings in Vietnam; besides, the social base of our ruling elite, or the economic base of the ruling party,

make any such claims somewhat unconvincing. But, for historical reasons, the prospects of Pakistan's disintegration had potential political pay-offs which the erstwhile uncertain political leadership was not averse to cash upon.¹¹ It was a political decision to be "humane" to the erstwhile East Pakistan refugees, to receive, shelter, and feed them for no more altruistic reasons than those prompting the military regime in Pakistan to do, with American money, to the Afghan refugees now. But our military-strategists' rationalisation before, and afterwards, that the war successfully met the threats to India's security posed by Pakistan has proved to be wide off the mark. Another example of the inadequacy of a technocratic view of national security bereft of its social, political and diplomatic component—a politically divided Pakistan, as it existed before Bangladesh, had proved all through to be militarily less of a threat to India than two politically united sovereign states flanking India at two ends, as recent events in the sub-continent would bear out.

The military-strategic achievements of the Bangladesh war for India could easily be exaggerated, just as the selfless sacrifices of our Armed Forces in this struggle for national liberation, in view of the subsequent reports about some of the sociological perversions of the Indian Army's north Indian middle-class social base displayed in the liberated areas of East Pakistan—just as they continue to be displayed in India's North-Eastern parts—before the political leadership of the Awami League established their control. In underdeveloped post-colonial societies, military options have many facets affecting its social fabric, more than even that which the veterans of the Vietnam war wrought to the American society in the seventies, than our strategists would care to consider as of any consequence. The social costs of war are never inconsequential, less so for underdeveloped countries.

The significance of the Bangladesh war for India's national security, far from being military-strategic, lay in the political and diplomatic spheres: the assertion of political will and of national sovereignty of an underdeveloped post-colonial society, in open defiance of the global designs of a Super Power acting in concert with another power with Super Power ambitions. Diplomatically, it signified the assertion of regional autonomy in South Asia from the global designs of the Super Powers and a legitimisation of India's logical geopolitical role in the new regional power structure. Imaginatively handled, these two political and diplomatic advantages of the Bangladesh war can be made into the most important in-puts in India's national security in the foreseeable future.

Significance of Pokharan

Just as the Bangladesh war, the military-strategic significance of the Pokharan implosion could easily be exaggerated. Firstly, because the usefulness of a nuclear arsenal lies almost exclusively in its deterrence-value and not its use-value. In fact, the paradox of a nuclear arsenal is that its

utility to the possessor decreases to the extent it is tempted to use it; it was certainly not out of moral compunctions that America could not use nuclear weapons—when it actually used all other inhuman weapons of mass destruction—to save itself from defeat in the Vietnam war. Even, theoretically, granting its use-value as a weapon of war, in any Indo-Pakistan or Sino-Indian war the use of nuclear weapons would be militarily self-defeating for the simple reason that in these geographically proximate regions, depending upon wind-directions at any point of time, the fall-out of nuclear weapons hurled against an adversary would cause unacceptable damage to the country using it. It is again for no grounds of morality that the only occasion when such weapons have been used in war, was by the Western Powers in a region far away from the crucible of Western civilisation. The logic of strategic deterrence lies in continually improving the quality of nuclear weapons and delivery capacity and its stockpile on a scale that only Super Powers with global commitments could afford, and find worthwhile to undertake. One or two small nuclear weapons, and corresponding delivery system, makes no convincing nuclear arsenal in terms of strategic deterrence; they can only manifest the desperate strategic perceptions of societies permanently in a state of siege and haunted by insecurity and guilt-complex as the racist regimes of South Africa and Israel.

Secondly, nuclear weapons, in the arsenal of a strategic command, on a social base of mass poverty, hunger, malnutrition and unemployment leading to deep-seated political divisions within the country is, apart from being counter-productive, thoroughly unconvincing as a strategic deterrence. Such societies tend to be fragile, even politically, with little potentials for patriotic mass mobilisation in the defence of national security. It is of some significance that, empirically, none of the major nuclear Powers of the contemporary world are confronted by such a social base that erodes, at the outset, the credibility of their potential nuclear arsenal as a strategic deterrence, as in the case of the Indian "bomb" or the "Islamic Bomb."

Despite its credibility-gap in terms of strategic deterrence, just as the Bangladesh war, the Pokharan "implosion" registered an important political point, apart from the scientific and technological point of the country's capability. The political point was the critical importance of political will in an underdeveloped post-colonial society as the determining variable in the assertion of national sovereignty in open defiance of the Super Powers' global designs. In fact, the Pokharan implosion of 1974 was the culmination of the important, but often forgotten, political point that Nehru was making through his policy of non-alignment from the beginning but which had been muffled in the "pragmatic" phase of our foreign policy by a groping leadership in the mid-sixties. This aspect of diplomacy of the earlier era was resurrected—howsoever fitfully—particularly in 1970 when the country symbolically retained the right to go nuclear by refusing to sign the Super Power-designed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since then, through the course of the Bangladesh war, India has been asserting the right, and

the possibility, of a determined political will in underdeveloped countries to defy the political logic of the duopolistic structure of International political system. The Pokharan "implosion", as it were, made this crucial political and diplomatic point with a bang, howsoever, symbolically. It was an important point to be made with potentials for significant diplomatic and political pay-offs to national security. But beyond that, it had little validity as a strategic deterrence. There would be as little strategic deterrence-value in translating the nuclear option emanating from Pokharan to a programme for a nuclear arsenal. The necessary strategic mileage, if any, could be derived from the post-Pokharan situation of technologically being at any point of time within six months of the political decision to go militarily nuclear. This seems to be a reasonably happy situation for Indian military strategy, since one does not usually visualise an Indo-Pakistan war without at least six months of warm-up session preceding it. A pre-emptive first-strike, even at a theoretical plane, is the prerogative of two first-rate nuclear Powers, with total strategic nuclear capabilities of near-equal strength, on a scale that is economically unrealistic to visualise in the Indian sub-continent in the foreseeable future.

Myth of the Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal

If the strategic significance of India's proposed nuclear arsenal, as visualised by our military-strategists, is illusory, the phantom of an imminent Pakistani nuclear arsenal, upon which such pressures are being mounted in India seems to be unreal; not on grounds of any technological or financial constraints but, paradoxically in the case of Pakistan, in spite of their absence. It is the satellite character of Pakistan's political economy, and surrogate nature of its military-bureaucratic regime that is likely to prove an insurmountable constraint for Pakistan to make precisely the political point that was made by India at Pokharan. The Super Power underwriters of the Pakistani military regime simply cannot allow it an indulgence they have denied to no less faithful—and strategically critical—allies as the Shah of Iran and the monarchy in Saudi Arabia; and, the Pentagon must be thanking its stars for its foresight on this score in the context of Iran. None of America's dependent allies in the under-developed world, so totally dependent upon its economic and military aid, and with a regime lacking any domestic political base, as in Pakistan, have been or could be expected to be, allowed the indulgence of a nuclear arsenal that could provide such a country a level of autonomy in policy-planning pertaining to national security that is simply unacceptable to a Super Powers' global interest. Dependent allies with autonomy of national decision-making is a contradiction in terms. In other words, Pakistan's political capabilities of building a nuclear arsenal is inseparably linked with the inter-woven movements for the country's democratisation and the political assertion of national sovereignty. In the present context of that country's political economy,

a nuclear arsenal for Pakistan with adequate capabilities of strategic deterrence appears to be an unrealistic assumption on which to build any case for India's strategic response.

Reality of Pakistan's Capability

But Pakistan's ambitions to demonstrate its nuclear technology capabilities—for reasons of obvious political pay-offs as for the Indian leadership—could be a more realistic assumption as a basis for an appraisal of India's possible response. It is a realistic assumption because the Super Power underwriters of the Pakistani ruling clique could not be averse to demonstrating, through a Pakistani nuclear explosion, to its Super Power allies and India, the dangerous implications of an unrestricted nuclear proliferation. It may be wise for India to conform to the logic of such a signal, even if it was American-inspired because an unrestricted competition to improve the quality of their respective nuclear arsenal—a logical corollary of a policy of strategic nuclear deterrence—between these two under-developed post-colonial societies would be even more counter-productive than the existing race for superiority in conventional armaments promoted in the region by the Super Powers and the new, proliferating, breed of their local agents, liaison men and defence contractors. In fact the far-reaching consequences of a probable nuclear arms race in the name of national security, on the political economy of the sub-continent, would, in the long run, be conducive to the Super Powers' global designs; in which case, in trying to establish our one-up-manship in the battle for a nuclear arsenal, we would lose the war of asserting our national sovereignty. We might as well deny ourselves the pleasure of such dubious "anti-Americanism"—of the sort often indulged in by the Shah of Iran, Ayub Khan or others among the Super Power's dependent allies for socio-psychological reasons not under discussion here—and work out policy-alternatives which, in the long run, help in the assertion of the country's national sovereignty, which is the most effective defence-mechanism of the national security of undeveloped post-colonial societies.

Options for India

If the Pokharan "implosion" has weakened India's objections against a possible Pakistani "explosion" to demonstrate its nuclear capability, a nuclear arsenal by India—with little impact as a strategic deterrence—would further weaken India's case against a Pakistani nuclear arsenal. In fact, given the history of Indo-Pakistan relationship, our objections would only make the case politically more attractive for the Pakistani regime. Also, there is precious little that India could do to prevent Pakistan from exercising its option in favour of a nuclear explosion and even, theoretically, for a nuclear arsenal, except appealing to the United States to advise

restraint on its dependent ally. But it would be politically and economically—even strategically—counterproductive to help, and endorse, Pakistan's Super Power linkages, in the interests of the long-term security of the sub-continent. A more preferable alternative, from the standpoint of India's national security, may be to help the emerging process of a social and political base in our neighbourhood that would provide built-in checks against the excesses of regimes that thrive off such desperate, and nationally counter-productive, military-strategic perceptions of national security which tempt them to opt for nuclear armaments.

III

SOME POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

The policy prescriptions emanating from such a comprehensive strategy of national security for India would involve, firstly, the announcement of a "self-denying ordinance"—in a manner that carries conviction and credibility—renouncing the counter-productive option of a nuclear arsenal. That would considerably help in allaying the insecurity in our neighbourhood—to the extent that it is legitimate—which has conferred considerable political legitimacy to the "Islamic Bomb." It would simultaneously weaken the base of one of the supporting props of the military regime which thrives off a self-generating cycle of military-strategic perception of national security, tensions in the sub-continent, and authoritarian rule at home. The second important component of the comprehensive strategy of national security would involve imaginative political and diplomatic support to the forces of democratisation in our neighbourhood, which are also, potentially, movements for the assertion of the autonomy of the sub-continent from the Super Powers' global designs. This policy-prescription is suggested not on any assumption that a democratic Pakistan would *ipso facto* renounce its possible nuclear ambitions; on the contrary, as already indicated, a democratic Pakistan is a necessary—though not necessarily sufficient—condition for a nuclear Pakistan. But since there is precious little that we can do to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear—and less so, once we ourselves decide to go nuclear—we might as well ensure, or at least aid the process, by which the nuclear trigger is provided with political checks against its misuse by desperate military regimes for ill-conceived personal aggrandisements. Empirically, democratic, political checks have been the only effective defence-mechanism for an under-developed country's social and economic priorities being distorted by military options to national security under the pressures of military-strategists, domestic and foreign. This is also true for many developed countries as well.

The second policy-prescription also involves a "self-denying ordinance" for the Indian leadership; to be sensitive to the democratic institutions and aspirations within the country so as to make our political and diplomatic support for similar aspirations in the neighbourhood to be morally legitimate

and politically convincing. But that by itself, would not be too bad a bargain for the country's national security, with or without a nuclear arsenal. In fact, the additional merit of such a comprehensive strategy of national security is the built-in premium it provides in this significant, but often forgotten, political component without which a strategy of national security built exclusively against external threat would be inadequate to meet the resultant challenges of internal disaffection. From the social, economic and political angles, a nuclear arsenal for India at present—with little impact as a strategic deterrence—could become the major liability for the country's national security, with or without the "Islamic Bomb."

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NOTES

- 1 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and the subsequent Decrees of Peace.
- 2 Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, and subsequently the alliance with Western Powers.
- 3 For a detailed discussion of the causes and its consequences, see Aswini K. Ray, "Myths in American and Pakistani Foreign Policies: Their Contemporary Relevance," *Foreign Affairs Reports* (New Delhi), September-October 1980.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 See, Aswini K. Ray, *Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1975).
- 6 Cited in Lenny Siegel, "The Future of Military Aid," in Steve Weisman *et al*, *The Trojan Horse* (Palo Alto, 1975), p. 209.
- 7 *Monopoly Capital* (Hammondsworth, 1966), pp. 176-77.
- 8 Joseph D. Phillips, "Economic Effects of the Cold War" in David Horowitz, (Ed.), *Corporations and the Cold War* (New York, 1970), p. 174.
- 9 See "Aswini K. Ray, n. 3.
- 10 Mrs Gandhi's unprecedentedly massive popular mandate in the General Elections of 1971 is an evidence of this statement.
- 11 Just as the Pakistani leadership, with similar prospects, would not perhaps hesitate to cash upon. Even Bhutto could not resist the political temptation to declare a "thousand years' war" against India, shortly before he persuaded Mrs Gandhi to receive him at Simla.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD: A STRUCTURAL REINTERPRETATION

By ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY*

The problem of economic aid requires a comprehensive reassessment. Apart from the shortcomings of the existing studies, a few other developments, having their origins in the seventies, have made this imperative. Firstly, consequent upon the intensified theme of transfer of resources under the demand for a new international economic order and the increasing vulnerability of the international credit structure, the issue of aid has re-entered the core of the development debate. The Brandt Commission Report as well as some other development documents have amply recognized this.¹ Secondly, the discipline of international relations has witnessed a paradigm shift towards political economy,² bringing along some new methodological insights which can be used to overcome the limitations of the available studies.³ Of the many such approaches offered,⁴ the structural approach has been found to be exceedingly useful particularly with regard to problems like trade, technology and private capital.⁵ Aid so far has escaped its application. This paper seeks to fill this gap by attempting a two-fold reconstruction, theoretical and empirical.

I

METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

Method, broadly speaking, is a composite of two dimensions, substantive and technical. In broad terms, the "substantive" dimension implies that, in order to analyse a particular phenomenon or an aspect of reality, one has to situate it first in its totality and make assumptions about the relationship between the aspect chosen and the totality of which it is a part; whether or not these assumptions are valid will be determined by how far the theoretical structure built upon them corresponds with reality as it has historically developed and, is concretely manifesting itself. The technical aspect basically relates to the details of this enterprise, i.e. the building up of the theoretical structure and showing the proposed correspondence or absence thereof.

Existing studies on aid perform poorly on this plane. While most of the economic studies have made a fetish of technique taking it as the whole method, the political studies have, alongside, attempted substantive assumptions too. They are inadequate on both the fronts. The two constituents of evidence—statements and statistical data—have not been rigorously tackled. Where statements—official or unofficial—can support or refute a conceptual formulation, they have been used as evidence and contrasting data either

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set aside or marginally touched upon (applicable mostly to political studies).⁶ Where on the other hand data serves the purpose, statements to the contrary have been either neglected or down-played (applicable mostly to economic studies).

A slightly careful examination would reveal that neither of the two types taken in separation can constitute a self-sufficient proof, *though statistical evidence, even in the absence of statements, would be closest to self-sufficiency*. The statements can be either mystificatory of the real motives, consciously or unconsciously, or may just represent perceptions of the decision-makers or actors involved, which in turn may not be necessarily true of reality.⁷ Official statements can be used as rigorous evidence *only if statistical data support or supplement them*.

It is clear therefore that methodological scientificity demands a set of assumptions, (based on an understanding of reality as it has historically unfolded itself), which will inform our interpretation of evidence, and for which data and statements will be used in the order of their reliability.

What then are our substantive assumptions with regard to our problem and why? The discussion here would start with the inadequacy of existing assumptions—implicit or explicit—and then proceed on two interconnected levels, on the “structural” level of aid relations and on the contextual determinants of that structure.

Aid so far has been discussed either as an enterprise purely economic or something which is predominantly political with the economics involved seen just as an *instrument* for political purposes. With isolated exceptions,⁸ the mainstream of aid-scholarship has followed either of these two approaches. Economists, particularly of the neo-classical persuasion, have primarily been concerned with the relationship of aid with levels of income, savings, investment, growth rate etc.⁹ Since their methodology and perspective take little note of, if not neglect altogether, the social context of economic transactions, economic development has been presumed by them as the determinant of aid-relations. If it has not materialized, it is because of the intrusion of extra-economic irrationalities into the mathematized rationality of economics. Needless to add, until failures of the developmental objective itself are not incorporated in the framework, its explanatory utility is inherently limited which is exactly the case with these studies.

Political scientists on the other hand emphasize the primacy of politics in two ways. The earlier writers,¹⁰ writing in the Cold War milieu or just thereafter, focused on the politico-strategic imperative as the guiding force of aid and domestic economic necessities were regarded as relatively unimportant. The more recent writers¹¹ on the other hand, have given the economic dimension a logical twist; while domestic economic interests, like the former argument, have not been important as far as aid extension is concerned, “aid-weariness” is primarily explained by referring to the “realization” that aid was not bringing about economic development and was instead creating an exploitative image in the recipient countries.

Thus, while linkages have been sought, it has been done eclectically. Explanatory convenience has basically decided which factor—political or economic—will be important. There is no genuinely integrative attempt, which can trace the *underlying inter-connections* between the economic and the political levels—as they interact on the plane of aid-relations.

The concept of “structure” can integrate the two levels. The basis for this view is the fact that *all* economic transactions, including aid, take place in a social setting, where forces which generate interaction with the economic also at the same time pressure the political.¹² Every state is rooted in a socio-economic system. The latter at every given point produces certain *objective tendencies and necessities* which the State has to manage. The set of these interconnected *objective forces, tendencies and necessities* present in every socio-economic system at all points of time are the integrative structures, that need to be examined.

How do these considerations apply to aid relationships? A dissection of the definition of aid would be helpful. Aid is defined as a cross-national official flow of resources made available at concessionary terms. Now, the fact that it represents a flow of resources relates it to the economic level and that it is official, connects it to the state and therefore to the political level. To show how this objective interconnection has *a logic of its own*, an illustration can be given and the relevant generalization abstracted therefrom. How does one, for example, explain the fact that aid still continues to exist in substantial magnitude, despite the oft-heard complaint in the poor countries that aid is “exploitative” and the over-used chorus in the donor countries (including United States), that aid is “ineffective” and “misused”? Surely, if conscious perceptions of decision-makers were the guiding logic, aid should have lost its existence by now. It is obvious that certain objective forces have been more important than subjective assertions. The search for causation therefore involves an exploration beneath these immediate appearances and identification of the underlying forces and tendencies—structures—of the interacting systems.

Several questions immediately crop up here. Given the fact that the nation-states interacting as donors and recipients are not monolithic units, but concrete entities in which various social groups are differentially placed with respect to hold over resources, can the question of “exploitation” and “misuse” or benefit and loss be confined to nations as a whole? Does this differential placement—an objective fact—not generate continuity of aid—another objective fact—despite the various reservations? Is there not the possibility of some particular groups benefiting on both sides despite the overall loss to one particular nation? At any rate, is the sheer necessity produced by the growth pattern not an impelling consideration? The available studies have either partly raised these questions or only partly answered them.¹³ On the other hand, by looking into the nature of the socio-economic systems involved, the differential placement and needs of social groups, the

insertion of state therein and the consequent resources, our attempt shall be addressed to exploring the structures which these questions suggest.

II

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS : AID AS PART OF THE STRUCTURE OF DOMINANCE AND DEPENDENCE

It is clear that, in the first place, interaction between two types of structures is involved—one relating to the needs of the recipient and the other to the extension by the donor. But this is not the only level of the process at work. While both the structures have their own systemic contexts, the interaction takes place in a still wider context, the world system, of which the two interacting systems are a part. As a result, there is also present an overarching structure specific to the wider system, which shapes the aid-interaction. This structure is the International Division of Labour, which has developed historically along with the evolution of the World System itself.¹⁴

The literature on aid tries to posit the two sides as completely separate, having to inter-systemic linkages. What is being essentially argued here on the other hand is that, though functioning apparently separately, the limits of the two operations—extension and receipt—are set by the broader structure of International Division of Labour. The latter, by historically dividing economic labour between various countries, also shapes *objective relations of dominance and dependence* between them. Perspectively seen, aid transactions are a component of this pattern of dominance and dependence; they connect the dominance—rationality of the donor to the dependence—pattern of the recipient, both processes having been generated historically and finding expression *inter alia* in the form of aid in a given historically specific period of relationship.¹⁵ While the dominant systems tend to maintain the existing Division of Labour, wherein lies their dominant position, and aid is *one of the many mechanisms* for this purpose, the dependent systems are caught in the rigidity of this Division and aid is *one of the many reflections* of it. The other components are transfer of private capital (as distinguished from official transfers of aid), technology, and trade.

This pattern however is not static; while aid generates (and is in turn generated by) dependence, it does not mean complete subordination. Nor does it imply the absence of attempts to overcome dependence. Such attempts do exist; their effectivity however is circumscribed by the Division of Labour. The resultant tension is reflected in the aid relationship, particularly on the political level where the presence of independent statehood clashes with the compulsions of economic dependence, and sometimes leads to erosion of aid links too. The point needs emphasis, for the Marxist writers, in particular, have either totally ignored or considerably underemphasized it. The result is a unilinear economic causation, which fails to explain periodic assertions of autonomy by the dependent states.¹⁶ Most of the liberal writers on the contrary have made too much of political

independence while analyzing aid relations. Klaus Knorr's list of "twenty five notorious cases" is an example of this.¹⁷

THE RECIPIENT SIDE : AID AND THE STRUCTURE OF DEPENDENCE

Why at all is aid needed? Since most of the controversy revolves around the objectives of the donors, this question has received inadequate attention.¹⁸

The most frequently quoted explanation rests on the two-gap model¹⁹ which has become conventional wisdom in development literature. The basic argument of the model is that growth in the LDCs is hampered by gaps in two types of resources—savings and foreign exchange. While domestic savings are needed to generate investment, exchange is needed to buy imports and technology which can sustain and enhance its level. However, because of their poverty, the LDCs have meagre quantum of both, and aid by intervening at the low savings part of the process can help these economies break out of the vicious circle of poverty.

The model bases itself only on a part of the truth and is both factually and conceptually weak. By presuming *general insufficiency* of capital and not going into the question of *differential availability* of resources with diverse social groups, it glosses over the issue of "potential" economic surplus²⁰ being existent with the privileged classes/strata of these countries and yet not being properly utilized. Baran and following him some other writers,²¹ have convincingly shown that even though the potential surplus in developing countries was small in comparison to the advanced countries, it was large as a proportion of the total domestic output and national income of these countries and accordingly was sufficiently large to permit high rates of growth.²² Similarly, the presence of substantial foreign exchange resources in a number of these countries at the time of their independence has also been overlooked by the model. Here too its proportion to the national income has been found to be sufficiently large.²³ Therefore it is not so much these gaps themselves, but the causes behind the creation of these gaps which account for the need of aid. The causes, on the most obvious level, are two and they are inter-related; (i) the failure of these states to fully mobilize the potential resources, and (ii) the mode of the utilization of whatever surplus was generated.

What relates the two phenomena is the structurally dependent character of these systems. Structural dependence is a product of three basic features of the post-colonial systems: (i) the historically shaped structure of the economy; (ii) the nature of the new state, particularly in terms of its relationship with the privileged classes; and (iii) the development pattern followed by the state, given the first two features. These features would clarify how aid is interwoven with trade, private capital, technology, consumption and market pattern and the state's role therein.

It is widely accepted now that the economic structure inherited by the new states had certain built-in distortions, which the logic of the colonial

phase had concretised. For our purposes, the most important distortion is the market-pattern which on account of industrialization not being preceded by an agrarian revolution (as was the case in the advanced countries), was biased against "mass" consumption goods and oriented in favour of "luxury" consumption goods. "Marginalization of masses" produced the former and the Europeanized consumption pattern of the privileged social strata accounted for the latter.²⁴

The nature of the "new state" was such that it could not radically alter the consumption-pattern, for that would have meant a fundamental restructuring of income-distribution in favour of masses to generate substantial demand for mass-consumption goods. This in turn implied transferring the surplus available with the privileged classes, in particular the indigenous capitalist class (wherever it existed), and the landlords, which the actively supportive role of the former in the national liberation movement and the entrenched power of the latter in the socio-economic structure made objectively difficult.²⁵ Therefore, the industry-based development that was followed after independence inevitably reflected the existing consumption-bias. Moreover, appropriation of the privileged surplus being ruled out, the mobilizing of resources required for industrialization was based more and more on indirect taxation, which meant a further squeeze on mass-incomes. A cycle was thus built; whereas industrialization itself was heavily focused on the production of capital and luxury goods; the further marginalization of masses that resource-mobilization implied meant at any rate no increase in the demand for mass-consumption goods. Industrialization therefore became "top-heavy", with the capital and luxury goods industries flourishing and those producing mass consumption goods languishing.²⁶ Now, the fact that luxury and capital goods are technology and capital-intensive made import of inputs a necessity and the latter in turn demanded considerable foreign exchange to pay for the imports. If the exports too could correspondingly be increased, foreign exchange reserves would have existed. But the exports of these countries principally being primary goods, and the world demand for the latter being considerably inelastic,²⁷ persistent balance of payments problems drained away the exchange reserves. Thus, industrialization required substantial aid.

Need for aid at a particular stage however does not mean continued dependence on it. After all, West European countries which received heavy aid at one time under the Marshall Plan, are now challenging the American economic pre-eminence. A combination of at least five specific factors prevented its repetition in the case of the LDCs. First, the export-lag, which partly accounted for the aid-need itself, continued for the reasons stated above. Heavy increase in exports on the other hand was required to offset the continued need of aid.

Secondly, aid itself was accompanied by "strings," the most important of them being the insistence of donors on lesser state interference in the economy and greater play of market forces. Its two important results were:

(i) demand being the stimulant of supply in a market economy, it deepened the existing consumption bias; and (ii) it also brought with it foreign capital to support investment. Notwithstanding this initial influx of capital, the technology-intensive (and labour-saving) character of this capital prevented a substantial rise in mass-employment.²⁸ The marginal mobilization-effect therefore further consolidated the existing consumption-bias. Though exports in a number of cases did rise, because of the export-restriction clauses²⁹ of the investment, they did not rise significantly enough. As a final addition, the outflow of profits (generated from the domestic market), dividends etc.,³⁰ burdened the balance of payments situation still more.

Thirdly, the state—the political level of the system—too developed a vested interest in the continuance of aid. The existence of the ruling elite in power demanded a consequent growth rate so that the system could function properly. However, given its inherent incapacity on the resource-mobilization front and the intrinsic unpopularity of tax-measures which alone could have generated those resources in the absence of a fundamental reshuffle, aid (along with private foreign capital), constituted a relatively easier option to get the resources that were needed to maintain a comfortable level of investment.

Fourthly, indigenous capital also, like the state, developed a vested interest in the continuation of the trend. Precisely the same factors that generated the state's dependence brought this about, though in a different way. Given the technology and capital-intensive character of the industrialization, the indigenous capital realized that a complete capture of the domestic market *on its own* was objectively impossible. Since some growth is better than no growth or even very little growth, the very growth-needs of the indigenous capital impelled it to make use of whatever co-operation the technologically superior and capital-abundant foreign business was ready to provide. The "strings" of aid particularly in terms of the entry of foreign capital with which the indigenous capital had an adverse relationship before independence, were not really important, for so long as aid could support a larger investment programme within an already limited market, it implied an absolute increase in the share of indigenous capital. The same limitation of market later induced a drive towards exports for growth; here again, despite the export-restriction clauses of the MNCs, a share in whatever export-rise was possible was an absolute increase. So, the very growth-needs of indigenous capital required persistence of aid, irrespective of whether it was desperately needed or not.

Finally, given the co-existence of limited export-earnings and the rising debt burden, the repayment of earlier debt itself necessitated greater availability of aid.

To sum up, three basic themes seem to be consistently inherent. Firstly, it is clear that continued dependence on aid is precisely the result of those structural features which generate its need in the first place. Secondly, it is also clear that the process unleashed by the internal structure has super-

imposed on it the confines of the International Division of Labour. While the market and consumption patterns, and the state's relationship with the privileged social groups define the internal structure, the limitations of export earnings and the differential hold over technology and capital in the world system define the external structure. On yet another level, the colonial genesis of both the market and the consumption pattern shows how the historical evolution of this division patterned the internal structure itself. The role therefore of the external structure in the generation and maintenance of the need for aid is critically important and needs thus to be noted. In a way, it is not only super-imposed on the internal structure but is very much internalized therein.

Thirdly, management of the system being one of the primary tasks of the state and aid being intrinsically connected with it, the new state operates within the economic parameters outlined above. While the economic logic does not automatically translate into political logic in the sense that economic dependence does not force a re-incarnation of political dependence, it does militate against a blanket assertion of political independence. And added to the vested interest of the ruling elite itself in the continued availability of aid, one can clearly see the objective tension that exists between this necessity and the necessity of maintaining political independence. The foreign policy of these states therefore reflects this tension. Both compromises with and/or submission to the donor on the one hand and autonomy-assertion on the other, will co-exist, the exact extent of each at a particular conjuncture being determined by the extent of necessity itself.

Explanatory Framework

What evidence do we have for these theoretical formulations? We shall divide this part into three sub-parts—(a) concerning aid flows, debt service burden and private capital flows; (b) concerning the trade-pattern, on the basis of which limitations of the export earnings of the LDCs and their implications for aid could be shown; and, (c) concerning the market and consumption pattern. Statements here will not be a part of the empirical evidence, primarily because, given the number and heterogeneity of developing economies, any single set of statements made by any given country or leader may not be generally reflective of the entire developing world, even though a single explanatory framework may exist. Data on the other hand can show the latter and will be relied on here.

Table I gives the latest available figures (1965-78) on official and private flows from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD countries, which cover all the developed market economies. While official development assistance (aid) has increased, what is more important to note is that private flows, consisting predominantly of private investment and lendings have increased at a faster pace. Whereas the value of private investment and lending was roughly 50 per cent of the aid-flows in 1965, it had

Table 1

Net Official and Private Flow of Resources from DAC Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Agencies¹

| | (\$ million) | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Type of Flow | 1965-67 Average | 1970 | 1972 | 1973 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
| Official Development Assistance ² | 6118.0 | 7983.8 | 10253.1 | 11995.0 | 13665.4 | 14695.7 | 19881.8 |
| Private Flows at Market Terms ³ | 4134.8 | 6870.6 | 8618.8 | 11071.6 | 22417.0 | 29987.9 | 44611.3 |
| Private Investment and Lending ⁴ | 3174.0 | 4728.9 | 5237.0 | 09873.0 | 16993.2 | 21887.8 | 34924.5 |

- Notes:*
- 1 Includes all multilateral organizations meant for extending resources to developing countries. Only part of EEC funds went to EEC members. This will not significantly affect the conclusions.
 - 2 Includes both bilateral and multilateral flows.
 - 3 Includes private investment and lending and private export credits.
 - 4 Includes direct investment, bilateral and multilateral portfolio investment.

Sources : Compiled from the following :

- (i) *Development Co-operation, 1974 Review* (OECD, Paris, 1974), p. 233.
- (ii) *Development Co-operation, 1978 Review*, 1978, p. 216.
- (iii) *Development Co-operation, 1979 Review*, 1979, p. 226.

overtaken the official flow by 1976, and by 1978, the former was nearly 75 per cent higher. In an effort to explain this change in the structure of development finance, centering more on private investment and lending, it has been generally argued that the enormous increase in private lending in the post-'73 phase was entirely because of the need to recycle petro-dollars. This is an overstated point. As many reports and statistical studies have shown now, existence of petro-dollars merely quickened the process that was already under way in the early's eventies.³¹ In any case, direct investment too continued to increase though admittedly at a lower pace in the 'seventies. Aid certainly facilitated the tightening grip of private market flows. Some more dimensions of this relationship will be made clear when we examine donor structures.

Table II shows the rising debt burden. Only the latest figures have been given, but the trend is quite clear. While the official debt has had a little over two fold increase, its servicing in 1977 too is twice the 1970 amount. If we take all the flows together—all in any case being a part of the dependence relationship—the rate at which the debt-service has grown has been greater than the total flow itself; four times increase as opposed to the three times increase in flows in the period covered. It is clear that the presence of aid has neither meant elimination of its need (despite its so-called gap-filling function), nor has it meant a lesser debt-service burden. It has in fact been

accompanied by larger private capital. Table III covering the period upto 1972 further shows how the service—both on official and private flows—has consumed an increasingly large share of the export earnings, explaining partly the difficulty LDCs face in getting rid of aid. As for the period after 1972, the picture is all the more telling. The Brandt Commission Report notes that during 1973-78 “debt grew two-and-a-half times as fast as exports

Table II

Total Debt of Developing Countries (Disbursed) At Year End And Total Annual Debt Service (1970-77)

| | (\$ billion) | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Type of Debt | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1977 |
| <i>Debt</i> | | | | | |
| 1 Bilateral and Multilateral ODA | 28.60 | 33.30 | 43.50 | 56.60 | 64.30 |
| 2 Other Multilateral | 6.40 | 8.40 | 11.40 | 17.60 | 21.60 |
| 3 Total Export Credits | 26.10 | 32.50 | 39.20 | 57.50 | 66.00 |
| 4 Other (Market Items) | 12.10 | 20.10 | 44.80 | 79.40 | 91.60 |
| 5 Unallocated | 0.90 | 0.90 | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
| Total Debt | 74.10 | 95.20 | 139.90 | 212.20 | 244.00 |
| <i>Debt Service</i> | | | | | |
| 1 Bilateral and Multilateral ODA | 1.40 | 1.80 | 2.00 | 2.60 | 2.80 |
| 2 Other Multilateral | 0.80 | 1.10 | 1.40 | 1.90 | 2.20 |
| 3 Total Export Credits | 4.90 | 6.50 | 9.20 | 13.40 | 16.20 |
| 4 Other (market items) | 1.80 | 3.40 | 7.50 | 13.20 | 15.20 |
| 5 Unallocated | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| Total Debt Service | 9.00 | 12.90 | 20.30 | 31.30 | 36.60 |

Source : *Development Co-operation, 1978 Review*, (OECD, Paris, 1978), p. 250.

Table III

Exports, Debt Service and Investment Income Payment of Developing Countries


| | (\$ billion) | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|-------|-------|
| | 1960 | 1970 | 1972 |
| 1 Total Exports | | | |
| 2 Debt Service Payments | 29.60 | 63.00 | 79.90 |
| as per cent of Exports | 2.00 | 5.40 | 7.30 |
| 3 Foreign Investment Income | 6.80 | 8.60 | 9.10 |
| Payments (net) as per cent of Exports | 3.00 | 7.60 | 10.00 |
| 4 Total debt service Payments | 10.00 | 12.10 | 12.60 |
| as per cent of Exports | 5.00 | 13.00 | 17.30 |
| | 16.80 | 20.70 | 21.70 |

Source : *The United States and the Developing World Agenda for Action 1974*, (New York, Praeger 1974), pp. 156-7.

for more than half the oil importing developing countries."³² Figure 1 combines these trends at one place.

Figure 1

Debt, Debt Service, and Export Earnings of
Non-Oil-Exporting Developing Countries, 1967-1976
(\$ billions)



¹Disbursed and undisbursed debt

²Payments of principal (amortization) plus interest payments

NOTE: Debt and debt service data include only those 74 non-oil-exporting developing countries (plus the East African Community) that report debt to the World Bank. The 1976 figures for debt and debt service are ODC estimates based on World Bank data. Export earnings data are for all "non-OPEC developing countries" (as classified in the UN Standard Country, whether they report debt or not).

Source: *United States And the World Development Agenda 1979*, Overseas Development Council, (New York, 1979), p. 240.

Tables IVA, IVB and IVC carry further the point established by Table III. They show—(i) the lagging export-growth rate of developing economies (IVA); (ii) the high and increasing percentage of manufactures in world trade (IVB); and (iii) the abysmally low share of the developing economies in the export of manufactures, even as late as 1977 when some of the newly-industrialising countries had stepped up their manufactured exports (IVC). Moreover, even in the export of non-fuel primary commodities on which the LDCs depend for the most part, the share of the developed world is comparatively larger. Seen in conjunction with the first three tables, one

Table IV^a

Annual Average Growth Rates of Total Merchandise Exports

| | 1961-70 per cent | 1971-80 per cent |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| World | 7.8 | 6.0 |
| All Developing Economies ¹ | 6.5 | 5.4 |
| Developed Market Economies | 6.3 | 6.7 |

Note: 1 Excludes the seven capital-surplus oil exporters.

Source: World Bank Annual Report, 1980, (Washington, D.C.), p. 18.

Table IV^b

World Merchandise Exports by Category

| Category | (Percentages) | |
|------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| | 1960 | 1979 |
| Fuels | 10.6 | 21.7 |
| Non-Fuel Primary Commodities | 37.2 | 19.5 |
| Manufactures | 52.2 | 58.8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: World Bank Annual Report, 1980, p. 18.

Table IV^c

Percentage Shares in World Exports, 1977

| Country Groups | Non-fuel Primary Commodities | Manufactures |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|
| Developing Economies ¹ | 35.0 | 10.1 |
| Developed Market Economies | 55.6 | 79.6 |
| Others | 9.4 | 10.3 |

Note: 1 Excludes the seven capital surplus oil exporters.

Source: World Development Report, 1980, (World Bank, Washington, D.C.) p. 7

can see how the sluggish growth of exports—which is not likely to change given the commodity composition—and rising indebtedness are inter-connected.

On the question of the consumption and market patterns, if we could show that a large section of the population has been below the poverty-line, the meagre level of demand for mass consumption goods would be demonstrated. The greater demand for capital and luxury goods would then be a logical corollary of this. There are a number of studies available on the poverty issue. According to one of the most exhaustive studies undertaken so far under the auspices of the World Bank,³³ the percentage of population earning below \$ 75 per annum was found to be as large as 57.2 per cent for the Asian and 43.6 per cent for the African countries chosen for study. It is clear, if the percentage of low-income population is added to the percentage below the poverty line, the overall figures will be enormously large and there is absolutely no question of a substantial level of demand which can support the sustained growth of industries of mass-consumption goods. The implications of this have already been discussed. In most of the cases, the percentage seems to be increasing over the years. Thus, instead of eliminating poverty or promoting development—as claimed sometimes by aid-donors—the very existence and continuity of aid is to a substantial extent sustained by the existing poverty, with the latter's reflection on the market bias and industrialization pattern.³⁴

THE DONOR SYSTEM : AID IN THE STRUCTURE OF DOMINANCE

If relative neglect characterises the recipient state of the process, endless controversy marks the donor's side. In fact, so much has been written, controverted and re-answered that an evaluation of the existing viewpoints is necessary before positive formulations are put forth.

"Mixed bag of purposes" has become an aid-cliche. The discussed purposes can be divided into three categories—humanitarian, politico-strategic and economic. While most of the controversy has been on the relative weights of the last two purposes, "humanitarianism" too has formed an important component of the discussion. Moreover, as a matter of averages, the liberal writers have tended to exaggerate the humanitarian and/or the politico-strategic factors while most of the Marxian scholars have overstated the economic category, which again leaves a great deal unexplained. Liberal criticisms apart, even the recent developments in the Marxist method have rejected such reductionism as a simplistic explanation of reality.³⁵ Finally, though all the developed countries have extended aid, the focus of the available discussion is understandably on American aid. Despite the recent decline (as per cent of GNP) in the latter's contributions, it continues to be the largest single aid-donor country so far, overwhelmingly large to begin with and significantly large even now.³⁶ Though our discussion is pitched at places at the level of generality, we too would follow this pattern

with one proviso that the politico-strategic objectives are far less applicable in the case of other major western donors (Britain, West Germany, France)³⁷ for the simple reason that their "strategic" power has been considerably smaller than that of the United States and that it is the latter which has been leading the west in its various struggles with the opposite camp so far. In fact, some of the lesser western donors have explicitly acknowledged their utmost concern with commercial reasons.³⁸

We take up first the "humanitarian argument," the intensity of which has fallen over time but to date has not died.³⁹ The United States Government has repeatedly patronized the idea that being the richest country in the world, it has a "moral obligation to help alleviate poverty and promote more equitable economic growth in the developing world."⁴⁰ And aid symbolises this deep concern.

This argument has another variant, which emphasizes on philanthropy as an innate part of American tradition and relates aid thus to the national value-system. This variant gained a fair degree of academic currency, particularly after Gunnar Myrdal's view in the late fifties that aid was a twentieth century extension of the principles of welfare state into the international sphere.⁴¹

The argument has both conceptual and factual flaws. While one would certainly concede that humanitarianism played an important role in the actions of individual Americans or their teams, it would be rather naive to transplant this contention on to the official plane as well. The foreign-aid programme is formulated and executed in an administrative and political setting, whose continuity is sustained by the extent to which the interests of the vitally important lobbies are taken note of. Altruism in this setting is at best—that too not always—the public face of a formidable interest-core. This becomes all the more clear when the process involved is examined.⁴² The agencies of government concerned with those programmes have also to annually justify them before a Congress which in turn has to give expression, *inter alia*, to the interests of its constituencies. While the total tax for aid-programmes may not be large, it is nonetheless true that until they have at least some commensurability with the economic interests of important interest groups or with the safety of the state, it would be difficult to proceed with those programmes.⁴³

The internal process apart, even on external grounds the argument cannot be sustained. In a world of clashing ideologies and interests, humanitarian assistance to a country professing faith in, or showing inclination towards a rival ideology or power will be and is viewed as self-defeating. A number of incidents can be quoted, where despite an existing commitment and immediate necessity on humanitarian grounds, aid was held up for political reasons.⁴⁴

To the extent therefore, the value-system is germane to analysis—and it is certainly not without significance—it is in fact its *ideological* component which is more important than the *humanitarian* component, defining ideo-

logy with reference to the concrete socio-economic beliefs. Seen in the humanitarian sense, it can either refer only to the *occasional* instances of emergency relief operations, or to the group-activities of the explicitly humanitarian agencies, as opposed to being a *sustained* force at the governmental level. It was no wonder therefore that Myrdal himself had to revise his opinion in his later works.⁴⁵

This brings us to the main controversy. The terms of the debate have been posed in two broad ways: (i) strategic *versus* economic, purposes, and (ii) strategic primacy *versus* economic primacy. The latter has been an improvement of the late sixties and the seventies. However, the improvement also suffers from limitations in the light of the larger questions which are involved, questions which are not just confined to aid and in the context of which an integrated position will be constructed.

The politico-strategic argument is best represented in the proposition that "aid is a strategic reflection of a world outlook."⁴⁶ Concern for security in a world dominated by contending Powers implies maintaining the strategic balance of international forces in favour of the United States *vis-a-vis* the Communist Powers. To the extent economics has played a role, it has had less to do with "mercantilism" and more with the promotion of economic development of the recipients for the latter facilitated stability and thereby US security. Economics has been a tool in the hands of security and not its mentor.

The economic primacy argument has many variants: surplus capital and/or, the need for raw materials and markets have been regarded as *the* causes, particularly in the case of the United States, requiring incorporation of the newly independent countries into the capitalist system. This was given, according to these studies,⁴⁷ an ideological garb of the security of free nations and was achieved *inter alia* through the extension of aid. Initially, this was done on a bilateral basis and subsequently, with the lessening effectivity of this mode, multilateral channels like the World Bank became important and were relied upon.⁴⁸ The problem with both these views is not that they have marshalled no evidence for their positions, or that they are totally wrong. Where both err is in the very narrowness of the questions they have raised and the resultant limitation of their evidence search.

Two interrelated flaws have produced the inadequacy. First, the concept of primacy or causality has been wrongly perceived by them. The issue is not whether aid was meant to promote strategic interests either through economics or without it, or whether it just meant furtherance of economic interests behind a strategic smoke-screen. No system, given its various levels—economic, strategic, political, ideological etc., — functions in such dichotomies. In various phases the levels may have differences or different relative emphases. Such differences will continue to exist due to the periodic divergence of interest between various social strata, business, bureaucracy, military elites, etc. but the important thing is to recognize that, notwithstanding these periodic *differences* or *differential emphases*, the fact that they

are levels of the same system gives them an *underlying objective* unity too. The short-term and the long-term are therefore to be clearly distinguished while assigning causality. Short-term primacy is not causality, which is essentially long-term and constituted by the structural connections between the various "spaces" of the system. The same long-term dynamism of the structure has been at work, its only that the changing contexts have given it changing short-term modalities. The Cold War gave it a strategic edge and the 'sixties an economic thrust which further deepened in the 'seventies.

The point is all the more underlined by the second flaw of these approaches. While the politico-strategic argument concentrates on the compulsions of the international system, the economic argument focusses on the needs of the domestic system. The interconnections between the external and the internal have not been identified, which is basically because of the confusion of the short-term with the long-term.

What then are the interconnections in the case of the United States, our focus as the donor-system? Just as the existing International Division of Labour shaped the interaction between the external and the internal in the case of recipients, its historical specificity provided the base for such interaction in the case of the United States too, but in a necessarily different way. The specificity was two-fold: (i) the rise of the United States to a position of supreme dominance (in place of Britain) with the internal features of a dominant economy but without colonies as the external adjuncts, and (ii) the emergence of a rival socialist bloc along with a rising tide of decolonization.

Considerable evidence can be given in support of the argument that the American socio-economic system was generating external drives. The most important indicators are four: the state of the availability of raw materials, the function of external markets, the close association between the economic, military and the political elites, and the acute "depression psychosis." The first two can be historically demonstrated showing thereby the long-term nature of the drive. A study conducted by the United States Bureau of Census on "The Raw Materials in the United States Economy" itself showed that, whereas till the 1920s the United States was a net exporter of minerals, by 1940-44 it had become a net importer.⁴⁹ This trend has consolidated after 1945. On the question of capital export and external markets too, similar trends are visible. While by 1914, American investments accounted for only 6.3 per cent of the total investment of major capital exporting countries as opposed to the British share of 50.30 per cent, by 1930, the respective percentages were 43.8 per cent and 35.5 per cent and by 1960, the United States share constituted 59.1 per cent as against the halved British position of 25 per cent⁵⁰. One can therefore clearly identify the American drive towards economic ascendancy in the international system. That the drive was not purely economic can be shown by its roots in the socio-economic structure. Various studies, particularly that of C. Wright Mills,⁵¹ have empirically proved the interconnection between the economic

and the political elites of the United States. To these structural features was added the contingent factors of depression psychosis which had caught the American business. Galbraith has given ample testimony of this fact.⁵²

Thus, whereas the internal needs of the American socio-economic system, required maintenance of the International Division of Labour, reflected particularly in the historically existing pattern of raw materials and capital export, the external situation was threatening to weaken it. On the one hand, given the fundamentally different political, economic and ideological character of the socialist system, its further proliferation implied contraction of the area in which capitalism could operate. On the other hand, political independence of the erstwhile colonies, added to the above mentioned, gave them some measure of manoeuvrability *within* the system. The logic of the historical process, therefore, demanded newer forms of control, which could *orient* political independence towards the dominant centre and its system. Aid essentially emerged as one of the new features (the other being technology), of this structure of dominance, which also sought to maintain the existing international division of labour with its longstanding patterns of trade, market and private capital.

Precisely the same two contending forces however also meant that dominance had to be wider than just economic. The fact of political independence required that the process of penetration had to start through the State i.e. through the political level, and the fact of socialist antagonism highlighted the need for a strategic alliance with these states. Being a state-to-state operation, aid could perform the politico-strategic function of alliance-making too. So, which level came first did not matter. As long as overall orientation could be shaped forwards creating dependence the contingent need shaped the form of aid-policy;⁵³ the structure of dominance continued to evolve.

Further, the logic of this evolution also determined what importance aid itself would have *vis-a-vis* other components of the structure. Once it substantially oriented the developing economies towards the dominant centre and its system, the patterns of trade, private investment, and technology, so developed, themselves could be relied on for the continuance of the structure. The general decline of aid levels in the 'seventies and the greater emphasis on the last three issues could be explained to a great extent by this logic. Giving "determination" to cold war or even balance of payments problems of the developed world would be an inadequate explanation.

Empirical Evidence

The empirical evidence on which theoretically the above formulations are based is divided into three parts. The issue of overall orientation is tackled first and its two predominant constituent levels, politico-strategic and economic, dealt with next.

While, because of the nature of the structural argument, one is usually

obliged to cull out fragments from various Reports and Acts to exemplify the overall thrust, it is interesting to note that a memorandum prepared by the Agency of International Development (for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1965), has put across the aggregate picture in an unusually illustrative way. Since it has not been properly noted by aid-literature, quoting it at length would be in order:

The United States Government carefully considers whether diplomatic aid and cultural relations between the new nation and its former metropole will adequately maintain a western orientation within the country or whether the United States wishes to establish more extensive ties with the new nation than diplomatic relations alone permit, *in order to bolster the country's western orientation and/or to promote more specific US interests...*

Total reliance on the former colonial Power is often politically unacceptable in the newly independent state—moreover, the US position on, for example, issues before the United Nations may differ from that of the former metropole. In such cases, a modest US assistance program may 'sweeten' and thereby make possible continued primary reliance on the former metropole and/or may demonstrate US concern and interest and thereby increase receptivity to US views on international issues.⁵⁴ (Emphasis added).

While most of the other official accounts vaguely touch upon the question of "receptivity," the illustrative merit of the aforesaid lies in its location of the problem historically and stating that the purpose is both systemic i.e. general (irrespective of whether it serves the US interests in the immediate sense) and specific, both being fundamentally complementary.

Politico-Strategic Level of Operation

On this level, aid has been used for two functions—principally to keep the strategically important areas of the world under US influence, and additionally to induce desired contingent foreign policy changes.

Tables V, VI, VII and VIII show how the changing politico-strategic salience of different regions or countries over a period has accounted for changes in aid-concentration. Table VIII makes clear the disproportionality between population and aid percentages. Despite the fact that the Marshall Plan countries and the "client" countries, lying at the Soviet and the Chinese periphery, constituted only 30 per cent of the total population covered, they received 70 per cent share of the aid provided in the period. The reverse is true in the case of the LDCs. Table VI further shows how the share of Marshall Plan countries declined after the shift of the Cold War to Asia.

For the period after this, Tables VII and VIII cover two types of data and are to be read together. They strengthen the conclusions of the preceding

Table V
US Bilateral Economic Assistance (1945-1967)

| To | Aid | 1965 Population |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Per cent of Total | Per cent of Total |
| 1 Developed Countries ¹ | 39 | 19 |
| 2 "Client" Countries ² | 31 | 11 |
| 3 All other LDCs | 30 | 70 |

Notes: 1 Western Europe (except Spain & Portugal), Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

2 11 LDCs which had special military pacts with the US for "containment", including Pakistan.

Source: Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York, 1969), p. 124.

Table VI
US Bilateral Economic Assistance (1957-1967)

| To | Billion \$ | Percent of Total |
|-----------------------|------------|------------------|
| 1 Developed Countries | 7.5 | 13 |
| 2 "Client" countries | 20.7 | 37 |
| 3 All other LDCs | 27.8 | 50 |

Source: Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York, 1969), p. 124.

Table VII
Geographical Distribution of US Economic Assistance (1962-75)

| | (fiscal years) | | | | (\$ million) | | |
|--|----------------|------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------------------|
| | Total | Near East & South Asia | Latin America | East Asia (including South East Asia) | Africa, | Europe, | Others (inter-regional) |
| Obligations & loan authorizations. 1962-74 (average) | 3981 | 1144 | 867 | 969 | 336 | 49 | 616 |
| 1975 | 4892 | (28.74) | (21.70) | (24.34) | (8.44) | (1.23) | (15.44) |
| Loan Repayments and Receipts. 1962-74 average | | 1785 | 776 | 737 | 334 | 13 | 1247 |
| 1975 | | (36.49) | (15.86) | (15.06) | (6.83) | (0.27) | (25.49) |
| | 675 | 421 | 75 | 93 | 34 | 48 | 4 |
| | 783 | 330 | 144 | 103 | 71 | 133 | 1 |

Notes: 1 Figures in bracket represent percentages of the total.

Source: *Economic Report of the President, January 1977*, United States Government, (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 300.

Table VIII

Annual Ranking of the Major Recipients of US Bilateral Official Development Assistance, Fiscal Years 1967-77.

| Country | 1977 | 1975 | 1974 | 1973 | 1972 | 1971 | 1970 | 1969 | 1968 | 1967 | 1982 (If known) |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----------------------|
| Egypt | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2 |
| Israel | 2 | 2 | 10 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 8 | — | 1 |
| Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam before unification) | — | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | — |
| Republic of Korea | — | — | — | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | — |
| India | 6 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Pakistan | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3 | Not clear yet. |
| Bangladesh | 3 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | 5 |
| Indonesia | 4 | — | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Phillipines | 9 | — | 8 | 6 | 9 | — | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 6 |
| Cambodia | — | 6 | 2 | 9 | — | 9 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Turkey | — | — | — | — | 10 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 3 |
| Colombia | — | — | 9 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | — |
| Jordan | 10 | 9 | 6 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 8 | — |

Notes: 1 Major recipients means the ten largest recipients in each fiscal year.

2 The thirteen countries tabled above have figured most frequently in the list of major recipients. In some isolated years, other countries also figured, e.g., Bolivia, Syria, Chile, Brazil, but their frequency of appearance was very limited; at best two years in the decade covered.

3 For lack of data, no aggregate order has been given to the countries. Their appearance is based on the approximate recent ranking and/or largest frequency of appearance on the list of major recipients.

4 Blank spaces mean that in the year, for which no ranking is given, the country concerned does not figure in the ten largest recipients. It does not necessarily mean zero aid figure, though in some cases it may be so, e.g., Vietnam in 1977 and Egypt in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies.

5 The ranking proposed for the fiscal year 1982 is on the basis of requests made to the Congress by the Reagan Administration and is preliminary.

Sources: Compiled from the following—

- (i) *The United States and the Developing World, Agenda For Action 1974*, Overseas, Development Council (New York, 1974), p. 202.
- (ii) *The United States and World Development, Agenda for Action 1976*, (New York, 1976), p. 209.
- (iii) *The United States and World Development, Agenda 1979* (New York 1979), p. 258.
- (iv) For the fiscal year 1982 figures, *Business America* (Washington, D.C.) April 1981, pp. 2-5.

tables. First, the importance of the strategic factor is revealed quite dramatically. South East Asia and the Middle East change places with the end of the Vietnam war and the emergence of the Egypt-Israel detente tilted towards and worked for by the United States (Table VII). As the countrywise ranking further shows (Table VIII), the Republic of Vietnam, after being the topmost recipient from 1970 to 1974, slides down to the fifth rank in 1975 and by 1977, completely disappears from the list. In contrast, Egypt, absent till 1974, and Israel, never in the upper half till 1974, became the topmost recipients from 1975 on. The present Administration had continued the trend. Secondly, the low salience of poverty in aid-allocation is borne out by the twin facts that (i) of the major recipients between 1967-1977, only three (Bangladesh, Pakistan and India), figure in the United Nations category of low income countries,⁵⁵ and (ii) the share of Africa consisting most of the countries in the low-income category, has been quite minimal. The low strategic importance of Africa, as compared to the Middle East and South East Asia, explains the meagre aid-attention given to it, notwithstanding its abysmal poverty.

The most interesting feature of the table (Table VII), however is the substantial share of Latin America, which has not been strategically important in the sense of either being geographically contiguous to the USSR needing preemptive protection or having a communist threat as strong as the one in South East Asia requiring counter-measures. While the Cuban revolution did cause concern about Soviet designs, it should not be exaggerated. Neither in the strategic nor in the economic sense has the Soviet Union consequentially penetrated into Latin America.⁵⁶ The basic problem in Latin America in this period has been its utter political instability and the internal radical threat forcing a drive towards nationalistic and at best mildly socialistic, economic measures. Given the high level of American investments, both nationalism and communism merged into a single process and the basic purpose of aid therefore was to preserve domestic stability. The Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara himself Stated before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:

Social tensions, unequal distribution of land and wealth, unstable economies, and the lack of broadly based political structures create a prospect of continuing instability in many parts of Latin America... the goals of the alliance can be achieved only within a framework of law and order... *The primary objective in Latin America is to aid, where necessary, in the continued development of indigenous military and para-military forces capable of providing in conjunction with police and other "security" forces, the needed domestic security.* (Emphasis added)⁵⁷

It is important to note that Africa did not receive equal attention, despite being faced with similar instability. Thus, *level of economic interest or involvement in an area of instability also created strategic importance, regard-*

less of whether instability generated nationalism or a communist drive. This is another factor which explains additionally the large share of the Middle East and of Egypt and Israel in particular. The present Secretary of State frankly admitted: "Many of our security assistance partners enjoy a *geographical proximity to the resources of our economic demands*. Others possess timely knowledge of complex regional events and are best suited to understand these events and assure that they do not slip beyond responsible control." (Emphasis added) This statement was made while presenting the new aid policy to the Congress in March 1981.⁵⁸

Apart from this, aid has also been used to achieve short-term foreign policy changes in the LDCs, mainly through suspension, delay or reduction in the promised aid authorization. For example during the Korean war, the promised food shipment for India was reduced as a reaction to India's role in the war. Aid to Chile was, similarly, suspended after Allende's rise to power and resumed after a pro-American regime overthrew him.

Economic Level of Operation

The economic dominance functions of aid have been basically four-fold: (i) encouragement of private enterprise in general in the LDCs; (ii) Simultaneous expansion of American capital; (iii) Liberalization of trade, and (iv) Simultaneous promotion of American trade-interests. All the four purposes are inter-related. Besides, roughly till the late 'fifties, when the American economy held a position of supreme pre-eminence, the last three purposes were in fact subsumed by the first. Greater free enterprise was practically synonymous with greater dominance of the United States, for economic challenge being non-existent, it only meant greater freedom for American capital and consolidation of its trade pattern. However, with the rehabilitation of Western Europe and Japan by the 'sixties, attempts at specific trade and private capital promotion also were undertaken within the larger framework of the free enterprise system. Aid was used as an instrument in both the phases, and for all the purposes. Note for example, the following statement by the present AID administrator made before the Congress in justification of aid in March 1981: "Private US investment has been encouraged and the system of international trade strengthened in recognition of the opportunities trade can offer as an engine of growth especially for market-oriented economies."⁵⁹

Starting with the Marshall Plan, American insistence on "free enterprise" has never been in doubt, even when the development plans of aid-recipients have attempted a niche for the state sector in their economies. The various Aid Committees appointed by the United States Government and their reports have converged on this point. While the Clay Committee Report of 1963 stated that aid should not be given to establish "government owned industrial and commercial enterprises which compete with existing private endeavours,"⁶⁰ the Pearson Task Force of 1970 maintained that "US inter-

national development policies should seek to widen the use of private initiative, private skills and private resources in the developing countries."⁶¹ The Reagan Administration has also stated this explicitly.⁶²

The picture however needs some modification in its details. Despite the Clay Report, even the public sector of developing countries has been aided by the United States, but this has been true only of infrastructure projects and not the so-called "strategic" industries. Aiding these technology-intensive industries would obviously have gone against the American position in the international division of labour. The overall result, realized somewhat later, in any case has been promotion of free enterprise, for the state sector in all these economies was predominantly serving the interests of the private sector.

As regards the specific strengthening of American private capital, Table IX sums up the general trend. Whereas in the period covered, US development assistance increased only by about 70 per cent American private investment rose by 330 per cent which is nearly five times the increase in aid flows. Private flows in general (including portfolio investment) grew by about 310 per cent in the same period.

Table IX

Net Flow of Financial Resources from the United States to Developing Countries and Multilateral Agencies

| | (\$ million) | | | | |
|---|--------------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| | 1966-68 Average | 1970 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
| 1 Official Development Assistance | 3351.8 | 3046.00 | 4334.00 | 4159.00 | 5663.5 |
| of which : | | | | | |
| (a) bilateral | 3177.4 | 2653.0 | 2838.0 | 2897.0 | 3474.0 |
| (b) multilateral (including contribution to IBRD & IDA) | 174.40 | 393.00 | 1496.00 | 1262.0 | 2189.5 |
| 2 Private Flows ¹ : | 2006.30 | 2521.7 | 6399.0 | 6159.0 | 8287.0 |
| of which: | | | | | |
| Private Direct Investment | 1302.30 | 1888.00 | 3119.00 | 4866.00 | 5619.0 |

Notes: 1 Flows include portfolio investments and export credits also.

Source: 1 *Development Co-operation, 1979 Review*, (OECD Paris, 1979), p. 225.
2 *Development Co-operation 1978 Review*, 1978, p. 215.

A trend like this was ensured by the various Foreign Assistance Acts which explicitly established a connection between American private capital and aid. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, for example, enjoined the

Table X
Aid Financed US Agricultural Exports

| Year | PL 480 as percentage of the total agricultural exports. |
|------|--|
| 1960 | 27 |
| 1961 | 26 |
| 1962 | 29 |
| 1963 | 27 |
| 1964 | 26 |
| 1966 | 19 |
| 1967 | 19 |
| 1968 | 19 |
| 1969 | 17 |
| 1970 | 16 |
| 1971 | 13 |
| 1972 | 12 |

Source: *The United States and World Development Agenda For Action 1975*, Overseas Development Council (New York : Praeger, 1975), p. 246.

United States Government not to provide aid "to the government of any less-developed country which has failed to enter into an agreement with the President to institute the investment guarantee program...providing against... expropriation or confiscation."⁶³ The investment guarantee programme, administered by the AID, provided insurance for US citizens and corporations investing abroad. By the late 'sixties, it has been calculated, more than 70 LDCs had signed investment guarantee treaties.⁶⁴ Further, one of the official statements refers to the fact that earnings from US direct investment in 1975 in the LDCs amounted to \$7.4 billion—"more than our total foreign assistance that year."⁶⁵ Thus, not only has the annual growth-rate of direct investment been higher than that of aid (Table XI), even the earnings from the investment have, *at least in some years*, exceeded the total aid amount. One can see both the drive towards control and benefits therefrom.

Table XI
Major Voting Powers in the IBRD at the End of Fiscal 1980

| Country | Voting Power in per cent of Total |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| United States | |
| United Kingdom | 23.39 |
| Federal Republic of Germany | 08.62 |
| Japan | 05.84 |
| France | 05.81 |
| | 05.82 |

Note: By having more than 20 per cent voting rights of the total, the United States has a blocking minority on major decisions, which need 80 per cent votes to be passed.

Source: *World Bank Annual Report 1980*, (Washington, D.C.) pp. 158-9.

The third and fourth functions—aid to promote trade—have proceeded on two planes: by conditioning aid on general import liberalization of the recipient economy and by the practice of aid-tying. While the first has been prevalent all along, the second aspect has grown in importance since the 'sixties.

Since aid has been intrinsically connected with the balance of payments problem of the LDCs, its extension has almost invariably been preceded by an analysis of the problem by the United States. One of the most frequently advised solutions has been liberalization of trade policy; import-substitution plans of many countries during the 'fifties and early 'sixties, aimed at establishing an indigenous industrial base, were heavily criticised and the thrust sometimes changed. From the mid-sixties, this kind of control has come to be exercised in the form of program loan practices which conditions aid on an overall assessment of the economic programme of the aid-recipient.⁶⁶

Aid-tying too was largely a product of the 'sixties, when the goods of the other Western Powers had started becoming competitive. Jagdish Bhagwati, in one of the most exhaustive studies undertaken on aid-tying so far,⁶⁷ has arrived at the following conclusions regarding the American practice. Beginning from 1959, when development loans began to be tied, all AID loans have now become formally tied. "Informal" tying too has increased in the sense of AID missions seeking to encourage imports from the United States. Finally, AID has successfully imposed limitations on financing projects and/or commodities where US exports would be *competitive on commercial terms*, thus making it more likely that additionality would follow from aid-tying.

Table X gives statistical substantiation of the point regarding agricultural exports. The 'disposal of surplus'⁶⁸ thesis gains considerable credibility, if we further note that 68 per cent of the total wheat exports from the United States between 1955-66 was financed by PL-480.

III CONCLUSIONS

In the paper, an attempt has been made to locate the structural bases of aid-relations. Essentially because of their methodological inadequacy, most of the existing studies have not realized the importance of the issue and have in the process failed to comprehensively explain the various dimensions attached to the problem. We can briefly re-capture our contentions here. It is argued that after 1945, the historical process placed the world system in a position where the structure of dependence, built into the economies of the erstwhile colonies, made their economic development dependent on aid, whereas the structure of dominance created supremely in the American economy generated a drive towards orienting the world along its needs and aid was a part of this expression. Both the drives were shaped by the existing

international division of labour, which the United States sought to maintain for its dominance *inter alia* through aid, and which was against the interests of the newly independent but whose limits nonetheless circumscribed their development into an aid-oriented pattern. It is also shown how this process was not purely economic; whereas the dominance-drive demanded overall control within which economic control operated and to which aid was addressed, the dependence logic created both divergence and convergence between the political and the economic on the issue of aid.

The process has not yet ended and is not likely to end either. Until such time as the international division of labour continues, as it does, the process too will go on, though with varying emphasis on the components of the structure. Presently, with the entrenchment of the other components which aid facilitated, the utility of aid as a creator of favourable orientation has declined. This trend however is likely to change. To ease the pressure on the international credit structure created largely by private finance, greater flow of official concessionary finance, according to most analyses, would have to be made available—even to the middle income developing countries.⁶⁹ Newer modes of concessionary resource-mobilization are being increasingly discussed and thought of,⁷⁰ which are however yet to filter down to the political levels. Revival of the strategic edge of the American-Soviet struggle is another factor, which may reinforce the above necessity.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the long stretch of aid-inflows, the continuing and, in most of the cases, increasing dependence of the Third World, with the exception of a small category of countries,⁷¹ which can be labelled either as middle Powers or clubbed as the semi-periphery of the World system, has led to demands more comprehensive than just aid. In their case too, the increasing realization about the insufficiency and distortions, though not the irrelevance, of aid has produced simultaneous emphasis on trade and technology. On "aid" proper, this realization has engendered demand for more concessionary terms *along with* desired changes in the other two components. The earlier demand was more or less without these components.

It has been sometimes argued that the "big" emergence of multilateral aid-agencies like the World Bank—a development of the 'seventies—has changed the dominance overtones of aid and in particular, has de-linked it from western and/or American dominance.⁷² Facts however point to the contrary. Table XI shows the respective voting strengths of major countries. Western control over it, and American preponderance therein, are more than clear. The conditions attached and other features of its aid programme—import liberalization, promotion of foreign investment, emphasis on programme assessment—also reveal, economically speaking, the orientation-similarity between the western and the Bank aid-policies.⁷³

Therefore, rather than signalling the end of the link between aid and dominance, western and/or American, multilateralization of aid represents a new form through which dominance is getting articulated. The increasing

penetration of the World Bank into the Third World is, in fact, building new channels of dependence. While the magnitude of problems associated with bilateral aid and loss of the strategic edge of the struggle had mainly accounted for this phenomenon,⁷⁴ the essential point remains that aid has continued to be a part of the structures of dominance and dependence.

June 1981.

NOTES

- 1 See the two chapters devoted to development finance by the Brandt Commission in its Report, *North-South: A Programme for Survival* (London, 1980), pp. 221-56.
- 2 Accounts of the paradigm-shift are now available in abundance. In particular, see the following: Donald J. Puchala and S.I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s: The search for a Perspective," *International Organization* (Stanford), Vol. 28, no. 7, Spring 1974; Michael P. Sullivan, "Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contemporary International Politics," *Millenium* (London), Autumn 1978.
- 3 The burgeoning literature on International Political Economy has already started this exercise. The two most exhaustive recent attempts on aid are from the Political Economy of International Relations Series (series edited by Benjamin Cohen). The books are: David Wall, *The Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid* (New York: 1973), and Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations*, (New York, 1975), Chapter On "Economic Power in Economic and Military Aid", pp. 166-206.
- 4 For a summary of the available approaches, see James Petras and Kent Trachte, "Liberal, Structural and Radical Approaches to Political Economy: An Assessment and an Alternative," *Contemporary Crises* (Amsterdam), April 1979, pp. 109-148.
- 5 Both Liberal and Marxian writers have used this approach. Among the former are Johann Galtung, Raul Prebisch and Furtado. The important Marxist scholars are Paul Baran, Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin and Arighi Emmanuel.
- 6 As an exception, some isolated recent studies by political scientists have attempted to rigorously use data. For example, see R.D. McKinley and R. Little, "The U.S. Aid Relationship: A Text of the Recipient Need and Donor Interest Model," *Political Studies* (London), June 1979.
- 7 Some studies are aware of this point. For example, David A. Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy*, (New York, 1966).
- 8 The notable exceptions are: Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, (New York, 1969), Chapter on "Aid and Trade" and David Wall, 3.
- 9 The most important exponent of such an approach has been Hollis B. Chenery. His many studies include "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," *AID Discussion Papers* (Washington D.C.), No. 7, June 1963, (done with M. Bruno), "Optimal Patterns of Growth and Aid : The Case of Pakistan," *The Pakistan Development Review*, (Karachi), summer 1966 (done with A. MacEwan). For a recent mathematical exercise, see Michel Beenstock, "Political Econometry of official Development Assistance," *World Development* (Oxford), February 1980.
- 10 See Edward Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*, (New York, 1964), and John D. Montgomery, *Foreign Aid in International Politics*, (New Jersey 1967).
- 11 D.H. Blake and R.S. Walters, *The Politics of Global Economic Relations* (New Jersey, 1976), Chapter on Aid. Also Knorr, p. 3.
- 12 The relevance of the social context of economic processes in economic analysis is being increasingly recognised even in liberal writings now. The entire range of literature

- published in the journal *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago), and the Structural Schools led by Johann Galtung and Raul Prebisch respectively fall in this category.
- 13 Cheryl Payer, has raised some of these issues. See her *The Debt Trap* (Hammondsworth, 1974), pp. 43-46.
 - 14 For a brief account of the evolution of the World-System and the rise of International Division of Labour, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System," in *The Capitalist World Economy* (Ed.), (London, 1979), pp. 1-36. Also see W. Arthur Lewis, *The Evolution of the International Economic Order* (Princeton, 1978)
 - 15 Some writers have expressed the mistaken view that aid existed even in medieval times and have failed to see its historical specificity. For example, see Klaus Knorr, n. 3, p. 166.
 - 16 Teresa Hayter in *Aid As Imperialism* (Hammondsworth, 1971), Jack Woddis in *Introduction to Neo-Colonialism* (New York, 1967) and even Andre Gunder Frank have committed this exaggeration.
 - 17 Klaus Knorr, n. 3, pp. 180-183 and p. 338. He only analyzes the end-point of a process which has already produced dependence and in the process overdoes the independence shown by recipients.
 - 18 Even Walls' book (n. 3)—the most exhaustive attempt in the Political Economy Series so far—totally neglects this part of the process. There is no full-length politico-economic analysis available on this question, except some specific case studies. On India, see P.J. Eldridge, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in India* (New Delhi, 1969). Purely economic explanations are however available.
 - 19 Chenery's many studies (n. 9), are based on the two-gaps model. Another important writer, P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan has more or less followed this line. See his "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard Eckaus, (Ed.), *Foreign Aid* (Hammondsworth, 1970). For a particularly effective critique of these models, see Amiya Bagehi, "Aid Models and Inflows of Foreign Aid," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Annual Number, February 1970, pp. 223-38.
 - 20 For an elaboration of the concept of "potential economic surplus" see Paul Baran. *The Political Economy of Growth* (Hammondsworth, 1973 edition), p. 376. He has defined it as "what would be available for investment given a purposeful utilization of the national output produced with such resources as are presently employed."
 - 21 For calculations on Egypt see Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York, 1974), p. 9.
 - 22 Paul Baran, n. 20, pp. 355-56.
 - 23 Cheryl Payer, n. 13. She has examined the implications of this question with reference to a number of developing countries.
 - 24 For an excellent analysis of this question, see Samir Amin, "Self-reliance and the New Economic Order," in A.W. Singham (Ed.), *The non-Aligned Movement in World Politics*, (Connecticut, 1978), pp. 145-57.
 - 25 A number of studies are available on the relationship of state with the privileged classes. Two of them are important: Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* (London), 74, (July-August 1972), pp. 59-81 and W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendorfer, "The State in Peripheral Societies," *The Socialist Register* 1977 (London, 1977), pp. 143-77.
 - 26 Prabhat Patnaik, "On the Political Economy of Underdevelopment", *Economic and Political Weekly Annual Number*, February, 1973, especially pp. 203-205.
 - 27 For a brief statistical account of the inelastic demand for primary goods, see Michael P. Todaro, *Economics For a Developing World* (London, 1977), pp. 295-6.
 - 28 For a further discussion of the social implications, see Paul Streeten, "Costs and Benefits of Multinational Enterprises in Less Developed Countries" in J.H. Dunning, (Ed.), *The Multinational Enterprise* (London, 1971), pp. 240-58.

- 29 For export-restriction as a part of the monopolistic practices of MNCs, see Edith Penrose, "Ownership and Control of Multinational Firms in Developing Countries," in G.L. Helleiner, (Ed.), *A World Divided* (London, 1976), pp. 165-168.
- 30 This has been accepted even by official sources. See US Council on International Economic Policy, *The United States in the Changing World Economy : A Report to the President*, The Peterson Report, Government Printing Office, (Washington, D.C., 1971).
- 31 See Orio Giarini, *Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare: A Report to the Club of Rome* (Oxford, 1980), p. 332. For statistical calculations see Cleveland and W.H.B. Brittain, "Are the LDCs in over Their Heads?," *Foreign Affairs*, (Washington, D.C.), July 1976 pp. 732-50.
- 32 *North-South: A Program for Survival*, n. 1, p. 240.
- 33 Hollis Chenery, et. al., *Redistribution with Economic Growth* (Oxford, 1974), p. 12. Even though these figures are large enough, they have been found to be considerably conservative, which further increases the top-heaviness of the market. For an appraisal of these estimates, see Ashutosh Varshney and Satish Jha, "The World Bank and the Global Economy in the Seventies," *Foreign Affairs Reports* (New Delhi), April 1981.
- 34 This point has been touched upon by another study. See Juan C. Sanchez-Arnau, "Debt and Development," *IFDA Dossier* (Geneva), December 1979, pp. 55-66.
- 35 The new tradition roughly starts from Louis Althusser's "intervention" in the mid-sixties with "Contradiction and Over-determination" in his collection of essays. *For Marx* (Hammondsworth, 1969).
- 36 According to OECD calculations, the United States share in total DAC ODA was 59 per cent in 1962 and 28 per cent in 1977.
- 37 For the aid policies of other donors, see the following :
 1. Goran Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered* (Paris, 1965).
 2. R.D. McKinley, "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model And Interpretation of the Distribution of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany," *Comparative Political Studies* January 1979, pp. 411-464.
 3. Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Western Bilateral Aid Allocations : A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received* (Beverly Hills, 1972).
- 38 According to the *Report from the Select Committee on Overseas Aid* (House of Commons); "Commercial considerations alone would suffice to justify participation in the aid effort, both bilaterally and through multilateral agencies." Quoted by David Wall, n. 3, p. 47.
- 39 See a relatively recent writing on aid by David Gordon, "United States Aid in Perspective," *Current History* (Philadelphia) July-August 1979, p. 2.
- 40 Speech by the Secretary of State of the Carter Administration quoted in the *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.), June 1978, p. 14.
- 41 Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy* (New York, 1956), pp. 120-122. Similar view was held by another prominent scholar Jan Timbergen, *Shaping the World Economy*, (New York, 1962).
- 42 For an elaborate analysis of the domestic context, see David Wall, n. 3, pp. 50-79.
- 43 Edward Mason, n. 10, pp. 26-7.
- 44 Two important examples are: President Johnson's policy of not sanctioning food shipments to drought-struck India, apparently for inducing a change in India's stance on Vietnam in 1966, and suspension of aid to the Allende regime in Chile by the Nixon Administration.
- 45 Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Volume II (Hammondsworth, 1968), 634-640.
- 46 John D. Montgomery, n. 10, p. 18.
- 47 Refer n. 17.
- 48 Teresa Hayter, n. 17.

- 49 Quoted in Harry Magdoff, n. 8, p. 47.
- 50 William Woodruff, *Impact of Western Man*, (New York, 1966), p. 150.
- 51 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, (New York, 1956).
- 52 J.K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism* (Hammondsworth, 1963), pp. 76-97.
- 53 Also see Harry Magdoff, n. 8, pp. 164-7.
- 54 US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act 1965*, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, (Washington, D.C.), p. 584.
- 55 See *Development Co-operation, 1978 Review* (OECD, Paris, 1978), p. 179.
- 56 For Latin America's low position in the Soviet Union's economic relations, trade and aid, see Deepak Nayyar, *Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries and the Third World* (London, 1977).
- 57 Quoted in *Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967*, (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. 116-17.
- 58 See the reproduced speech in *Agenda*, an AID publication. (Washington D.C.), May 1981, p. 4.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- 60 Quoted in Goran Ohlin, n. 37, p. 33.
- 61 *Report of the Peterson Commission*, "US Foreign Assistance in the 1970s : A New Approach" (Washington, D.C.), March 1970, pp. 2-4.
- 62 See *Agenda*, n. 58, p. 3.
- 63 *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, quoted in Harry Magdoff, n. 8, pp. 127-8.
- 64 *Ibid.*
- 65 *Department of State Bulletin*, (Washington, D.C.), April 1978, p. 24.
- 66 For a brief discussion on the partial shift from "Project" to "Programme" Aid, see Cheryl Payer, n. 13, pp. 28-29.
- 67 Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Tying of Aid," UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/7/Supp. 4, United Nations, 1967, reproduced in Bhagwati and Eckaus (Ed.), *Foreign Aid*, n. 19, pp. 235-293.
- 68 Studies on this aspect abound. For a critical account, see Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies* (Hammondsworth, 1978). For the case of food aid, see J.A. Pintus, "The Lost of Foreign Aid," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 45, no. 4, 1963, pp. 360-67. Further important studies on farm surpluses are by T.W. Shultz, and E.M. Fisher, both reproduced in Bhagwati and Eckaus, no. 19.
- 69 See *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, n. 1, p. 229. Also Orio Giarini, n. 31, pp. 316-29.
- 70 Ideas like international taxation, automaticity, special development taxes are being increasingly discussed. For details, see the following: (i) Horst Paul Weisbach, "Mobilization of Development Finance: Promises and Problems to Automaticity", *Economics, Science* (Tubingen), Vol. 22, 1980, pp. 7-37. (ii) *North South : A Programme for Survival*, n. 1, pp. 244-256. The Brandt Commission Report has even suggested the creation of a new agency, World Development Fund, for supplementing the present aid agencies.
- 71 This category includes the relatively economically stronger third world countries—designated by various phrases—which include the OPEC countries, Brazil, Argentina, India and Nigeria. Wallerstein's description of these economies as the "semi periphery" of the world system is particularly appropriate. The concept middle Powers was first used by George Liska.
- 72 The various statements and policy-pronouncements made by the Bank officials take this position.
- 73 J.M. Vaan De Laar, "The World Bank and the World's Poor", *World Development* (Oxford), October-November 1976.
- 74 See the two articles by Thomas Balogh and P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan respectively in part four of Bhagwati and Eckaus (Ed.), n. 19, pp. 203-231.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA : AN INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

By INDRA NATH MUKHERJI*

This paper initially examines the level of development and the rate of economic growth in South Asian countries. Subsequently attention is shifted to examine how far economic growth has contributed to social justice. The level of development is examined conventionally in terms of relative per capita incomes, while the rate of economic growth is examined in terms of annual compound growth rate in real gross domestic product (GDP). For evaluating social justice several indices are used—relative income inequality, distribution of assets, proportion of population below the poverty line, and real earnings of agricultural labourers. Having consolidated the available literature on the subject, a search for their consistency is attempted and interpretations offered. The final section thus examines the evidence with respect to causation of inequality and offers policy guidelines. While the focus of the paper is the South Asian countries, illustrations from the experience of South East Asian countries is also drawn for comparison.

I

LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

To make international comparisons of national income is beset with a host of problems, the most difficult being comparisons in purchasing power parities of national currencies. The most elaborate and ambitious effort in this direction is being attempted by the United Nations International Comparison Project with the support of the World Bank. In the interim, the World Bank continues to publish the *Atlas* indicating population, per capita national product, and growth rates therein. The values are indicated in US dollars which is obtained by converting the values of national currencies to US dollars at the official rate of exchange. In the words of Myrdal, "it may not be too unreasonable to present these figures on the hypothesis that it is better to paint with a wide brush, of unknown thickness, than to leave the canvas blank."¹

Table I presents the per capita incomes of South and South East Asian countries. The World Bank classifies low income countries as those having per capita incomes below US \$ 200. Judged by this criterion, all South Asian countries could be considered as belonging to this category. This should not obscure the fact that some countries in South Asia such as Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh are in the lowest rung of the low income countries. By comparison, the countries in South East Asia which have, in general, more

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Table I

Per Capita Income and Growth Rates of Real Gross Domestic Product at Constant Market Prices in South and South East Asian Countries, 1950-76

| Countries | Per Capita Income (US \$ 1975) | Growth Rate (Per cent per annum) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | 1950-60 | 1960-70 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |
| India | 140 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 1.8 | -1.2 | 3.7 | 0.2 | 8.9 | 1.5 | — |
| Pakistan | 160 | 2.5 ^a | 5.4 ^a | 7.4 | 7.2 | 3.7 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 8.4 | 1.4 | 6.9 | 2.6 | 6.5 |
| Sri Lanka | 190 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 5.7 | 2.6 | 0.2 | 3.2 | 6.0 | 0.4 | 3.6 | 2.9 | — |
| Bangladesh | 90 | — | — | 4.6 | 3.3 | -0.6 | — | -14.0 | 4.7 | 11.1 | 2.5 | 9.5 | — |
| Nepal | 110 | — | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | -0.1 | -2.0 | 2.0 | 6.4 | 2.5 | — | — |
| Bhutan | 70 | — | — | 2.0 | — | 2.2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Indonesia | 220 | — | — | 1.9 | 6.5 | 8.3 | — | — | 12.9 | 6.4 | 5.4 | 7.5 | — |
| Malaysia | 760 | — | — | 6.9 | 6.0 | 6.7 | — | — | 13.1 | 6.9 | 1.8 | 13.0 | 7.7 |
| Philippines | 380 | — | — | 5.2 | 5.1 | 6.1 | — | — | 8.6 | 5.3 | 6.6 | 7.3 | 6.2 |
| Singapore | 2450 | — | — | 5.8 | 12.8 | 9.5 | — | — | 11.5 | 6.3 | 3.9 | 6.8 | — |
| Thailand | 350 | — | — | 7.2 | 8.5 | 6.5 | — | — | 10.3 | 4.6 | 5.5 | 6.2 | 5.8 |
| Developing ESCAP Countries | | 4.0 | 4.4 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |

Source: (i) United Nations ESCAP, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1974, 1977, 1978*
(ii) *World Bank Atlas, 1977*

Note: (a) : Includes East Pakistan

favourable man-land ratio, also have per capita incomes some two to three times higher than those in South Asia.

The United Nations had set a target growth rate of 6 per cent per annum in real GDP for the developing countries during the first Development Decade. It will be seen in Table I, that in none of the South Asian countries (with the exception of Pakistan during the 'sixties) was this target realized. Assuming a growth rate in population of around 2.5-3 per cent per annum in these countries, in only three, namely, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka did the growth in real GDP exceed population growth. However in the other three countries, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, during the 'seventies, the growth rate in real GDP has been barely adequate to keep pace with population growth. Accordingly there has been no improvement in their real per capita incomes over the last quarter century or so. In marked contrast, the growth rate in real GDP in South East Asian countries has been more vigorous, and in many of them the target set by the United Nations has been realized.

Another feature of the growth rate in real GDP in South Asian countries is their unevenness. In India and Sri Lanka the rate of growth accelerated marginally during the 'sixties, particularly during the mid-sixties as compared to the 'fifties, but slumped during the 'seventies. Pakistan witnessed much more appreciable acceleration in its growth rate during the 'sixties as compared to the 'fifties, but as in case of India and Sri Lanka, its growth rate slumped in the 'seventies. In Nepal and Bhutan the growth rates, modest as they are, show no sign of either acceleration or deceleration. In contrast to South Asian countries, the growth rates in real GDP in South East Asian countries have not been subject to so much fluctuation. Moreover no trend towards slackening of the growth rates during the 'seventies can be discerned in these countries. While political factors have intervened in most South Asian countries contributing to economic instability in the early 'seventies, fluctuations in the agricultural sector over a long period have been the main factor contributing to economic instability in the region.

It may be observed finally that countries with a lower per capita income base have been experiencing generally lower growth rates as well. This is illustrative of growing disparities among the developing countries.

II

EVALUATION OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Relative Income Inequality

While economic growth may be a necessary condition for an increase in social welfare, it is not by itself sufficient. It is equally important to see how the benefits of growth have been shared by the society at large. One way of doing this is to stratify the population by income groups and to examine what proportion of the national income accrues to these groups.

By stratifying cumulatively the proportion of income and the corresponding proportion of population, it is possible to estimate the Gini co-efficient of concentration.²

Table II. indicates the Gini Concentration Ratios (CR) of incomes in South and South-East Asian countries using different sources for different countries over different reference periods.

Table II

Gini Co-efficient of Concentration of Income in South and South-East Asian Countries.

| Country | Source | Year | Concentration Ratio | | |
|------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------|-------|
| | | | Rural | Urban | Total |
| India | Ojha and Bhatt ^a | 1953-55 | .343 | .401 | .376 |
| | | 1961-64 | .319 | .474 | .385 |
| | ESCAP ^b | 1968-69 ^c | | | .310 |
| | | 1970-71 ^c | | | .290 |
| | | 1973-74 | | | .280 |
| Sri Lanka | ESCAP ^b | 1953 | .45 | .52 | .50 |
| | | 1963 | | | .49 |
| | | 1973 | | | .40 |
| Bangladesh | Alamgir ^d | 1963-64 | .33 | .41 | .36 |
| | | 1966-67 | .31 | .38 | .30 |
| | | 1968-69 | .27 | .37 | .30 |
| Pakistan | ECAFE ^e | 1963-64 | .350 | .366 | .358 |
| | | 1966-67 | .321 | .384 | .346 |
| | | 1968-69 | .294 | .364 | .333 |
| Indonesia | ESCAP ^b | 1973 | | | .41 |
| Thailand | ESCAP ^b | 1962-63 | | | .41 |
| | | 1968-69 | | | .43 |
| | | 1971-72 | | | .50 |
| Singapore | ESCAP ^b | 1966 | | | .48 |
| | | 1973 | | | .46 |

- Source: (a) Ojha and Bhatt, "Pattern of Income Distribution in India, 1953-54 to 1961-64," Paper presented at the Seminar on Income Distribution, organised by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, February 1971.
- (b) For original source see UN/ESCAP, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific*, 1978, Table 76.
- (c) This is based on consumption data; accordingly the concentration ratios are lower than those based on income data.
- (d) Mohiuddin Alamgir, "Some Analysis of Distribution of Income, Consumption, Saving and Poverty in Bangladesh," *The Bangladesh Development Studies* (Dacca), October 1974, p. 775.
- (e) UN/ECAFE, "Intra-regional Trade Projections, Effective Protection and Income Distribution, Vol. III (Bangkok, 1972), Table 2, p. 95.

Wherever available, rural urban CR have also been indicated. It may be seen that in all cases inequality in the urban sector is more pronounced than in the rural sector, indicating thereby that increasing urbanization is likely to accentuate income inequalities. It may also be observed that inequalities in South Asian countries are less marked than in South-East Asian countries. Among South Asian countries income inequality is the highest in Sri Lanka and the lowest in Bangladesh while India and Pakistan fall in between.

Regarding the trend in income inequalities, it may be seen that in India, inequalities in the rural sector declined over the decade from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties, whereas inequalities in the urban sector got accentuated thereby contributing to an increase in overall income inequalities. From the end of the 'sixties to about mid-seventies, the consumption expenditure data reveals a lessening of inequality.

This is further corroborated by Ahluwalia's estimate of CR in consumption expenditure during the period 1956-57, particularly between 1967-68 to 1973-74.³ In Sri Lanka, the trend appears to be towards an unambiguous decline in inequality between 1953-73. In Bangladesh the data available for the 'sixties reveals some decline in inequality between 1963-68. Among South East-Asian countries an increase in income inequality is to be observed during the 'sixties. In Singapore however, some decline in income inequality may be observed between 1966-73.

Distribution of Assets

It is from the possession of productive assets that income generating potential is created. Its significance however is wider since assets confer on the owner not only this potential but also status, security, leisure, and access to complementary resources. Since land is the most important asset in the rural sector of South Asian countries, it may be interesting to examine the concentration of land holdings in these countries and the trend over time. This has been presented in Table III.

An examination of Table III reveals that inequality in the distribution of land in all the countries is considerably more pronounced than inequality in the distribution of income. The difference gets further accentuated when zero landholders are included in the distribution of land as in the case of India. Inequality in land distribution appears to be lowest in Sri Lanka followed by Bangladesh. Although the data for Pakistan in the Table is somewhat remote, the very high degree of concentration of land in the country is apparent.

A disquieting feature of the trend in concentration of land holdings, is the increasing concentration of land holdings in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh during the 'sixties. In the case of India however, the various rounds of National Sample Surveys (NSS) of land holdings point to a steady decline in such concentration. While this may in fact, have occurred, two surveys

Table III
Concentration of Land Holdings in South and South-East-Asian Countries

| Country | Year | Concentration Ratio |
|------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Bangladesh | 1960 | .47 |
| | 1974 | .57 |
| India | 1961 | .59 |
| | 1970-71 | .63 |
| | 1953-54 ^a | .78 ^b |
| | 1959-60 ^a | .73 ^b |
| | 1961 ^a | .72 ^b |
| | 1971 ^a | .71 ^b |
| Pakistan | 1960 | .60 |
| Sri Lanka | 1962 | .35 ^c |
| | 1970 | .41 ^c |
| Thailand | 1963 | .46 |
| | 1971 | .41 |
| Indonesia | 1963 | .55 |
| | 1973 | .53 |

- Source: 1 UN/ESCAP, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific*, 1976, p. 69.
- a. This is based on national sample surveys 8th, 16th, 17th and 26th rounds respectively. This has been presented by A.C. Minocha, "Some Aspects of Income Distribution in India." *The Indian Economic Journal*, (Bombay), Vol. 25, no. 2, October-December 1977, Special Conference Number, Part II, p. 5.
 - b. The high value of these ratios is due to the inclusion of zero landholders. Ideally they should be included to measure the concentration of land holdings. However in the absence of similar data for other countries we have shown concentration of land distribution in respect of cultivators who own some land.
 - c. Size distribution of holdings in 1962 and 1970 has been presented in E.L.H. Lee, "Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka, 1963-73" in ILO, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia*, 1977, Table 64.

of Reserve Bank of India, All India Rural Debt Survey 1961-62 and All India Debt and Investment Survey, 1971-72 point to an increase in the concentration of asset holdings in India. The CR in respect of asset holdings increased from '68 to '70 during this period.⁴

In the case of two South-East-Asian countries, Thailand and Indonesia, the inequality in land distribution does not appear to differ significantly from that of the South Asian countries. Moreover some decline in the concentration of land holdings appears to have taken place in those countries during the 'sixties. This is in contrast to trends in income inequality.

Percentage of Population Below Poverty Line

While overall income inequality measures are useful, they fail to identify the target group—that is, those who constitute the poor. This alternative approach seeks to identify that proportion of the population whose purchasing power falls below the minimum necessary to buy a bundle of commodities required to meet the minimum calorie requirements.

In Table IV alternative estimates of poverty ratios for South-Asian countries have been presented for different periods.

It will be seen that not all the estimates are consistent. These nevertheless point to the very high incidence of poverty in South Asian countries. In India for instance, the incidence of poverty has fluctuated during the 'sixties from a little over 40 to 50 per cent of the rural population. Although Bangladesh has less income inequality than India, in view of its lower per capita income, a larger proportion of the population in the country is below the poverty line than in India. Alamgir's estimate⁵ reveals higher incidence than that of Khan⁶ because of more restrictive assumption of the poverty norm adopted by the former. The incidence of poverty in Pakistan as estimated by Naseem⁷ appears to be quite high in comparison to India especially when considering that the per capita income in the former is marginally higher than in India. This difference would have been higher but for the less restrictive definition of poverty in Pakistan than in India.

Looking at the trend in poverty ratios, some inconsistencies are to be observed. While Minhas' study, covering the period during the 'sixties, reveals a decline in the incidence of poverty, Bardhan's study points to an increase in this incidence. Bardhan's findings are corroborated by Ahluwalia's study, a part of which covers this period. Again both Ahluwalia's and Dutta's⁸ findings reveal a decline in the incidence of poverty since the end of the 'sixties. Ahluwalia's most comprehensive study of the subject covering the period 1956-57 to 1973-74 shows no significant time trend in poverty ratios in India. His analysis at the states level reveals that only two states, namely, Assam and West Bengal, show a significant trend in the increase in the incidence of poverty while Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu show a significant decline. For all other states no significant time trend in the incidence of poverty could be observed.⁹ It is pertinent to observe here that both in Punjab and Haryana no appreciable decline in the poverty ratio took place even when considering that these states spearheaded the "green revolution."

Both Alamgir's and Khan's study point to an increase in the incidence of poverty in Bangladesh between 1963-64 to 1973-74. However the trend during this period is not similar in the two estimates. In Sri Lanka the incidence of poverty appears to have declined perceptibly between 1969-70 to 1973.

Table IV
Percentage of Population Below Poverty Line in South-Asian-Countries

| Country | Year | Source | Percent of Population | | Definition of Poverty |
|------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------|---|
| | | | Rural | Urban | |
| India | 1956-57 | Minhas | 65 | } | Rs. 15 per capita per month at 1960-61 prices (weighted average of states) to meet norm of 2250 calories per day. |
| India | 1960-61 | | 59 | | |
| | 1964-65 | | 52 | | |
| | 1967-68 | | 51 | | |
| | 1960-61 | Bardhan | 38 | | |
| | 1964-65 | | 45 | | |
| | 1967-68 | | 53 | | |
| | 1961-62 | Dandekar and Rath | 40 | | |
| | 1968-69 | Dutta | 50.3 | | |
| | 1969-70 | | 49.1 | | |
| | 1970-71 | | 45.4 | | |
| | 1973-74 | | 44.3 | | |
| | 1957-58 | Ahluwalia | 42 | | |
| | 1959-60 | | 48.7 | | |
| | 1960-61 | | 53.4 | | |
| | 1964-65 | | 50.4 | | |
| | 1966-67 | | 57.4 | | |
| | 1968-69 | | 53.4 | | |
| | 1970-71 | | 49.1 | | |
| | 1973-74 | | 47.6 | | |
| Bangladesh | 1963-64 | M. Alamgir | 88 | 82 | Take 252 and 298 per annum at 1966 prices for rural and urban areas respectively to purchase minimum consumption bundle of 2100 calories and 45 gram protein per day. Take 23.61 per capita per month at 1963-64 prices to meet 1935 calories per day or 90 per cent of the "recommended" intake. Rupees 27.53 per capita per month at 1959-60 prices to ensure 1995 calories, or 95 per cent of the "recommended" intake. Rs. 200 per household per month |
| | 1966-67 | | 62 | 72 | |
| | 1968-69 | | 79 | 70 | |
| | 1973-74 | | 94 | — | |
| | 1963-64 | A.R. Khan | 40 | | |
| | 1968-69 | | 76 | | |
| | 1973-74 | | 74 | | |
| | 1975(I Qd.) | | 62 | | |
| Pakistan | 1963-64 | | 72 | | |
| | 1968-69 | | 64 | | |
| | 1969-70 | | 68 | | |
| | 1970-71 | | 71 | | |
| | 1971-72 | | 74 | | |
| Sri Lanka | 1969-70 | | 72 | | |
| | 1973 | | 40 | | |

Source: (i) UN/ESCAP, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific*, 1978. Table 76.
(ii) M. Alamgir, *The Bangladesh Development Studies* (Dacca), October, 1974.
(iii) Bhaskar Dutta, "On the Measurement of Poverty in Rural India", *Indian Economic Review* (Delhi), April, 1978.

Real Wages of Agricultural Labourers

Agricultural labourers may be deemed to constitute among the lowest deciles or quintiles of a frequency distribution of personal income. An assessment of the real income of this poorest group may be made in order to assess the incidence of poverty.

In Table V(a) the variations in money and real wages in different states of India covering the years 1960-61 and 1969-70 has been presented.

Table V (a)

Variation in Money and Real Wage Rates in States of India 1960/61-1969/70

| State | Money Wages | | Real Wages 1969-70 | Change in Real Wages Over 1961 |
|----------------|-------------|---------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | 1960-61 | 1969-70 | | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 1.46 | 2.46 | 1.40 | — 0.06 |
| Assam | 2.29 | 3.80 | 2.04 | — 0.25 |
| Bihar | 1.30 | 2.70 | 1.34 | + 0.04 |
| Gujarat | 1.97 | 2.94 | 1.73 | — 0.24 |
| Kerala | 2.10 | 4.67 | 2.31 | + 0.21 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 1.32 | 2.11 | 1.02 | — 0.30 |
| Mysore | 1.67 | 2.35 | 1.34 | — 0.33 |
| Orissa | 1.26 | 2.15 | 1.01 | — 0.25 |
| Punjab | 2.81 | 6.34 | 3.24 | + 0.43 |
| Tamil Nadu | 1.43 | 2.65 | 1.39 | — 0.04 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 1.31 | 2.61 | 1.32 | + 0.01 |

Source: S.M. Pandey, "Pattern of Wages, Income and Consumer Expenditure of Agricultural Labourers in India: Problems and Policy Perspectives" in *Rural Labour in India* by S.M. Pandey (Ed.), Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources (New Delhi, 1976), p. 93.

It will be seen that when adjusted for the cost of living index of agricultural labourers, the wage rates declined in 8 out of 11 states. The absolute decline was much more pronounced in Gujarat, Mysore, Assam, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Among the States showing increases in real earnings, Punjab and Kerala stand at the top. The increases in UP and Bihar were very marginal.¹⁰

The experience of other South Asian countries, notably Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, is similar as may be seen in Table V (b).

In Bangladesh real wages declined sharply during the late 'forties and early 'fifties, they rose for a decade thereafter, but since 1964 a pronounced downward trend is visible. Also to be seen is that the real wage index in Sri Lanka in estate agriculture declined.

Table V(b)

Real Agricultural Wages in Bangladesh and Real Wage Index in agriculture in Sri Lanka

| Year | Bangladesh (Rs./Takas) | Sri Lanka (1952 = 100) |
|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1949 | 2.36 | |
| 1950 | 2.13 | |
| 1951 | 2.00 | |
| 1952 | 1.97 | |
| 1953 | 1.71 | |
| 1954 | n.a. | |
| 1955 | 1.92 | |
| 1956 | n.a. | |
| 1957 | 1.99 | |
| 1958 | 1.93 | |
| 1959 | 1.94 | |
| 1960 | 2.06 | |
| 1961 | 2.27 | |
| 1962 | 2.21 | |
| 1963 | 2.36 | 104.2 |
| 1964 | 2.66 | 103.5 |
| 1965 | 2.22 | 103.4 |
| 1966 | 1.90 | 103.5 |
| 1967 | 1.92 | 104.9 |
| 1968 | 2.04 | 114.3 |
| 1969 | 2.22 | 106.3 |
| 1970 | 2.24 | 101.5 |
| 1971 | n.a. | 99.8 |
| 1972 | 1.60 | 98.4 |
| 1973 | 1.59 | 101.5 |
| 1974 | 1.42 | |
| 1975 (First half) | 1.28 | |

Source: 1 A.R. Khan, "Poverty and Inequality in Rural Bangladesh," and E.L.H. Lee, "Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka," both published in ILO, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia* (Geneva, 1977), Tables 50 and 63 respectively.

Note: (a) Here agriculture refers to estate agriculture only.

III

INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL DATA

Interpretation of empirical data, particularly those relating to distributive justice is by no means a simple task given the inconsistencies in empirical evidence.

Ojha and Bhatt's findings reveal a decline in income inequality in the rural sector during the period mid-'fifties to mid-'sixties, although inequalities in the urban sector got accentuated during this period. This may well have resulted from the heavy emphasis put on industrialization.

Estimates of poverty in India are based on various rounds of National Sample Surveys (NSS) on consumer expenditure. We have earlier observed

that during the period 1960-61 to 1967-68 the estimates of poverty ratios by Minhas and Bardhan differ. This arises from the use of different price deflators to measure changes in real consumer expenditure. Whereas Minhas uses the national income deflator, Bardhan uses consumer price index numbers for agricultural labourers. The national income deflator covers prices of agricultural products, manufactured commodities and services. During the 'sixties the prices of agricultural commodities, particularly coarse cereals, rose at a much sharper rate than those of finished manufactures. Since the weight of manufactured consumables in the budget of the rural poor is likely to be much lower than the national average, the national income deflator is very likely to have understated the rise in the prices paid by the rural poor. The use of consumer price index numbers for agricultural labourers used by Bardhan on the other hand, is a more appropriate index to evaluate the cost of living index of the rural poor.¹¹ Ahluwalia also uses this index and his findings conform to those of Bardhan. Again both Ahluwalia's and Dutta's findings reveal some decline in the incidence of poverty since 1968-69 to 1973-76. Since Dutta uses a separate price index for each expenditure class on the basis of its expenditure pattern, some reliance may be placed on his findings. Further corroboration of this trend is to be found in a decrease in consumption expenditure, inequalities and marginal improvement in the distribution of land. Although asset distribution does not correspond to this trend, on the whole, some improvement in social welfare seems to have taken place. Whether this change reflects a permanent structural change, or is transient, subject to status quo ante, it is too early to say. What would happen, for instance, if a series of good harvests were followed by bad ones in succession? This calls for observation over a long period of time. When however this is attempted (as for instance by Ahluwalia), no significant trend in the poverty ratio emerges for the country as a whole. Ahluwalia's attempt at examining the trend in consumption expenditure inequalities over a long period in nominal terms cannot be considered to be conclusive. As he himself mentions, "ideally we should examine trends in the distribution of real consumption since changes in the distribution of nominal consumption may reflect no more than differential movements in the price indices. In the absence of fractile specific price indices we can only compare inequality in nominal terms. Such comparisons remain of interest since the available evidence suggests that while they may exaggerate the extent of the change in inequality, they nevertheless point in the right direction."¹² The available evidence however suggests the contrary. The Minhas-Bardhan controversy examined earlier, as well as illustrations from other South Asian countries (which we shall presently examine), clearly reveal how the use of CR over different points of time in nominal terms may be highly misleading.

The evidence available for Sri Lanka tends to support the argument of a persistent and significant decline in the CR over the period 1953-73. The main source of data is the Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances, 1963 and 1973,

published by the Central Bank of Ceylon. Lee attempts, for the first time, to cross check the shift in the income distribution with that of the shift in consumer expenditure. In his view where a reduction in income inequality of the magnitude described earlier occurred, data on changes in consumption levels should show corresponding change. The available evidence from the same source however points to greater inequality in consumer expenditure over the period. Moreover the per capita consumption of rice per two months in the rural sector fell both in the rural and estate sector. This fall is overwhelmingly concentrated among the lowest income classes. Thus the two types of data from Consumer Finance Surveys are internally inconsistent. Again given the magnitude of change in income distribution, one would expect an improvement in real wages of workers. No such trend however is to be noticed.¹³

An explanation of the inconsistency referred to above is provided by Lee. In his view "the crux of the problem lies in the fact that the period spanned by the Consumer Finance Surveys was one of rapid inflation and in which, in particular, the price of staple food, rice, increased sharply relative to other commodities."¹⁴ This is likely to have increased the imputed value of money incomes of the poor relative to the more affluent. Since food consumption, particularly rice, constitutes a much larger proportion of the budget of the poor, the deflation of all money incomes in the later year by an overall consumer price index is unlikely to mitigate the illusion of an improvement in income distribution. The correct procedure, as Lee justly points out, would be to use income-group-specific cost of living indices or to look at actual quantities consumed. Further the introduction of an income ceiling of Rs. 2000 per month in 1972 could also have induced the rich to understate their incomes in the 1973 survey contributing further to a deceptive decline in income inequality.¹⁵ Another evidence casting suspicion on an improvement in income distribution in Sri Lanka is the trend towards increasing concentration of land holdings in the island.

In case of Pakistan also, we have observed consistent decline in inequality in income distribution during the 'sixties. This was also the period of rapid economic growth in the country. Yet it is puzzling to note that in spite of this, the poverty ratio, staggering as it is, has remained totally unaffected. This again raises doubts as to the validity of CR as depicting improvement in income distribution. Since the CRs have been compared in nominal terms, the limitations of this approach which was relevant for Sri Lanka would apply equally in the case of Pakistan. The United Nations ECAFE study points out thus: "To what extent these results truly reflect the degree of income inequality and changes therein is difficult to state. The data base of the entire study is extremely weak. Besides, these results relate to the income at current prices. There is evidence elsewhere to suggest that price changes have affected various income groups differently. It is therefore likely that this decline reflects only changes in process, while real income distribution was not changed at all. Furthermore, the survey data

show a decline in per capita income and per household income over the period, whereas, according to national income data, there has been a marked increase. It is difficult to say which of the two trends is correct, but the results on income inequality obtained above may be entirely due to this fact."¹⁶

The data used by Naseem is the same as that used in the United Nations study referred to above. It is based on the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) Quarterly Survey of Current Economic Conditions (QSCEC). His analysis lends itself to greater credibility since he deflates household expenditure by group specific cost of living indices. He constructs a Laspeyre price index for each of the all income groups in the 1963-64 Survey by using that year's expenditure weights for each group.¹⁷ Naseem's study clearly reveals that the high rate of economic growth in Pakistan during the 'sixties has made no dent in the staggering level of poverty in the country lending support to the contention that inequality in Pakistan, far from declining, must have increased considerably during this period.

Alamgir's estimate of CR in income distribution for Bangladesh during the period 1963-64 to 1968-69 reveals some decline.¹⁸ Like Naseem, he uses the QSCEC 1963-64 as benchmark household income and expenditure. The deficiency of the study lies in that comparisons in CR are made in nominal terms. As he admits, "in terms of welfare implication one problem in such comparison arises due to differences in family size, prices, age, consumption patterns and other personal circumstances."¹⁹

A.R. Khan estimates poverty ratio in Bangladesh by using the aforementioned data source. However his methodology is more sound than Alamgir's because he deflates consumer expenditure on the basis of income specific price indices. Accordingly, the rise in the prices of the goods which have a heavier weight in the budget of the low income groups has been given due consideration. Thus, given the growing incidence of poverty between 1963-64 and 1968-69, stagnation in real earnings of agricultural labourers since the mid-'sixties, and growing concentration of land holdings during the 'sixties generally, one would have some hesitation in accepting Alamgir's finding of a decline in inequality in Bangladesh over the period indicated by him.

It thus appears that in the South Asian countries economic growth has not generally been associated with an improvement in the well being of the poor. A possible exception to this may be in case of India for the period 1968-69 to 1973-74 during which there is some evidence to suggest gains in social welfare.

IV

DETERMINANTS OF INEQUALITY AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

The historical experience of presently developed capitalist countries reveals growing inequality in the initial phase of development followed by

some levelling up of incomes at a later stage.²⁰ Cross-sectional studies also tend to confirm an U-shaped relationship with inequalities widening from low income group of countries to middle income group and finally flattening out with high income group of countries.²¹ Drawing from the aforementioned analysis, conventional theorists, well versed in neo-classical analysis, tend to give primacy to economic growth asserting that its effects are bound to "trickle down" and percolate to the society at large.

The experience of South Asian countries however reveals that there need not be any automacity in the "trickle down" effect of economic growth. The rich in low income countries are well known for their conspicuous consumption. On the other hand, the poor in these countries are abysmally poor such that a further reduction in their consumption cannot but adversely affect their capacity to work. What is in fact necessary in these countries is to reduce the consumption of the rich and *increase* that of the poor. In the practical context in which productive potential is more broadly conceived, the dichotomy between consumption and investment loses its edge because some consumption, like investment, can also be productive. Thus the blind application of "stage theories" of economic growth and income distribution to the developing countries is likely to be inappropriate, misleading and dangerous.

As to the determinants of inequality, reference may be made to a cross-section study by Ahluwalia.²² Using regression analysis, the study reveals that the level of primary school enrolment has a positive bearing on the income share of the lowest 40 per cent. Again, a high rate of population growth bears a significant inverse relationship with the share of the lowest 40 per cent. The study also reveals that the share of the lowest 40 per cent is significantly higher in socialist countries. Thus the spread of primary and secondary education, control over population growth, and adoption of socialist policies is likely to promote greater equality in income distribution.

K.N. Raj's analysis of inter-state variations in levels of per capita income and per capita food consumption in India shows that per capita consumption of food does not depend on per capita income alone; it is higher the higher the per capita output of food-grains is within each state, and lower the greater the inequality in the distribution of land holdings. Hence it follows that raising levels of food intake requires not only increasing the output of food in each state and region, but reducing inequalities in the distribution of land.²³

Ahluwalia's study of poverty and agricultural performance in India establishes relationships which are similar to those of Raj. He finds a close inverse association between growth in agricultural output per head and the poverty ratio at the all-India level. At the level of states a similar association is found in respect of 7 of the 19 states. These states account for 56 per cent of the rural population in India and about three-fourths of the rural population in poverty. However the nature of data reveals that in many of these states other factors are also at work which tend to increase the incidence

of poverty. These factors may relate to the land tenure system or tenant displacement—factors which may not be independent of agricultural growth.²⁴

Thus the lesson to be drawn from both Raj and Ahluwalia is that the best way of reducing poverty and improving consumption of the poor is to concentrate food production in regions where food is deficient and to undertake at the same time suitable land reform measures designed to distribute assets in favour of the poor.

May 1981.

NOTES

- 1 Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (Middlesex 1968), Vol. 1, p. 483. For a discussion of difficulties in international comparisons of income see pp. 474-82.
- 2 The Gini co-efficient of concentration is estimated by the following formula: $1 - (f_i - f_i - 1)$ ($Y_i + Y_i - 1$) where f_i is cumulative of households or population and Y_i is cumulative of income shares. The value of the concentration ratio so derived will vary between 0 and 1, these being the limiting values of perfect equality and perfect inequality ... respectively. For details of estimation see UN/ECAFE, *Intra-regional Trade Projections, Effective Protection and Income Distribution*, Part I, Vol. III (Bangkok, 1972).
- 3 Montek Ahluwalia, "Rural Poverty and Agricultural Performance in India," *Journal of Development Studies* (London, 1977); World Bank Reprint Series: Number Sixty, Table 8, p. 317.
- 4 See A.C. Minocha, "Some Aspects of Income Distribution in India," the *Indian Economic Journal* (Bombay), October-December 1973, p. 5.
- 5 Mohiuddin Alamgir, "Poverty, Inequality and Social Welfare: Measurement, Evidence and Policies," *The Bangladesh Development Studies* (Dacca), April 1975, p. 171.
- 6 A.R. Khan, "Poverty and Inequality in Rural Bangladesh" in ILO, *Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia* (Geneva, 1977), Table 48.
- 7 S.M. Naseem, "Poverty and Landlessness in Pakistan," ILO, n.6.
- 8 Bhaskar Dutta, "On the Measurement of Poverty in Rural India," *Indian Economic Review* (Delhi), April 1978.
- 9 M. Ahluwalia, n. 3, Table III(a), p. 305.
- 10 S.M. Pandey, "Pattern of Wages, Income and Consumer Expenditure of Agricultural Labourers in India: Problems and Policy Perspective" in *Rural Labour in India* by S.M. Pandey (Ed.), Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources (New Delhi, 1976), p. 93.
- 11 P.K. Bardhan, "On the Incidence of Poverty in Rural India of the Sixties," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Annual Number, 1973.
- 12 Ahluwalia, n. 3, p. 319.
- 13 E.L.H. Lee, "Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka" in ILO, n. 6, Table 63.
- 14 Ibid., p. 178.
- 15 Ibid., p. 172.
- 16 United Nations, ECAFE, n.2, pp. 108-9.
- 17 Naseem, n. 7, p. 45.
- 18 M. Alamgir, "Some Analysis of Distribution of Income, Consumption, Saving and Poverty in Bangladesh," *The Bangladesh Development Review* (Dacca), October 1974, p. 775.

19 Ibid., p. 785.

20 See Simon Kuznet, *Modern Economic Growth* (New Delhi, 1972), p. 218.

21 See Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem" in *Redistribution with Growth* (Ed.), Chenery et al, Oxford University Press, (London, 1974), p. 15.

22 Ibid., pp. 16-18.

23 See K.N. Raj, *Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy: A Case Study of Selected Issues with Reference to Kerala*. (Delhi, 1977), p. 1.

24 M. Ahluwalia, n. 3, pp. 308-16.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE

This is the text of an Address by Shri P. V. Narsimha Rao, Minister of External Affairs, delivered at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi on 11 June 1981.

PAKISTAN and India met their tryst with destiny as independent nations within twenty-four hours of each other. In his very first statement as Prime Minister of independent India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared that "we look upon the world with clear and friendly eyes." I bring today to my friends in Pakistan that same message. I also bring to you the message of our Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi—"We have common concerns and friendship is the basic necessity."

There can be no doubt that while our fight for freedom was on, it was for the whole country as such and generally understood and felt on that basis. Naturally, therefore, as the struggle advanced to more and more decisive stages and as more and more signs of success appeared on the horizon, the emerging two-dimensional concept of freedom came to be attended with controversy, whose intensity increased correspondingly with the overall quick tempo of the phase immediately preceding independence. Yet, after the crescendo, when freedom came as a fact, controversy gave place to conciliation. To be sure, it was gradual, even painful, this process of tapering off of tensions; yet it brought about a new atmosphere of normalcy in general, barring of course the specific problems that had surfaced meanwhile.

It may not be out of place to point out here that, in many ways, the partition of the country was debated and implemented in a manner which was entirely familiar to the common people of India. The concept of partition among co-sharers or co-inheritors was and is so much a part of our tradition that many persons from outside the sub-continent, who had wanted a perpetual attrition at the people's level between the two countries, were rather unpleasantly surprised at the comparative ease and speed with which both countries, soon after the fact plunged headlong into their respective internal problems barring the specific issues that had been thrown up between them. Partition no longer remained an issue as such, just as in the face of the impending monsoon, partition of the ancestral land between two farmer-brothers concluded during the preceding summer months no longer remains an issue. Their hopes and efforts are directed to the future. Their efforts are dependent on the monsoon, not against each other. So was, by and large, the case with the people of India and Pakistan.

PRAGMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS

Further, it is not our practice in this part of the world to hark back again and again to the circumstances of one's birth. Millions of people cannot

even remember the dates of their birth accurately. No authentic data is available about the dates and places of birth of almost any of our saints, savants, kings, heroes and others held in the highest esteem in our history. We are essentially a forward-looking kind whose mind is conditioned to thinking of the hereafter. Therefore, there seems to be no reason whatever why, in our mutual relations also, we should not come to concentrate on the future, instead of the past. And, in any event, those whose memories are still entangled in the Partition are fast disappearing from the scene. For the new generations emerging and to emerge hereafter, India and Pakistan are two distinct and separate entities, totally independent, completely at liberty to attain whatever destinies they choose for themselves, deliberately and unfettered by any of the features of the past, taking it or leaving it, or any of it, as they wish to. Points of commonality need not in any way bind either country down to any particular relationship, other than what both consciously and in their respective interests choose to make of them. The pre-partition generation, with its admixture of nostalgic and bitter sentimentality, has no right to condemn the coming generations to adhere to unwanted identities. In a word, the future on both sides must be free and based on interest and reason—and not on emotion.

I wish to reiterate, that these new premises of our existence are already being tacitly accepted, and I am absolutely certain that a new and fresh relationship is emerging between the two countries, based on objective realities, and not on notions. Even notions have begun to be conditioned by realities. It is not difficult to see that both countries can and should now co-exist, since in the world of today that is the only way to exist. It is high time that a clear-minded awareness of this new future is heralded and fostered continuously between India and Pakistan.

May I, therefore, submit very sincerely that those who are still trying to see, or make others see, sinister designs in our two countries, aimed at each other's existence are, to say the least, wasting their time. India should at least be credited with the perspicacity to know that there is not a single problem which will come anywhere near solution by the undoing of Pakistan. And as for the fantastic fear that India wants to gobble up Pakistan, I can only say that those who are plugging this line are doing injustice to Pakistan and India both.

Nothing is farther from India's mind than this course. Alarmists and opponents of Indo-Pak friendship will have to concoct something more plausible than this worn out theory. And that something is just not there. We, on our part, are fully convinced that we have an abiding interest, even a vested interest in the stability of Pakistan. It is sometimes pointed out, with some justification, that this picture of India depicted in acquisitive juxtaposition to Pakistan can be traced, at least partially, to external sources. But that is all the more reason why we should shun it with greater determination since it is an insult to our intelligence. Our attitudes towards each other should freely evolve on the basis of our direct and clear perception of

each others' interests and motivations based on direct contacts and direct exchange of views. We should develop an individual and, if necessary, a joint capacity to resist the negative impact on us by external trends, external elements and extraneous factors.

Coming back to the point about India acknowledging Pakistan's separate and permanent identity as an abiding interest of ours, I do not think that this elite audience would expect me to catalogue the reasons for this interest in any great detail. I would, therefore, like to state categorically, on behalf of the Indian people that India has, and will always continue to have, full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability and independence of Pakistan. When this is stated by our Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, I hope it will be realized that there is no voice louder and clearer and no resolve more dependable. It would be my first and foremost concern to set all minds at rest on this score. Our respective successes and failures are, and will continue to be, entirely our own. We could profit a lot by not putting the blame for them on each other.

Thus, having disposed of this basic aspect, and unmoved by sentiments or bias, if we approach our problems as well as the scene around us and generally in the contemporary world, as two independent sovereign states with the given geo-political situation, I am sure we can work out a whole gamut of sensible relationships based on our respective perceptions. Such relationships alone would endure and we shall have a pragmatic framework of improving upon them, to the extent we both consider such improvement mutually beneficial.

Let me repeat, quite candidly, that between sovereign states, improvement of relations has to stem from a mutuality of desire; it is not possible to achieve this unilaterally in a vacuum, howsoever desirable it may be otherwise. States should be mature enough to absorb possible ups and downs in their relations and nothing should prevent them co-existing peacefully for some time on a low profile of relations, meanwhile working silently for foregoing a framework of better relations, to emerge at a propitious future time. It is not unusual to find next door neighbours not being on talking terms for a while; but neighbourliness in the end is the experience.

SOUTH ASIA EMERGES AS AN IMPORTANT "POLE"

I shall now briefly advert to the geopolitical situation which both our countries find themselves in. The extent to which they share perceptions on the situation, is again a matter of their compulsions.

It is said quite emphatically that the world has travelled from bi-polarism during the past three decades. This trend is indeed unmistakable; but equally unmistakable is another trend, namely that the world, while tending to become multi-polar, is at the same time being subjected to bi-polar pulls in a variety of ways. I shall not go into the details of the methodology of these pulls and the intricate and subtle motivations induced; they are all

well known. It so happened that almost from the beginning of the bi-polar race, some prominent leaders like Nehru, Tito, Nasser, etc. strongly felt the illogic and irrelevance of the emerging polarisation from the standpoint of a vast majority of mankind, just freed from the shackles of imperialism and colonialism, and found itself faced with their accumulated needs and problems hungering for urgent solutions. They had the vision to speak up for this dumb chunk of humanity called the Third World and conceived of the Non-Aligned Movement. Since then, more and more "poles", major and minor, have appeared on the horizon from time to time. Despite the short-term question-marks about their viability, independence and effectiveness, no one doubts the conclusion that they have come to stay and that a return to the classic bi-polarism of the late forties and early fifties is quite unlikely. The present scenario is, therefore, one of a painful, even perilous transition.

SOUTH ASIAN "POLE" MUST MOVE TOWARDS SELF-RELIANCE

Where do India and Pakistan stand in this crucial transition ? It seems to me, that in the emerging multi-polar situation, South Asia is bound to be an important "pole". Its size, location, resources and over-all potential compel it to play a no lesser role. There is no running away from it. This role, naturally and inevitably, entails the fulfilment of certain pre-requisite conditions. In the first place, any "pole", properly so-called, in a multi-polar system, should make conscious and strenuous efforts to minimise the spectre of dependence behind and move in the direction of self-reliance. Obviously this self-reliance would not be absolute; it would be viewed in a new context of interdependence and complementarity. Can a new relationship of this kind be forged in South Asia ? We need to examine this not from the limited standpoint of individual or even collective gains of the countries in the region, but in the truly global context of real multi-polarity. To the extent this new relationship is strengthened, multi-polarity, and along with it the political substance of Non-alignment, is promoted, at least in the negative sense of making the old type of bi-polar blocism more difficult and less meaningful. I suggest that India and Pakistan could seriously think of their role—joint or separate, as they may choose—in this emerging context. I emphasise joint or separate because I think both are conceivable in a framework of accepted objectives and co-ordinated actions. What is important is that a beginning be made in the process of understanding the new context in all its ramifications. We have recently witnessed an important and interesting phenomenon of countries of our region manifesting their desire to work together for their common good. I refer to the meeting of the seven Foreign Secretaries of the South Asian countries in Colombo to consider the proposal of the late President of Bangladesh to establish a framework for regional economic co-operation. Perhaps we should expect to see more such initiatives being considered and it is in this context that I invite the attention of one and all, especially intellectuals, to this issue. The matter has become

particularly relevant after Pakistan has joined the Non-Aligned Movement. This has come as a happy augury.

India, Pakistan must work for Close Economic Co-operation

I now come to another, but allied topic of Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries (ECDC) and Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC). It has been my happy experience during the past one and half years, that on matters concerning the future of developing countries, both *inter se* and *vis-a-vis* the developed world, as also on the New International Economic Order and the strategies for the Development Decade, India and Pakistan have held almost identical views and worked in close co-operation. This, again, was no doubt the result of decisions arrived at independently; what is important is that the decisions coincided in the way they did. It is possible to pursue this *modus operandi* further and in more diversified fields of endeavour. I propose that deeper thought be given in both countries to this activity which will perhaps outstrip everything else in importance in the near future. It will be mutually beneficial for both countries to play, and be seen to play, the role which must legitimately belong to them.

INDO-PAK ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Areas of Consensus and Disagreement

On issues like those of the Middle East, South Africa, Namibia and several others, India and Pakistan are already in tune with each other and with the general consensus of the Non-Aligned Movement. I have no doubt that in the years to come, both our countries will be called upon to become more active on such vital issues. This is yet another opportunity to work in close co-operation in world affairs, given the will to do so.

I shall now touch upon a few issues on which our countries have not been in total agreement, although this phenomenon has been depicted as a measure of difference which is hardly justified by the factual position. I do consider it important to put these issues in proper perspective.

Political Solution Only Answer to the Afghan Issue

I start with Afghanistan, in view of its importance for Pakistan as well as India. It all started on 27 December 1979, when we in India were in the thick of elections to Parliament. Following the results on 10 January, the Government was sworn in on 15 January. It was during this interregnum that we inherited this problem. A resolution was tabled in the United Nations General Assembly calling for immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union however indicated that they had been invited by the leadership in Afghanistan and that they would not remain there longer than necessary. They also made accusations of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan from across the borders and for fomenting of insurgency. This was the scenario three or four days before our government was formally sworn in.

We took stock of the situation and concluded that there was no hope of implementing the resolution in the terms in which it was couched. At the same time, we reiterated, *inter-alia*, our stand that we were opposed to the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would not violate the independence of Afghanistan. Ever since then India has urged a political solution with all the other concomitants clearly spelt out, including of course, withdrawal of foreign forces.

During the past sixteen months, we have doggedly stuck to that line, in the face of insufferable calumny, misrepresentation, distortion and a vicious smear campaign. The public statements, of the Prime Minister and my own speak for themselves. In particular, it may be noted that while in the initial stages we were subjected to the treatment I have just described, our consistent stand did result in the gradual acceptance of the need for some kind of dialogue to resolve the problem. This is evident from the progressive modificatory resolutions adopted and statements made over the last year.

On this occasion, I thought I owed it to myself and the cause, to bring out the above essential facts concerning India's stand on Afghanistan. However, I have desisted from mentioning many other aspects and subsequent facts because I do not intend to ruffle feathers and I want the issue to be settled under any of the initiatives known to have been taken already. Whatever the agency, it is the result that matters. While it is encouraging that a political solution is now apparently favoured all round, it is regrettable that the time taken ostensibly in the quest for the solution is being promptly and assiduously utilized for purposes such as escalation of Great Power presence in the region on a permanent basis, leading to a vicious circle which no one seems to know how and where to break. I invite your pointed attention to this aspect which on no account should be swept under the carpet. The views of India and Pakistan on this issue, while not being identical throughout, have not been diametrically opposed either and have in fact tended to come close to each other as time passed and events unfolded. They eventually converged on the New Delhi Declaration which, as you know, was based on consensus, like all such declarations. In the ultimate analysis, each country's attitude should be judged by its commitment to that Declaration. For my part, I am prepared to state categorically that India reaffirms its support for the relevant paragraph of the Declaration of the Non-Aligned Foreign Minister's Conference held in New Delhi in February 1981, and I am glad to add that both Agha Shahi and I have reaffirmed this in our Joint Press Statement issued yesterday.

Kampuchean Problem should be Resolved in the Interests of the People

At this point, I would also like to briefly touch upon the issue of Kampuchea. It has been a tense and a troubled country. The travails of the Kampuchean people over the last two decades and especially in the 1970's go beyond human imagination and were too ghastly for normal human compassion to remedy or to provide succour. Every leader and foreign minister I have come across so far has categorically expressed abhorrence of the doing of the Pol Pot regime. Yet the irony is that in the United Nations, the same regime is allowed to represent its own victims, as it were, and no concern seems to be felt about this phenomenon. The anomalous position of the Pol Pot regime is that no one favours it; many continue to recognise it technically while voicing their opposition to it; some have de-recognised it; some do not seem to know what to do or say and wait for further developments but meanwhile the people of Kampuchea continue to suffer. The central concern of all countries should have been to bring to the Kampuchean people some hope of stability, some sense of peace, some prospect for their well being. In spite of this, the whole issue was dealt with and continues to be dealt with in many quarters and by many countries in terms of their own strategic and national interests under the umbrella of technical and legalistic arguments. India's approach was and is to be responsive to the predicaments and the needs of the Kampuchean people. It is this approach which led us to recognise the present Government of Kampuchea—of Heng Samrin. This is the national consensus which emerged in India both before and after the 1980 elections to Parliament and all political parties, except one, are in favour of the decision. In fact, when I announced this in Parliament as the fulfilment of the election pledge of our Party, all leaders of opposition parties stood up and protested; they said that this was a matter on which there was national consensus and that the Foreign Minister could not, therefore, claim the credit entirely as his own or as of his Party ! I then corrected myself and admitted that this was a question of national consensus. Leaving aside the politics and polemics of tactical and strategic competition and confrontation, some stability and order, some measure of peace and calm have come back to Kampuchea under its present Government. These facts have been confirmed by many persons who visited the country, including some non-political UN experts and a delegation of Indian Members of Parliament, belonging to different political parties. It is therefore our assessment that if the people and the Government of Kampuchea are allowed to devote themselves to the task of their national reconstruction and well-being without external interference, without the imposition of extraneous interests on the course of events, then the issue will resolve itself and pave the way for stability in the whole region.

Of course, if these objectives are to be achieved it would involve withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. In our view that can best be obtained by quiet diplomacy between the countries directly concerned and

by a regional dialogue which was urged by the recent Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in Delhi, and generally accepted by the parties directly concerned. It is our hope that they will continue along this constructive path.

INTERACTION AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED

These, then, are the issues on which India and Pakistan have somewhat different perceptions. No one can say they are too many, nor too deep. Nevertheless, there seems to be an unfortunate tendency all the time in both countries to play up the differences rather disproportionately.

I have often wondered why this should be so. Could it be a part of the overall effort to establish separate identities? Could it be a bundle of complexes developed on both sides, to the effect that any emphasis on similarities may prove unpopular? In that case how and why did such emphasis become unpopular? Could it be merely a hangover we are not able to get over? It is possible, that it may be a combination of all these and several other factors which have led to the playing up of these differences. Be that as it may, I think it is time to realise that just like differences, similarities too cannot be wished away; so also complementarities. It is of course open to us to ignore them and go our separate ways, regardless of the cost of duplication, avoidable wastage, inconvenience of fixing up alternatives, etc. Such a cost is known to have been accepted by sovereign States at times for countervailing reasons. What I wish to submit, for the consideration of the people of Pakistan is that in our case there are no such countervailing reasons. The logic is overwhelmingly in favour of coming closer.

The stark reality which confronts the two of us is that we are both poor, and that for both countries, poverty is the main enemy. Hence our shared interest in the new International Economic Order. Hence too, the interest in our countries in the adaptation and application of scientific knowledge and technological know-how is the essential task before us: the betterment of our living conditions and the augmentation of the welfare of our peoples. I would, therefore suggest that we move towards free exchanges in the economic field. I also believe that if we were to promote thorough going academic exchanges, the greater cross fertilisation of ideas would gradually and irreversibly lead to a more sympathetic and mutual understanding, at a deeper and more profound level.

We have in fact been attempting to do this since the commencement of the Simla process. The process of normalization envisaged in the Simla Agreement means—and can only mean—the intensification of interaction at all levels between our peoples and Governments and with a view to evolving an integrated, realistic and mature relationship.

We are happy to note that in the field of intellectual and cultural contacts, we have received in India scores of Pakistani writers and poets, journalists and commentators, musicians and other artistes. I would like to express

my gratitude for the warm and enthusiastic welcome which you, in turn, have invariably reserved for Indian artistes and intellectuals and sportsmen visiting your country.

India's desire for close and friendly relations with Pakistan is founded on a realistic appreciation in India of Pakistan's inherent strength. In terms of population, Pakistan is one of the big countries in the world. Out of the 160 countries or so of the world, Pakistan comes in among the first ten or twelve. Apart from a large and skilled population, Pakistan has impressive natural resources, ranging from some of the most fertile land in the world to valuable mineral deposits. There is also much to admire in the economic progress you have made in the past three decades. These potentialities strengthen prospects of co-operation between Pakistan and India. Our own experiences and experiments in the spheres of agricultural research, development of new sources of energy including solar energy, and intermediate industrial technology have been satisfactory and useful. If you are persuaded that this Indian experience is relevant to your needs and conditions and could contribute to strengthening your economy, we would be only too ready to share it with you.

It is our belief that the countries of the sub-continent constitute a fraternity whose destinies are interlinked. This is what led our Prime Minister to tell *The Muslim* newspaper the other day: "We feel that a stable Pakistan and the progress of its people is as much in India's interest as it is in Pakistan's."

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

In conclusion, I would venture a few words about my vision for the future of Indo-Pakistan relations. I have referred to the Simla Agreement. Both our countries acknowledge that it provides a framework, a basis for expanding our relations, for encouraging our common endeavour for peace and stability so essential for the well-being of our peoples. It would be our endeavour that attitudes and actions flowing therefrom contribute through varying vicissitudes, to the process of normalisation; to strengthening the bonds of friendship; to adding positive and creative dimensions to our mutual understanding. I am trying to look beyond the stage of normalisation and aim at positive friendship based on active co-operation born of genuine mutual trust. I think we have to undertake a deliberate and conscious transformation of our respective psyches. I am conscious that this will be a gradual process. But all progress will depend on the cultivation of grace under pressure, empathy in adversity and a capacity to discern the positive and work for it in the face of limitations.

P.V. NARSIMHA RAO

PARTY SYSTEM UNDER SADAT — CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

A lot has changed in Egypt since Sadat came to power in October 1970. In the first few months, at least till the May 1971 showdown with his leftist colleague, Ali Sabri, Sadat repeatedly vowed to follow Nasser's objectives and to respect his legacy. In fact, the over-riding consideration in the choice of Anwar al-Sadat by the political leadership and the committees of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was undoubtedly his closeness to Nasser and his willingness to follow Nasser's policies. In its unanimous vote for the nomination of Sadat on 7 October 1970, the National Assembly stressed the fact that he was "a comrade of Nasser in all stages of his struggle." It expected Sadat to follow Nasser's path towards socialism, anti-imperialism, ties with the Arab states and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Even the men in the street indicated the popular will to carry on Nasser's tradition as they shouted "Sadat, Sadat, do not think that Nasser is dead."

As soon as Sadat found himself firmly saddled in power after eliminating his rival Nasserite group led by Ali Sabri, he forgot his promises to follow the Nasserite path. He very discretely stopped mentioning Nasser and the Nasserite path. The expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt in July 1972, only a little more than a year after the Egypt-Soviet Union Friendship Treaty of May 1971, clearly indicated a major shift in the foreign policy of Egypt. On the domestic front, a soft line was taken right from the beginning so far as state-enterprise was concerned. Capitalism no more remained a sin, rather, it was said, the sectors of the economy which effectively could be managed by private enterprise in a mixed economy would be given sufficient protection.

But in one sphere of general policy — and this he never admitted — Sadat really followed Nasser. This was the Nasser style of politics, especially the use of the party system to perpetuate personal rule while creating a semblance of popular participation. Sadat liberalized his regime and created a multi-party system of sorts. The endeavour here is to examine how real was this apparent change in the party system under Sadat and to identify the points of convergence and divergence; in short, to see whether the changes brought about by Sadat in the party system represented change or continuity.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE NASSER AND SADAT ERAS

The similarities between the initial years of Nasser and Sadat are striking. It took two years for Nasser to eliminate his rivals within and outside the "Junta"; Sadat took around nine months. The challenge to Nasser came from the Right, chiefly from the Muslim Brotherhood which apparently had the sympathies of General Neguib; Sadat faced the challenge from the pro-Nasser leftist group led by Sabri. Both Nasser and Sadat, having once eliminated their rivals consolidated their power — Nasser

eliminated his rivals in 1954 and consolidated power till 1956; Sadat eliminated his rivals in 1971 and consolidated power till the October War in 1973. Only then did they think of affecting structural changes and experimenting with them. But it was always a controlled experiment—never did they allow the experiments to endanger their position and hold on power.

The Legitimacy Problem : A Common Feature

The basic problem for both Nasser and Sadat was that of legitimacy. Saddled with the bitter and seemingly permanent legacy of the 1967 Arab-Israel War and burdened by mounting economic problems, lacking the personal magnetism of his predecessor and unable to maintain the ideological momentum of the Nasser regime, Egypt at the time Sadat took over, seemed headed for a legitimacy crisis. Even the inevitable—inevitable because Nasser had left little or no institutional legacy—struggle for power between Sadat and Ali Sabri should be taken as a conflict arising out of a crisis of legitimacy. Although Sadat legally succeeded Nasser and was later overwhelmingly confirmed as President by a national referendum, he was challenged by some of Nasser's men, especially Ali Sabri, who considered themselves equally legitimate and qualified to fill Nasser's place.

Nasser had never vested political power in any Egyptian political institution and though he did prefer some institutions over others, the ASU certainly was not his favourite political instrument. The ASU was his own innovation, yet he did not trust it. But after his death, outside the formal governmental, bureaucratic and military structures on which Nasser had heavily relied, the only arena for political debate and constitutional procedure was the ASU. Sabri and his aides, Sami Sharaf and Sharawi Goum'ah, the Minister of the Interior, with the ASU as their source of power¹ and supported by the leftist *al-Tali'ah* intellectuals and the managerial class in the factories, appeared poised to win against Sadat and his group. However, Sabri and his ASU associates made a mistake in assuming that the union had become the powerful party that they wanted it to be. They ignored the fact that the Army was powerful and they could not be sure of its support. They also ignored the fact that the people saw them as a tyrannical group which had turned itself, after Nasser's death, from the status of "instruments of power" to one of "holders of power."² Besides, they made no attempt to forge close links with the people, a relationship which could have stood them in good stead. Sadat realized, after his proposal for an Egyptian merger with Libya, Syria and the Sudan was voted down by the ASU Executive Committee that a *coup* against him was in the making. It was as a defensive measure, therefore, that he proceeded to purge the party and the government after announcing the discovery of a conspiracy; in a matter of days, he dismissed Ali Sabri and four other members of the Committee from the ASU's Supreme Executive Committee. One of them, Sharawi Goum'ah,

was a Cabinet Minister. Five other Cabinet Ministers, including the Minister of War, General Mohammed Fawzi, were also fired. In one stroke then, Sadat had eliminated almost everyone who could pose a threat to him and in the process, had crippled the ASU. He abolished whole time work in the party and dissolved all the old party committees in the provinces. The ASU was virtually dissolved and ordered to be recreated in May 1971 through elections from the base to the apex. The explanation given was not new. Nasser had ordered election in 1968 because the ASU at that time, he said, was not built on free elections; Sadat, alleged that the whole organization as it existed then was based on elections rigged by the "centres of power."³

What is really striking is not that both Nasser and Sadat had to face a legitimacy crisis but that they used more or less the same themes to gain legitimacy—pan-Arabism, economic policy, Islamism and so on. Nasser relied heavily on sources of legitimacy other than the political party. So did Sadat in the beginning of his presidency.

Sadat embarked upon a policy, rather a show, of pan-Arabism, one which Nasser had so successfully used to gain legitimacy. Like Nasser again, Sadat resorted to what has already been referred to as a traditional legitimacy device—Islamic orthodoxy. There was a strong trend towards Islamic revivalism and political conservatism. In a definite shift to the right Sadat "abandoned the middle position in ideological affairs" and came "to rely increasingly on a mixture of elements from the liberal bourgeois and the Islamic right."⁴ If Nasser enforced land reforms, confiscated foreign property and later nationalized private enterprise in a bid to win support and legitimize his rule, Sadat attempted to undo this while the object remained the same. He found small presents to placate each class. As early as December 1970, Sadat ordered the review of expropriation measures and the restoration of sequestered property to its original owners. Even before this was done, price cuts in consumer goods like grain and rice and non-consumer goods had been affected and imports liberalized. The wholesale promotion of about 150,000 government employees with promises of a pay-rise⁵, new schemes for better health, housing and transport and the release of around 3,000 prisoners within a few weeks of coming into power were all measures taken to give the impression that a new era had begun—more liberal than the previous one, in which Egyptians could hope to improve their lot.

After May 1971, Sadat went further with these policies; while the pan-Arab slogan was played down in favour of a policy which can be described as "Egypt first,"⁶ the role of Islam was stepped up. Article 2 of the new Constitution of September 1971 stated: "Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation." Along with a crack-down on the Left,⁷ Sadat adopted a policy of progressively easing pressure on the Right. As if in a bid for support, he granted amnesty and rehabilitated hundreds of those who had suffered during the Nasser era—the beneficiaries were elements of the Farooq regime, the Muslim Brotherhood, landlords and expelled judges.⁸

The October 1973 War was a crowning success for Sadat. He felt strong enough to claim that the former regime had lost all its legitimacy as a result of its defeat in 1967, implying thereby that his regime had established its own legitimacy by its successes. The new group of journalists who were released or allowed to return from exile included the Amin brothers—Mustafa Amin and Ali Amin—Ahmed Abu al-Fath and top army officers considered responsible for the defeat in 1967 and also some of those like General Fawzi who had been implicated in the leftist plot in May 1971.⁹ A High Court order in May 1971 declared that all expropriation under Nasser was illegal and must be returned.¹⁰ The huge public sector was blamed for the visible deterioration of the Egyptian economy and infrastructure. An open door policy was then openly accepted as the cure for the country's economic ills.

The Liberalization

Lacking Nasser's overwhelming charisma, Sadat was in no position to carry on in the same tradition as the former. Between 1967 and 1970 enough had happened to raise expectations of a new, more liberal system in the near future. After Nasser's death it appeared that any Egyptian leader who took over would have to become "a broker among the emergent interests in the country and less of a patrimonial autocrat."¹¹ It was expected that the vacuum created would be filled by some kind of a collective leadership rather than by the sole political organization, the ASU, which would however, be called upon to play an increasingly important role. At the same time people hoped that the National Assembly and the various mass organizations would be more closely associated with the elaboration of general policy.¹² That a certain amount of liberalization was expected/desired is clear from certain proposals presented to Sadat (after he was elected President) by three of Nasser's prominent associates and fellow RCC members—Zakaria Mohieddin, Abdul Latif Boghdadi and Kamal ed-din Hussein (all rightists)—which demanded *inter-alia*, an open political system with at least one opposition party, a free Press and collective authority to reside in the head of the government instead of a single strong man.¹³ These proposals had to be rejected because it was not an opportune moment.

Some liberalization did take place. For instance, debates in the National Assembly¹⁴ became more free. The 1964 Constitution stipulated that the Government submit its programme of action to the Parliament. In 1964, when Ali Sabri was Prime Minister, the programme was not even discussed for it "covered everything." During the 1966-67 session when Zakaria Mohieddin was Prime Minister till the death of Nasser, no debate on government programmes took place; there was only unanimous approval. But after Sadat took over, the programme was debated but without dissent. In February 1972, the debate was mild. In 1973, the People's Assembly demonstrated that it was not after all entirely impotent.¹⁵ The Press, too,

was permitted to write and criticize much more freely. For the first time since the *coup d'état*, the Egyptian Press afforded a rather reliable picture of the nation's economic and social problems.

CHANGES IN THE PARTY SYSTEM

Perhaps it was as a result of this freedom that for the first time in March 1972, there was an admission by Syad Marei, First Secretary of the ASU Central Committee, that Egypt's hopes of building a sound political party had not been realized, that democracy was limited inside the party, superficial political flattery was widespread, the institution considered itself an organ for producing excuses and justifications for government action and reports were drawn up to please the leaders rather than represent the true feelings of the people.¹⁶

But it was only after the positive outcome of the October War of 1973 that Sadat felt strong enough to take steps to modify the party system. He touched off a debate when in August 1974 he issued a 7,000 word "working paper" to reform the ASU. Egyptians engaged in a spirited debate on the return of political parties. In newspaper columns and meeting halls all over the country politicians, intellectuals, students, workers and peasants mulled over the reform proposals. The views expressed ranged from the abolition of the 50 per cent quota system for peasants and workers to the abolition of the ASU and the setting up of a second political party.¹⁷ However, when the Egyptian Parliamentary Commission, set up to study the reorganization of political parties, recommended the maintenance of the one party system, it became clear that Sadat had settled for breathing a new life into the ASU rather than forming a new party. All that he seemed to want was that the ASU be a centre for healthy dialogue and a focal point for opposing views rather than rigidly endorse conformism. Accordingly, a year later, Sadat announced the creation of a new political grouping within the ASU to be called the "Free Socialists."¹⁸

Then, in January 1976, Sadat formed the Commission on the Future of Political Action of the People's Assembly. And on 14 March 1976, he announced that on the basis of the report of the Commission and in the implementation of his policy of liberalizing the country's political and economic institutions, the ASU would be permitted to have three different groupings or "platforms"—a liberal right wing, a governmental center and a Marxist left. He ruled out an early return to a multi-party system adding that there were "no solid foundations at present for the formation of parties."¹⁹

The 1953 ban on political parties remained. However, within the ASU, three permanent "platforms" representing the right, the center and the left were permitted. Each platform could lobby for its ideas, disseminate its views through the media, and prepare a programme and a list of candidates for election. All platforms were to work under the legitimizing formula of the ASU; none was to impose its opinion upon others. The ASU was

thus to provide a framework "to safeguard national unity, the inevitability of the socialist solution and social peace,"²⁰ while the platforms were to be the actual political organizations to carry out all their political activities and programmes in full freedom and submit candidates who, if they reached the People's Assembly, were to exercise full constitutional rights. The President himself declined to belong to any platform stating that he would be an arbitrator among all authorities, unbiased and a "safety valve protecting the masses."²¹

Through these legitimizing "platforms",²² Sadat hoped to deflect the pressure for a multi-party system and to encourage the People's Assembly to function as a representative body capable of constructive criticism and useful legislative initiative and oversight e.g., modification of the budget in 1976.

The three "platforms", represented very different sectors of the Egyptian Government spectrum. The Left group was called the National Progressive Unionist Rally. Led by the "Red Colonel", Khaled Moheiddin, it was for closer ties with the Soviet Union, stress on public sector investment and reliance on class struggle. The Centre "platform" was the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization and included the Prime Minister, Cabinet members, key civil servants and heads of the 26 governorates. It was for the continuance of the government policy—a theme of gradualism and guided democracy, a mixed economy with a healthy dose of private sector investment and closer ties with the West. The third "platform", was named the Socialist Liberals. It "was neither socialist nor liberal"²³ and was for a return to capitalism, greater private enterprise and a heavy reliance on market forces to solve Egypt's economic problems.

Seeing that the trial balloon was doing well, Sadat, in November 1976, one week after elections to the People's Assembly, announced that the three "platforms" were to be called political parties. Though the ASU was to continue supervisory and financial controls over the parties and at least for the time being, only the three parties were to be allowed to function, it did appear that the way was set for a multi-party system in the near future. Hopes, however, were soon to be belied.

On 29 June 1977, the Egyptian Parliament adopted a new law on political parties which for the first time since their abolition in 1953, permitted the establishment of political parties subject to certain conditions. The conditions are important for it was because of these conditions that the members of the opposition Right and the Left boycotted the vote on the new law. The conditions meant that the ASU would continue to maintain control over the formation and life of parties. They were:

- (i) Any new party must have the authorization of the ASU.
- (ii) It must include at least 20 members of the Egyptian Parliament.²⁴
- (iii) It should not have been in existence at the time of the Monarchy,

i.e., parties which had been dissolved in 1953 could not be revived in their former form.

- (iv) Any new party must support national unity and acknowledge that Egypt's problems could only be solved by "socialist" means.
- (v) The aims and principles of any new party must be different from those of the groups affiliated to the ASU.

The third condition had the clear implication that the Egyptian Communist Party, the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood could not be legally reconstituted.²⁵ And it was from these three organizations that opposition to Sadat could come.

The Muslim Brotherhood was not much of a challenge. With the release from prison of most of the Muslim Brothers in the 1960's and after Sadat came to power in the 1970's, the message went around: "the Brotherhood has arisen." The Muslim Brotherhood reorganized itself in small secret cells in villages to begin with and then in religious schools, towns and cities. The pressure on the regime from the Brotherhood was for a further movement towards Islam. Sadat went out of his way to court the conservative, religiously directed Brotherhood in proclaiming the Arab Republic of Egypt as an Islamic state. Limiting the sale of alcoholic beverages in May 1976 and the adoption of certain legislation based on the *Sharia* were also placatory gestures. When the platforms in the ASU were formed, the Muslim Brotherhood with a following of about 50,000, perhaps more, was reported to have decided to reconstitute itself not as a political party but as a religious organization, pending the official restoration of the right to form political parties under two former free officers—Kamal-ed-din Hussein and Hussein Shafie—without joining any of the three platforms.

But the Left²⁶ was taken as a real threat even when it had never enjoyed any significant political power in the past. Sadat's attitude towards the Left was clearly reflected in the manner in which he attacked the National Progressive Union Rally while discussion for legalizing political parties were in progress. He called them "traitors" and "agents" and emphasized that he wanted a left wing that "was Egyptian and not Soviet."²⁷ The Progressive Union, however, reiterated its stand in June 1977 and said that it supported better relations with the USSR as that was in Egypt's interests. But they were cautious; they accepted that there were nationalist groups and elements in the ruling authority. Khaled Moheiddin is reported to have said: "We have to work within the system... there can be points beyond which we cannot go. They can finish us off. But what will be the use of that."²⁸ This attitude of fear as well as hatred continued. Even as late as 26 October 1978, a communist plot to overthrow Sadat was said to have been discovered.²⁹

Ever since it was banned in 1953, the Wafd remained "no more than the throbbing of the city's inner life, the great elusive murmur which serves as a barometer if not a guide to the ups and downs of public opinion."³⁰ All through, it is said, it remained the strongest electoral force in Egypt

wherein lay its role as a potential threat to the regime.³¹ This was proved when the New Wafd was officially registered as a party on 4 February 1978.

The New Wafd³² came up as the first freely created political party since 1953. Having 24 members³³ in the Assembly, it was the second largest party in the Egyptian Parliament. It was an instant success. For the student, no less than for the peasants, Serageddin's party represented an alternative to the government and a chance for genuine political expression. It claimed a membership of 50,000 which was believed to represent only a fraction of the potential membership. The party indicated that their numbers in the Assembly would have been more had it not been for the stage management of their re-emergence by the ASU.

However, it can be said, that the New Wafd did overestimate its pre-revolutionary support. For one reason, the following of the young people was superficial; they attended the Monday night gatherings because their parents used to vote for the Old Wafd. For another, its appeal was not real, rather it was the result of the all-inclusive character it had come to assume. It had members both from the extreme Left and the extreme Right. Finally, in their enthusiasm to embarrass the government, the approach of the New Wafdists was naive. For example, one of them—Sheikh Ashur Nasr—shouted in the Assembly "down with Sadat," and was expelled.³⁴

A word about the state of the Press here would not be out of place.³⁵ The first opposition newspaper, the weekly *al-Ahram* (The Liberals), was the organ of the Liberal Socialists and made its appearance on 14 November 1977. It did criticize the government for its game of Cabinet reshuffles but was on the whole mild and cautious in its attack. It was the leftist *al-Ahali* (the People), an organ of the Unionist Party, that was really critical of the government. For the same reason perhaps its circulation shot up from 50,000 to 135,000 in only four months.³⁶ And it was for the same reason again, that its 11 April 1976 issue was seized by the authorities for in it was published an interview with Heikal.³⁷ The party had to halt its publication until the newspaper could publish the views of the Party freely. However, it started publication again in July 1978 but was banned in August 1978 because it had criticised the peace initiative. In the place of the *al-Ahali* the Unionist Party launched a new paper, *al-Tuqaddam* (Progress) which was closed down by the authorities in January when it protested against Sadat playing host to the exiled Shah of Iran.³⁸

The popularity of the New Wafd, as also open criticism by the Left, aroused concern in the ruling circles. The government felt that they were becoming serious opposition groups which were bound to affect their hold on the system. It even instilled fear in the privileged Armed Forces which was fearful of being swept out of power and influence by a genuinely civilian administration. Thus to prevent the opposition from going out of hand, a referendum to decide whether to allow Communists to hold key posts in the government or the press, whether those who served the system of the pre-1952 era be allowed to participate in political life, whether all former political

parties be allowed to return to political life, and whether the condition of working within the national unity framework, social peace and the inevitability of the socialist solution be imposed was ordered on 15 May 1978. The referendum, the result of the fear of Nasserism (as many Nasserites had been released from prison and were thinking of forming a party),³⁹ was generally opposed but as could be expected 98.29 per cent of the people voted "yes."⁴⁰

The "yes" vote affected two parties—the New Wafd and the Unionists. A thirteen-point bill in accordance with the referendum verdict was to purge at least three top New Wafd leaders—Chairman Serageddin, its Secretary-General, Ibrahim Farag and its Deputy Chairman Abdel Fattah Hassan. The latter two had held posts in governments of the old Wafd before 1952. Similarly, it was to ban the Marxists and pro-Moscow officials who had served Nasser because they supported an ideology "incompatible with religion." The result was that on 2 June 1978, the New Wafd dissolved itself rather than submit to the political restrictions imposed by Sadat which rendered political parties a "mere facade."⁴¹ Three days later, the Unionist Party announced that it was suspending all political activity to protest against the new law. A week later it, however, postponed a decision to dissolve itself for another two months and decided to contest the constitutionality of the law in court.⁴²

This left only two political parties—the governing Egyptian Arab Socialist Party with 300 of the 360 seats in the Assembly and the Right Wing Liberal Socialist Party which supported the government on important issues.

Sadat announced on 22 July 1978 that after a lot of hesitation and thought, he had decided to set up his own political party. This step was aimed at countering criticism about the repressive measures after the recent referendum. The new party, modelled on lines of social-democratic parties of Western Europe and named the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in August 1978.⁴³ The Party headed by Sadat⁴⁴ set prosperity for Egyptian citizens as its chief goal. A 10,000 word policy document released in August stressed the "need to build a modern state on science and faith in which every citizen can realize his legitimate ambition, free from fear and hunger."⁴⁵ To strike a balance between the interests of the individual and the community, the programme provided for the adoption of Democratic Socialism based on Islamic and Christian values and the principles of the 1952 Revolution and the corrective Revolution of May 1971. Referring to the absence of the word "socialist" from the party's name, Fikry Mahram Ebeid, the Secretary-General of the Party, said that this was not a slight on socialism for the Constitution mentions the word many times and there is no need for repetition.⁴⁶ Obviously, the NDP was to be more positive than the former ruling party towards private enterprise.

What was new about the NDP? First, Sadat himself became its leader. This lent it a weight which the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party did not have.

And second, the new party brazenly tried to take the ideologies of the two suppressed parties; while it took the populist tone of the Left, the NDP, following the Wafd, declared that it would be more positive towards private enterprise than the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party.

In order to preserve the democratic image of the regime and facilitate the formation of an "honest" opposition, Sadat called on some of the People's Assembly members to form a new "honest" opposition according to the Parties Law. Soon two very small opposition parties were formed—the Socialist Labour Party and the National Front. The two enjoyed very little popular support and did not indulge in any outspoken criticism of the Government.

CONCLUSION

Sadat's continuing experiment with the party system meant at least one thing—that the problem of legitimacy for his regime was not solved. Two questions remain; what made Sadat change the very form of the party system in Egypt and to what extent was he making a break with the Nasserite past?

What Sadat had said long back in 1958 about the National Union appears to be equally relevant twenty years later for his own experiments with the party system. In 1958 he had said: "It (the National Union) is not an expedient freely adopted, but a necessity forced upon us, dictated by our new condition and our new responsibilities."⁴⁷ What were these new conditions and responsibilities? First, there was need for legitimacy especially in the face of the re-emergence of organized opposition at the right and left of extremes of the political spectrum. Second, Sadat's turn-about on pan-Arabism and his moderation toward Israel, and more important, the massive assistance from the Arab-Gulf states and the United States of America necessitated a show of liberalism and political structures comparable to that of the democratic West. So strong was this urge to present a semblance of Western political structures that in December 1976 Sadat allowed the Liberal Socialist Party which had only 12 members in the Assembly (as compared to 280 of the ruling Egyptian Arab Socialist Party), to form a shadow cabinet headed by Ahmed Sayed Darwich.

Then again, President Sadat never made a clear break with the Nasserite past. Like Nasser he wanted to have an ideal democracy where the opposition would be neither "insolent" nor "impertinent." He proposed to reserve the right not to allow "anti-national" parties to grow. When he came down heavily on the Left and formed his own party, he was playing Nasser's old balancing act, balancing the Right and the Left and never allowing either to become a danger to his rule. His role was one of an arbitrator. Basically Sadat's actions were aimed at giving the Right a deserved but contained outlet for its grievances after years of enforced silence, while at the same time not completely alienating the Left. Sadat offered himself as "as symbol

of continuity with a difference."⁴⁸ In the same way he also sought to reassure the Egyptian Center.

The pluralist regime he tried to set up was rotten at the base in as much as the opposition was merely tolerated. That the primary aim of all these exercises had been to strengthen Sadat's own position is apparent from the sharp criticism levelled against him by the former Egyptian Ambassador in Lisbon and former Armed Forces Chief, Said Shazly. After the Referendum in May 1978 he denounced the government as a dictatorship "hiding behind a face of powerless democratic institutions."

PRADEEP SEN*

NOTES

- 1 Since 1967, the ASU had been in the ascendancy. Sabri who was reappointed (he was replaced by Nasser himself immediately after the Six Day War), the Secretary-General of the ASU in 1968, grabbed the opportunity, when Nasser needed his support. He purged the Army, recruited cadres from the technocratic-industrial sections, organized leadership groups in the rival areas, increased the general membership and spread the wide network of the ASU. Further, the militia and guardsmen were also organized into the ASU network. After Nasser's death, the ASU leftist paper, *al-Tali'ah* emerged from obscurity and became the stronghold of extreme leftist-oriented intellectuals and journalists. The *al-Goumhuriyah* was infiltrated by Sabri loyalists. Both publications launched a bitter journalistic war against *al-Ahram's* Heikal and, indirectly, against the Sadat regime.
- 2 Per Gahrton, "President Sadat's New Brand of Egyptian Nationalism," *New Middle East* (London), No. 40, January 1970, p.11.
- 3 *Indian Express* (Delhi), 24 April 1972.
- 4 John Waterbury, "A Note on Egypt: 1973," *Field Staff Reports North East Africa Series* American Universities Field Staff (New York), XVIII, No. 4, July 1973, p. 4.
- 5 *The Guardian* (Manchester), 13 March 1971.
- 6 Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics—The Search for Legitimacy* (London, 1977), p. 248.
- 7 Ninety leftist intellectuals, charged with causing tension, spreading false information and undermining national unity, were expelled from the ASU in January 1973. *Arab Report and Record* (London), 15 January 1973.
- 8 Najib E. Saliba, "Decline of Nasserism in Sadat's Egypt," *World Affairs* (Washington), Vol. 138, no 1, Summer 1975, p. 52.
- 9 *The Guardian*, 16 March 1974.
- 10 *New York Times*, 25 May 1974.
- 11 Shahrugh Akhavi, "Egypt's New Patrimonial Elite," in Frank Tachau, (Ed.), *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* (Massachusetts, 1975), pp. 86-87.
- 12 *Le Monde* (Paris), 7 October 1970.
- 13 *New York Times*, 10 October 1970.
- 14 The Egyptian Parliament according to the September 1971 Constitution was to be called the People's Assembly.

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- 15 Fuad Mater, "After the Deluge: Egypt's Parliament Finds Its Voice," *New Middle East* (London), Nos. 52/53, January/February 1973, p. 45.
- 16 *Al-Ahram* reported the comment of one People's Assembly member that "People have heard so much about preparations for the battle that they are fed up with slogans uttered here and there without result." *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 11 December 1972. Again, government ministers who reported to the Assembly were subjected to harsh questioning.
- 16 *Indian Express*, 24 April 1972.
- 17 Some of the prominent views that emerged during the debate were:
 - i) Hafez Badawy, Speaker of the Assembly, echoed the views of Sadat, who was not against political parties but believed that confrontation with Israel was to be resolved first. Badawy said: "We object to parties as long as war continues. We also object to any encroachment of 50 per cent minimum representation of workers and farmers in all political institutions."
 - ii) Mohammed Abdel Shafie, a member of the Assembly, called for the abolition of the quota system. He said that the return of political parties would be the only safeguard against a return of "centers of power."
 - iii) Many saw the ASU as designed to blur issues and soften political confrontation.
 - iv) Youssef Idris, a Marxist, said that the ASU was "artificial" and should not be reformed but abandoned. "We should be fully socialist or fully capitalist and not a mixture of both as we are now," was his comment.
 - v) Ali Amin, Chairman of *Al-Akhbar* said: "We need socialism with freedom" along European lines.
International Herald Tribune (Paris), 11 September 1974.
 - vi) There were at the same time some attempts to found a second political party in addition to the ASU. Certain Egyptians had wanted to name the new party to be formed as "October 6", the date of crossing the Suez Canal. The new party was to support Sadat's leadership more firmly.
B.K. Narayan, *Anwar el-Sadat—Man with a Mission* (New Delhi, 1977), pp. 97-98.
- 18 *Statesman* (Delhi), 27 October 1975.
- 19 *Ceylon Daily News*, 16 March 1976.
- 20 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London) Vol. 22, 1976, p. 27810.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 This was not the first time that such an idea had come up. Way back in 1964, Nasser had reportedly attempted to supplement the ASU with yet another group of 4000 members which would function as the "Government Party" within the ASU. The new organization was designed by Nasser "to enforce a peaceful transfer of power and a continuation of his policies if anything happened to him." *Washington Post*, 9 February 1964.
- 23 A.Z. Rubinstein, "Egypt of Sadat", *Current History* (Philadelphia), Vol. 72, no. 423, January 1977, p. 20.
- 24 This condition did not apply to the three parties already existing. The distribution of seats in the Assembly among these three was:

Liberal Socialist—12
Egyptian Arab Socialist Organisation—280
National Progressive Union—2
Independents—48

The minimum number of members in the Assembly required for a new party to be formed was reduced according to an announcement made by Sadat in July 1978. The new number, however, was not given.

- West Asia Diary* (New Delhi), Vol. 3, no. 36, 1978, p. 1220.
- 25 However, the Wafd was reported to have decided at a meeting in May 1977, to re-constitute itself, *Le Monde*, 1 June 1977.
- 26 The debate for the reactivation of the Egyptian Communist Party which voluntarily disbanded itself in 1965, had started as early as 1966. The 1967 debacle and Nasser's inclination towards compromise solutions strengthened the trend. The death of Nasser and the purge of the Sabri group forced the pace. So did the Egyptian help to General Nimeri of the Sudan to crush the Communists and the expulsion of Soviet experts from Egypt in 1972. They paused a little, to detract any accusation of a Soviet plot, till de-Nasserization was well underway. Then seeing the poor economic conditions, the Communist Party thought of harnessing the disaffections and rumblings among the people and on May Day, 1975, revived itself. *Times of India* (Delhi), 18 August 1975.
- 27 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. 23, 1977, p. 28516.
- 28 *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 3 February 1977.
- 29 *West Asia Diary* (New Delhi), Vol. 3, no. 25, 1978, p. 1104.
- 30 Jeanne and Simone Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (New York, 1958), p. 242.
- 31 It is alleged that the Wafd had planned to export the student demonstrations in 1968 to overthrow Nasser's regime but withdrew when it found that another party was competing with it to exploit the situation. A leading Wafd member had admitted to organizing demonstrations at the funeral of Nahas Pasha in 1965. *Daily Telegraph* (London), 18 September 1968.
- 32 The New Wafd was accepted because it declared its allegiance to the 1952 revolution and principles of socialism, democracy and the rights of workers and peasants. More important, it supported Sadat's peace initiative. Domestically, it said, it would prefer a more capitalist economy and would like to see more power in the hands of the Government than the President.
- 33 The biggest loser was the Right—out of its 12 members in the Assembly, 9 joined the New Wafd. An equal number left the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party to join the New Wafd. The rest were independents.
- 34 *Times of India*, 3 June 1978.
- 35 The Press was nationalized in the 1960s. The ASU owned all the publications. But after the three parties had been formed within the ASU framework the question was: Who owns what? There were calls for the ASU to renounce its ownership of the Press and for shareholder companies to be set up to run the newspapers. Others suggested that each of the principal dailies be assigned to one of the three parties. The matter was, however, left to the Higher Council of the Press to decide. *Kuwait Times*, 5 January 1977.
- 36 *Times of India*, 3 June 1978.
- 37 *West Asia Diary*, Vol. 3, no. 22, 1978, p. 1076.
- 38 *New Statesman* (London), 16 February 1979.
- 39 *Indian Express*, 26 May 1978.
- 40 It is to be noted that the opposition was never allowed to voice its opinion. The last edition of the weekly, *al-Ahali* which called on the people to vote "no" was seized before it could reach the streets. *West Asia Diary*, Vol. 3, no. 32, 1978, p. 1176.
- 41 *The Times* (London), 3 June 1978.
- 42 The Unionist Party held that the new law violated article 40 of the 1971 Constitution prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, origin or language. *West Asia Diary*, Vol. 3, no. 29, 1978, p. 1147.
- 43 The ASU announced that it would merge with the National Democratic Party.
- 44 Sadat had remained out of the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party.
- 45 *Cairo Bulletin* (Press Bureau of the Egyptian Embassy in India, Delhi), 23 August 1978.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 16 August 1978.

- 47 *Qaidah Shah' biyyah* (Cairo), June 1958. Quoted in Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt: The Praetorian State* (New Jersey, 1974), p. 145.
- 48 Raymond William Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat* (Massachusetts, 1978), p. 156.

BOOK REVIEWS

DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY AND TECHNOCRACY:
INTERACTION OF THEIR ROLES

A Review Article

WRITING early in this century Max Weber had argued that bureaucracy is the most rational and efficient mode of group activity to achieve chosen goals. But the spread of bureaucratic organizational styles to all nations, not just to governments but to business houses, banks and even universities, so fully discussed in Henry Jacoby's recent book *The Bureaucratization of the World*, has also coincided with a growing resentment against the bureaucratic style of functioning. All over the world and particularly in India today, the bureaucracy's ways and attitudes, the budgetary burden which its proliferation imposes, the muddles which add misery to the life of the people, have made it a target of criticism not only by the public, but also by politicians, including those who as Ministers exercise authority over them, as well as by those who play a technical rather than an administrative role in government, engineers, doctors, teachers, scientists and others.

Nevertheless, we simply cannot do away with the bureaucracy. The civil service, the more acceptable name for it, plays a key role in the running of governments. Ministers keep changing; the civil service provides them with the support and assistance they need to fulfil the popular mandate with which they have come to power, harnessing for the purpose such technical expertise as may be needed. Also, whenever there is a malfunctioning or breakdown of the political system, it is on the civil service that the responsibility of carrying on the administration devolves — as a rule on a caretaker basis, though instances are not wanting when, for example in France at certain times, even without a stable government the bureaucracy has been able to provide a stable, competent administration.

Against this background, the crucial question which has to be asked is—What can be done to ensure that the country has an honest, efficient and capable civil service, free from red tapism and other failings which bureaucracies are prone to develop? In any consideration of this problem there are two possible approaches. The focus may be on the kind of relationship which should exist between the political chiefs, the civil service and the technical experts, whose collective functioning and mutual interaction determine the quality of the administration as a whole, or attention may be given to the recruitment, training, working methods and the like, which influence the functioning of the civil service. Prof. Muttalib's book,* as its title implies, is primarily concerned with an examination of the ways in which the three different elements work or fail to work together, though in the latter half of the book he discusses some more specific functional issues.

*M.A. Muttalib: *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Technocracy: Assumptions of Public Management Theory* (Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1980), ix, 132 p., Rs. 50.

The book is essentially a compilation of separate, self-contained articles or addresses. As a result there is often a repetition of the same thought in different places. The author also seems to have a passion for propounding theories, as is evident from the captions of the different pieces "The LGS Theory," "The Triad Theory of Organization," "The Theory of Co-ordination Rediscovered and Reformulated" and so on—resulting in a somewhat stilted style which detracts from the readability of the book, giving it the character of a textbook; while the issues discussed and points made have a much wider readership interest because of their relevance to some hotly debated present day issues.

Another weakness which stems from his anxiety to evolve theories is that he has had to have recourse to abstractions and prototypes which are far removed from the concrete realities of life. The point is best illustrated by considering his LGS theory which as he says in the Introduction "is the core theory with 'L' standing for layman—that represents Politocracy; with 'G' standing for generalist—that represents Bureaucracy; and with 'S' standing for specialist—that represents Technocracy." Muttalib considers the minister to be a layman who is concerned with diagnosing the needs of the community, the bureaucracy to be a bunch of generalists who are responsible for the prescription of the ways and means to deal with them, the specialists to be the people who actually handle the fulfilment of the needs following the generalists' prescription. Summing up he says; "The philosophy of the triumvirate of functions is akin to the keeping of the ship afloat by the technocrats, being steered by the generalists towards the destination chosen by the lay functionaries."

The question which arises is whether what the author has presented is a realistic picture of what is or an idealistic projection of what should be. To look upon the political leadership merely as a group of laymen who know what hurts the people and diagnose their ailments is to ignore the basic contribution which the ministers make or are expected to make in the running of a democratic government. Different political parties often agree about the ailments which afflict society and have to be removed; the difference between them usually arises in the choice of the remedy which they propose to prescribe. All political parties agree that unemployment is bad. But to deal with it some may emphasize the role of cottage industries and decry modern technology, some may urge greater attention to agriculture than to industry, some may argue for greater scope to the private sector. The electoral manifesto of the party which comes to power contains, at least in broad general terms, the prescription for dealing with the identified ailments; it is erroneous to suggest that the bureaucracy does the prescribing.

The ministers have also the power and the responsibility to decide upon the detailed steps that are to be taken to fulfil their electoral pledges. The task of drawing up a blue print for the purpose devolves on the professionals serving under them, but the final choice between one set of proposals and another rests with the minister. He has to judge for himself which of the

possible courses of action presented to him would be most effective in terms of achieving the objective and also—this is most important—be acceptable to those whose political support has brought him to power. Thus when a democratic government takes a decision on the size of a programme, the resources for which have to be found through higher taxation, it not only considers how big a programme would achieve the objective in the minimum time, it also takes into account how much additional taxation for the purpose the people would put up with.

To be able to discharge this function, the minister must be a man capable of exercising the right judgment. Now it is true that in order to do so he need not himself be an expert in the field of his responsibilities. In this sense he can be said to be a layman. But lack of expertise is not a qualification for political responsibility. It is the capacity to form a judgment on the issues arising in a particular area which determine the suitability of a person for a particular political assignment. In allocating portfolios to different ministers the Prime Minister tries to take into account the special qualities and capabilities of each. The Law Ministers of India, starting from Dr. Ambedkar, have been men of legal eminence. Finance Ministers, beginning with Dr. John Mathai, have as a rule—though there have been exceptions—been selected with special regard to their understanding of economic problems. Proved administrative ability has been another factor which has influenced the choice of ministers.

In considering the bureaucrat to be a generalist the author endorses a popular misconception which has been at the root of much confused thinking on the role of the administrators in the machinery of government. Recruitment to administrative services is done on the basis of tests which pertain to the general ability of the candidate rather than specialized knowledge or study of subjects germane to administration. Such a policy is justified on the consideration that it widens the field of choice to the maximum possible extent. If recruitment were to be confined to those who had obtained degrees in public administration or allied fields of study, many brilliant youngmen having an aptitude for, say, mathematics or science would be confronted at a young age with a choice between not studying the subject in which they are interested or ruling out the possibility of competing for entry into the administrative services. What the present policy aims at is the induction of the brightest and best young men out of those who desire to enter an administrative service and thereafter to train them for the fulfilment of their responsibilities. Much of the training is on the job itself: working, at first under the supervision and guidance of more seasoned administrators and then, over the years, assuming greater responsibilities; the man who started his career as a generalist matures to be a specialist in administration.

The image of the administrator as a generalist is sometimes created in the public mind because of transfers from one department to another. Actually there is much in common between different departments in regard to the administrative skills which they need. In business and industry we often

witness managers moving from one line of production to a totally different one. This is not because the manager is a generalist but because management techniques are essentially the same whether in a steel plant or a fertilizer plant. A good case can of course be made out for much greater specialisation within the broad field of administration. Even in the British days, when the ICS was considered to be omni-competent, after a few initial years each member of the service began to specialise, some spending most of their time in executive field work, some being permanently assigned to judicial work, some being used most often in the Secretariat where policies were made. And when in the thirties it became clear that administration in certain economic fields needed more of expertise and a higher degree of specialisation, the Commerce and Finance Pool was created drawing upon members of different services who were continuously engaged thereafter in economic administration, both in an executive capacity and in the policy sector.

The role of the technocrat in administration has also been changing with times. Before Independence, they were primarily used in executive assignments—engineers formed a service to look after the execution of public works, there were cadres of doctors for providing medical services to the people. Occasionally some members of the technical services also held high posts in the Secretariat, e.g. in some provinces, the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department was also Secretary of the same department. After Independence with the enlargement of the scope of governmental activities there has been a tremendous increase in the need to draw upon the advice of specialists in fields other than administration, not in the execution of projects but in policy fields, to determine priorities—e.g. economics, agronomy, engineering and science—to select the best technology and equipment for particular purposes, to create the necessary environment for fulfilling the plan targets of development in different sectors. In certain departments and Ministries, like Science and Technology, Economic Affairs, Railways etc., the post of Secretary is being filled not by an administrator but by a technocrat. On the other hand, the old hierarchical system also exists in some departments where the technocrats do not have direct access to the Minister; their views have to percolate through different levels of the bureaucracy before they get to the top. Much of the frustration of men of technical talent is attributable to this out-moded system wherever it still survives.

Muttalib's view that the role of the technocrat is to do the executive jobs or, to use his metaphor, to administer the medicine prescribed by the bureaucrat corresponds neither to reality nor would it be a desirable arrangement. No doubt some technical men are needed for field work. But equally quite a large number of administrators are engaged in executive assignments at the district, tehsil or block level. With the inter-changeability which exists between posts in the Secretariat and posts outside, it is difficult to maintain that the former is the preserve of the bureaucracy and the latter of the technocracy. In the shaping of policy, specialists in all the relevant fields must make their voice and views felt before the ultimate decisions are taken at the political

level. In some areas, for example law and order, the administrator may be able to provide all the specialised knowledge which may be necessary for the decision-making process. But for more complex issues the views of experts in different fields may have to be drawn upon. Thus in deciding what the support price for a particular agricultural crop should be the advice of agricultural experts, economists and administrators may have equal relevance, to which the ultimate decision-makers must add political considerations of which they are the best judges. Once policy decisions have been taken their implementation is left to executives who could be men with technical qualifications or administrative ability, depending on the nature of the job to be done. Building of roads would be entrusted to engineers, running of hospitals to doctors, rationing of sugar to administrators. In this way no, jealousies would be aroused at the implementation level.

It is in respect of the role of the technical expert in shaping policies, as distinct from his role in executing them, that conflicts arise. In his general exposition of a three-tier organisational framework, Prof. Muttalib suggests that the technocracy has no direct contact with the political masters; it is the bureaucracy which serves as "the hyphen that joins, the buckle that binds" the lay functionary and the specialists together. But in his lecture entitled "The Theory of Specialism and Generalism", he comes round to support the view advanced above that the administrator as well as the other concerned experts should participate in policy formulation. He says: "With the increasing relevance of science and technology to development administration, neither specialists nor generalists can be the servants of the other since there must be a thorough mixing of scientific and political considerations in the determination of policy. Accordingly the Fulton Committee has favoured the idea of allowing the specialists to have direct access to the Minister.... In development administration, the pressure for increased specialisation on the one hand, and the pressure for greater co-ordination on the other, are to be accommodated with a view to replacing the present superior subordinate relationship with a new concept of partnership."

Far more complex issues arise when considering the relationship between the political heads and the services, administrative or technical, on whom they depend for the fulfilment of their electoral promises. Muttalib rightly touches upon their different socio-economic backgrounds as well as their different approaches to dealing with problems—politicians relying on their intuition while specialists use rigorous logical reasoning. However, because of his assumption that the man at the top is a "lay functionary", he has not discussed the question whether any thing can be done to improve the availability of men of competence and talent to occupy the high political offices carrying executive responsibility which must be filled from the elected members of Parliament and State legislatures. It is a sad thought that prior to Independence, with little hope of forming a government which would wield effective power, many of the ablest and brightest Indians dedicated their lives to politics, participating in the struggle for Independence, spending

long years in prison; but three decades after Independence the filling of Cabinet posts is proving difficult, not because of a plethora of talent but because of its paucity.

Within the parameters of the things as they are, scattered through the different pieces in this compilation. Muttalib has many worthwhile thoughts and observations. He draws attention to the continuous "interaction between authority of ideas and authority of office or between knowledge and power." The danger that Ministers, who have the authority of office, and the services, who claim the authority of knowledge and experience, fail to work together in harmony is real. There are increasing signs of distrust and tensions developing between the two and some ineffective and undesirable answers are being attempted to deal with them. One such trend is for the Minister to want to be surrounded by men of his own choice. When it comes to the appointment of Private Secretaries, as Muttalib rightly points out, it is but proper that Ministers should be free to select people in whom they can repose full confidence. But when it comes to Secretaries of Departments or Ministries, their role and utility would get vitiated if they kept changing with the Ministers, become their yes-men, or, in the alternative, they were short-circuited by the Ministers' Private Secretary or special Assistant.

But a deeper issue than of personal equation also arises in any consideration of the relationship between the political leadership, which in a democracy comes to power through elections, and the bureaucracy and technocracy, which are not affected by the ballot box. Will the latter see eye to eye with the former, be responsive in an adequate measure to the new impulses which the democratic process has brought to the fore, or will they turn out to be a negative, obstrusive factor? The answer one gives to this question would determine one's response to the issue whether the bureaucracy should be neutral or "committed". Muttalib provides a useful analysis of this problem. His broad conclusion in line with the recommendations of the Fulton Committee in Britain and the thinking of our own Administrative Reforms Commission, which has also the support of the French and American practice, is that it might be advisable for some supporting staff—men of competence and commitment—to be provided to Ministers, not to be a part of the permanent establishment but to hold office as long as the Ministers do. The introduction of such an element, provided the dangers of obvious abuse are guarded against, can be helpful to political leaders in the discharge of their onerous responsibilities. It can also help overcome the kind of insularity which bureaucrats develop and even technocrats begin to acquire once they form part of a service cadre.

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ORIENTALISM—A CRITIQUE

A Review Article

EDWARD W. Said, Parr Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, New York and a Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at Harvard, has been known in the Western academic world pre-eminently as a knowledgeable and perceptive literary critic of sharp insight and profound wisdom. In this latest publication* of his he however presents himself in a somewhat different role; in that of a brilliant historian of ideas, visions and attitudes spread over for more than three hundred years of Western confrontation with the East, but a role which a sharply imaginative and perceptive student of literature and art alone could play. Consisting of three long well-documented and well-argued chapters, this book is in brief, a subtle and penetrating analysis of the attitudes and approaches that the West adopted and cultivated towards discovering the Orient for themselves, not as a geographical aggregate alone, but to "designate a people, a landscape, even a spirit" which the West was afraid of and yet at the same time was dangerously attracted to because of its romantic charm!

Edward Said's academic adroitness lies in showing how, from the eighteenth century onwards, politicians, creative and descriptive writers, painters and later, photographers, all shared in the discovery and conquest of the mysterious East. Almost with unerring insight Said shows how, caught between knowledge and racism, between colonialism and post-Reformation Western systems of thought, Orientalism voices more about the West than about the East. This book which I consider to be a very significant one, is a fine, sophisticated study of an intellectual phenomenon in which "power and politics play crucial roles in the production of culture and knowledge."

By about the middle of the eighteenth century, India, a part, almost the core part of the 'mysterious' East or Orient, had emerged from the fables and fairy tales, medieval romances and adventure stories of European travellers and merchant-men, stories that were full of truths, half-truths and untruths and were imaginatively more thrilling than romances. The Orient was now being confronted by more than a couple of European Powers with colonial visions, ambitions and aspirations which slowly but surely translated themselves, a century or so later, in terms of actual imperial experiences. These visions and experiences comprised Egypt and parts of Africa in the West and all but practically the whole of what is called Asia. Indeed, the eighteenth and the nineteenth century witnessed the discovery and control—political, economic, intellectual and cultural—of that part of the contemporary world which the "Occident" or the West came to know as the "Orient" or the East. The leading European Powers that achieved

*Edward W. Said: *Orientalism* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1978), xi, 368 p., \$ 15.

this unique phenomenon in history were the French, the English, the Dutch and last but not the least, the Americans. It was in this context that there grew up the intellectual quests which are referred to under the blanket term of "Orientalism," broken up, for the sake of convenience and following the regional interests of the respective colonial Powers, into *Egyptology*, *Assyriology*, *Indology*, *Sinology* and the like. Over the decades of two centuries these terms tended to build up respective images and connotations of their own. What these connotations and images are can best be perceived and understood by a study and analysis of the articulated objectives and actual activities of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century scholastic and intellectual bodies that came to be known all the world over as "Oriental" or "Asiatic" societies, institutes or academies; the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, founded in 1784 being the oldest of them. But whatever the images and connotations the greatest common determinant and denominator of each of the disciplines mentioned above, is the language or languages of the given geographical area, and since this was so the basic general approach was primarily philological and linguistic.

In common usage when one refers to the Orient or the East one seems to be using nothing more than a geographical term which is counterpoised against another geographical term, namely, the Occident or the West. But the same terms may, in fact, do acquire a different connotation when one uses them in the historical context of the seventeenth and the two subsequent centuries when the Orient or the West became, for historical reasons an integral part of European (mainly West-European) consciousness. Terms which were once more or less geographically descriptive, tended to and did indeed become significantly connotative with various meanings in their variegated shades, nuances and suggestions which, one knows, were historically conditioned and determined.

Of the continents of the world, Asia and northern Africa were the nearest to Europe. From the remote days of antiquity this vast area of which Egypt and Ethiopia, India and China were the pivots, was known to the Europeans as peopled by exotic men and women and still more exotic and monstrous animals of fact and fancy, of soft and tender romance and riotous adventure, of breath-taking landscapes warmed by the sun, washed by the rains and cooled by the snow. There was indeed no end to this experience of fact and fiction of antiquity. But to the people of Western Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth century these were all things of a remote past, and hence somewhat unreal. Contemporary Europeans west of the Danube, were products of a mature mercantile age followed steadily but surely by an industrial one. One who knows anything about European history knows also that this was the beginning of the colonial experience of the West-European Powers in north Africa and in India, to begin with, and later all but throughout in Africa and Asia, the French and the British taking the lead in the accumulation and utilization of this experience, followed by the Dutch and the Belgians, the Germans and the Russians, the Spaniards and

the Italians, all but marginally. The Americans followed too, and in a big way, in China, Korea and Japan primarily, but secondarily, to Southeast Asia as well, but at a time when the configuration and lineaments of this experience had already been outlined.

It follows therefore that what is called the "Orient" or the East is not just a geographically descriptive term, but an area of the then known world which lay to the east of Europe and which was the field of altogether a new European experience, namely, a colonial one, of the more dominant Powers of Western Europe, the French and the English, who came eventually to conquer and occupy Egypt and India respectively as their possessions. It was this European colonial experience that discovered, invented and made "real" what we call the "East" or the "Orient." Indeed, this Orient, pregnant with meaning, was the discovery and invention of the French and the English, which other West-European nation-states and the Americans eventually adopted.

If the Orient is not merely a geographic but a significantly connotative term in the historical context of the eighteenth and the two centuries that followed, Orientalism, then, must also have a connotation, no less significant, in the same context. What is this connotation?

The eighteenth and nineteenth century discovery and the slow and steady but eventual conquest of the Orient by West-European Powers helped Europe build up a new material culture. In the process which is well-known to any student of modern European history, the Orient became an integral part of the psyche and consciousness of contemporary Europe, more particularly of the nation-states of Western Europe. It also helped Europe to re-define the Occident and Occidental culture by contrasting its own ideas and institutions, facts and experiences, images and visions, designs and patterns of life etc., with those of the Orient, of course as the collective mind and psyche of Europe perceived, understood and interpreted them. From this point of view Orientalism is but a cultural and ideational mode, or style of approach to a debate, discourse or discussion on the Orient supported by researched ideas and institutions, facts and experiences, images and visions, designs and patterns of life, beliefs and practices etc. which scholarships in several old and new fields of intellectual disciplines alone can unravel.

The first and the most significant meaning of Orientalism is therefore a scholastic and academic one, which is manifest in the aims and objectives as much as in the activities of all such institutions that describe themselves as "Oriental" or "Asiatic" or "Indological," for instance. It matters but little whether the person of the institution concerned is involved and engrossed in philology or historical linguistics, in anthropology or sociology, in history or political science of any one or more regions of the East or the Orient, in any one or more specific or general aspects. Whoever is thus involved is an Orientalist, was indeed the thrust of the entire argument. "Compared with *Oriental Studies* or *Area Studies*, it is true that the term *Orientalism*

is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and general and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth and early twentieth century European colonialism.... The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and thesis about the Oriental and the Orient...."

But this scholastic and academic meaning of Orientalism does not stand by itself. A close analysis of the writing of European philosophers and historians, economists and political scientists, politicians and statesmen, novelists and administrators of the eighteenth and nineteenth century would show very clearly that there was also a general meaning of Orientalism which was based on a readily accepted and widely believed fundamental distinction between the Orient and the Occident, the latter occupying a superior position because of its superiority in power relationship with the Orient. The European scholar or the scientist, the soldier or the merchant man, the missionary or the administrator was there in the Orient because he had *earned* his authority to be there, and along with this right he had also *acquired* his right to interpret the Orient and to build up its image as he liked to see it. But it was not merely the superior power relationship that gave him the right and authority to do so. Heir to the rich legacy of the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, the West European bourgeoisie of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were, intellectually and culturally speaking, in a superior position in the context of the contemporary educated Indian *elite* of a socially, economically and politically disintegrating India. The comparison was inept, intellectually unfair, but in their flush of power the Europeans did not seem to have perceived it even, while his Indian or Oriental counterpart simply acquiesced in it, even accepted it since he had not built up an alternative image that he could offer to the European. In any case the fact remains that this general meaning of Orientalism got interwoven with the specific academic meaning of the term that I have already spoken of.

Yet there is, I believe, a third meaning of the term, a very subtle and complex one, which is reflected in the writings of French and British authors of novels, histories, travel accounts, diaries, reminiscences, etc. of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. An analysis of such writings reveal very clearly that Orientalism was slowly and steadily developed in Western Europe as a systematic intellectual discipline by which the Occident or the West could know and interpret and control the Orient or the East. Orientalism was not therefore a purely disinterested, objective quest for knowledge alone, but was a product of a mixed, and hence a complex human situation in which intellectual quest, ideational explorations, individual and collective self-interest, quest for political and economic power, hunger and thirst for exotic and romantic experiences, etc., all had their role to play. The European scholar or intellectual who found himself launched in a quest for knowledge of the Orient, could not help being influenced by these ideas and emotions in varying degrees of intensity. That Indian scholars of a later

date, obliged to follow the models and methods evolved by their European predecessors, would inherit or imbibe quite a few of these imperatives, was only in the nature of things.

Seemingly unrelated to the point I am seeking to make is a fact which I would like to mention here somewhat in parenthesis. In 1832 the Asiatic Society of Bengal completed 47 years of its life; it seems somewhat strange that till then there was not even one Indian on the roll of its members, not even men like Raja Rammohun Roy or Raja Radhakanta Deb, both well-versed in more than one Oriental language, vastly learned in Indian religions and sacred lore and in socio-religious texts, in Indian traditions, rituals and practices. One feels curious to know why the Society for its first well-nigh half-a-century remained an exclusively European association as if it were and no Indian felt called upon to join it and get involved in its activities.

The eighteenth and nineteenth century discovery, conquest and the demands of administration of the colonies, in our case, of India, called for the acquisition of more and more knowledge of the land and its people through the ages. For effective administration the first thing necessary for the colonial rulers, the army and the merchant-men as much as for the colonial Christian missionary was a close knowledge of the languages of the land, and here while modern languages were indispensable for day-to-day transactions of business and pleasure the ancient and medieval ones were no less for the acquisition of knowledge of the history and culture of the land and its people, their literature, religion, myths and legends laws and customs, beliefs and practices, ideas and institutions, behavioural patterns, and traditions, etc., indeed for the total funded knowledge and experience of the Indians of the past. All but simultaneously the need was also felt for a gathering of further knowledge on the same items of life and culture as far as possible from actual field study and observation on the spot. Thus was set in motion a long intellectual quest on the part of a small but knowledgeable segment of contemporary European bourgeoisie for more and more knowledge of and above the Orient, in our case, of and about India. For the Europeans, particularly for the French and the English, the Germans and the Dutch it was indeed another age of enlightenment which enabled Europe to know themselves better and from a different perspective and this, in the light of the new knowledge they came to acquired in and about India.

The story of the widening and deepening of Oriental studies in regard to India is a fascinating one. Besides the three disciplines, autonomous and yet at the same time allied, inter-related and inter-dependent, namely, Comparative Philology and Historical Linguistics, Comparative Religion, Myths and Legends and Social and Cultural Anthropology, Indology branched off, with the passage of time and change in ideas, in more than one direction. Late in the nineteenth century attention of European scholars started shifting from purely sacred, scriptural and socio-religious texts to genealogical

accounts and historical chronicles on the one hand and to technical treatises on political economy, civil and military administration, or arts, and crafts, architecture and icon-making, on astrology, agriculture, metallurgy and minerology etc., that is to the material aspects of life on the other. Almost simultaneously attention was also being drawn to texts on astronomy and mathematics, botany and chemistry, medicine and surgery, that is, to the achievements of Indians in the field of science and technology. But in all such branches of knowledge and experience, texts laid down the boundaries to which an Indologist could travel, and since it was so, Oriental Studies remained language-based throughout. There has not been much of an attempt to relate textual knowledge and experience with the actual realities of archaeology and history.

These are but a few of the responses which were evoked in me by a reading of Professor Said's book. Indeed, I felt that he has said what, in essence, I have been wanting to say for a number of years, but without his wide sweep of perception and scholarship in the area of Western art and literature. Besides what he has covered in the book, his analysis and interpretation of Orientalism lead to a chain of other ideas and themes which still await detailed investigation, analysis and interpretation. Limiting oneself to India one could suggest, for instance, the theme of the all but for-all-times fixed images of India or as a matter of fact, the relative historical and cultural position of India *vis-a-vis* the East and the West, which two centuries of Oriental studies have generated and reared up in the minds and imagination of the Western and Indian educated *elite*.

Professor Said's indictment of Orientalism is a revealing critique, to my mind, of the system that obtained for more than two centuries, and still does so in a good measure. I would strongly recommend the volume to the serious notice of all those who want to understand the Orient and the Occident in the eighteenth, nineteenth and first quarter of the twentieth century.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

G.H. JANSEN: *Militant Islam*. Pan Books, London. 1979, 224 p., £1.25.

THIS book is mainly addressed to the Western reader to whom the several different manifestations of "militant Islam" in recent years have given cause for "alarm and despondency." Jansen attributes these Western reactions to the atavistic stereotypes inherited from a hoary past going back to the Arab conquest of Spain, the Crusades and the Ottoman siege of Vienna. He counsels the West that if "it keeps its head and does not allow primitive hatred and fear of Islam to cloud its judgement, there is no real reason why its encounter with militant Islam should be unpleasant."

Why is Islam militant today? Well, it has always been so because it is *young* (just 1400 years old as compared to Christianity and Buddhism which are much older); because it is *rigid* (the doors of *ijtihad* or doctrinal adaptation through reasoning having been closed in the 10th century); and because it has *no priesthood* (hence no visible targets of criticism on account of "the inevitable and inescapable gap between lofty preaching and worldly practice)." Despite its innate militancy Islam could "very well have relaxed into torpidity" but for the challenges posed by the Christian West to its spiritual, political and cultural existence. Did not the Muslim world, located as it is at the crossroads of three continents, become the prime target of the aggressive thrust of Europe's missionaries, merchants and military adventurers? For over 150 years since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798), there was scarcely a five-year period without some Muslim area somewhere in Asia or Africa being lost to the Western Powers or when Muslims were not fighting against the encroachment of these Powers. Jansen maintains that the number of Muslims converted to Christianity during this period was negligible, which is true; but he also asserts that "as a rule the struggle against the West was for Islam and by Islam," which is only partly true. The fact is that while Islamic inspiration played the dominant role in the nineteenth century it increasingly yielded ground to nationalism. Moreover, in many countries including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Palestine, secular nationalism proved to be the sole effective antidote to communal strife.

Jansen is all the more unconvincing when he traces the contemporary responses of militant Islam to the Arab defeat in the June 1967 War against Israel and the bifurcation of Pakistan in 1971. The two events are described as "major hammerblows" to the world of Islam. True, the outcome of the 1967 War had a traumatic effect on the Arab mind. But does this hold good for the non-Arab Muslim countries also? Besides, when the Jordanian mercenaries literally massacred thousands of Palestinians in 1970-71 the Muslim world hardly raised its voice. On the contrary, General Zia-ul-Haq, whom the author designates as a "militant Muslim", is known to have been

personally involved in the physical liquidation of the Palestinian commandos in Jordan. As for the birth of Bangladesh, the attitude of the Muslim world towards this event was not much different from that of the Indian Khilafat Movement towards the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Caliph during the First World War. Incidentally, in both cases nationalism won. The author also makes a brief reference to the role of "oil money" in fuelling the engine of militant Islam but dismisses it as a "smaller and not so reputable reason."

Aside from the sources of its inspiration and sustenance what exactly is militant Islam up against? We are told that what really offends militant Islam so much is not the "over-arching civilizational challenge of the West"—which at any event "will continue for generations to come"—but the "more penetrating" one of "youth culture" and pop music, "which poses tremendous problems to Islamic society in this post-Beatles age of ours." Even Ayatollah Khomeini's opposition to the West is rooted in his hostility towards the "world-wide culture of pop and jeans."

Having identified the arch foe of Islam the author sets out to show how militant Islam meets this and other challenges of the modern world. To begin with, its responses are far from being uniform because of "the varied range of Muslim countries" which produces a wide variety of Muslim leaders. He distinguishes three types. First, there is the "exploiting" type comprising professional politicians, essentially secular and Westernized, who simply harness Islam to achieve their own un-Islamic political goals. The notorious ones in this category are Jinnah, Ayub Khan and Bhutto of Pakistan and Necmettin Erbakan of the National Salvation Party and Alparslan Turkes of the National Action Party in Turkey. Numeiry of the Sudan, King Hassan II of Morocco and even the Shah of Iran qualify as runners-up for having occasionally indulged in exploiting Islam for political ends. These, then, are people who "give Islam a bad name and give militant Islam an even worse name." The second type consists of religious leaders—the orthodox ulema as well as the unorthodox mystic brotherhoods. Neither have played a very activist or dynamic role in militant Islam. But the ulema are "a strong, silent pressure group" ready to join the battle for Islam at the opportune moment—as they in fact did in Pakistan during the last phase of Bhutto's rule. The mystic orders on the other hand are less prone to political activism barring notable exceptions such as the Mahdiya in the Sudan.

It is the third type for which Jansen reserves his highest admiration. Included in this category are the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), the Jamaat-e-Islami (Pakistan), the Masjumi Party (Indonesia) and the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (Iran). Curiously enough, they are all clubbed together under the label of "modernist reformers." In fact, the word "reform" is an anathema, especially to Hasan al-Banna and Maulana Maududi, the founders respectively of the Brotherhood and the Jamaat. What they frankly demand is not reform but full-scale resurrection of Islam. While conceding that these groups comprise "tough, realistic operators who have not shrunk from using violence" the author credits them with "trying the very difficult task of

'rethinking Islam in modern times.''' On what lines? By insisting that politics and religion are parts of the single totality of Islam; by claiming that 'the Koran is our constitution;' by asserting that the party system is fundamentally incompatible with the Islamic spirit; and by declaring that all social inequities will vanish with the abolition of usury and imposition of *zakat* (alms tax). That there is no explicit basis for these claims in Islamic theory and practice or in common sense, is no concern of these "rethinkers."

Jansen is quite right in saying at the very outset that militant Islam "is really no new thing." It has long been there. What he does not say is that the West had indeed learnt to live with it, even tamed it. For more than a quarter century after the Second World War many in the West had come to view Islam, militant or otherwise, as a dependable ally in their quest for economic gains and political influence in the Third World. But this perception now stands shattered. And the blow has been struck not by Banna's Brotherhood or Maududi's Jamaat but by Khomeini's revolution. The book under review takes only a cursory note of the specific causes and probable effects of this most momentous event in the recent history of Islam.

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ROGER D. SPEED : Strategic Deterrence in the 1980's. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1979, 174 p., \$ 7.95.

NUCLEAR weapons have modified traditional national security perceptions. Effective defence against nuclear attack being virtually impossible, deterrence gains ascendancy. Mutual assured destruction capabilities of the two Super Powers has thus far preserved the central strategic balance. This requires survivability of nuclear forces after a nuclear blitzkrieg, so that residual nuclear weapons remain to annihilate the adversary.

The author postulates that the Soviet Union, having reached a situation of nuclear parity apropos the United States, would proceed to achieve nuclear superiority in the eighties. The Soviet Union may not reach its political objectives thereby in the Third World. But, a Soviet "damage-limiting, first-strike capability against the United States or its overwhelming military superiority in the European theatre coupled with a massive second-strike capability" could neutralize US strategic forces.

Speed contends that the American triad-land-based missiles, long-range bombers and nuclear missile armed submarines are increasingly becoming vulnerable as the accuracy, yield and reliability of Soviet missiles increase. He believes that multiple missile attacks upon individual missile silos could destroy the US I.C.B.M. force on the ground. The United States long-range bomber force could similarly be annihilated by a depressed-trajectory, saturating SLBM attack on strategic airbases. US submarines are also becoming

vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities, seriously degrading the present invulnerability of the American undersea deterrent.

The author comes up with predictable solutions. He favours a multiple-aim point ICBM deployment—akin to the shell game—developing counterforce nuclear weapons, and MX deployment in a mobile mode. Bomber vulnerability could be reduced by establishing additional bases. Cruise missiles should be deployed in land, air, sea and underwater modes to saturate Soviet air defences, and allow penetrability by American long-range bombers. Besides, SSBNs should be deployed under the Arctic ice-cap, equipped with 6,000-mile range Trident-II missiles; submarine communications should be improved by setting up ELF (extremely low frequency) ground stations. Naturally, arms control agreements affecting these weapons systems or deployment modes are reprehensible for: "Treaties concluded for the sake of *detente* rather than for security are likely in the long run to threaten not only true *detente* but international peace as well."

Proceeding further, Speed believes it unrealistic that the nuclear defence of West Europe and United States would remain coupled as heretofore. Since nuclear parity obtains, the United States is unlikely to stem a Soviet invasion of West Europe by escalating conflict to strategic nuclear levels. He advises strengthening of border defences between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to delay and contain a Soviet offensive across the border. The West Europeans are urged to develop their own independent deterrent. Further, linkages should be established between nuclear weapons available with France and United Kingdom, and a political confederation formed to defend West Europe giving limited veto powers to West Germany. The United States is advised to strengthen its counterforce option—limiting nuclear conflict to primarily military targets by developing appropriate weapons options, and, lastly, to ensure the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces.

There is much to cavil at here. The Warsaw Pact may not be deterred by a tactical nuclear defence confined to the European theatre. And West Germany would be destroyed in the process of being saved. A political confederation of Europe is a myth. West Europe's reactions to recent international crises in the monetary, energy, economic and political spheres highlight the inherent parochial approaches of West European nations. Warsaw Pact conventional forces being superior in strength, mobility and fire power, the West Europeans have traditionally sought to couple their defence with the United States, hoping that the threat of strategic nuclear conflict might deter Soviet adventurism in Europe. Speed's thesis would only enhance West Europe's fears of an ultimate US withdrawal from their defence.

Strengthening the military option and developing more esoteric weapon systems might serve counterforce strategy objectives; it might also ensure greater survivability of the American triad. But, this would create greater uncertainty, instability and difficulties in future arms' control negotiations. Besides, every technological advance made by the United States can be

reached by the Soviet Union. The net effect of strengthening military options would be to generate an action-reaction phenomena and inexorably propel the nuclear arms race onwards.

That apart, Speed has written a lucid, persuasive thesis embodying the convictions of an influential body of conservative American opinion. A physicist by training his book optimally moulds technical data to illuminate strategic theory.

Bhopal

P.R. CHARI

KARL BRUNNER, *Ed.*: *The First World and the Third World: Essays on the New International Economic Order*. University of Rochester, New York, 1978, 270p., \$ 9.95.

“THE New International Economic Order,” says Prof H G Johnson, “is neither new, nor international, nor economic, nor an order.” This conclusion characterises the point of view of most of the contributors to this collection of essays. Although published in 1978, they have obviously been written during an earlier period and reflect the reactions of the “neo-conservative” school of observers to the demand by the developing countries for an NIEO formulated in the early 70s. One could, of course, note that since little significant progress has taken place in the succeeding period, the observations of these authors continue to have interest. Indeed, this school may well have gained in influence in a number of major developed countries due to the results of recent elections.

While one cannot generalise about the differing views and perspectives of half a dozen different authors, by and large, all of them are animated by the same ideological stand-point; M/s Brunner and Bauer, perhaps more so than McCulloch, who demonstrates a greater openness to the factual under-pinnings, behind the demands of the developing countries, and Prof Johnson coming somewhere in between. The well-known article of Moynihan is in a class by itself and merits reading, if for no more than his vituperative wit. No attempt can be made in the space available to try and either sum up, or assess the individual contributions. Some general remarks are, however, in order.

There are many levels at which one could approach the task of examining their arguments and conclusions. At one extreme it would, of course, be quite simple to observe that these authors, by and large, are no less guilty of the ideological bias, which they decry in such forthright terms amongst the proponents of the NIEO. This, while true, is not conclusive, for economics does rest on ideological premises. It is, therefore, useful to be clear about these implicit and explicit value premises in appraising the views of any of the authors.

By and large, apart from their hostility to what they consider to be the

ideological slant of the proponents of the NIEO, at the analytical level the authors, by and large, consider that the present international economic order has deserved well of mankind. They, therefore, feel that the demands for change reflect either political motivation or demonstrate lack of understanding of the merits of the present system. This broadly neo-classical world view, of course, can and has been successfully impeached by many authors of other schools.

There is, of course, no question that an important part of the rationale for the NIEO demands is based on ethical, not to say political precepts based on the idea of human fraternity, and the hope that what is good for some should also be available to the many. But it is important to appreciate that apart from these specifically ethical foundations, there is also an independent set of justifications which most of the authors totally ignore. For apart from the demand for change on grounds of equity, the NIEO demands are also based on an objective assessment of the present order, which concludes that it is sub-optimal even from the view-point of those who benefit from it today. To put the point briefly, many, if not all, of the NIEO demands are non-zero sum in nature, so that conceding to them would benefit not only the recipients, but also the donors. Of course, one could legitimately point out that while this may be so in the long run, in the short and medium term there may be substantial differences in gains and losses amongst different groups of countries. Such an objection, however, is not available to those, like the authors, who reject the validity of the very concept itself. It is, of course, this class of criticism which can truly be called constructive since it leads immediately, having accepted the premises of an NIEO, to fruitful discussion of its operational implications over time.

For students in India, who take for granted entirely different value premises, which make the NIEO concept a self-evident one, the present volume of essays may be useful, if not for illumination, to provide thought and to cause them to re-examine the foundations of their own value premises.

New Delhi

A.N. ABHYANKAR

Foreign Policy

AMERICA

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: *Side-show: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia*. Fontana Paperbacks, Suffolk, England, 1980, 467 p., £1.95.

SIDE-SHOW is a remarkable study on two counts. It is a direct, compelling story of the tragedy of a nation and a merciless account of how normal democratic processes were subverted in the United States to add up to the

full horrors of the tragedy. The main point Shawcross makes hardly needs reiteration today, that Cambodia was a mere appendage to American objectives in Vietnam. He had the benefit of Nixon's memoirs, but Kissinger's *White House Years* had not yet appeared. It is a tribute to the thoroughness with which Shawcross has researched his material (using the liberal US Freedom of Information Act) and his ability to marshal the facts that Kissinger was forced to revise the Cambodia chapter of his brilliant, if self-serving, work to answer the charges.

I was a frequent visitor to Cambodia in the happy days of the early sixties when Prince Sihanouk was performing the remarkable feat of keeping his country out of the Vietnam War, then raging with increasing ferocity. To be sure, he was not a democratic ruler in the accepted sense of the word; but though eccentric, his tight-rope walking secured for the country what no one else could have given it—a decade of peace. Sihanouk had to turn a blind eye to North Vietnamese and Vietcong incursions and their use of Cambodian territory for prosecuting the war in South Vietnam. After his overthrow and a deeper American involvement in supporting the Lon Nol regime and bringing the full ferocity of their air power to Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge victory was inevitable although few had then anticipated the fury of doctrinaire communism. The North Vietnamese installation of the Heng Samrin regime was a tragic culmination of events for a tortured country.

Kissinger's defence is that Cambodia was unwilling or unable to defend its neutral status (although he concedes that the first United States raid on Cambodia on 18 March was followed by another strike in April 1969, largely because of Nixon's desire to demonstrate his anger at the shooting down of an unarmed American reconnaissance plane in North Korea), that the original objective in keeping US strikes secret was to avoid *forcing* the North Vietnamese, Prince Sihanouk and the Soviets and the Chinese into public reactions, that Sihanouk did not object, that the Pentagon's "double book-keeping" on the raids was less sinister than made out to be and that the situation changed dramatically with Sihanouk seeking refuge in Beijing and espousing the communist cause.

Kissinger gives a philosophical twist to his defence by suggesting that "...statesmen get no rewards for failing with restraint. Once committed they must prevail. If they are not prepared to prevail, they should not commit their nation's power." Even in Kissinger's own account, not to speak of Shawcross's searing version, the subsidiary role Cambodia played in being chosen for destruction is clear.

Shawcross is most concerned with demonstrating the perfidy of Kissinger and Nixon in the destruction of Cambodia. But in India and the Third World, the account will strike many as a crowning justification for non-alignment by showing what happens to a small country which is forced to align itself with a Super Power, either one. Americans were first obsessed by winning the war in Vietnam and then by leaving Vietnam with as little loss of face

as possible. Cambodia became a mere plaything for achieving these objectives, which proved unattainable in the end.

Prince Sihanouk, who remains the symbol of Cambodia, told me in Beijing in April 1979, that the Chinese and the Russians wished the fight to continue "till the last Cambodian." In his picturesque way, he was making a simple point, that after the Khmer Rouge genocide, the deaths in the American air strikes and the continuing guerrilla war against the Hanoi-installed Heng Samrin regime, there would be few Cambodians left in their homeland.

New Delhi

S. NIHAL SINGH

R.P. KAUSHIK AND SUSHEELA KAUSHIK : *Back to the Front: The Unfinished Story in Vietnam.* Orient Longman Ltd., New Delhi, 1979, vi, 120 p., Rs. 35.

AS stated in the Preface, the book under review is an attempt to trace the historical and psychological background of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, its cause and course, and to point out the broad outlines of future trends. Most of the book deals with the history of Vietnam, particularly with its liberation struggle against France and the United States and the role played by the socialist giants—the USSR and China.

The book was written in July 1979 when the Vietnamese forces had already entered Kampuchea but there was still a lot of hope among friends and well-wishers of Kampuchea that the intervention would not turn into occupation and that Vietnam would withdraw its forces after a painless surgical operation to eliminate the cancer of Pol Pot. Vietnam still enjoyed world sympathy.

The conflict between China and Vietnam has its roots in history. It was natural that when Vietnam came into its own, it would refuse to accept Chinese tutelage or become its satellite. It is of academic interest now whether the Vietnamese of Chinese origin, the Hoa people, were the innocent victims of an inevitable tragedy or whether they were invited and exploited by China, or in a pre-emptory bid persecuted by Vietnam. What is natural is that Vietnam would have liked to get rid of them, particularly from the regions adjacent to China and perhaps, for economic reasons as well. But the writers take the Vietnamese line on this as on other controversial questions.

Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea, the increasing pressure on Pol Pot's client state, the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Vietnam and the USSR, China's perception of a fall in its prestige in Southeast Asia, the loss of face in replacement of a Chinese client by a Vietnamese lackey in Kampuchea and the growing convergence of interest

between the United States and China, all no doubt accelerated the process of polarisation and precipitated the Chinese invasion. But indeed it is another glorious chapter in Vietnamese history to have resisted Chinese invasion successfully without compromising its position in Kampuchea.

The USSR extended verbal support to Vietnam, threatened but never attacked China in order to open a second front. The authors have tried to rationalize this restraint. The fact is that the Super Powers in the nuclear age would always hesitate to involve themselves directly in such regional wars. The United States took advantage of this conflict to strengthen its geo-political position in the region, used China to put a brake on Vietnam's expansion beyond Indo-China as well as stirred fear psychosis among the Southeast Asian states. The ASEAN objective became the neutralisation of Kampuchea but so far this remains unrealized.

In retrospect, the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam appears to be an episode in the long history of Sino-Vietnamese conflict with little impact on the contemporary balance of power in the region. Indeed it has not deterred Vietnam from consolidating its primacy in Indo-China. By giving little in subsequent negotiations, Vietnam has earned the grudging respect, of the ASEAN countries. They fear yet admire Vietnam on the whole, look upon it as the sentinel of the region, the bulwark against Chinese thrust. However normalisation of relations with the United States, Japan and Western Europe has been delayed because of Vietnam's tactical proximity to the USSR.

This book has been written from the Vietnamese angle and naturally suffers from the limitation that while Chinese motives have been interpreted negatively, Vietnam and the USSR always receive the benefit of doubt and their policies and actions are projected in a favourable light.

The most interesting part of the book is the admirable delineation of the Vietnamese character steeled in ceaseless conflict, always ready to pay a price in blood, sweat and tears for independence and for the pursuit of national interest. Vietnam in modern parlance is a hard not a soft state, is a strong not a weak state, with a leadership capable of hard decisions ignoring international repercussions or reactions, such as its continued occupation of Kampuchea for which the authors do not have a single critical word. Perhaps it was too early to do it in July 1979.

The book under review, though clearly partisan in approach, brings together a host of historical facts which would serve well any student of Southeast Asia in understanding the Vietnamese mind and evaluating its likely response.

New Delhi

SYED SHAHABUDDIN

LATIN AMERICA

VASANT KUMAR BAWA: *Latin American Integration*. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 244p., Rs. 60.

THE basic objectives of Bawa's *Latin American Integration*, as the author himself claims, are "to take an overview of the Latin American integration movement . . . to analyse . . . the complexity of the integration process in Latin America, and thus enable policy-makers to learn from the success as well as the failures . . . and to arrive at tentative findings to help shape the process of integration in developing areas generally." Against these rather too ambitious objectives, the author has gone at length, though somewhat superficially, delineating the integration processes in Latin America. Much of what Bawa has written—as many as six chapters—describing the evolution of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM) is, by and large, confined to the initial twelve years after their inception. No doubt, even during this period and after, neither LAFTA nor CACM proved any success as institutionalised mechanisms for integrating the diverse economies of Latin America. Contradictory ideological stances and disparate levels of economic development of the countries of Latin America have been the major obstacles to the integration efforts. In the process, the movement towards integration, whatever may have been the impulses and compulsions that catalysed them, have been a failure.

Even so, the integration process in Latin America has now moved away from a continent-wide trade integration process to a more meaningful and limited process of economic integration as reflected in the examples of the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), La Plata region, Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), and the Amazon Pact, as well as instances of integration for limited economic objectives, such as Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) and Latin American Economic System (SELA). Whether the fragmented forms of economic integration are the consequences of the failure of the continent-wide integration process is a moot question. In fact, the major objectives of LAFTA at a time when it was launched in the early 1960's and the basic objectives of the newly emerging fragmented and limited efforts such as ANCOM and SELA are very different. Also, the circumstances and the compulsions explaining the evolution of ANCOM and like movements are very different from that of the earlier efforts towards integration.

Instead of devoting more attention importantly to the efforts of integration that the Latin American countries have launched in the decade of 1970's, which in fact are meaningful and are of considerable significance to the developing countries of Asia and Africa, the author has covered at considerable length the earlier desultory free trade movement. In fact, ANCOM and SELA are of tremendous significance to the Third World countries in

terms of their relations with the industrially advanced countries. Their efforts in the realm of foreign investments, import of advanced technology and management of multinational corporations are greatly relevant to the countries of Asia as well as of Africa which are presently grappling with such problems as foreign investments and advanced technology. The serious lapse of Bawa's otherwise readable book, is in its scanty, in fact, little or no attention whatsoever to the questions of meaningful integration relevant for developing countries of the world.

Most of the statistical tables as well as the bibliographical notations in the book are somewhat dated and the book, in addition, contains a number of typographical and factual errors which could have been carefully eliminated before publishing. Even as a general book on Latin American integration, given that a number of similar books have already been published, Bawa's *Latin American Integration* breaks no new grounds. Despite these shortcomings, the book should be welcomed as evidence of growing Indian interest in inter-American affairs.

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V. SHIVKUMAR

NADER ENTESSAR : Political Development in Chile: From Democratic Socialism to Dictatorship. K.P. Bagchi and Co., Calcutta, 1980, vii, 206p., Rs. 45.

MANY of the recently published books on Allende's Chile reflect a polarity, primarily based on theoretical predilections and ideological preoccupations of the analysts and consequently, veer away from objectivity. In this respect Nader Entessar's book is no exception. It may however, be said that his treatment of the subject is both systematic and analytical. Entessar treats the socio-political and economic conditions of the pre-Allende period as dependent variables. The independent variables, according to him, are the massive land reforms, nationalisation of monopolies and other progressive measures initiated by the Popular Unity Government of Allende. How these efforts to dismantle the pyramidal economic structures and the dependency situation were frustrated by the United States through economic sanctions, manipulation of copper prices, overt and covert activities of the CIA and other US-based multinationals and above all, thanks to the disunity within the Popular Unity are systematically analysed.

The book abounds with facts and arguments to show how the 1973 tragedy had been deliberately engineered by the internal and external opponents to the progressive regime. A postscript appended to Entessar's dissertation describes the post-Allende Chile experiencing the reverse process of denationalisation and counter-reforms initiated by Pinochet's military junta with its avowed adherence to "authoritarian democracy" (!) The

author sees little possibility for a right-centre-left alliance as it happened in the 1930s in Chile when the military government of General Ibenez was ousted.

R. MARIA SALETH

EUROPE

ROBERT HARVEY : *Portugal : Birth of a Democracy*. Macmillan Co., New Delhi, 1978, viii, 151p., £ 3.95.

THE long-lasting military dictatorships in the Iberian Peninsula and their almost simultaneous disappearance raise certain unusual questions in one's mind. After all, the Portuguese and the Spaniards earned renown in world history as extraordinary adventurers in those times when the other West Europeans were more or less in a state of slumber. But then equally ironical is the fact that in the twentieth century both the Portuguese and the Spaniards suffered for so long under the humiliating and de-humanizing authoritarian dictatorships that the West Europeans nearly exorcized them from their endeavours of raising a trans-national European Community. For political reasons and strategic considerations however, Portugal became a member not only of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also of various European organizations, such as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the Council of Europe and later on of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Now, of course, it is making efforts to enter into the European Economic Community (EEC) as well.

Out of two Iberian states, Portugal became more accursed in the Third World because of its suppressive and barbaric colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique. With India itself, Portugal ceased its diplomatic rapport since mid-1950s because of the liberation struggle in Goa; these were restored only after the Socialist Government led by Mario Soares took over in Portugal in 1975.

The story of the revolution master-minded by the young military captains and skilfully carried forward by them to herald an era of democracy in 1974 is indeed fascinating. This was a truly historic change and a significant political transformation. It is altogether a different matter whether the socialists could or could not bring about affective stability in Portugal. What is of basic value to the world in general is that it has got rid of an inhuman authoritarian dictatorship. In a young nascent democratic setting, there has to be the inter-play of forces, sometimes under the over-weaning pressures of the international environment. Yet, it is under the democratic impulse provided by the political parties that Portugal is laying the roots

for political democracy. Indeed, the extremists, both at the Right and Left, have found their designs defeated.

The work under review gives an in-depth detailed study of the *coups* and the counter-*coups* by various political forces, invariably influenced by different army factions. The author of *Portugal and its Future*, General Spínola, the first President of the Portuguese Republic was ousted only a year after the revolution and his place was filled by de Costa Gomes, another military General, who had clearly identified himself with the Portuguese Communists. He too could not hold on for long. Very soon after, General Ramalho Eanes, an apolitical "professional soldier", assumed the Presidency of the Republic. (p. 93) It must be said to the credit of the new Portuguese regime that despite its links with the military, it is oriented towards political democracy, with a penchant for social democracy. And this seems to be in accord with the young Republic's state of political economy, which despite gargantuan efforts, continues to be in a shambles. Whether Portugal would succeed in finding roots in a stabilized political democracy, cannot but be a brave conjecture. However, the new political orientation imparted to it by the political forces is positivist.

In a nut-shell, the present study gives a lucid and absorbing account of how Portugal moved on from dictatorship to democracy. It is indeed a valuable addition to any library on the area.

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H.S. CHOPRA

CHINA

RAM K. VEPÄ: *Mao's China—A Nation in Transition*. Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1979, 220p., Rs. 60.

DR Ram K. Vepä, a senior official of the Government of India visited China in October-November 1978 as a member of the United Nations Group. The book under review is a product of the trip. Vepä has given us his impressions of China and of the great effort at economic reconstruction and building of a new socialist society that the Chinese Communist Party is carrying on in China. The account is straightforward and very informative indeed.

Those who write on contemporary China in this country usually project either of the two views. One of them consists in very reluctant admission that the Chinese might have made some progress over the last thirty years. A characteristic statement which exponents of this view make is the following "May be, an average Chinese eats better than an average Indian. But apart from that they have achieved precious little of any significance." The point is usually to insist that we have not done worse. The other view is to adopt a "socialist", "progressive" pose and argue how the Chinese have moved

away from the "correct" Soviet path and therefore suffered. The two points of view are but two sides of the same coin. They reject the Chinese experience as either relevant or meaningful.

Fortunately, Vepa avoids both these positions. Consequently, his account of the "nation in transition" is sympathetic, straightforward and factual. In short, the first two parts of this book are rather useful as a first hand report on contemporary China which is both good reading and also full of useful information and statistics.

However, one encounters quite a few problems when one starts reading the third and the last part of the book in which Vepa discusses the relevance to India of whatever he had observed in China. Interpretation and theory are obviously not his strong points. Had that not been the case he would not have blandly asserted that "what has happened in Mao's China since 1958 owes its inspiration to the teachings of Gandhi." (p. 178) No wonder his "Chinese hosts were surprised." This enthusiasm for establishing links between Mao and Gandhi has taken him at times, to absurd lengths. At one place he says: "A revolution is an act of violence by which one class overthrows another." Now, this is obviously not wrong. But he goes on to add "Gandhi accepted the goal but rejected the violence." (p.182) Where does Vepa get it from that Gandhi accepted the goal of one class overthrowing the other? Most Gandhians would be shocked. That apart, the plain fact is that such statements have no basis in anything that Gandhi wrote or did.

It is confusion like this which makes Vepa see the tussle between Mao and his opponents in China as between following "a path similar to that advocated by Gandhi" and wanting "a Soviet style of economic growth," (pp. 185-6), it is difficult to say where such naive absurdity springs from. Vepa gives its best example when he compliments the Government of India for "seeking new solutions that are closer to Sarvodaya than centralised planning and the emphasis on heavy industry that India had followed till now." (p. 212) To describe either the Janata experiment or the Congress experiment later as being closer to Sarvodaya is using terms and concepts with absolutely no regard for their meaning. In short, if Vepa had the philosopher in him under check this could have been a good and significant work.

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G.P. DESHPANDE

IRELAND

J. BOWYER BELL: *The Secret Army—The IRA 1916–1979*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, xiv, 481 p., \$ 30.00

AS the author states in his Foreword, this is a book about a particular organization, a secret army—and not about Irish political history. Nevertheless, it is a pity that he did not include even a brief account of Britain's sordid record in Ireland—seven centuries of brutal exploitation and the continuous land-grab that motivated successive rulers of Britain; the great Cromwellian repression; the first Irish Constitution at the end of the 18th century that deprived the Irish of most personal rights; the Great Famine of 1846 that Britain did little to alleviate and the subsequent Irish “diaspora”; the rise of Fenianism and the intense nationalist movement after the start of World War I. Without a knowledge of Ireland's tragic past it would be difficult to understand the phenomenon of the IRA. Few readers, even in England, would be aware of the extreme injustices that had been perpetrated on the Irish people—from which stems the vehemence of IRA terrorism throughout most of this century.

Bowyer's book starts with the intensive conflict (which in Ireland is called “the Anglo-Irish War”), that took place during and after World War I. This ended with the peace agreement of December 1921 and eventually resulted in the Irish Free State (1922)—a sort of dominion status for Ireland. The author carefully records the line-up between those Irish nationalists who accepted this sop and the extremists, the Sinn Fein, the party which declared an Irish Republic. Eamon de Valera was declared the president but he resigned even before he took office and chose to lead the extremists. (It is to be noted that another provision of the agreement with the British which the extremists rejected was that the six counties of the north, the stronghold of the Protestants, were to be excluded from the Irish Free State). The IRA became the central force in Republicanism during the next two decades, declining in importance only during the Second World War and in the 1950s—before spreading out its tentacles to attain its present fame (or notoriety, depending on how you look at it).

From the earliest days of the Free State the IRA had held that the “Republic” was always in existence, and repudiated the authority of any other form of government. Faced with middle-of-the-road liberals it soon took the law in its own hands and large areas in the south and west came under its control. Acts of violence by both sides (and executions, lawful and otherwise), became frequent, with De Valera openly supporting the insurgents.

During the Second World War, the IRA established a link with Berlin “to fight the common British enemy.” A certain amount of sabotage work, both in Northern Ireland and in Britain, was carried out and agents exchanged with Germany. However, at no time did the sum total of it amount to much more than mere nuisance value: and by the closing years of the war

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the IRA was entering its leanest period. The British were able to liquidate a number of their leaders and for the first time in generations the organisation was badly disrupted—there was no GHQ, no Chief of Staff, no Army Council.

It was the shift of focus to Northern Ireland in the 1950s that revived the IRA; it aimed at ending partition and freeing the six northern counties by physical force. From a small cell the northern IRA organisation was gradually built up till it became the most important branch of the Secret Army.

In Part VI of the book, a recent addition to an older edition, the author brings the story up to date with an account of the "war" in the north that has been waged since 1968, drawing the British Army into the fight. The whole Republican movement became deeply involved in the events in Ulster. The IRA felt that there were two major considerations: the first, to protect the Catholics against sectarian assault and British police injustice; and the second, to co-operate with the civil rights movement in dismantling the Unionist machine. It was in the degree of emphasis and the priorities to be allotted between these two factors that brought about the split in the IRA and the birth of the Provos. Following large-scale guerilla activities and British repressive measures of August 1969, moderates in the IRA decided to recognise de facto that Ireland had two governments. The dissenters withdrew and formed the Provisional Army Council to continue the "war".

The Provos may have for ever remained thin on the ground but for Edward Heath's Conservative government that came to power in 1970. A crack-down was ordered in Ulster. Then followed massive repressive measures and organized, widespread police brutality—just what the Provos needed. The polarisation of the two religious communities was almost total—a situation in which sympathy and support for the Provos increased ten-fold. Ulster became more and more deeply embedded in a continuing insurgency from which, to this day, there has been little respite. There seems to be no room left for political manoeuvres as the author rightly feels, the present phase is still one of continuing violence and attrition.

New Delhi

D.K. PALIT

INDIA

History of Modern India

BANI BANERJEE: Surendranath Banerjea and the History of Modern India 1848–1925. Metropolitan Book Co., New Delhi, 1979, viii, 256 p., Rs. 80.

SURENDRANATH Banerjea was one of our nation-builders. He lived through the rise of Indian nationalism and exercised a major influence

on its early growth. Before the close of the nineteenth century he had emerged as one of the foremost liberals who dominated the early phase of the Indian national movement. He derived his political philosophy from Western liberalism and shared with his compeers a profound, almost a touching, faith in the British sense of justice and a deep appreciation of the 'benefits' of British rule to India. His ideal for the country was a liberal, democratic polity patterned on Western liberalism. This he strove to achieve gradually by constitutional means under the "benevolent" tutelage of the Raj. He was irrevocably committed to constitutionalism and abhorred violence and revolutionary methods. Throughout his long, eventful political career he strenuously endeavoured to strengthen the foundations of Indian nationalism and fought to secure a respectable place for his countrymen under the Raj. Through his journalistic, organisational and other activities he fostered political awakening and national consciousness among the people and campaigned ceaselessly for the political rights and social privileges denied to them by the British. He openly blamed their misery, privation and political degradation on British rule and spearheaded numerous campaigns and movements for constitutional and political reforms. He was unsparing in his criticism of British policies that perpetuated economic backwardness and brought industrial stagnation in the country. In a nutshell, he played a major role in the history of modern India and made his mark in the annals of the Indian national movement.

Unfortunately, however, the nationalism which Surendranath Banerjea had helped to rear and sustain left him behind and forged ahead under the banner of "nationalists"—a new generation of political activists who emerged at the turn of the century and came to dominate the national movement after the First World War. He failed to move fast enough to catch up with the growing dimensions of a maturing nationalism in a colonial country which could no longer be contained within the shibboleths of the Western liberal creed. He did not seem to have fully grasped the inner dynamics of Indian nationalism which now increasingly exposed the growing contradictions of colonialism and rendered obsolete the kind of political set-up that he had envisaged for the country. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms marked a turning point in his political career. Owing to his deepening differences with the dominant leadership and growing alienation from the mass-oriented phase of the national struggle he left the Congress and became a founder member of the Liberal Federation of India, a refuge of unrepentant liberals. Under the new constitutional scheme he was appointed a minister and was knighted by His Majesty's Government. But all this was a poor substitute for the fall from grace which he suffered when he dissociated himself from the mainstream of national politics.

Surendranath Banerjea nevertheless remains a major force in our national movement by virtue of his manifold sacrifices and selfless devotion to the national cause. Such an eminent personality deserves a truly critical appreciation of his life and work. What, however, has been presented in this

work is a mere catalogue of his political activities without any attempt to analyze and understand them in proper perspective. It is a raw Ph.D. dissertation full of ill-digested stuff completely devoid of balanced judgement, and hence generally to be classed as a panegyric. Apart from its poor content, the book suffers from countless stylistic and grammatical lapses and is full of misprints. What is even more egregious is the system (or lack of it) of documentation followed in it and the undue liberty taken with the spelling of names of well-known national leaders. Far from giving a detailed and critical account of the ideas and contributions of Surendranath Banerjea to the cause of nationalism as claimed in the blurb, the book is, frankly speaking, a measly tribute to an outstanding national leader.

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R.L. SHUKLA

S.C. PATRA: *The Formation of the Province of Orissa: The Success of the First Linguistic Movement in India*. Punthi Pustak, Calcutta, 1979, xxv, 292p., Rs. 100.

ORISSA emerged as a province in 1936—the result of an agitation by the Oriyas who feared the loss of their cultural identity on account of the administrative disintegration of Oriya-speaking tracts. The tracts were under the Bengal, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar and Madras administration where the official reaction to the Oriya cultural aspirations was apathetic if not disdainful.

The Oriya Movement established the potency of language as more a culturally unifying force than a politically explosive issue. It caused the administration some embarrassment and a little sense of guilt, but no fear; for the Movement was entirely peaceful, being carried on constitutional lines, fervently appealing to the government, never seeking to force its hands.

The book traces the Oriya feeling, that all the Oriya-speaking tracts be brought under one administration as a vital measure for keeping the Oriya culture alive. The territorial dismemberment of Orissa was as much the result of historical forces (pp. 1–24), as that of administrative measures of successive rulers—the Mughals, Marathas and British. This point and another—the survival of Oriya culture under pressure of other dominant linguistic groups in neighbouring provinces—have been convincingly established by a mass of data—historical, literary, linguistic and statistical. (pp. 25–74)

Renaissance in Orissa had the same character as that elsewhere: expanding education, developing communication links, a strident Press and vociferous public associations. All this fostered the emerging spirit of Oriya unity as manifested in a language agitation in Oriya-speaking tracts of the neighbouring provinces. (pp. 75–117) The new Oriya elite, led by Madhusudan

Das and supported by the Oriya landed gentry launched the Oriya Movement obliging the Government to enquire into the genuineness of the simmering Oriya grievances. The result of the enquiry was the birth of the new Province of Orissa. It was indeed "an achievement of a particular area without support from any all-India organisation." (p. xxi)

Interestingly enough, the Oriya grievances caused common concern and sympathy in two Englishmen, who perhaps had nothing else in common—Curzon and Attlee; both helped in the realisation of the Oriya dream of a culturally integrated province.

The book is welcome as an excellent reference work, and perhaps only as that; for it is just a compendium of facts and figures with hardly any discussion or analysis of issues. It is a plain, dull-reading narrative of events as set out in the many memoranda submitted by the aggrieved Oriyas and as presented to the Government by enquiry commissions. Even in the conclusion the author makes no remark or observation of his own.

A few statements made by the author call for comment. Do the Oriyas really constitute "one of the major linguistic communities of the Indian sub-continent?" (p. xvi) The author should have provided statistical support to his contention that there were "tales of woes of the scattered Oriyas under other neighbouring peoples" (p. xx); the alleged discrimination against the Oriyas has to be viewed alongside the tardy growth of English education. The remark that "on the British era no English historian wrote anything," (p. xxii) is rather a sweeping one, for the author has himself drawn on the works of English civilians—Stirling, Beames. Hunter and Toynbee—as anyone else would have done for data on the early British administration of Orissa. The author found no "immediate results" produced by Wood's Educational Despatch, dated 1854 (p. 80), but in 1856 the Commissioner of Orissa reported that "there were no less than 2074 schools attended by 15,547 in the Cuttack district, and 839 attended by 8,224 boys in that of Balasore," and so he wanted a "separate agency for the educational development of Orissa." (pp. 80–81) This is again contradicted by his observation that the "progress of education was not satisfactory before the Naanka famine of 1866.... There were few schools and number of students was very small." (p. 85)

A word about the sources. Consultations bear dates, but many a time no number. Some books occur in their abbreviated form in the "References," but not in the bibliography—e.g. Richard Temple, *Report*, (pp. 23, 24), and A. Basu. (Ed.), *Report* (p. 62) The records cited give no clue to *where to find them*. Private papers of Curzon, Hardinge and others have not been consulted.

There are some excellent maps reproduced from well-known works. But then the price of the book, considering its content and size, is rather high.

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KANCHANMOY MOJUMDAR

Political Institutions

T.S. RAJAGOPAL IYENGAR: *Indian Democracy Speaks*. University of Mysore, Mysore, 1979, xviii, 445 p., Rs. 40.

THERE have been some books by academics, Indian and foreign, on the functioning of our political institutions. But far fewer are books by persons who have been active in politics. The title of Rajagopal Iyengar's book—with its overtones of approval and authority—makes one expect a stout defence of Indian Democracy by a practitioner, as the author has been a State legislator for long years. The book, however, turns out to be one of the more conventional legalistic evaluations of the Constitution and political policies of the country. It is neither a national bird's-eye view nor a provincial bee's-eye view of Indian politics in practice. Developed out of lectures given in Mysore University for laymen, the book suffers from the dilemma that extension lectures face—how much of explanation and appraisement to combine. Another of the author's problems is that while preparing the manuscript he had to take note of the political events that occurred between 1975 and 1977 which involved many cardinal assumptions about Indian Democracy.

The scheme of the book is ambitious. After a discussion of the conceptual basis of democracy, it purports to assess its record as a political arrangement, as a social and economic technique, as an approach to international relations, and as a way of life. The first section manages in some measure to live up to expectations, because of the author's knowledge of law. In support of his conclusions he cites as many as fifty major legal cases, some of which have been benchmark decisions. Students will find this section valuable. There are other portions, such as the discussion of rigidity and flexibility of constitutions (pages 214–215), which have wider usefulness.

The part dealing with economic policies, in contrast, is thin fare. The opportunity to examine in depth the compulsions and constraints under which democratic planning operates (as distinct from planning in one-party systems) has not been availed of. As for the section on foreign policy, there is little effort to explain the democratic element in the conduct of foreign policy. The author has not taken the trouble to unravel the interplay between public opinion, pressures of special interest groups, parliamentary scrutiny and the executive's response.

Iyengar makes no secret of his own political affiliations. He is basically a Rajaji-ite and, when he revised the book, he was very much in tune with the Janata philosophy. His attitude towards Jawaharlal Nehru is lukewarm and that towards Indira Gandhi overtly hostile. (It is noteworthy that under the general heading *Crisis of Democracy* the first sectional heading is "Women Prime Ministers.") His disapproval is directed against the emergency during which, he says caustically, "constitutional amendments were effected with as much ease as amendments were made to the Village Panchayat Act or

the Maternity Act." (page 222)

The following lines from page 82 are a fair indication of the author's view of democracy in India: "The weakness of Indian Democracy is that it runs on the wheels of an illiterate electorate. Pandit Nehru and Mrs. Indira Gandhi ruled the country for over a quarter of a century because the illiterate masses did not cast their vote on the basis of even an elementary grasp of the issues and values involved but were rather swung by charisma, demagoguery and herdpsychology."

While the table of contents sketches out a comprehensive scheme, the treatment is uneven. For example a whole chapter entitled the *Vice President of India* consists of a single page of 14 lines of text and 7 lines of footnotes.

The author cannot be blamed (but sympathised with) for the patchy index and the disastrous proof-reading. Many universities in our country do not take as much care about their publications as they should.

New Delhi

H.Y. SHARADA PRASAD

G.G. MIRCHANDANI: *The People's Verdict: DCM Computer-based Study*.
Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1980, ix, 194p., Rs. 45.

THE Election Commission takes almost two years after a general election to publish the kind of data which students of Indian elections and politics so avidly want. But it is now possible, by turning to computers for storing and processing large volumes of data, to drastically reduce such a lag-time. Whether and when the Election Commission will move in this direction remains to be seen; others have already made a beginning. I am, of course, referring to the teaming-up of the United News of India (UNI) with DCM Data Products and Press Trust of India (PTI) with International Data Management Pvt. Ltd. (IDM) for covering the elections to the Seventh Lok Sabha held earlier this year. It is for the first time in India that computers have been used for quick processing and instant analyses of election results. Both teams need to be commended for taking the lead in this.

The book under review by G.G. Mirchandani is based on one such effort. The data for it was collected by UNI reporters spread all over the country and processed on DCM's Spectrum/7 Computer. Although the blurb claims that the book provides "in depth" analyses of the Lok Sabha Elections of 1977 and 1980, it does nothing of the sort. Perhaps it is too much to expect this of a book which was published, as the author informs us, "within about a fortnight of the receipt of the last official results."

The book does reflect though Mirchandani's experience and skills as a journalist of long-standing. Well over two-thirds of the text provides what journalists would, I imagine, call a "backgrounder." The first chapter, for instance, describes the conditions and events leading to the dissolution of the Sixth Lok Sabha. The second summarises useful information on rules, regulations and procedures relating to general elections in India. The third

chapter highlights some of the electoral trends since 1977. Chapters 4-7, like chapter one, are based on "headlines of yesterday." Anyone wishing to write about the 1980 Election will find these chapters a great help; they will, to a large extent, save him the trouble of plodding through piles of old newspapers.

When it comes to data on the 1980 Election one begins to get it only from chapter eight onwards. There is indeed a lot of information in chapters 8-11 but unfortunately not presented systematically. One gets it basically in the form of tantalizing snippets which perhaps can be used with great effect as single bits of information on the cocktail circuit. "The Janata Party," we are informed, "suffered its worst defeat in Sonapat where the State Party Chief, Mukhtiar Singh Malik, emerged third in a 11-cornered contest. The Congress (I) was at its best in Mahendargarh, where... Rao Birendra Singh wrested the seat from Janata by a margin of 91,347 votes." (pp. 144-45) Take another example: "A computer analysis showed that Dhillon polled 44.84 per cent votes in Tarn Taran, which was 3.91 per cent more than the poll of the winning Congress (I) candidate in Bhatinda." (p. 161) Both bits of information are interesting but obviously not of much use to those who want to do serious electoral research. The latter can use such information for systematic research only if they also have data on how Janata and Congress (I) candidates fared, in terms of votes, in the other 9 constituencies in Haryana and 12 in Punjab. Researchers do not want observations based on data but the data itself.

The tabular form of presenting data obviously does not recommend itself to Mirchandani except for chapter eight; there are no tables at all in the other three data-based chapters. But even in chapter eight most tables are without a heading and sometimes incomplete in the information they provide. Tripura and Manipur, for instance, are left out of the table on pp. 120-121. One has to go to the Appendix to find data in a tabular form. But unfortunately there is precious little of it even in the Appendix. Of the 28 tables which appear there only 16 give data which is of some use for an analysis of the 1980 Elections. I say "some use" advisedly, for in all these relevant tables data is presented in the form of aggregates, with aggregation being done in almost all cases at state and the national level. The only exception are the last three tables where data on party performance is given by regions—Hindi belt, North-East and the South.

For the research scholars this is truly disappointing. UNI-DCM would have done them great service and, in the bargain, stolen a march over the Election Commission had they also given in this book constituency-wise data which must have obviously been collected by them. In its absence, whatever appeal the book may have for the general reader it has no more than a marginal value for serious scholars of Indian politics and elections.

Center for the Study of Developing Societies, BASHIRUDDIN AHMED
Delhi.

J.R. SIWACH : *Politics of President's Rule in India*. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1979, xvi, 533p., Rs. 80.

THE findings of this well documented study tries to prove that "whoever goes to Lanka becomes a Ravana." The study was undertaken during the 1973-75 period when the author was a Visting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.

President's rule in the States as a result of the failure of constitutional machinery under Article 356 of the Constitution of India is a weapon of great power placed at the disposal of the Union Government by the fathers of the Constitution to discipline the States. This weapon has been used many times by the Union Government ever since the inauguration of the Constitution in 1950. By the end of 1980, during a thirty-year period, President's rule was imposed sixty-five times in all, an unflattering record indeed of a country wedded to democracy under a liberal democratic constitution.

During Nehru's prime ministership, the longest period so far (fourteen years and four months), the Article was invoked only on seven occasions. During Lal Bahadur Sastri's brief tenure of one year and seven months, President's rule was imposed twice. But under Morarji Desai's prime ministership lasting just two years and three months, constitutional emergency was declared in the States fourteen times. During a total period of over twelve years so far of Mrs. Gandhi's prime ministership, President's rule has been imposed thirty-nine times. Charan Singh was Prime Minister only for a little over five months. Yet the Article was invoked as many as four times! There is hardly a state which has escaped President's rule. Meghalaya is the only exception! Orissa leads the table with a record of President's rule seven times closely followed by Punjab and Uttar Pradesh (six times), Kerala and Bihar (five times), West Bengal, Gujarat, Manipur and Pondicherry (four times), Tripura, Rajasthan and Goa (three times), Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh (twice), and the rest once.

The book is divided into 28 chapters under two parts. Part I consists of six chapters which form the author's analysis of different aspects of the failure of the constitutional machinery and what happens after the declaration of President's "rule. Of these, the chapters on "Politics of Suspended Animation" and "Concept of Stable Government and President's Rule" are of special interest since they show the working of the party system in India and how the party in power at the Centre misused its authority to gain political advantage in the States. Chapters 7 to 25 of Part II deal with the different states where President's rule was imposed, one chapter for each state. Chapter 26 deals with the dissolution of nine State Assemblies at one stroke under the Janata Government and Chapter 27 on Governor's Rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Chapter 28 is the concluding chapter which briefly embodies the author's main findings of the study.

The author's conclusion is that President's rule in various states has been imposed on various "untenable" grounds such as : a stable government is

not possible, the government is misusing its powers; the government has lost the confidence of the people; the government is indulging in secessionist activities; and the Chief Minister has refused to resign when the major partner withdrew support. According to him, "these were some of the false pretexts used by the party in power at the Centre either to dismiss the state ministry having the confidence of the assembly or to prevent the largest opposition party from forming the government either immediately after the election or when a vote of no-confidence was passed against the government." After condemning the action of the Centre in such sweeping terms he justifies the action of the Janata Government in dismissing the nine State Governments (Congress) on moral, legal and constitutional grounds. (This was of course written when the Janata was still in power!) Obviously, according to him the dismissal of state governments by the Centre, ruled by the Congress party alone was morally, legally and constitutionally unjustified every time. And in this type of wholesale condemnation he forgets the fact that it was a Congress government at the Centre which dismissed Congress governments in the States on many occasions. We do not know from the book whether he would have justified the so-called caretaker government of Charan Singh dismissing four state governments in a period of four months. Perhaps he would have justified it, although the whole thesis of the book is against the Centre dismissing any state government, because he appears to be an ardent admirer of Charan Singh.

It is unfortunate that studies of this type while professing objectivity betray the very lack of it. Any student of constitutional government in India knows that politicians as a class have always taken advantage of every possible situation to keep themselves in power. In this process they have indulged in many morally undesirable activities and have taken many political decisions which are indefensible. But this has never been the monopoly of the Congress Party. Because that Party was in power for a longer period than others, both at the Centre and in the States, its record appears to be worse than that of others. But this is only one aspect of the problem and perhaps a relatively less significant one.

If one were to look back and survey the working of state governments, one could see the evil effects of the pernicious practice of defection among members of the legislatures. There was hardly a state where this evil phenomenon did not manifest itself. In Haryana defection reached the most ludicrous limits imaginable. In 1967, in the State Assembly, members crossed and recrossed the floor many times in a single week. It was estimated that within a single year after the General Elections of 1967, there were as many as 448 defections in the legislatures of the country taken as a whole. If many state governments had to be dismissed by the Centre which, fortunately for the country was stable, who is to be blamed more, the Centre or those in power in the states. Siwach's ponderous volume does not probe deep enough and offer a convincing answer to the most vexing constitutional and political problem that confronted this country all these years. He has no constructive

suggestions either. On the whole, a disappointing work.

The real problem is the absence of a high political standard in the country as a whole. There is no political or constitutional morality which is the essential ingredient for the success of democratic government. We must remember that constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated among the people as a whole. Then it will be reflected in the politics of the country and the governments both at the Centre and in the States. The words of Ambedkar thirty-two years ago are still true : "Democracy in India is only a top dressing on an Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic."

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Tripunithura.

M.V. PYLEE

V.K. VARADACHARI : Governor in the Indian Constitution, Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, vii, 171 p., Rs. 50.

THE office of the Governor has been the subject of considerable controversy ever since our Constitution came into being. Till 1966 the post from all appearances looked to be redundant, to be utilized principally as a sinecure for old and decrepit politicians or to put out of mischief's way inconvenient and troublesome political colleagues. It was only in the post 1966 era that the Governor came into his own when many state governments had political parties other than the one ruling at the Centre. Large scale defections and coalition governments during this period added to the necessity of having experienced and wise Governors as Heads of the States.

Much has been said lately about the role of the Governor in our Constitution but so far I have not seen any authoritative book on the subject. Shri V.K. Varadachari has very ably gone into and analyzed the functioning of a Governor over various facets of his task—as a constitutional head, as a link between the Centre and the State, as an executive head, as one acting in his discretion and as a guide and protector of the services, etc. He has gone into very great details and in the process must have had to do considerable painstaking research and study. One thing that struck me greatly is his objectivity of approach which makes this book very valuable for the students of our Constitution.

Generally speaking the Governor is expected to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers, but in many matters he can and is expected to *exercise* his discretion. It is noteworthy that whilst the Governor in our Constitution has been given considerable powers of discretion, the president has not been clothed with any such powers. For this one would presumably have to go back to the history of the formation of our Federation. Before the coming into being of the Constitution, there were no states in British India. There were some convenient administrative areas called Provinces and ruled directly

by Governors under the control and supervision of the Viceroy and Governor General of India. The Provinces had no autonomous sovereign status. All the powers were centred in the Centre. In normal federations when the federating states come together to form the federation, the states shed most of their sovereign powers in favour of the Centre and retain the residuary powers in their own hands. In the Indian Federation the process of federating was a reverse process, viz., the Centre shed a lot of its powers in favour of the States to clothe them with the authority of a state, and naturally in such circumstances, retain the residuary powers in its own hands. Moreover our Constitution-makers were also influenced by the past history of our country. If one goes through the past history of India one cannot fail to observe that the brightest periods in our long history were those when the Central Government of our country was strong. Whenever the Central Government of India became weak the country invariably fell to pieces and became so weak as to become easy prey to invaders and outsiders. Our Constitution-makers therefore not only deliberately made the Centre in India strong and clothed it with all the residuary powers to enable it to maintain and safeguard the interest of the country against divisive forces, but also thought it fit to clothe the Governor as an independent statutory authority with considerable discretionary and statutory powers, with the same object in view.

To understand correctly the position of the Governor in our Constitution it is important to keep the above background in mind.

Whilst the task of a Governor as a constitutional Head of the State seems to be simple and easy, it is when he is faced with the exercise of his discretion that the greatest caution, patience and wisdom are called for.

Whilst there can be no disagreement with Varadachari's view that whenever possible the Governor should avoid assuming the responsibility for deciding whether a government in office has lost its majority or not and that it would be safer and more appropriate to get the assembly to give its verdict in the matter, yet there may be occasions when in the overall interests of the state and the constitutional proprieties this may not be the best course to follow. For example, what should be the duty of the Governor when he finds that the Chief Minister is deliberately delaying his advice to the Governor to summon the assembly, in order to gain time to utilise the interim period to bring to bear extra constitutional and coercive pressures on the members of the opposition, either to terrorise them not to vote against the Government or to absent themselves from the assembly when summoned for fear of their lives. Should the Governor allow things to drift to such a situation or in adherence to his oath of office as the protector of the Constitution and the interests of the people placed in his charge, proceed to act and dismiss the government of the recalcitrant Chief Minister? At present he would appear to have no option but to act on his own, in these circumstances. Therefore to save him from such a predicament it would appear to be advisable to

enable him to summon the assembly himself, under certain specified circumstances, without the obligation of doing so only on the advice of the Council of his Ministers.

During the period a state is under the President's rule, there is no elected government and the Governor as the President's representative governs the state directly. He is in fact the Governor and the Council of Ministers rolled into one during this period. With the elected government of the state out of office the burden of what the elected government would have done to safeguard the interests of the state and its people falls on the Governor during the period of President's rule. What is his duty in such a situation? If he feels that the Centre is treating the state unjustly should he protest and resist, as the elected government would have done, or should he keep quiet and allow the Centre to get away with the injustice? I wish Varadachari would have thrown some light on this aspect of the Governor's duties.

Another matter which seems to have escaped the author's attention is the qualifications of the persons to be appointed as Governors. If the office of the Governor has come into some disrepute it is mainly because of the casual manner in which successive governments at the Centre have advised the President to appoint Governors. To enable a Governor to discharge his multifarious duties, constitutional, discretionary and executive, he should be completely fit both in body and mind, should possess considerable experience of men and matters, should have inexhaustible patience and possess considerable tact, wisdom and integrity. Times have gone when any old and decrepit person could be appointed a Governor. Today only those who possess the qualities enumerated above can do justice to the job. Only such people can inspire confidence in the people entrusted to their charge, can be objective and fearless in their approach to problems and situations, and if need be even stand up to the Centre to safeguard and protect the interests of the Constitution and the State and the people entrusted to their charge.

New Delhi

DHARMA VIRA

SHRIRAM MAHESHWARI : *State Governments in India*. Macmillan, New Delhi, 1979, xi, 328p., Rs. 58.

NO one will disagree with the author's observation that the central government receives the major attention of scholars who write on the Indian government system and the state government is either conveniently skipped over or gets scant notice. The present work is the outcome of the author's attempt to fill this gap, and he has done it admirably well.

The book is divided into 19 chapters, dealing with various parts of the machinery of government in the states and union territories. The introductory chapter rightly emphasizes the importance of the states in our governmental system. It is followed by a compact historical account of the evolution of the

states since early British times. The roles of the Governor, the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, the executive departments, the Board of Revenue where it exists, are then brought out. Divisional and district administration claim two separate chapters. Union territories likewise, form the subject of another chapter. The organisation of the services and the vigilance machinery are then dealt with followed by a review of administrative reforms in the states. But these are not mere descriptive accounts of the structures concerned and their functions. The author also provides an evaluation of their actual working by bringing to bear on them his mature judgement and deep study of constitutional and political proprieties. Thus the wide gap between the accepted recommendations of the various reforms committees and their implementation by the governments concerned is very well brought out.

Perhaps the best chapter in the book is the one dealing with regionalism. The present turmoil in the North-eastern states lends topical importance to it. The author's reasoned conclusion that "it is highly necessary that we discard, once for all, the notion of regionalism as being somewhat unpatriotic or posing a threat to national integrity," deserves to be widely appreciated in the perspective of various national pluralities. His plea for a balanced course of action in building up regional institutions in place of the extremes of ignoring regional differences and aspirations on the one hand, and conferring statehood on each and every vocal region on the other, is worthy of serious consideration. Similarly on Centre-State relations he has emphasized the need to treat the states with the respect due to them under the Constitution, especially in the Centre's exercise of the powers under Article 356. He also draws attention to the present disparity in the financial powers of the union and the states, having a crippling effect on the latter. Whether his suggestion to write off the huge debt of the states to the centre is feasible in view of the heavy burden of servicing the national debt which the Central Exchequer has to bear may be a debatable issue. But the need to improve the financial position of the states is certainly important in the present unsatisfactory state of Centre-State relations. In this context the plea he makes for the effective use of Article 263 is unexceptionable.

The book is brought to a close by setting out the variety and problems of local government institutions, both rural and urban, in the states. The appendix lists the districts in India with their respective areas and population. Incidentally, the list under Maharashtra (p. 31) begins with Rajanandgaon which should have figured under the preceding state.

To bring so many different aspects of state government within the compass of 300 odd pages is no mean achievement. The author must be complimented on his skill in thus compressing his material without losing sight of the essentials or presenting a disjointed discourse. It should not be a detraction from the merit of the book if one suggests that, for completeness of treatment, a chapter on the state legislatures in so far as they (and their committees) have

a bearing on policy-making and public administration—on which the book is focused—should have found a place in it.

Pune

S.V. KOGEKAR

Planning

P.B. DESAI : Planning in India—1951-78. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, 194p., Rs. 60.

M.L. GUJRAL : Economic Failures of Nehru and Indira Gandhi: A Study of Three Decades of Deprivation and Disillusionment. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 255p., Rs. 75.

THE two books under review purport to provide factual information regarding the process of economic development that has taken place in post-Independence India. It cannot be said in honesty that the purposes have been well achieved. The books however achieve a different purpose : that books produced with such superior quality of print, paper binding etc., and sold for prices as high as Rs. 60 and Rs. 75 can be so poor in content is a thought provoking reflection on the state of the publication industry in the country. The two books have not only their publisher and their poor standard in common; one more thing that they share is that they were both conceived and produced during the brief period of Janata euphoria. This brief period produced many bad harvests including a bad harvest of political economic literature. These two books belong to that motley collection of books written in haste, produced in haste and sold in haste to cash in on the euphoria. A second point that is common to them is a vague commitment to some woolly conceptions of Gandhian economics.

P.B. Desai's book on planning is not as bad as that of Gujral's. It attempts to provide "a connected chronological view of the course of development since independence," according to the author himself his "comments in the text of this narration have been limited to an unavoidable minimum." This has meant the narration to be uncritical and non-analytical. Even as a non-analytic chronological narration of facts the book could have been useful if it had paid some attention to the sequence of changes in the economic policies pursued by the government. A student of the Indian economy who would like to test certain hypotheses regarding the class character of the State and the changes brought about in it by changes in alignments of classes would have been helped by such a historical documentation. To the best of the reviewer's knowledge, no such documentation of the evolution of economic policies along with their political economic contexts has been made by anybody. The author says in the Preface that what he has to say by way of comments is put together in the last chapter. However, in that chapter one

finds not so much any considered views of the author himself but rather a reproduction of the views of a miscellaneous collection of well-known and not so well-known authors. The statistical tables relating to production, investment etc., are all taken from standard official publications, a compilation the likes of which are available in the country in plenty.

The writer of the second book, M.L. Gujral, is introduced by Jayaprakash Narayan as a "gifted writer." However, this gift does not in any way get reflected in the book under review. The author, unlike P.B. Desai, does not exercise any restraint over his views. The book is nothing but a continuous flow of comments, incorporating vague, woolly, shapeless, phony, unconnected ideas, all passing in the name of Gandhian economics. The author is obviously not a professional economist. Far from that being a matter of criticism, that could have been a point of advantage, given the state of the literature of economics. The author is entirely right about the "irrelevance of orthodox economics and economic education." And one does enjoy his description of the discipline of economics as one "conceived by thugs and self-seekers in their own self-interest." However the author does himself damage by mixing up his layman's observations, like the one above, with far too many quotations from and references to the same professional economists, thus exposing his lamentable ignorance of the subject. The same result is obtained by his mentioning several minor economists in the same breath as some of the profoundest thinkers on the subject (sometimes misspelt, like "Paulo" Sraffa !). The book lacks an integrated structure. Some of the chapters bear on certain sectors like education, health, population, agriculture, industry etc. Thrown in between are pseudo-theoretical discourses on neo-classical economics, development economics, Gandhian economics, paradigms and excursions in the history of socialism and planning. All in all the book is written in the style and standard of vulgar journalism.

The capacity for doing mischief and damage by such books is however not to be underestimated. A whole lot of nonsense is being propagated by self proclaimed "Gandhian economists." It requires to be stated categorically that there is not the slightest bit of substance in the argument that the failures of economic development in India arise because of a departure from Gandhian economics. Failures in the country's economic development are there for all to see. The causes for the failures also lie in pursuing wrong economic policies. These failures and these wrong policies do require to be analyzed, exposed and changed. It can however be confidently asserted that the fault of these policies do not lie with not following the Gandhian path. It was simply not possible to follow Gandhian economics because there is no such economics. There is no coherent body of ideas regarding the process of development which could be ascribed to Gandhi. Industries simply cannot be done without. Small scale industries require large-scale industries to sustain them. Gandhi's own favourite sewing machine would call for steel factories and factories to make machinery. It is simply not true that one could produce "cloth, shoes, hair oils, combs, tooth brushes, tooth pastes,

mirrors, glass or plastic ware" in self-sufficient villages. Despite the charge that Nehru abandoned village industries, the fact is that he has made the nation pay heavily to subsidize a whole range of non-viable village industries as a token of his loyalty to Gandhi. The ironic denouement of this cult of village industries is embodied in the glittering show-cases and the stylish sales-girls decorating the cottage industries emporia which have done little good to the villages while catering exclusively to the urban rich and foreign tourists. Finally, a nail has to be driven hard into the lie of agriculture having been neglected to benefit industries. Any serious intersectoral analysis will show that all along the course of development of post-Independence India, agriculture has been heavily subsidized by the State with the help of resources either mobilized from the non-agricultural sector or received from other countries.

Viswa Bharati,
Santiniketan.

ASHOK RUDRA

SURAJ B. GUPTA : Monetary Planning for India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, xi, 240 p., Rs. 75.

LORD Robbins, the well-known British economist, relates in his book entitled *Political Economy: Past and Present*, the story of a senior official of the British Treasury, who was expounding fiscal policy at an important meeting in the mid-forties of this century and thought, in his ignorance, that the appropriate use of the bank rate was to put it down, when prices were going up and to increase it, when prices were going down. There has been a considerable change since then in all countries, including India, and a growing awareness of the various issues in monetary policy, accompanied by a great deal of concern about the debasement of currencies and the persistence of inflation. Even in India, the literature on monetary economics is already voluminous; and books and articles are being added every day. The relevance or utility of monetary theory, from the point of view of those who are required to take decisions, continues however, to be limited.

Prof. Suraj Gupta has tried to remedy this defect by writing a book not on abstract theory or economic or econometric models, but on practical issues with which the Reserve Bank of India and the Central Government are concerned. His objective is clear and lucidly stated in the opening pages. He distinguishes monetary policy, which deals with aggregates, from credit policy, which relates to sectoral allocations and the end use of money. After having analyzed the causes and consequences of inflation, he assigns a neutral role to monetary policy. This is justified, partly because there are dangers in the excessive creation of money, in the belief that a mild inflation may provide a continuing stimulus for growth, but partly also because the creation of excess money supply serves no real purpose and the excess is merely spent

in driving prices upwards all along the line, without affecting the demand for real money as a proportion of real income.

Gupta is a Monetarist and not a Keynesian; he prescribes for India a policy on the lines suggested by Friedman. The demand for money is assumed to be stable. The income elasticity of this demand is presumed to be unity. The rate of interest on non-monetary assets is not important as affecting the demand for real money balance. There is hardly any scope left for the further monetisation of the Indian economy. Real income is thus statistically the only significant determinant of real money; and the long-term trend rate of money supply should, therefore, be so regulated as to leave the price level unchanged, while the economy operates at or near the level of the maximum possible output.

Having defined the objective, Gupta goes on to describe the manner in which it can be achieved. His main thesis is that high-powered money (H), which on being multiplied by the money multiplier leads to money supply, rather than the money supply itself, will have to be controlled. All policies will have to be adjusted or oriented towards maintaining H at the desirable level. For this purpose, deficit financing by the government, defined as the sum total of the Reserve Bank's credit to government plus the increase in Government currency, plus any net sales of old or previous year's issues of Government securities to the public, minus net purchases of such Government securities from the public and minus also that portion of the deficit-finance, which is met from the increase in the non-monetary liabilities of the Reserve Bank, will have to be carefully watched and regulated from time to time.

Open market operations by the Reserve Bank of India would have to be conducted, so as to offset the creation of high-powered money (H) by government's deficit financing. The market for treasury bills in India should be developed by creating a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India to undertake this promotional role. This subsidiary would be expected to tap surplus funds belonging to companies, firms and others. The Reserve Bank should cease to deal in treasury bills as the agent of the Central Government and should not also discount treasury bills except for this new subsidiary. The mopping up of funds through treasury bills and open market operations in treasury bills, if necessary, supplementing those in dated securities, will ensure that notwithstanding deficit-financing by government, the creation of H will be restricted to the desired level.

As far as banks are concerned, Gupta suggests that the Reserve Bank should be free to increase the impounded reserve ratio of the commercial banks to any figure which may be necessary to offset the increase in H money beyond the safe or desirable limit. The special or discretionary refinancing for commercial banks should be completely given up; and the basic quotas for borrowing by the commercial banks from the Reserve Bank should be reserved only for meeting unforeseen and temporary needs. The statutory liquidity ratio, which the banks are required to maintain, should be

converted into a statutory ratio for investment in Government securities; and this in turn should be raised as much and as often as may be necessary to offset any increase or threatened increase in H.

Lastly, the development banks like the IDBI and the ARDC must be compelled to raise genuine resources in the market and to improve their working, so as to generate more funds internally, instead of drawing from the Reserve Bank of India, or tap funds, which at one further remove become transformed into H-money.

There is some logical consistency and tidiness in the methods suggested for controlling high powered money (H). But the value of the suggestions is very greatly reduced by a lack of appreciation, firstly, of the side effects and economic and social consequences of the suggested prescriptions and secondly, of the limitations within which the Reserve Bank has to work.

There are two attitudes towards money and monetary policy. One is to regard money as a sacred trust and as something, which is independent of human aspirations and efforts, to be respected merely because it is money. Governments controlling the use of money must be accountable according to this view for the consequences of their policies; and individuals should be free to escape from paternalism and restrictive authority, exercised through controlling the money supply. The alternative view is to regard money not as significant by itself, but merely as reflecting the desires and actions of human beings, in societies which can accept certain goals, results and adjustments, but not others. Governments and Central Banks have to act and cannot be mere idle spectators. As everything is uncertain, their guesses may be as good as any one else's; and they will have to be allowed to exercise their judgement. Professor Herbert Frankel of Oxford has written an entire book on these two rival philosophies.

Gupta seems to be inclined to accept the first rather than the second of these two rival approaches. It is not surprising, therefore, that he elevates neutral monetary policy to the status of a gospel and a dogma, regardless of the effects of following that policy, such as arrested development, human suffering as a result of steep doses of deflation, difficulties which may be created for industries, the abandonment of all attempts to provide for the needs of the neglected and backward sections of society and the consequences, from the point of view of the profitability of the banks, of reducing the total volume of their working funds below the level at which they may be able to earn some profits.

At a more mundane level, in criticizing the Reserve Bank of India, Gupta seems also to have been less than charitable. He appears to have ignored some relevant facts; on page 106, the theory of open market operations is correctly stated, but it is not clear why the net sale of securities by the Reserve Bank has been included as one of the component items in the definition of H--deficit finance on page 75. Equally, it is not clear why the expansionary effects of the purchase of securities by the Reserve Bank, leading to an additional reserve base of H money, for banks to expand the money supply,

have been ignored. It is not true that considerations of debt management in the interests of the Government, have dominated the Reserve Bank's open market policies. The Bank has tried in fact to ensure that the net result of its open market policies, including transactions in "old" and not merely current or recently issued securities, will be neutral; and it has gone on record, saying this quite clearly. It is not also necessary for the Bank to provide, as now suggested, for an efficient arrangement for the quick transfer of funds. It has been offering this facility at subsidised rates for about forty years; and it incurs a great deal of expenditure in doing so. As another example, it is no longer correct to say that the portion of a savings bank deposit, which is treated as a demand deposit, is the amount, which is withdrawable without notice (a different formula, namely, that the excess over the average amount on which interest has been paid in the past should be treated as a demand deposit was introduced, with effect from 16 August 1978). It is true again that the treasury bill market in India is thin and artificial. But if it has not developed, this is not because the Reserve Bank has been indifferent. In fact, there is hardly any suggestion regarding any promotional or development activity which the Bank has not explored at some time or the other in its history. It is true that there are surplus floating funds. In a country, in which there is a parallel black market, which is already very large and is also growing every year, it will be idle to deny the existence of such funds. But they are not available to the treasury bill market, which, as matters now stand, provides an outlet mainly for the surplus unspent funds of the State Governments, foreign quasi-government banks, other banks and a few other institutions. There is no reason for thinking that a new institution is going to succeed, where the Reserve Bank has failed.

Monetary problems and issues are complex and often baffling. In prescribing or criticising any policies, the environment and institutional framework within which they are to operate cannot in any case be ignored. The Reserve Bank of India provides plenty of information in its monthly bulletin, occasional papers and annual reports. If they had been consulted a little more carefully, some criticism, which seems to have been based on unverified assumptions and statements, and a few minor errors could have been avoided.

This does not however detract on the whole from the merits of this book. In the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, soft options are as dangerous as a rigid theology or an uncompromising attitude. Perhaps, they are even more dangerous. In drawing the attention of the authorities and others to this, Gupta has done some service.

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R.K. SESHADRI

K.S. SASTRY : *Performance Budgeting for Planned Development*. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1979, xv, 220p., Rs. 50.

IN a developing country, such as India, the need to develop and utilise scarce available resources within a planned framework to achieve pre-set goals of development is obvious and generally accepted. Further, in our situation, it is recognised that the State has, of necessity, to assume the primary responsibility for economic development, and that too, largely, through public expenditure programmes. At the same time, it is important that the techniques and models employed in framing the Plan match the socio-economic culture and environment and that its implementation is effective. Achievements have to be measured against the targets set and the assumptions made at the time a project or programme was approved for being financed out of public funds. This is possible through careful "Performance Budgeting" where the emphasis is on explicit specification of objectives, detailed analysis of programmes including their time schedule and an obligatory evaluation of their success.

K.S. Sastry's book *Performance Budgeting for Planned Development*, is a useful addition to the reference literature on the subject. The author has drawn on his rich and varied experience of budgeting, accounting and audit of public expenditure in writing this book. "The theme of the book is that efficiency in budgeting is a question not of mere magnitudes of resources and outlays but of defining the objectives and priorities and that, at any given level of resources, efficiency can be improved through a more explicit definition of goals and objectives, through greater clarity and consistency in ordering the priorities, through a thorough-going analysis of the end benefits of programmes, and indeed through proper management of programmes, attending to the nuts and bolts as it were." The author has pointed out that performance budgeting is not a mere catalogue of physical targets and achievements and has to be viewed as a total management system defining targets in the different sectors reflecting governments' order of priorities in terms of their declared political goals, providing for allocation of scarce resources to achieve such targets, monitoring progress of implementation from time to time and appraising performance in terms of norms pre-set and easily understood.

The book describes the different stages of performance budgeting. The selection of "objectives" has been discussed in two chapters, with appropriate illustrations. The difficulties faced in the quantification of objectives and in relating them to the long term goals of government policies have been listed. There are two chapters on "Analysis" where the various criteria presently adopted for the selection of programmes/projects to be financed out of public funds, namely, cost benefit analysis, discounting techniques, internal rate of return, return on investment etc., are critically examined. The author has suggested a criterion which he calls "value added to capital employed" (VACE), for the selection and evaluation of public investment.

programmes. He is of the view that in the case of public investment programmes, it is appropriate to compare the value added with the aggregate capital employed and not merely the capital invested by the sponsoring agency. The relevance of this ratio in the analysis and evaluation both of revenue programmes and capital projects has been discussed at some length. It has been argued that the VACE criterion is a simple one, which admits of ready application even by the lower echelons of public administration thus facilitating decentralised decision-making, planning and speedy execution of planned schemes. The possibility of discounting the flow of benefits and costs over a time period and use of shadow prices for foreign exchange in the actual application of the ratio have also been discussed. The author is of the view that the use of the VACE will help in taking a community-wide view of costs and benefits. With regard to continuing programmes it has been proposed that "Zero base budgeting" could be adopted.

There are useful chapters on classification, organisation and evaluation. The new classification now adopted for the Plan and the Budget, which is based on the purpose of expenditure, was introduced on the recommendation of an expert team with which the author was closely associated. The role of organisation and the importance of its being tailored to subserve the requirements of the objectives have been highlighted. The need for delegation of financial and other powers based on the principle that authority should match responsibility has been stressed.

The different criteria generally made use of in evaluation have been discussed. For meaningful evaluation, the need to keep in focus the norms and criteria by which the project was initially judged and cleared has been emphasised. Discussing the importance of efficiency-cum-performance audit of public expenditure, the author suggests that the responsibility for regular audit check of individual transactions should progressively devolve on the internal accounting organisation leaving the Comptroller and Auditor General's organisation to devote its attention to a review of performance and efficiency.

The Government of India have accepted the need for performance budgeting and decided that it should be adopted by all the Economic Ministries. Accordingly, most of the economic ministries have been presenting their annual Performance Budget to Parliament before the discussion on their demands for grants. However, at present these documents are little more than a collection of data on financial expenditure and physical targets. Implementation of meaningful performance budgeting, as envisaged by the author, would require several steps to be taken and these have been detailed in the concluding chapter of the book.

The author has largely succeeded in his effort to be objective in his presentation without at the same time being too critical of existing practices and procedures. The book will enable civil servants and managers who are concerned with economic administration to understand the problems of budgeting of public expenditure in the proper perspective. The language of the

book is simple and direct. The presentation is precise and lucid. It is handy and well got up. One cannot however, wholly agree with all the comments and suggestions of the author. The merits of VACE as a better evaluation tool remains to be tested in actual practice. There are some typographical errors which will have to be corrected in the subsequent editions.

New Delhi.

R.V. SUBRAHMANYAN

Economic Development and Social Change

C.H. HANUMANTHA RAO and P.C. JOSHI, *Eds* : Reflections on Economic Development and Social Change : Essays in Honour of V.K.R.V. RAO. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 486 p., Rs. 100.

THIS book brings together 26 essays by economists and social scientists (five of them foreign), in honour of Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao who in a career spanning over forty years has distinguished himself as an economist, educationist, parliamentarian, administrator and institution-builder. The essays are grouped in five parts, namely, rethinking on development, economic structure and policy, the demographic dimension, development as a social process, and perspectives in social sciences. As Hanumantha Rao has remarked in his foreword, "the fact that the contributors belong to many disciplines is an indication of the position enjoyed by Dr. Rao not only in economics but in social sciences as a whole." The last part of the book lists Dr. Rao's writings which give some idea of his prodigious output and versatility of mind.

In the opening essay, A.K. Das Gupta writes on the limitations of economic theory and draws attention to how the euphoria of the Keynesian analysis is all but gone. Hayek was one of the earliest to point out the weakness of the analysis forty years ago, while Hicks systematically exposed it in 1974 with reference to scarcity and choice in the contemporary free market economy which does not look upon socially planned investment as inconsistent with a free market. Das Gupta warns that "supercession of the principle of scarcity in India's planned investment in the past 20-25 years has brought trouble to the economy." Jan Tinbergen examines in econometric terms the doomsday forebodings of the Club of Rome and their like, and concludes that there is no need to fear slow growth rates in advanced countries if it became inevitable owing to physical and biological constraints. He advocates in fact their going slow on their growth, but only upto the point that does not hurt developing countries. The difficulty about this thesis, however, is that the "hurt point" varies widely among developing countries.

In a dozen pages, H.W. Singer brings out lucidly how the "trickle down" model, followed by most Third World countries for their development in

the past 20-25 years, has failed to trickle down to the last man, and the fruits of development, such as they are, have been unduly tapped at various points of the pipeline by socially powerful intermediate classes. Our own *Antyodaya* scheme is a belated recognition of this fact. The ILO has also done much in recent years to shift some emphasis of growth, but not all, from GNP to employment. The employment emphasis paves the way for a less aggregated and dispersed view of planning.

There are two essays specifically on Keynesian economics, one by Sukhamoy Chakravarty and another by K.N. Raj, and a mathematical one by P.R. Brahmananda which also touches on Keynesianism. Chakravarty draws attention to a problem that is assuming more importance in development planning, viz., distribution of incomes, and concludes that Keynes is still relevant to developing economies for planning their investment judiciously and influencing their consumption. This is the same as a saying that there are some economic phenomena that are unrelated to stages of economic development (that is, unrelated to economic time and place), and to see in Keynesianism an immanence and universality, a view with which probably few would agree, least of all Brahmananda. (Whoever overlooks his hero, Sraffa, does so at his own risk). Even Raj who sees Keynesian analysis useful for gaining insight into "the phenomenon of high rates of interest prevailing in agrarian economies," cautions that in applying Keynesian economics one should bear in mind differences in structure, function and interaction of markets in the different phases of historical evolution and different regions of the same agrarian economy. "While Keynesian economics, as also general equilibrium economics, have some insights and clues to offer," he says, "their uncritical use without paying adequate attention to these vital features of agrarian economies is still unfortunately all too common today, concealing a great deal of superficiality behind a facade of theoretical elegance and sophistication."

Colin Clark has written an interesting essay on a subject that normally receives meagre treatment in economic literature, viz., output and prices in the service industries, and brings out the difficulties of computing them. There is in fact a problem of classifying service industries and their products (hotel rooms, sports and beauty parlours for example). How much of mathematical calculation, and how many pitfalls, lie behind the index numbers of prices to which the public is treated day after day is brought out in M. Mukherjee's paper on the subject, while J.N. Sinha writes on national wage policy on which price indices make such a quick impact. P.N. Dhar answers the criticism in detail that India's heavy industry oriented planning model neglected small-scale industry. C.H. Hanumantha Rao analyses data on field work done in respect of employment and new technology on land in U.P. with some comparisons from Japan and Korea. V.M. Rao's paper on rural planning is also based on field data from Tumkur district in Karnataka where the Institute for Social and Economic Change (Bangalore) is engaged on a major project.

The last essay in the section on economic structure and policy is contributed by R.J. Chelliah who writes on what in recent years has become a hardy annual—merger of sales taxes with Union excise duties. The essay is well argued and comprehensive, covering the constitutional and political aspects as well as the economic. The combined burden of the two taxes is now 53 percent of the total Central and States revenues. Instead of shifting the whole of it to the production stage (mostly industrial), which almost certainly will provoke large scale evasion, Chelliah suggests the burden be shared partly by agriculture through some form of higher taxation on agricultural income (presumably levied as a Central tax). This is an explosive political question as everyone knows, but Chelliah also questions its constitutional wisdom. In course of time the combined Central excises and Central agricultural income-tax would give the Union such an over-whelming share of the total tax revenues of the country as to make the States financial mendicants of the Centre. Such a result must tend to undermine the stability of the federal system.

Several experts discuss the demographic problem in the third part of the book. While much of the literature on population revolves round the rate of natural increase in population, Rati Ram and Theodore Schultz point out the improvement in the life span of males and females in the reproductive age groups 15-40, which, in respect of females, must naturally increase the net reproduction rate unless it is otherwise checked. Asok Mitra has added that the proportion of the population in the age groups 15-34 "will reach new peaks in the next 20 years." If his forecast comes true, it must rather shake his assumption that a norm of two children per family ensure a net reproduction rate of 1 (or "unity", at which a population stabilizes itself). Both Schultz and Mitra stress the importance of investing in human capital through health and education so that these age groups can contribute to faster development through their knowledge and skilled work. Mitra rejects the Malthusian view and accepts the neo-Marxian view that "fertility is a function ultimately of social organisation," of ownership of the means of production and social relationships arising therefrom. It is his unstated assumption, of course, that socialist production is conducive to keeping down the net reproduction rate.

There are two essays bearing on Political Science, one by Rasheeduddin Khan on political culture and another by T.N. Madan on the role of language in Indian polity. Khan has brought out forcefully how the heritage of Indian nationalism is becoming untraceable in our latter-day politics. "Today this heritage provides only the background but not the content of political functioning in sovereign India." Our constitutional pundits who argue from textual perception fail to see, in Khan's words, that democracy has been "reduced to the formal political and legal-structural level" and is in effect "an apparatus devised for obtaining mass support for elite ends." Khan indeed suggests with much force that Hindu society is not compatible with modern democracy at all. "Operational Hinduism," he writes, "distinct from the

philosophical and mystical level, perpetuates norms, values and institutions of social life that negate the prerequisites of democracy and modernity." To an extent this is true of Islam also. The only eastern people who have overcome this operational handicap of religion for democracy and modernity are the Japanese. The Chinese could do it only by going communist.

Whether or not elite rule is desirable (in communist dictatorships no less than in democracies), it may be unavoidable in most Third World countries. What is more disconcerting is that the ruling elite in the latter is becoming more and more *mindless*, not just unintellectual, as P.C. Joshi points out in the concluding essay of the book on social science research in India. Developmental effort in these countries is adding large numbers to the intelligentsia but fewer of them are entering the ruling elite. The result is a potentially disastrous vacuum in the evolution of organized society, especially in large countries like India.

This is a manifestation of mobility and class circulation or lack of them, unforeseen by India's formalistic constitutionalists. It was not foreseen by Marx whose philosophy of history was related to societies which had gone through a religious reformation as well as an industrial revolution. The philosophers of history who had in a way foreseen this were Hegel and Spengler whose historical frame of reference was Prussian militarism and latter-day fascism respectively. This is not a happy thought for Indian political sociologists.

Joshi has some very pertinent things to say about social science research in India. It needed saying by academics like him rather than by those whom they are apt to look upon as the flotsam and jetsam of the intelligentsia. There is increasing polarisation in social science research in India between textual perception and field perception, and Joshi rightly pleads that Indian social development requires that they be brought closer, if not synthesised. He also rightly draws attention to the role of foreign money and growing "bureaucratization and commercialisation" in Indian social science research. Their influence on the *methodology* and end-product of social science research can be insidious and the countervailing power of Indian social science may be insufficient to meet it. On the contrary, newer groups (ex-ambassadors, ex-civil servants, etc.) are being sucked into the knowledge industry, now well endowed with foreign and domestic capital.

Few books from academe combine scholarship with readability. This one does. The inexpert but intelligent layman can also profit by reading it. This is a special tribute to Dr. Rao who has written a great deal to inform the intelligent layman and not confined himself to olympian heights.

New Delhi.

H. VENKATASUBBIAH

K.K. VERMA : Changing Role of Caste Associations. National Publishing House, Delhi, 1979, viii, 104 p., Rs. 35.

ALTHOUGH caste association has been a popular theme of investigation among Social Anthropologists and Sociologists, given the essentially regional-linguistic character of caste structures and the consequent multiplicity and variety involved, it still remains a potent area of analysis. Viewed against this backdrop we should welcome many more studies on caste associations. However, the reader expects—both in terms of descriptions and explanations—a few new things from a full-length study of a single caste association. Unfortunately, the book under review disappoints us on both these counts.

That the caste associations have been channels of upward ritual and social mobility, instruments of social reforms and caste welfare, agencies of modernisation and change, vehicles of politicisation and mobilisation, are all well-documented facts by several researchers and known to the author. Further, caste associations are variously viewed as “intermediate structures” linking tradition and modernity accelerating the process of social transformation, as “counter-vailing powers” moderating the authoritarian tendencies emanating from the state apparatus, as “voluntary associations” providing an opportunity for citizen-participation in political affairs, as “mere extensions of state authority” constantly being manipulated by those in power for their personal and political ends, as “cultural platforms” facilitating the crystallization of social identities. Viewed in the context of the known facts and theory, the book under review does not offer us any fresh insights or novel facts about the phenomenon under analysis.

Given the present state of our knowledge regarding caste associations what needs to be undertaken is either an *intensive* or an *extensive* analysis of this phenomenon. An intensive analysis in this case would mean a study of caste associations functioning at the local, supra-local and supra-ethnic levels in terms of their *inter-linkages*. When the author announces that his is a micro-sociological analysis this is precisely what the reader expects; but disappointment sets in soon when he discovers that much of the data and analysis relate only to the supra-local level leaving out both the local and supra-ethnic caste associations, save occasional perfunctory references to them. An extensive analysis in the present case should involve working out the inter-relationships between other structures and processes—political parties, economic organizations, electoral behaviour, capital accumulation and investment, etc. Notwithstanding occasional references to these structures and processes no systematic attempt is made to interlink them with caste associations in terms of the dialectics and dynamics involved.

An interesting point that Verma touches upon is the changing goal orientations of the Kurmi Sabha over a period of time. In the early phase the goal was to achieve higher ritual status through *sanskritization*; gradually

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it changed to the attainment of secular status—economic and political. In this process the reference groups of the caste have changed, a pattern the Kurmis share with several other similarly placed caste groups. But the pertinent question, “Why this shift in orientation,” is not answered, not even raised. To understand this one should link it up with the changing over-all ethos of the society itself. Similarly, references are made to the process of caste fission and fusion. Not only that the Kurmis have transcended their “ethnic boundaries” to encapsulate castes following similar traditional occupations from other cultural regions, thereby indicating an “outer directed” orientation, but they also have shown tendencies towards an “inner-directed” orientation by insulating themselves with fellow-caste-men from the same region. Further, the Kurmis have claimed not only castes with Kshatriya status into their fold but also those with the status of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the first for enhancing ritual status and political prestige, the second for augmenting numerical strength and political prowess. All these point to an “identity crisis” among the Kurmis, again a trait they share with several similar caste groups. The dilemmas involved here—those between status and power—are real and need to be carefully investigated and explained, a task from which Verma shies.

Not only that adequate data are not presented in the book in terms of the inter-linkages between caste associations of Kurmis at different *levels* and the inter-relationships between other structures and processes as I have indicated above, but even the scanty data presented are not “situated” in a theoretical framework. There are two major possibilities here : analysing caste associations as the “organizational core” of caste movements, in which case the focus of attention should be on mobilizational (that is processual) dimension, or viewing caste associations as “voluntary associations” in a transitional society, structures which combine the characteristics of traditional and modern sectors in society or which encapsulate the traits of primary and secondary groups. While the data presented by Verma indicate that the adoption of either of these frameworks would have illuminated our understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, he opts out of it, of course for unstated reasons.

Finally, a non-academic point. The text of the “book” has 86 pages in big print and it costs Rs. 35. This smacks of crass commercialisation. In fact, the text could have been neatly summarized to about 60 per cent of its present length and published as a research paper in one of the professional journals in social sciences.

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T.K. OOMMEN

Role of Women

KHAWAJA AHMAD ABBAS : Sarojini Naidu : An Introduction to a Fascinating Personality. Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1980, 114 p., Rs. 60.

K. A. ABBAS has, like some others, tried to relate the story of Sarojini Naidu. Writing her life story is not such a difficult task; in fact, probably, many today must be familiar with the important events of her life. But I do not suppose it is ever possible to really lay bare all the important events or describe the multifarious forces that move a personality or the variety of factors which make up the sum total of her life.

To really depict Sarojini in her true personality is indeed a difficult task. The closer one got to her, the more one saw her, the more bewildered one felt. There were many conflicting and contradictory forces working within her that nobody so far has delineated. This may not be unusual, it is probably true of most outstanding personalities who have within themselves complex components. Almost everybody who has written or talked about her has stressed that she was most unique, a person apart, the only one of her kind. Yet nobody has really analysed the chemistry of all the elements which made up this unique personality.

Author Abbas has gathered together many more little pieces for his grand composition, even though his book is very small. There is in it a directness, simplicity and sincerity in the unfolding of his tale which I found very moving. All he has said can now be compressed into a few telling characteristics of hers. Her ancestry and background provided her with the essence of our tradition, the spirit, with its solemnity and deep experience, to create the synthesis from a blending of various trends to weave into a harmonious pattern. This obviously provided her both the background and the vision for an easy communion with humanity. She had no doubt many rare gifts and talents but *this* was the bed-rock from which she rose and dominated her scene. This explains how she struck a new note that seemed like an echo of an India struggling to regain its identity. One could catch in her ringing tones the call of the silent moving millions and in her lilting cadence, the compassion and large heartedness which has distinguished the Indian people. This is why Sarojini could not only appeal to people of all faiths, colour and languages but move them to warm response.

It was this heritage so richly embodied in her that made Sarojini a genuinely cosmopolitan personality. She was remarkably at home everywhere, among the lowliest and the poorest as amongst the affluent elites. She could become a companion to a child just as she could spell out ancient wisdom. That is why she was true to the several roles she played in her life, from a poet to a soldier, from a rebel to a governor of a state.

Above all she brought a new quality to womanhood and a new tone to her sphere. For the world in which she was born and grew up, women were still rather dim figures. She also belonged to a wider span of time and was

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not a period character; therefore too big to be circumscribed by the boundary of an age. Her poetry and the delicate lilting verses seemed like an echo to all that she was and she stood for. Abbas's precious book makes one nostalgic for the exhilaration of idealism and the colour of romance with which she and her times filled our nostrils and our eyes. It was this which transformed the humblest task into a heroic deed.

New Delhi

KAMALADEVI CHATTOPADHYAY

JAMILA VERGHESE : *Her Gold and Her Body*. Vikas Publishing House, Sahibabad, 1980, xi, 228 p., Rs. 60.

THE spate of literature on women that started during the International Women's Year has not receded yet. The book market still continues to be flooded with works in the area of women. Their quality and contents vary and these studies range from systematic accounts of empirical investigations to free lance but pedestrian journalism. Some of them are, of course, welcome additions. Even on a fair assessment, it is difficult to include the book under review in that category.

The recent books on women may be broadly classified into three categories, viz., (i) those written within an historical perspective; (ii) those based on findings of empirical investigations and (iii) those whose contents have strong streaks of affective orientation and which are full of intuitive or wild generalizations based on inadequate historical and contemporary evidences. Any careful reader of Verghe's book would place it in the last category.

Verghe's has discussed the hackneyed theme of women's oppression and exploitation by man. The supporting evidence, as she has said, was collected from the various secondary sources, viz., books, research papers, periodicals, newspaper reports, in addition to some random personal interviews of the commuters on buses and trains.

The discussion in the book centres mainly around two themes i.e., the exploitation of woman, firstly, as human being and secondly, as means of extortion. Her main thesis is a trite; that the woman had always been a non-entity, tyrannized and exploited, in all the societies, at all the times, and the situation still continues to be the same, particularly in India. The argument is neither new nor innovative. She presents a heap of evidence mainly from historical records, religious scriptures, epics, etc. She also uses newspaper cuttings, and available statistics in support of her argument. However, her disinclination to use the numerous empirical studies on women made recently is rather shocking. It is also a pity that she makes no attempt to analyze her material in a proper sociological perspective. At no place, any effort is made to relate the position of woman in different historical stages of development or in different societies to the socio-economic

variables characteristic of those periods or of the structures of those societies. Obsessed as she is with her thesis, she is totally oblivious to the changes in the women's status resulting from the spread of modern education among women which facilitated their entry into the occupational world and to the impact of various social reform movements.

The book does not seem to have a thoughtfully planned out scheme for either the presentation of the material or its analysis. There is considerable lack of a logical order or coherence. One would hardly find any historical sequence or thematic continuity in the narrative; at many places it shifts suddenly from a tale in the old Testament to a report in the *Pravada*, before jumping back to a social practice in Kerala or to what Manu had said (e.g. pp. 57-60 and pp. 83 *passim*). Accounts of certain happenings and reportages on her personal interviews with respondents are interspersed throughout the book, sometime very oddly and also in their ludicrous details. What strikes the reader most is her irresistible temptation to use colloquial words and terms from the vernacular languages, for which she provides English translations sometimes promptly in the foot notes and sometimes in the notes at the end of the book. Not only is there no systematic order but it is also very irritating for the reader. Moreover she does not come forward with any initiating or concluding statements in the chapters; as such, readers get lost about the central ideas or thrust of the chapters. Consequently, it is always a challenge for the reader to find the relevance of the titles of chapters to their contents. The last two chapters, "What Went Wrong" and "Travellers", and also the "Epilogue" offer nothing new to add to whatever has been said in the earlier chapters.

Perhaps anticipating a lot of criticism on the lack of rigour, it was tactical on her part to have disarmed critics beforehand by conveying that she had "no claims to erudition and scholarship." (p. vii) However, the question that plagued this reviewer most was as to why at all a publisher like Vikas had ventured to publish this book, perhaps without proper editorial treatment.

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UTTAM BHOITE

A. RAMANAMMA : Graduate Employed Women in An Urban Setting.
Dastane Ramachandra and Co., Poona, 1979, vi, 159p., Rs. 48.

THE present book is a revised version of the author's Ph. D. dissertation completed in 1969. The Indian Council of Social Science Research gave the financial support towards its publication. In the words of the author, the book is an "attempt to assess the structural changes in the various institutions due to the changing position of women arising out of their education and employment." The book comprises the data analysis of 505 graduate

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women of Poona city who were interviewed with the help of a scheduled questionnaire.

The questionnaire is comprehensive and the sample taken is of a cross-section of women with varying backgrounds. Due consideration is given to age, marital status, economic position, employed or unemployed etc. Women with six different occupations were chosen.

The responses show that while the women have advanced views on matters of education, employment and choice of partners, they are still sticking to traditional ideas about marriage and divorce. The vast majority thought that companionship is the first priority for marriage and sex satisfaction next in order of preference. Having children (because they are the support in old age) was much below on the list. Nearly 60 per cent were in favour of equality with the husband and not submissiveness and were not afraid to correct their husbands. The vast majority were in favour of family planning; 33.6 per cent had only two children while only 6.2 per cent had five or more. Those who had no children were not unhappy and some of them thought children were a bother.

While the majority were against giving dowry, their reasons were rather curious. Unmarried girls expressed the view that "dowry should not be given for educated girls." Other women also felt that "injustice was done to them as money was held in greater esteem than their education."

The respondents' views on marriage show that there is no change in their outlook on this question. The majority (68.7 per cent) thought it was a sacred *samskar* and 82.4 per cent wanted a traditional marriage as opposed to registration. On divorce also, they showed no change in the value system and the vast majority opposed it.

Thus we see that no clearcut pattern emerges and one cannot say whether education and employment of women has brought about a structural change in society. Even the fact that educated women specially if they are employed want nuclear families does not prove that they are instrumental in the breakdown of the joint family system.

There seems some confusion in the chapter heading "Education of Women". Table 6.2 dealing with "Reasons for Not Taking Higher Education" (primary reasons) and 6.2A dealing with "Reasons for Not Taking Higher Education" (secondary reasons) gives the impression that some of the women did not go in for higher education. In the beginning however, it is made clear that all the 505 women were graduates. If by higher education is meant post-graduation, then some of the answers do not make sense. As for example one respondent says "even though I got very good marks, I was not sent to college, but just to get my brother admitted to college, they gave a donation to the college."

Micro studies have their place but one cannot generalize on the basis of such studies. Maharashtra State as such and Poona city, in particular, cannot be representative of India. Poona has been far more advanced specially in the context of women's education. And the only women's university that exists

in India is in Maharashtra. Therefore, generalization on the basis of this book would be misleading.

New Delhi

URMILA HAKSAR

S.P. JAIN and KRISHNAMURTHY REDDY : Role of Women in Rural Development : A Study of Mahila Mandals. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, iii, 93 p., Rs. 16.

AT a time when the United Nations Decade for Women is in progress and the global strategy is to reinforce the concept of full participation of women in national development programmes, it is indeed gratifying to find that the National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad has brought out an empirical evaluation study of the working of the Mahila Mandals.

In reviewing the historical growth and development of Mahila Mandals in the total perspective of community development and Panchayati Raj organizations in India, a commendable job has been accomplished. While all the Development Commissioners' Conferences right from 1955 till 1965 recommended gradual quantitative extension of Mahila Mandals, the 1976 Committee on Community Development and Panchayati Raj recommended the inclusion of home economics components of the programme so as to be beneficial to the weaker sections of the society. The working group in 1978 went a step further in recommending that the Mahila Mandals should draw rural women in the mainstream of development so as to enable them to function as instruments of social change by providing them with programmes in which they would have a stake of a sustained interest such as "improving their income or productivity and employability or employment." A Mahila Mandal for 500 people, with a block grant of Rs. 1,500 and Rs. 7,500 for administrative and development purposes respectively was recommended. Field level workers—five per block and one officer each at the block, district and state levels, training of workers, representation in the local Panchayat and formation of a federation of Mahila Mandals at the block and district level etc., were the suggested structure for organisation.

With a descriptive review, the Report identifies the strong and weak points of the functioning of mandals. The methodology adopted was random sampling and documentary analysis. However, it could have been better analyzed and reviewed if certain criteria or a yardstick of success could have been developed to ascertain the effectiveness of the functioning of these Mahila Mandals. Like any other governmental report of T.E.O. or National Commission of Agriculture, this study, even though it identified the lack of appropriate policy as one of the reasons for the poor performance of these Mahila Mandals, never went to the extent of studying the a target of these Mandals. Women members could have been closely interviewed to analyze their

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perception about the objective and working of these mandals. This would have helped in further framing out the policy.

As regards their structure and functioning, two points emerged : (a) location of the mandals; and (b) the existing social structure acting as deterrent factors in proper participation of different sections of women. It has been very rightly observed that the functioning of social organizations and institutions cannot possibly be in isolation from the total environment of the society. "Unless these barriers are broken, the concept of community participation can hardly be realized."

The study has brought out a very relevant sociological point, which collaborates other earlier well known facts, that all these activities were oriented more for the well-to-do sections of the community and that there was a limited interaction of extension staff with women of lower castes. The membership of the mandals, by and large, is limited to those belonging to higher echelons of the society in terms of caste, occupation and financial status. Participation of the younger generation in Mahila Mandals is a promising indicator of the process of social change.

The study reveals that due to lack of managerial skill and technical knowledge the mandals never tried to build up any cumulative assets to spend on development programmes; the result is that hardly any of them is self sufficient in finance. Thus, the absence of a regular source of income and the capacity to mobilise resources locally are two major constraints against the efficient implementation of the women organisations in rural reconstruction programme.

Activities of different mandals indicate that besides the traditional concept of child care, nutrition education, home craft, family welfare only a few mandals are practising kitchen gardening, poultry-keeping, fruit preservation and compost preparation.

Besides, associating themselves with government sponsored programmes, applied nutrition and family welfare and adult education (most effective in Kerala and Tamilnadu), the mandals appeared to have played an important role in nutrition education, child-care, sewing and embroidery classes apart from building up awareness. It has provided a forum for village women to associate themselves with development activities. All these go to indicate that activities are mainly oriented to social welfare programmes and very little effort has been made to strengthen the skills of economic productivity of women.

Among certain administrative shortfalls identified are : (1) lack of regular financial assistance; (2) non-availability of guidance from officials; (3) lack of accommodation and equipment; (4) lack of proper orientation in organizational arrangement and activities to be taken up; and (5) lack of proper policy approach. All these need careful analysis for future corrective measures.

The study has correctly suggested that despite the success and failure of Mahila Mandals in India, they have to be viewed from the perspective of humane resources development. Therefore, it is necessary to view the

total investment of this programme as a step towards the development of the traditional woman from traditional to modern society with all new values and attitudes towards life, this will ultimately contribute towards the economic development of the country.

It has been correctly indicated that with regular financial support from the government and development of an organisational structure, based on an appropriate policy framework in each state and at the national level, the Mahila Mandals could fulfill the promotional objectives, which they are intended to achieve in the process of rural development.

This book will fill up a need for all who are concerned with women's development programmes and rural development programmes in India.

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USHA BANERJEE

Drafting of Laws

G.R. RAJAGOPAL : The Drafting of Laws. N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1980, x, 229 p., Rs. 50.

G. R. Rajagopal has brought out an excellent book on the drafting of laws. He has brought to bear on his work his vast experience as Secretary, Legislative Department of the Government of India, in which capacity he was associated with the drafting of many statutes. As a member of the Law Commission he was in charge of the implementation of the legislative proposals of that body.

After the attainment of Independence there had been an urgent need for legislation bearing on all branches of law for declaring and defining the constitutional rights of the citizens. During a very short space of time various statutes were passed affecting the people, keeping in view the Indian angle. There were several Bills on social and economic reform. In all these we had to rely a great deal on the British laws as applicable to British India as an aid to drafting. The proliferation of new Acts in quick succession and the dearth of materials on legal drafting made the task of our draftsmen difficult. Several books on interpretation of statutes were the only guide. Only Ilbert had in the past produced a book on drafting, and Odger's book on interpretation of laws and documents showed the way to precise language.

A statute is the will of the legislature. The words in it have to be precise and unambiguous and should clearly declare the intention of the legislature. The difficulty in interpretation of laws is because of the limitations of language. Language is not infallible and different meanings can be attributed to the

words of the enactment. There is not much attention paid in India to drafting. Judges have often remarked that a book on drafting of laws from the Indian point of view has become very necessary. Some of these remarks have been included in the book in the chapter, "The Draftsman and his Equipment." Laws like judgments must be precise and clear so that "a linguistic game" is not set on foot in either.

Unfortunately no book published so far has laid down clear guidelines to draftsmen. This book will now serve that purpose. It analyses in an exhaustive way "the qualifications and training that the draftsman should have, principles of drafting, the pitfalls that he should avoid, the structure and different parts of an Act, the legislative process in the enactment of an Act, the General Clauses Act, rules of interpretation and delegated legislation." A number of statutory forms in common use has been added as a chapter. References to case law and precedents from other countries also find place in the book. The author has dealt with the subject of drafting of the Bills at different stages from the introduction of the Bill in Parliament to the assent by the President.

We have a written Constitution which guarantees to the citizens certain fundamental rights and freedoms. It has three Lists, the Central List, the State List and the Concurrent List. It also lays down certain Directive Principles of State Policy. The responsibility for enacting laws rests solely on the legislatures. In its eagerness to effect social change, a legislature may be tempted to pass enactments in a hurry. The draftsman has thus a heavy responsibility because he must bear in mind the constitutional provisions while drafting any legislative measure and he must avoid any language or expression which may make the legislative measure *ultra vires* the Constitution. This book, I have no doubt, will be of great use to persons who wish to shape their career as draftsmen.

New Delhi.

M. HIDAYATULLAH

Media and Society

GASTON ROBERGE : *Mediation : The Action of the Media in our Society.*
Manohar Book Service, New Delhi, 1978, xi, 210 p., Rs. 100.

SINCE the dawn of civilisation, every medium of communication, beginning with the human voice, has primarily served the purpose of mediating between the individual and society. From sound symbols and pictographs to ideographs and the alphabet, through printing to films, radio and TV, each and every development has widened the reach of the media. In the process, the potential of access to information for the masses has also increased tremendously. At the same time, because of the structure of the

world economic and information systems the so-called mass media remain under the control of a few. Thus the contradiction between the socialisation of production and individual ownership of the means of production duplicates itself in the area of mass media as well.

While discussing how communication media work in our society, *Mediation* uncovers this ugly truth and its disastrous consequences. Gaston Roberge, however, does not do so in a direct fashion. He is somewhat unconventional in his approach; his probings into the interaction between media and society are built round nine main images. They seem ill-assorted to the reader. As one goes through the book their relevance becomes evident. The alphabetical arrangement of these images and the comments on them leave the reader free to pick and choose as his fancy or interest wills. The discussion of any one subject under different heads may, however, seem confusing at times.

In the process, the reader does achieve an understanding of the media. Within this framework the author attempts to create a state of mind for an understanding of the mediation of the media between the individual and society. And this, as he rightly points out at the very outset, is most important because "the manner in which the media are allowed to 'mediate' shapes both the world and the mind."

At another level, *Mediation* is a media workbook. Many issues are posed which the author does not always answer. These are presented in a particular perspective to open up further discussions. Very liberally and imaginatively illustrated, the examples and arguments provided are thought provoking. They help to stimulate a student of media, who may find it worthwhile to attempt the exercises suggested at the bottom of each page.

The first subject treated is advertising. This quite naturally leads on to a multi-dimensional understanding of mass media today. Gaston Roberge correctly questions the validity of a consumer society advertising environment for India. This is inevitable when, as he points out, advertising as it exists today, is "irretrievably wedded to capitalism."

In such a situation the masses are encouraged to emulate an image of a way of life far beyond their means. They are compelled to live in two worlds, of reality and illusion, of what they are and what they would be. All this is justified in the name of equality of opportunities, which remains an illusion for the majority of the population.

The author repeatedly emphasizes the new realities created by the recent revolution in communication technology. It has become so powerful that today we live in a media-dominated society. Even our privacy is no longer sacred. In this context, Gaston Roberge shows a highly sensitive understanding of the interaction not only between man and the world around him, but also between his own spaceship earth and the surrounding universe, now being unravelled by human probings into limitless space. This, in turn, has considerably increased the potential of the iconosphere or the world of images to envelop us totally and change our life patterns.

The latest communication technology can open up every single source of information for the widest section of the people all over the world. It bridges the gulf of time and space and even of illiteracy. It can thus unite mankind through common understanding. Thus mass media today cannot merely "inform, educate and entertain;" they are instruments of democratisation of society. The question is, can such a process be achieved through the existing structure of the international communication and information system?

About this the author has serious doubts and misgivings and not without reason. Mass media function, not in isolation, but within the framework of a particular power structure and economic relations among people in society. Modern communication technology is controlled by a handful of owners. In a market economy, information is also a commodity, marketed on the basis of a philosophy that supply will determine the need. In such a situation information cannot obviously be value neutral.

Gaston Roberge effectively establishes how communication technology is manipulated by a handful in their political and economic interests through both misinformation and disinformation. His comments about the world of fantasy conjured up by the mass media, especially cinema and TV, assume particular relevance in this context. He calls this the "secondary reality," used as an instrument of advertising and even of politics. He explains how images instilling prejudices, entertainment glorifying negative attitudes towards change, advertising appealing to unconscious drives, education and various media of communication mediating for the preservation of obscurantist and retarding value systems, condition the mass mind.

In this context, the author quotes Cess Hamelink's *Perspectives* to emphasize the reality of the socialization function of public media being utilized to orient attitudes towards an ideology that legitimises the present socio-economic and political structures. One might add that, as modern communication technology is mainly controlled by transnationals, mass communication is used by them to subvert men's minds in order to prevent the development of an independent national economy and a modern society in the countries that have shed the chains of political dependence. There would seem to be an inseparable link between domestic cultural and information domination and cultural and information imperialism.

This is further aggravated by the contradiction created by modern communication technology between the socialization of the mass media and their individualization. The video cassette is the most recent example. In a sense it withdraws an individual from society and breaks the natural bonds of mutual obligation. This brings about a cultural alienation. This is really the road to the self-destruction of man. Gaston Roberge only hints at this possibility, which seems to be the inevitable logic of such developments.

In this background, the author's call for a national cultural policy related to development needs is very relevant. Equally relevant is his suggestion that we should conduct our own experiments for the most effective use of media and not depend on foreign models. This involves the establishment

of a logical and balanced relationship between human as well as natural and economic ecology. Gaston Roberge feels that TV, which extends to the human subconscious by bringing the viewers into close proximity with the image, can play an important role. At the same time mass produced images can cause alienation and institutionalized media do not really belong to the masses. Hence he would rely on existing areas of public communication to which the masses have ready access.

Traditional cultural forms could well serve this purpose. The author is, however, concerned lest these media should be repressed and distorted in the process. They could themselves get alienated from the masses by taking on the features of institutionalised media. This could have political implications as well. These dangers could be eliminated if one accepted the strategy of group media advocated by Gaston Roberge. In such a situation traditional media could come into its own, reflecting new realities and new values brought about by economic, technological and political change.

Group media is conceived as stimulating discussion and providing opportunities for systematic self-education. What the author does not discuss in this context is the possibility of creation of communication packages through group media. Traditional media could thus be used together with modern technology without the danger of institutionalization and alienation. This has already been tried successfully by different organizations in India, especially by the Space Applications Centre at Ahmedabad and the Centre for Development of Instructional Technology at Delhi.

This point is reinforced by what Gaston Roberge has himself to say about group media as opposed to mass media. He considers the latter repressive because they are centrally controlled by property-owners and bureaucrats and passively received. Group media on the other hand are emancipatory. They are decentralized. Each recipient is a potential transmitter, interacting with each other and providing instant feedback, with opportunities of self-organisation for collective production of communication programmes relevant to the situational context and providing an impetus to action.

At the same time, the author admits that media are repressive only in a certain societal context. Hence the importance of horizontal communication at the village level. He probably has a point when he maintains that this is more important than even the creation of international standards of mass media availability. He also admits however, that the basic parameters of massive investment and mass distribution can create popular mythology conducive to national development. Of course, this will not be possible as long as mass media remains a commercial commodity. One wonders, however, if a serious attempt can be made to use media for development needs, in a situation like ours, where, as the author puts it, market and command economies, interpenetrate one another?

This is very relevant to films. Parallel cinema in this situation can survive only if it works for certain human values relevant to the creation of a new society. Discussing Indian cinema further, Gaston Roberge suggests that

violence and sex in films do not necessarily encourage these vices. On the contrary they may help defuse such tendencies, especially in a society in which so many causes for violence exist. This seems an oversimplification. His criticism of theatre, which next to the cinema, has great communication potential with instant interaction, as elitist and unrelated to the poor, is quite valid.

The author's suggestion about the application of the ancient Indian theory of *rasa* for Indian arts, especially popular cinema, instead of the western theories of drama evolved from Aristotle's poetics, deserves serious consideration. This should also help refute the artificial contradiction he himself raises between the concepts of art and mass communication. Here he falls victim to the western concept of art considered as individual self-expression. On the other hand a dialectical relationship between *lokachar* and *sastrachar* or the popular and elitist stream of art, as discussed by the author, could certainly seek expression of relevant social reality and act as an instrument of social change.

The author rightly emphasizes the value of comics as carriers of myths, so essential to social life; myths that express many attitudes and beliefs underlying social organization and values. He however, fails to follow his thoughts up with suggestions about how comics could also be used for creating counter myths suitable for inculcating new social values and attitudes.

Gaston Roberge's appropriate last word is on violence, in a society in which mass media often commits violence on the masses. One would, however, like to end on a more positive note. In course of a thought-provoking discussion on art as communication and its relation to politics, Gaston Roberge quotes Kropotkin to point out that "it is hope not despair, which makes successful revolutions." This should be the attitude of those concerned with mass media as instruments of social change.

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SUBRATA BANERJEE

Terrorism

SHAILESHWAR NATH : *Terrorism in India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 350p., Rs. 100.

THIS book was started as a research project and it still retains the character of a thesis. Nevertheless, the author deserves credit for his stupendous labour in collecting so much material. This is undoubtedly useful for writers on Indian history, who should welcome this book based on exceedingly reliable and mostly unpublished source material. The author has extensively quoted official files of the Government of India, files of the

Political Department of the Government of Bihar, CID Bihar and judicial files. The author was given financial help by the University Grants Commission and the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi; one of his patrons was Pandit Binodanand Jha, Chief Minister of Bihar.

However, the thesis has hardly been shaped into a book suitable for a general reader—even one who is genuinely keen to know the activities of our terrorist patriots. The treatment is jerky and the composition is more suitable for official reports. A general reader's interest cannot be sustained by a long narration of factual data; he is likely to find the book too repetitive of similar facts. There is also repetition of ideas; the deeds speak for themselves and no emphasis of language is needed to add to the heroism. This book with its appendices and index runs into 350 pages. One wishes that either the author or someone else would produce another book one-third the size out of the very material in this book; if the price of the new book could also be nearly one-third it is likely to attract a wider circle of readers.

The author has given a background of the revolutionary movement throughout India in the first two chapters. He has proved conclusively that in terms of sheer patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice the terrorists were head and shoulders above many great ones, who flourished under Gandhiji's umbrella. The secret methods adopted by the revolutionaries show that several of them were first-class brains and, if they so desired, they could have led fairly comfortable lives by getting good employment in those days when the number of highly educated Indians was not very large. One has to agree with the author that "the revolutionary movement has a philosophical basis, notions of high idealism. . . ." (page 8) Most of the Hindu revolutionaries were devotees of the Gita. They were above caste and territorial barriers. A large number of specific cases of revolutionary murders, dacoities, robberies, conspiracy cases etc. have been discussed with a careful attention to exactitude in dates, names, places, legal terminology, etc.

This book should dispel a few common beliefs. The Judiciary in British India was only objective as long as the British empire was not threatened. When there was a threat to its very existence the Judiciary could depart from the elementary principles of justice. Even with the flexible conscience of the Judiciary the British Government was not able to cope with the movement and therefore the need was felt for the Bihar and Orissa Public Safety Act of 1933, which gave powers to the Executive to intern and extern individuals. The then Deputy Inspector General CID, of Bihar gave reasons. He observed, "Revolutionary activities have taken a firm hold on the youths of the province for some years past. . . . It has not been possible to deal with a number of individuals who continue to organise and instigate others, while they themselves are careful to remain in the background, well outside the clutches of the ordinary law. This type of individual is beyond doubt the most dangerous of all. In addition to organising and instigating, he overawes by threats those who wish to break away and turn over a new leaf and menaces the lives of others who assist the police in any way. The only remedy for

dealing with this class of persons is the externment and internment provided in the Act." (Pages 207-8)

The main objective of the author is served by two chapters, namely six and seven. Chapter Six deals with the revolutionary movement in Bihar from 1919 to 1935 while Chapter Seven deals with Important Overt Acts and Cases from 1919 and 1935. The reader should not forget that the author has set out to prove that Bihar was second only to Bengal in patriotic terrorist movement from 1902 to 1935. The treatment is really from 1912, when Bihar was separated from Bengal, and ends in 1935, when Orissa was separated from Bihar. To be fair to the author he has not concealed his motives and he has done his job well.

From an all-India angle, Bengal's pre-eminence in patriotic terrorist activity is well-known. The author's efforts prove that there was considerable movement in Bihar also. However, unless the author studies terrorist movements in other states, like Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and Maharashtra, etc., the reader may have his reservations and may feel that no decisive verdict can be given as to which state should be deemed to be runners-up in this race for national honours.

New Delhi.

N.S. SAKSENA.

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—Managing Editor.)

BANSAL, Ramgopal. *In the Land of Taimur and Babur*. Navyug, Delhi, 1978, 95 p., Rs. 6. (Paper)

An account of changes which have taken place in Uzbekistan, a part of Soviet Central Asia. It attempts to assess their practical relevance for India.

BHARGAVA, B.S. *Grass Roots Leadership: A Study of Leadership in Panchayati Raj Institutions*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, viii 88p. Rs. 30.

Analysis of important aspects and problems related to leadership in Panchayati Raj institutions on the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations, with special reference to leadership in Panchayati Raj system in Jhunjhunu district of Rajasthan.

BHARGAVA, B.S. *Minor Irrigation Development Administration: A Study in an Indian State*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 128p., Rs. 50.

Problem-oriented diagnostic study identifies key organisational deficiencies and project management problems. Participation of Panchayati Raj institutions in minor irrigation programmes is suggested as one of the remedial measures. Case of Karnataka state is discussed.

BHARGAVA, B.S. *Panchayati Raj Institutions : An Analysis of Issues Problems and Recommendations of Asoka Mehta Committee*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, 79p., Rs. 30.

Contains revised version of the author's four papers presented in the seminar on "Asoka Mehta Committee Report on Panchayati Raj Institutions," jointly organized by the Bangalore University and the Institute for Social and Economic Change at Bangalore in 1979. Papers discuss the issues and problems in regard to Panchayati Raj Movement in the country in general and Karnataka in particular, and the basic approach of Asoka Mehta Committee and its major recommendations.

BHARGAVA, B.S. *Panchayati Raj System and Political Parties*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, 536p. Rs. 130.

Empirical study of Panchayati Raj system as an experiment in political institution-building in a developing nation like ours, based on study of Jhunjhunu district in Rajasthan, contains a comprehensive bibliography; Ph. D. Thesis.

BHARGAVA, B.S. *Politico-Administrative Dynamics in Panchayati Raj System*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1978, 77p. Rs. 30.

Deals with behavioural aspects of the political and administrative actors. Based on the data collected by the author in connection with his doctoral dissertation entitled "The role of Political Parties in Panchayati Raj System: A Case Study of Jhunjhunu District in Rajasthan."

BHUYAN, Arun Chandra and D.E. Sibopada, Eds., *Political History of Assam* 3 Vols. V2: 1920-1939; V3 : 1940-47. Department for Preparation of Political History of Assam, Government of Assam, Gauhati, 1980.

Volume two focuses on the political aspects in Assam's contribution to the liberation of the country and assesses how the national movement in turn brought about a healthy metamorphosis of the socio-economic structure of the province. Local events, like the role of militant nationalists, socio-cultural issues which strained relations between various communities, the significance in the province of the arrival of international

currents of thought like communism and trade unionism are dealt with elaborately in this volume.

The third and final volume gives an account of Assam's great march to the golden gates of freedom. This volume also discusses in details the various local issues peculiar and pertinent to the state alone.

In this three volume project of the history, the period from 1826-1919 has been covered in the first volume.

The project was initiated in 1973 by the Karmavir Deshabhakta Centenary Committee with the purpose of systematically presenting history of the political trends and developments in Assam from 1826 to 1947.

BOXER, C.R. *Portuguese India in The Mid-Seventeenth Century*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980, x, 57p., Rs. 15. (Paper)

Deriving the theme from the Portuguese claim, first formulated in 1499, that their crown was 'Lord of the Conquest', Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia Persia, India, etc., these Heras Memorial Lectures delivered in Bombay in 1978, examine three aspects of Portuguese rule in India during the years 1640-68. Conquest, Navigation and Commerce, Lectures were sponsored by the Heras Society and organised by Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture.

JORDENS, J.T.F. *Swami Shradhdhananda: His Life and Causes*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, xv, 210p., Rs. 90.

Biographical study of the eminent leader of Arya Samaj, whose influence ranged far beyond the ambit of the Arya Samaj into national Hindu movements and national politics. Basing the study on English and vernacular sources and Swami's writings and messages, the author discusses his youth, position as the most revered leader of the Arya Samaj, leadership in Delhi of Gandhiji's satyagraha campaign of 1919 to protest against the Rowlatt Acts, Pan-Hindu Shuddhi and Sangathan movements, Gurukul Kangri, contribution to the causes of untouchables, championship of inter-caste marriages, opposition to child marriage and consumption of meat.

KAMBLE, N.D. *Rural Growth and Decline: A Case Study of Selected Villages*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, vii, 143p., Rs. 40.

Discusses the causes of migration of able-bodied working males and females taking place from rural areas to urban areas and from underdeveloped areas to developed areas even within rural areas resulting in decline in growth rate of backward areas. The author contends that the areas grow with the increase in employment opportunities leading to immigration and decline with the lack of employment opportunities leading to migration. Study is based on data collected from selected villages in the Karnataka State.

KAMBLE, N.D. *Structure and Determination of Manpower Resources*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980., 240p. Rs. 65.

Study of spatial variation in population, population densities, level of manpower utilization, structure of immigration, and its distribution among different economic activities, and the degree of influence of industrial complex of the immigrated region on structure of immigration and their absorption in various economic activities. It is conducted in Maharashtra and data for the purpose has been collected from the reports of the Census of India 1961. The author concludes that given resource endowments the type and nature of economic activities determine the size of manpower in a region and the level of local and immigrated manpower utilization in it.

OSBORNE, Arthur. *Ramana Maharishi and the Path of Self-Knowledge*. B.I. Publications, Bombay, 1979, xii, 207p., Rs. 10.50. (Paper)

PETHE, Vasant Prabhakar. *Population Policy and Compulsion in Family Planning*. Continental Prakashan, Poona, 1981, 188p. Rs. 45.

Interdisciplinary study of the issue of compulsory family planning encompassing the economic, political, cultural, ethical and philosophical aspects. The book not only describes Indian experience but also the experience of the less developed countries

of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It also contains commentary and texts of some policy statements of the Government of India and the text of the Maharashtra Bill, 1976 regarding compulsory sterilization.

RAGHAVARAO, D.V. *Panchayats and Rural Development*. Studies in Integrated Rural Development. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980., xii, 96p., Rs. 35.

Main focus of the study is on Gram Panchayats. It analyses, in theoretical perspective, among others, the significance of "dominant caste" and class in the emerging power structure in Gram Panchayats which influences the role of these bodies in administering rural development with social justice. Analysis has been based on data collected from 172 Gram Panchayats constituting 34 per cent of such units in the Tumkur district. The study suggests that a Gram Panchayat should have a minimum population of 4000 to make them economically viable and that such a 'unit area' should have similar rural development institutions to usher in integrated rural development.

RAJCHANDRA, I. *Shrimad. Atma-Siddhi: Self-Realisation* tr. by D.C. Mehta (Bhavan's Book University, 211). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bpmby 1976, vi, 98p., Rs. 4. (Paper)

The author an *atma-gyani* par excellence and a leading world philosopher in this sacred book has propounded the ways and means to attain the ultimate goal of liberation. Mahatma Gandhi acknowledged the author as his spiritual master and said that his influence on him was deeper than even that of Tolstoy and Ruskin.

RAO, V.G. and MALYA, Paramjit. *Agricultural Finance by Commercial Banks*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, xv, 220p., Rs. 65.

Nationalisation of banks in July 1969, among other policies, laid down a policy of ensuring bank finances to the productive needs of all sections of the population, irrespective of the size and social status of a beneficiary. The study in the light of this objective examines the structural changes in the credit patterns of commercial banks in terms of securities, disbursement methods etc; impact of bank loans on the recipients' business operations and income structure, and attitudes of borrowers and lending agents towards the evolved schemes of farm financing. It also identifies the expectations of the farmers and the means of meeting them. These aspects are analysed on the basis of field level data collected from selected bank branches and borrower farmers spread across the South Kanara district of Karnataka state.

SEETHARAMU, A.S. *Education and Rural Development*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, 303p., Rs. 85.

Study about the responsiveness of people in rural areas with different levels of education or no education at all to development programmes of the Karnataka state; sponsored by the Planning Department of the Government of Karnataka. Development programmes covered in the study are mainly production-oriented taken up by the Department of Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Industry and Commerce, Health and Family Welfare, Power, Irrigation, etc. Apart from these the "Free Distribution of Sites" and "Janatha Housing Schemes" programmes have also been dealt with.

SINGH, Sundra Rani. *Urban Planning in India: A Case Study of Urban Improvement Trusts*. Ashish, New Delhi, 1979, xii, 432 p. Rs. 95.

Empirical and behavioural study of the organisation, administration and working of five Urban Improvement Trusts in Ajmer, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Udaipur. The data has been collected from official records as well as through interviews of the trustee personnel and prominent citizens associated with these Trusts. The author concludes that despite many structural, procedural and functional flaws, the Urban Improvement Trusts have responded fairly well to meet the challenges of urbanisation. A small public opinion survey is included in the study to indicate that although the trusts have made efforts to develop cities, yet they have failed to provide civic amenities to the desired extent.

VIVEKANANDA, M. *Planning Unit Areas for Integrated Rural Development*. Studies in Integrated Rural Development. Ashish, New Delhi, 1980, ix, 74p. Rs. 35.

Deals with the prevailing pattern of amenities and services and the contact pattern of villages on other places for marketing and employment with a view to judge the minimal planning unit without resorting to a large scale expansion of the present basic amenities and services, keeping in view the norms for providing them. Further, in view of the non-feasibility of providing other rural amenities and services to the "minimal units" at the present level of development, an attempt is made to identify an area for providing some of these at a reasonable distance from the "Minimal units." The results of the study are given in four sections—the first deals with amenities and services, the second marketing, the third employment and the fourth strategy.

VYAS, N.N. MANN, R.S. *Disease Culture Contact and Tribals*. The MLV Tribal Research and Training Institute, Tribal Area Development Department, Udaipur, 1981, 13p., 85p.

Special number of journal *TRIBE*, deals with the problems of tuberculosis and venereal disease among the tribals of Rajasthan, and analyses the socio-cultural and other factors vis-a-vis disease. Recommendations for eradication of the diseases have also been made.

ENCOUNTERS**The Westerly Trade of the Harappa Civilization****SHEREEN RATNAGAR**

This study provides an overall view of the bronze age cultures, including those of Sumer, Akkad, Elam, Barbar and Umm an Nar, Yahya and Helmand cultures, spreading from the Lower Mesopotamian plains to the Indus Valley, and the evidence for trade links between them and the Indus Valley civilization. The author draws on both archeological and literary sources for evidence of extensive trading patterns that existed in this period.

Rs 120

PEASANT NATIONALISTS OF GUJARAT**Kheda District 1917-1934****DAVID HARDIMAN**

This book examines the peasant base to the nationalist movement in India, by concentrating on events in Kheda District of Gujarat, which was a major centre of rural nationalism in the early twentieth century. To understand the extent and nature of peasant involvement in the Gandhian movement, the author examines the complex local politics of Kheda at that time, analysing relations between the Congress, Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel and the peasants, as also between sections of the peasantry themselves.

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SUPER POWER RIVALRY IN SOUTH WEST ASIA : THE AFGHAN CRISIS 1979

By MAYA CHADDA*

I

INTRODUCTION

ON 24 December 1979, 50,000 Soviet troops equipped with tanks, heavy artillery and helicopter gunships crossed the international boundary into Afghanistan and took control of Kabul. The event was unprecedented in that it was for the first time that the USSR had stepped beyond the boundaries established at the end of World War II and practically "annexed" a sovereign nation. The previous actions, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, were mainly disciplinary in nature and merely sought to re-establish Moscow's hegemony within its imperium. Afghanistan was, on the other hand, a sovereign state, never a part of any alliance and functioned principally as a buffer between the countries of the region. The Soviet move was therefore qualitatively different. By forcefully expanding its international sphere of direct control, the Soviets in effect have violated a fundamental ground rule of East-West relations.

The United States which saw the Afghan intervention as a dangerous challenge to its interests reacted strongly. It did this in three ways: it sought to punish the Russians for their transgression; to pressurize them until their forces were withdrawn; and, warned them against future aggression, while building US military capabilities to deter other attempts to change the balance of forces between them.¹ President Carter suspended grain shipments, the sale of high technology and had the United States boycott the summer Olympics to be held in Moscow. He announced, in what has since then come to be known as the "Carter Doctrine" that America would repel with force any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Gulf region. He further announced the establishment of a "Rapid Deployment Force" and the strengthening of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean, made pointed overtures to China, including a willingness to sell arms to that country, decided to secure bases in Kenya, Egypt and Somalia, extended aid to Pakistan (President Zia rejected this as inadequate), and staged regular overflights of B52 in the Gulf region.

The Afghan Crisis was a turning point in the Super Power rivalry. What began as an urgent reflex to Soviet intervention has now under Reagan acquired the dimensions of a full-fledged policy of constructing a "strategic entity" stretching from Islamabad to Ankara.² Its principal purpose is to halt any further Soviet move towards the Persian Gulf and the region of

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South West Asia. The Reagan strategy for the Gulf presupposes that, 1. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as well as the collapse of the Shah in Iran are a result of serious weakness in the United States' political and strategic position in the world. 2. This was brought about by Carter's policies which were characterized by a wrong-headed approach to human rights, reduction of arms sales and support of nationalists and revolutionaries over allies. For instance, Carter's criticism of the Shah's repressive policies is seen as the principal reason for his collapse. Similarly, withholding arms sales and denying support to Zia on account of his human rights record is cited as the main cause which weakened the American position in Pakistan. The two—Iran and Pakistan together—now lacking US presence in South West Asia, created a power vacuum that the inherently expansionist USSR could not resist. 3. The USSR is not only expansionist, its Afghan move is the first step in its objective to dominate the region of the Gulf and South West Asia, since it can then deny the "Free World" not only access to the rich oil fields but secure these for its own use, particularly since by 1985 it would experience severe energy shortages. 4. The Soviets not only seek to establish global hegemony but now they also possessed the necessary military power to do so. The Afghan intervention is the first step in this direction.

It is proposed to show here that US perceptions are not borne out by the events as they actually unfolded. Afghan intervention was hardly a Soviet step in the conquest of the region. Its objectives were in fact limited. It was born mainly out of the Soviet perception of its own declining position in the Gulf and a need to assert its continuing, legitimate super power interest in the region. The above US perceptions are based on the "power vacuum" thesis which is defective in many ways and hence fails to provide us with the key to the question of Soviet intervention. To begin with, this argument ignores altogether the internal dynamics of the nations in the region whether it is Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan. The wave of Islamic fundamentalism that swept through Iran could not have been stemmed by all the repression at the disposal of the Shah. In fact, it went from strength to strength because of it. Nor was it generated as a result of the slight liberalization conceded by the Shah under American pressure. To assume so, is to arrogate to the United States power and influence it does not possess. By the same token, super power presence does not guarantee stability. Ironically enough, Iran is the most obvious example of this. Secondly, world politics is not a zero-sum game. Every setback to the United States is not necessarily a gain for the Soviets. For instance, Khomeini is as hostile to the USSR as he is to the United States and prefers to follow a policy of "negative equilibrium."³ Nor have the Soviets moved into every so called "vacuum" left open by the withdrawal of US power. For instance, US-Pakistan ties have seen many vicissitudes since the Bangladesh crisis almost a decade ago, but the Soviets made no attempt to fill this void. Thirdly, the power vacuum thesis ignores the fact that the Soviets are a global Power and do not react to a specific situation unless it weighs heavily in the overall balance of forces between

the two Super Powers. Fourthly, the USSR as well as the United States react not only to each other but also to rivalries, conflicts and pressures generated within their own political establishment.⁴ The influence of groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger and the team "B" of the State Department is well known. The Kremlin too must have their own counterpart to such influential circles. And last but not least, the Soviets must ultimately wait for internal developments to reach a point where Soviet policy whether of intervention or support, can become acceptable.

However, even if one rejects the present Administration's explanations of the Afghan crisis and Soviet intervention, the question still remains as to why one of the Super Power's decided to risk the established pattern of rules governing East-West interaction in choosing to intervene? We will attempt to answer this by examining the Soviet strategic and regional considerations in deciding to intervene, the role of internal developments in Afghanistan and the impact of the intervention and the resulting US reaction to regional rivalries and conflicts. Finally, we hope to discover the likely pattern of super power rivalry in the region in the 80's and its impact on the future alignments in South and South West Asia.

It is important at this juncture to distinguish between what could be identified as the reason behind Soviet intervention and the actual events that precipitated it. In other words, the causes and the occasions must be differentiated. In examining the former, the international environment and the immediate history of US-Soviet relations become critical since causes have much to do with perceptions and these are formulated in conjunction with past policies. Events, perceptions and responses are therefore inextricably interwoven to constitute the basis from which specific decisions such as whether to intervene or not are made. On the other hand, however desirable or risky it may be to intervene, the political situation within a nation must develop to a point where the consequences of actions are clear. Whatever may be the strategic importance of a region, unless intervention can be sustained or stands a reasonable chance of success, the intervening nation must wait for the right moment. The dynamics of internal events therefore act as a catalyst in bringing to the forefront strategic objectives that may have lain dormant. These are however formed in the larger context of changing alignments in world politics.

From the above it is clear that the reasons for the Soviet move cannot be analyzed unless one examines the extent of super power rivalry for Afghanistan and the developments in the years preceding the December 1979 intervention. There is yet another pressing reason to examine this; there is no agreement among scholars concerning the motives behind the Soviet move. According to one line of thought, Soviet intervention was a pre-arranged unfolding of a grand design for hegemony. They argue that the Soviets are seeking to expand their imperium. The Reagan Administration wholeheartedly subscribes to this thesis. The other line of argument stresses the essentially cautious nature of Soviet leadership and regards the intervention as a

defensive action. They point to the developments within Afghanistan and argue that the Soviets had no choice but to intervene.

It is likely that the Soviet move to control Afghanistan was its answer to the adverse developments in West Asia throughout the 70s. It was also an attempt to secure a position in the region that would place them in a better situation to prevent what was not in their interest and to promote developments that would at least counteract future US policy. In other words, the Soviets have not embarked on a grand plan to physically conquer the region. But they do not want to be caught without bases and allies if the situation were to change. The great significance of this region, both political and economic, is not in dispute. But no one can show with certainty that the USSR has decided to provoke a crisis here and boldly move to establish regional dominance. They do however recognize as much as the United States the importance of South West Asia in any super power interaction, whether of conflict or co-operation and feel compelled to secure to what advantage they can. However, if the situation had not turned in Kabul, as it did, with the *coup* of 1978, it is doubtful if the Soviets would have intervened.

II

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Many studies have drawn attention to the long history of Russian interest in Afghanistan but our discussion is concerned with the more immediate past.⁵ The intervention, which began openly on 24 December 1979, took place against the background of increasing Super Power involvement in Afghan politics since the mid 50s and particularly since Daoud's return to power in 1973.

An exhaustive examination of various internal developments in Afghanistan is outside the scope of this paper. However it can be said that by and large the Soviets have been a great deal more sensitive to the emerging balance of political forces within Afghanistan than the United States. The latter focused shortsightedly on the strategic aspect alone and ignored the unfolding logic of events within the country. Until the 1978 *coup*, the two Super Powers were able to maintain a rough equilibrium that alternated between a growing Soviet influence during the premiership of Daoud between 1953 and 1963, with a decade of pro-American policies under Zahir Shah who in turn was ousted by Mahammad Daoud in 1973.

Soviets Espouse Pushtoon Cause

Above all, the single most important reason that drew the Afghans closer to the Soviets was Kabul's espousal of the Pushtoon cause. This occupied a central place in Afghan politics throughout 1953-78. Afghan support of Pushtoon rights to self-determination emerged with the British withdrawal from India and the partition of the sub-continent. The subsequent border

clashes with Pakistan and the closing of the border by the latter set the stage for the development that eventually led to the intensification of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The closure of the frontier and the strangulation of trade routes via Pakistan (that lay through the tribal areas), and on which Afghanistan depended, imposed great hardship.⁶ It is this that made Afghanistan turn to the Soviets for assistance. But here there was an added factor; the two countries shared a common frontier, which enabled the Russians over a period of time to provide Afghanistan with an alternative trading outlet and to break that country's dependence on Pakistan.

Afghanistan signed a series of trade and aid pacts with the Soviets. As a result, by mid 1970's with over \$1.2 billion in aid and with 50 per cent of its trade with the Soviets, the latter emerged as the principle outside investor in the Afghan economy.⁷ It was, however, the American rejection of Daoud's request for military aid because of its commitment to an alliance with Pakistan and Iran that forced Daoud to turn to the Soviet Union for such aid.

Although United States' aid during the first decade of the Cold War (1955-65) was a substantial \$350 million, the pattern of regional alignment was consolidated by 1956.⁸ Pakistan had joined the SEATO and CENTO and the Soviets had as part of their "peaceful co-existence" strategy supported Indian and Afghan non-alignment.

The most serious crisis over Pushtoonistan occurred once again in the 1960-63 period when Pakistan closed the border for the third time since the departure of the British. In a dramatic display of support, the Soviet Union airlifted Afghan grape exports from Kabul while the Shah of Iran and the Kennedy Administration rejected the Afghan appeal for funds to build a new road outlet via Iran. This would have made the country independent of both the Soviets and Pakistan. However the inevitable overdependence on the Russians and the protracted hostilities with Pakistan led finally to the dismissal of Daoud in 1963.

Short-lived Experimentation with "New Democracy" followed by Soviet Support

The decade of 1963-73 ushered in an era of experimentation in "new democracy" in Afghan politics and a greater liberalisation within the society. The government was largely in the hands of American educated Afghans. But this experiment was doomed from the very beginning. The new politics was truncated by ethnic and tribal rivalries and an arbitrary exercise of power by the Shah. The "Wolesi Jirgah," the new assembly, was dominated by rural notables handpicked by Zahir Shah.⁹ What is more, one third of its members were illiterate. The criticism about Afghanistan's growing dependence on foreign aid and lack of socio-economic reforms grew both from within the state and without. It was during this time that the American aid to developing countries declined. To make matters worse, Afghanistan was hit by two successive droughts between 1969 and 1972. Nearly half a million

perished and scandals about corruption and nepotism aggravated the already unstable situation. Zahir Shah's external policies proved unpopular as well. The agreement between Iran and Afghanistan on sharing the waters of the Helmund river, when the latter was suffering from severe drought, enraged many within the government and outside. But most important of all, the Baluchi self-determination issue once again made its appearance in the wake of the Bangladesh War in 1971. It is in this context¹⁰ that Daoud returned to power, but this time he was assisted by a group of left wing Parchamite army officers.

After the *coup*, Daoud expressed support for Moscow's "Asian Collective Security Plan," appointed pro-Soviet leftists to government positions at local and national levels and lodged a protest against Iran's arms build-up. Initially, under Daoud Kabul drew closer to the Soviets with the latter pledging support for Afghanistan's natural gas industry, irrigation, roads and fertilizer factories.¹¹ But on the whole, Moscow carefully balanced its support for the Afghan Left that was badly divided between the Khalq and Parchamite factions, with that for the official government of Daoud. However by 1975, Daoud began to get concerned with the state of overdependence on Moscow and began to resuscitate fence-sitting policies.¹² He also launched a purge of the pro-Moscow Parchamites from the army.

Afghanistan Woos Regional Powers as Counterweight to the Russians

In response to the changing alignment in world politics, and the emergence of Iran and other OPEC nations as an important power factor in the region, Daoud began to woo them as a counterweight to the Russians. This was a dangerous turn of events for Moscow. Anxious to secure Iran's eastern borders, the Shah offered \$ 2 billion in aid to Kabul, a sum far surpassing the Soviet pledges to the Afghan Seven Year Plan (1976-85). The Shah also operated a busy SAVAK station in Kabul to help Daoud root out the "communists." Under the Shah's influence, Daoud even agreed to drop his militant support of the Baluchi and Pushtoon tribes and sought a peaceful solution of the border problem with Pakistan.¹³

These moves were too palpable a reversal of Afghan neutrality for both the Soviet Union and the Left in Afghanistan. The latter were extremely alarmed. Daoud's pro-Iran drift also produced a significant change in the Soviet policy towards the Afghan communist movement during the course of 1976. At the behest of Moscow and fearing attacks from Daoud, in May 1977 the two factions of the Left, the Khalq and the Parcham, abandoned their ideological and ethnic differences and merged into one party the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan).¹⁴ Given the growing hostility between Babrak Karmal and Amin, Taraki was seen as the obvious compromise head of the newly united party.

Daoud Accelerates Shift to the Right

During 1977-78, Daoud rapidly accelerated his shift to the Right in both domestic and foreign affairs. He concluded a Peace Agreement with Pakistan in March 1978.¹⁵ The direction of Daoud's policies was quite clear. He visited Egypt and India to arrange for expansion of military training programmes. The former had moved decidedly into the United States camp since the 70s and the latter, under the new Janata rule, seemed to have improved its relations with the United States much to the consternation of Moscow. Daoud was scheduled to meet President Carter in September 1978. Inside Afghanistan, the suppression of the communists also progressed apace. Parcham leader Mir Akbar Khaibar was murdered on 17 April 1978.¹⁶ This precipitated a confrontation between Daoud and the Communist Party. Daoud ordered mass arrests, but in the resulting moves and counter-moves he and his entire family were executed bringing the communists to the center of Afghan politics.

The Coup and After

Soviet Union was the first nation to extend diplomatic recognition and economic aid to the new regime in Kabul.¹⁷ But this did not solve any of the problems endemic to Afghan society. If anything, they were greatly exacerbated. First, the PDPA itself was a small, mainly urban-based, predominantly middle-class party with little support,¹⁸ contact or understanding of the 80 per cent rural population, that is illiterate and given to local and tribal particularities. The tribal groups are intensely proud and regard all Kabul governments with suspicion and fear. This chauvinistic attachment to traditionalism is often expressed in an attachment to Islam. But the ethnic factor is paramount. The mutual ill-will between the government and the rural masses was traditionally tempered by the historical association of the dynasty in Kabul with local notables and the chieftain of the clans. But the new communist regime could hardly resort to this mechanism. As a result, they failed to cope with this problem. Secondly, the unity within the PDPA, between the Khalqs and the Parchamites lasted for less than three months. In early July, in what looked like a veritable purge the Taraki and Amin governments sent abroad all the important Parcham leaders as ambassadors. Hafizullah Amin who was rapidly emerging as the strongman of the new regime was presumed to be behind this move. Khalq accused Parcham of pursuing a petty-bourgeois deviationist line involving both left and right opportunism, while Parcham accused the Khalq of unwarranted concessions to nationalism. The lines of ideological conflict between the two were not at all clear but the personal clashes between Karmal and Amin became violent and the Soviet Union became increasingly suspicious of Amin's policies and intentions. Thirdly, the establishment in Kabul of a regime committed to alien ideology and dependent on Moscow for its survival, along with the oppressive speed

of Amin's social reforms, rapidly unified the opposition.¹⁹ Fierce rebellion broke out in Herat, Nuristan and other outlying areas.²⁰ What is more, the rebel forces began to receive arms and finances from the United States and the oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia. Taraki was now fast losing grip over the government and the ruling party. It is this that prompted Moscow to persuade Taraki to demote Amin during the former's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1979.²¹ Amin was convinced that the Soviets wanted him out of power. This led to a showdown between Amin and Taraki upon the latter's return from Russia in which Taraki was killed. After this Amin's posture vis-a-vis the Soviets began to harden. He refused to allow the Soviet Army or personnel into Afghanistan. Nor would he allow the Russians to establish a base they so much desired in Shindand.²² The last was particularly important in view of the rising tensions between Iran and the United States. There appeared every possibility that the latter would intervene in Iran to rescue the hostages held in Teheran.

It is important to note that the United States' reaction to the 1978 *coup* was relatively mild. The American Ambassador met Amin at least fourteen times before the former was assassinated in Kabul under mysterious circumstances in the month of February. Ambassador Dubs regarded Amin as a "national communist" who wanted discrete links with the United States as a form of insurance against growing Soviet pressure to make Kabul accept satellite status.²³ In fact soon after the April 1978 *coup* Carter urged the Shah of Iran to recognise and support the new regime.²⁴ In other words, Amin was not such a hardline pro-Soviet communist as was made out in the Western Press. His differences with Karmal and the Russians (both from the very beginning had advocated gradualism), were motivated by a desire to consolidate his power base.

In the last two months of 1979, the situation came to a head. Taraki was assassinated in October and Amin emerged pre-eminent, but he was bent upon ruthlessly consolidating power even if this endangered the very foundations of the party and government. Anarchy prevailed in the peripheral provinces, a kind of Hobbesian "state of nature" where local chiefs issued rifles to their retainers and declared war on the distant government in Kabul. The fighting in the North-West Frontier Province, near Pakistan intensified throughout 1979. Under the circumstances, the Soviets had no alternative but to intervene and save the advantages gained in Kabul. The intervention thus was triggered by the danger of Amin's imminent defection from the Soviet camp.

However, there is no agreement among observers about the significance of internal events that brought the Russian intervention in December 1979. In one interpretation, internal developments and their danger to the Soviet position are of central importance. Here it is argued that the Soviet intervention was a natural outcome of the virtual state of civil war in Afghanistan, that it has little to do with Soviet expansionism or global ambitions for hegemony. Halliday for instance, comments that the "April 1978 *coup* had nothing

to do with alleged Soviet expansionism; rather it expressed the delayed release of tensions internal to Afghan society, which the Soviet Union, if anything helped to postpone by sustaining the Zahir and Daoud regimes."²⁵ In yet another version Kennan also emphasizes the internal dynamics as a cause of Soviet intervention but he sees the rising insurgency as a fundamentalist reaction along the pattern of Iran.²⁶ He points out that the Soviets intervened to prevent the Islamic movement from spreading to the Soviet Asian minorities in the bordering areas. This view has some basis in reality since Amin's reforms and ruthless methods had fuelled the fires of rebellion, which had, in its turn, led to steady defections from the army. But Harrison on the other hand points out that the "Kabul regime was not about to fall in late 1979. The rebel forces were not sufficiently co-ordinated to challenge Amin's control at the center. It was only after the Soviet invasion that the rebellion began to develop into a broad-based nationalist resistance."²⁷

There are two reasons why the 1979 Afghan crisis had led to different interpretations. To begin with, the accounts of events during 1978-79 have been at times contradictory, but more than that in many explanations the causes, both strategic and political behind Soviet intervention have been often confused with the immediate reasons that occasioned the move. The fundamentalist insurgency, the structural impasse of a feudal society or advent of a communist regime in Kabul did not by itself propel the Soviet Union to intervene. If the fundamentalist revolution in Iran had not already rocked the region of South-West Asia, the rise of Muslim insurgency in Afghanistan would not perhaps have mattered to the Soviets. Nor have they always supported revolutionary regimes everytime that these have managed to seize power. It is only in view of the Gulf, the destabilisation in Iran, the decline of Soviet presence in the Middle East and what seemed to them like a growing collusion between China and the United States that the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul must have been appealing. Once in power, it would have been foolish to lose the advantage thus gained. What was however a defensive move to begin with, after it was accomplished, acquired greater significance than was originally anticipated. That the Soviet Union has interests in gaining influence in the Gulf does not mean that they would actually do so in some pre-meditated unravelling of a Soviet grand plan. Any Soviet goal of dominating South West Asia will have to take into account Islam and its power in the region. From this point of view, crushing the Muslim insurgency and invading Afghanistan at a time when Islamic fundamentalism is at its peak can only harm the Soviet objectives in the Middle East.

It is clear in the ultimate that the Soviets seized the moment but not without costs and risks and they seized it for not only the internal but even more for the larger strategic reasons.

III

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND SUPER POWER RIVALRY

What was the overall balance of international politics that propelled the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan? Whether it is viewed as a defensive action born of a Soviet sense of vulnerability in the Gulf, or whether it is regarded as an adventurist and expansionist move, there is no doubt that the intervention was the Soviet answer to the pressures building in both Afghanistan itself and in their relationship with the United States. These pressures were partly the result of a new international environment and partly the result of policies pursued by the two Super Powers, particularly since the mid-seventies.

International Balance of Forces Transformed: Changing US-Soviet Relations

At the end of the 70s the international balance of forces had been radically transformed eroding the very basis of the United States-USSR bilateral relationship, constructed so carefully just a few years ago. Firstly, during the 70s the Soviet Union emerged as a super power with a truly global (military) reach. The Russians had made astonishing progress in modernising their navy and upgrading the ground forces in Europe. In strategic weapons too, they were approaching parity with the United States. Although capabilities are not a good indication of aggressive intentions, these abilities did exist and the decision to procure them at immense cost was taken. As early as 1976, some observers had already drawn attention to these developments. The 1977 election in the United States greatly obscured their implication, but only temporarily. These fears burst with renewed urgency on the American political scene just a year later.²⁸

Carter's central concern as he took office in 1977 was, the likely pattern of relationship between Soviet military power and their political intentions and how the United States could cope with it. These issues had to be decided against the background of two possible approaches. The first of these argued that all issues dividing Moscow and Washington were amenable to resolution by negotiations. This had been the Kissinger policy. It sought to construct a whole host of linkages to influence policy making in the Kremlin. In emphasizing the bilateral relationship however the Kissinger policy had often, and to the detriment of US interests, neglected the rapidly growing demand for a new North-South dialogue. The other approach was born of an exaggerated sense that *detente* was a failure as it merely comouflaged the new Soviet offensive whose ultimate victim was a weakened America.

Carter chose to fashion a policy that steered clear of both these approaches. He sought to abandon the "real politik" concern and replaced them with commitment to human rights, greater toleration of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World, decrease in the use of covert and overt intervention for counterrevolutionary purposes and greater sensitivity to problems of diffusing

global economic power.²⁹ He declared that the United States was now free of the "inordinate fear of communism" and that the world was a multi-centered system. However Carter failed to set priorities in his overall policy. As a result, contradictions appeared soon: the human rights focus became an obstacle to the SALT II process and greatly angered the Soviets. Nor could the United States protect supporter nations and allies given the commitment to reduce US sale of arms and the repudiation of clandestine operations. And toleration of domestic repression by regimes allied to the United States could only bring charges of hypocrisy and double-talk. These failures made the Carter Administration appear reactive, incoherent and vacillating.

Kissinger's policy linkages had managed to achieve some success because these de-emphasized ideology and gave a central place to US-Soviet relations. Also, these came when the Soviet Union was few years away from parity with the United States. Carter's vacillations between asserting and then denying linkages, his attempts to reduce the importance of US-Soviet relations and to force them into a human rights context, increased the ideological conflict between the two and thoroughly confused and angered the Russians.³⁰ The Carter Administration continued to give signs of indecision—mixing "hard" with "accomodating" signals while Moscow continued to behave as though SALT would continue, but would have no implications for their interests in Africa, Ethiopia and Angola or the Middle East, Dhofar and South Yemen. In fact Moscow perceived its renewed support for the revolutionary movements in the third world as a legitimate expression of its newly gained global reach.

However *detente* was in peril and SALT II had no chance of being passed by the Congress. At the end of 1978 it was obvious to Moscow that the right wing reaction was overwhelming any reasonable debate on East-West relations and that Carter could not sustain his moderate initiatives.

Sino-US Alliance Influences Soviet Strategic Perceptions

The normalization of relations between China and the United States and the talks about the sale of technology and arms was the second development that has altered the strategic environment confronting the Soviets. Although China's overtures to the West spring fundamentally from its own sense of military and economic vulnerability, the USSR is aware that the United States-China alliance could be highly dangerous to its own security. It would free China to make bolder moves in pursuit of its interests in South East Asia. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty in August 1978 with a pointed warning to the Soviets contained in the "anti-hegemony" clause, the invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, the sustained support to Pakistan, were all evidence of the fact that China's hostility towards the Soviets would continue unabated. As a part of its resistance of what it believed was "Soviet imperialism," China had moved promptly to counter the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. China not only extended support to the Afghan rebels camped in

Pakistan but in early 1979, it tried to establish a Muslim republic of Pamir on Afghan territory of Badakhan and the Wakhan corridor.³¹ This republic would have adjoined Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and the Pakistan-held territory of Kashmir. Although this attempt bore no fruit Soviet fears of Chinese intentions could not but increase. They were equally concerned about the sinification campaign in the Xinjiang province and felt that if Amin was allowed to pursue his secret overtures to the West, Afghanistan would have become a serious security risk to the Soviets. Particularly since it, together with Xinjiang, would have extended the Soviet Union's hostile frontiers by 2,500 kilometers.³² Though China was not perhaps the main factor as the Afghan crisis reached its climax in 1970, it significantly influenced the perceptions of the strategic problems confronting the Soviet Union at the end of the 70s.

United States Militarization in the Gulf Threat to Super Power Balance

The most serious threat to the political balance between the two Super Powers however came from the rapid US militarization policy in response to the collapse of its powerful ally in the Gulf at the end of 1978. The Shah's policies had been diametrically opposed to Soviet security interests. He had willingly promoted Western military and political interests and had remained deeply suspicious of any detente between the two Super Powers. His success in making Daoud more independent of the Soviets, support in suppressing the communist movement in Afghanistan and persuading Kabul to sign a peace treaty to settle the Pushtoon issue with Pakistan have been noted earlier. The Shah had also played a major role in promoting a loose alliance between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt (after the Sadat rupture with Moscow), and Ivory Coast and Senegal known as the "Safari Club" to counter Soviet activities in Africa and the Gulf.³³ The "Safari Club" backed the Moroccan forces in resisting Soviet-backed ex-Katangan gendarmes in the copper rich province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978. Similarly, it supported the Moroccan claims on Western Sahara in the face of Libyan and Algerian-backed guerilla attacks by the Polisario movement.

Political Changes in the Gulf Lead to Extension of Soviet Presence

Beginning 1974-75, Soviet policy had made a qualitative departure in pursuit of its interest in supporting "revolutionary" movements in Africa and the Middle East. It not only under-wrote the guerrilla insurgency in Angola and Rhodesia and Ethiopia but co-ordinated efforts of the entire socialist bloc in support of its policy. Although by proxy, the Soviets had not mounted anything on this scale before. The "Safari Club" and its involvement in the two Shaba Crises of 1977, 1978, had been an attempt by the Shah to neutralize Soviet influence in the region. Similarly, in preventing the extension of Soviet influence in the Red Sea, the United States with Iran as its surrogate, had protected the three monarchies of Iran, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia known

as the Red Sea Entente. With the ejection of the Soviets from Egypt in the early 70s, their position in the Middle East had weakened enormously. Soviet activities in North Africa, its initial support of Somalia and then of Ethiopia, its encouragement of the Dhofar rebellion³⁴ in Oman and the establishment of its military presence in South Yemen, were all aimed at securing a foothold in the region of the Red Sea and the Gulf from which the USSR could counter the United States-backed Red Sea Entente.

The fall of Haile Selassie in 1975 provided the Soviets with the first opportunity to break the Entente and extend Soviet presence in the area. The second and perhaps the most important pillar of the three, the Shah of Iran, fell only four years later. But this development was fraught with even greater danger. By 1979, United States policy was not only determined to resist every Soviet move in the Gulf, it had reinforced its military presence there and embarked on one of the largest peacetime programmes of re-armament, in response to what it considered was a growing Soviet challenge. Secondly, the Muslim fundamentalism sweeping Iran with its pan-Islamic dreams seemed singularly hostile not only to the United States which was its main target, but equally to the Soviet objectives in the region. Nonetheless, from the Soviet point of view, the removal of the Shah and the end of the United States presence in Iran meant the demise of America's Gulf strategy which had depended principally on the Shah. It was obvious that power by proxy would be replaced by the direct presence of American forces and bases in the region. The only way for the Soviets to counter this was also to extend its own power into the region. In this context, a new state of Baluchistan that could control the entrance to the Persian Gulf from the East, and Dhofar, a part of Oman, sitting on its mouth in the west, became vital to any Gulf strategy. We have already noted the Soviet support of the Dhofar rebellion (the Shah managed to suppress it). A Soviet presence in Afghanistan could only place them in a greatly strengthened position to promote Baluch *irredentism*. The relevance of the above to the Super Power rivalry in the Gulf and to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is only too obvious to need any further elaboration.

Further, given the history of the Afghan-Iran border problems, a Soviet controlled Afghanistan offers the latter enhanced opportunities to influence events in Teheran, particularly since Iran's centralised control has vanished and its armed forces stand immeasurably weakened. The Soviet decision to intervene must be viewed in this context. Afghanistan by itself is vital neither to the Soviet Union nor to the United States. In fact, America's Gulf and South Asia policy greatly neglected the developments in Afghanistan through the 70s.

IV

REPERCUSSIONS OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

However the Soviet decision was not without risks. Firstly, the intervention was bound to increase the counter-insurgency and opposition to Karmal's regime. This meant heightened support and arms from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt. As is widely known, Egypt had committed itself to training the rebel forces, Saudi's are financing the insurgency and China as well as the United States are extending help in co-ordinating and planning the overall efforts by rebel tribes.³⁵ The continuation of the counter-insurgency was bound to keep the Russians tied up in Afghanistan and focus world attention to their continued intervention there.

Secondly, it was bound to strengthen the hawkish sentiments in Washington setting the United States on a course of policy that would rule out for a long time, any easing of tension between the two Super Powers. The United States was likely to embark on refurbishing bases and alliances aimed against the Soviet Union; it would also feel justified in spending enormous amounts of money on a whole range of new weapons. This has already come to pass with a \$1.7 trillion arms budget to be spent over the next five years; the establishment of bases in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Gulf (Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Egypt); the new Reagan offensive to co-ordinate anti-Soviet sentiment in the Middle East; its active opposition to nationalist movements in Africa and Latin America.³⁶

Thirdly, the Soviets would have to contend with adverse reactions from Third World nations that would certainly dim its reputation as champion of nationalist revolutionaries. With 85,000 troops in Afghanistan and widespread opposition outside Kabul there was no way to sustain the myth of "revolution". As a matter of fact, despite Soviet propaganda, something close to a universal consensus quickly developed on the injustice of the Soviet action. Even pro-Soviet leaders such as Mrs. Gandhi of India, Assad of Syria, Gaddafi of Libya, called upon the Soviets to withdraw their forces.³⁷ The Muslim states of the Middle East were angered. The invasion dramatised the region's fragility and disunity. It brought home forcefully the lengths to which the Soviets were willing to go in order to extend their influence in the region.

The state of disunity and the suspicions of super power intentions, particularly of the Soviet Union, was obvious from the relatively mild response to the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear power facilities. Even radical and anti-Israeli nations such as Syria and the PLO did little but to denounce the Israelis. A few years ago such an action would have meant war. But the renewed US military commitment in the Middle East, the "Carter Doctrine" and the establishment of a permanent American presence has convinced the Arab nations that the United States is the stronger of the Super Powers, at least in that part of the world.

Fourthly, the intervention is likely to draw the United States and China

closer together, a development that the Soviets dread most since it increases their sense of vulnerability. Secretary of State Haig's June visit to China and the commitment to sell weapons in return for trade and listening posts around Soviet borders indicates that what the Soviets feared has now become a reality. Fifthly, the United States is bound to renew its presence in Pakistan and arrest the recent drift in its relations. A massive US presence in Islamabad would mean a direct confrontation between the two in a new area of the world. The risks contained in this situation cannot be dismissed easily, particularly since China is also bound to co-ordinate its activities to counter the Soviet presence in the region.

Despite these risks, in the long run the intervention makes sense. To begin with, the basic instability in the region is bound to create problems for massive American presence everywhere. Zia's regime is not only weak it is singularly unpopular. Saudi Arabia and Egypt both fear popular upsurge either of the Muslim fundamentalist variety or a secular opposition. Iran continues to be in a state of turmoil with no stability of government in sight. Arrival of a "nationalist leftist" on the scene, although not probable at this point, might become a distinct possibility in the future in both Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan, wedged as it is between Pakistan, India, Iran, China and the eastern mouth of the Gulf, gives the Soviets a unique opportunity to influence the regional balance of power. And although the diplomatic reaction of the Third World is more vehement than anticipated, over time, these are bound to be replaced by intra-regional rivalry, the need for the present ruling elites to sustain themselves in power and hence the need to make advantageous alignments. Nor could one ignore the need of the emerging elite to obtain support for their struggle from whatever sources that are willing to extend it. In short, the situation is volatile and is bound to create opportunities advantageous to the Russians.

Apart from these considerations, there was also the need to uphold the "Brezhnev doctrine" that declares the Soviets duty bound to prevent a reversal of any "revolutionary" triumph. Once the Soviet Union had been thoroughly embroiled in the internal struggles of the 1978 Khalq regime, there was no choice for them but to sustain the "revolution" both for its own sake as well as to demonstrate to the restive Eastern Europeans that Moscow would not tolerate any real setback within its sphere of influence. In view of the events in Poland, the Afghan move underlines the determination in the Kremlin. Last but not least, the instability caused by fundamentalism in Afghanistan could have spilled over to Soviet Union's Asian minorities living on the Russian - Afghan border. It is argued that this was a serious consideration in the Soviet decision to intervene, to seal off the border and to neutralize the Muslim tribal insurgency. There is however some disagreement on the weight attached to this factor; nonetheless if it did matter, the direction of Soviet policy is clearly indicated. We believe however, that the last was not the most significant factor in Soviet calculations. Nor are the arguments about Afghanistan being a source of energy very valid, since

the Soviet shortages of energy as it turns out were highly exaggerated, and the CIA has revised its earlier estimates.³⁸

In summary then, though the Soviet intervention was occasioned by the initial triumph and the later failure of a pro-Soviet revolutionary regime in Afghanistan, its deeper causes were rooted in the overall balance of political forces between the two Super Powers, the rising belligerency in the United States posture, its military challenges to the USSR, the rejection of SALT II and the demise of *detente*. It was also motivated by the desire to acquire a position of influence vis-a-vis the Gulf nations, particularly Iran, and the need to counter China's activities in the adjoining areas of Xinjiang and Pamir. Basically then, the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan was born primarily of geopolitical considerations while the ideology provided the justification and the occasion for it.

V

SOVIET INTERVENTION AND REGIONAL POWER ALIGNMENTS

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has profoundly affected the military and political balance in the region, particularly in South Asia. It has reversed completely the United States policy of balancing its interest between India and Pakistan. Also, the Soviet presence poses a new security risk for all the states bordering on Afghanistan: India, Pakistan, China and Iran. However, each faces a set of policy alternatives that may place them in direct conflict with the objectives of the others in the region. For instance, China as well as Pakistan see their interests protected by a closer alignment with the United States. India, on the other hand, cannot repudiate its economic and military ties with the Soviets. Khomeini has to date, pursued policies that seek a "negative equilibrium" designed mainly to keep both the Super Powers out of Iran.

The most decisive US response to the Soviets consisted in the following three lines of policies: 1. massive economic and military aid to Pakistan; 2. greatly enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf along with the announcement of the "Carter Doctrine;" 3. playing the China card. With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan became a frontline state. Until then the Carter Administration's Pakistan policy was based on: 1. dissuading Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons in order to further its own commitment to the prevention of nuclear proliferation; 2. balancing the United States' Pakistan/India policy with a tilt in favour of the latter. Carter in his policy of promoting regional influences recognized India to be the most formidable military and economic Power in South Asia. The then Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, on his part had vowed to correct India's tilt towards the Soviet Union and bring it to the point of true equidistance. The United States wanted to encourage this policy. 3. Pakistan's record on democracy and human rights under both Bhutto and Zia was difficult to defend when compared to that of India. As

a result, Carter had exerted tremendous pressure on Pakistan to correct its policies of internal repression and linked the sale of A-7 fighter planes to Pakistan's refusal to rescind on its nuclear agreement with France.³⁹ Pakistan retaliated by pulling out of CENTO in 1970 and declared its shift to the non-aligned forum.

The Afghan intervention occurred at this point. It has been argued that Carter's position on human rights and support of nationalists over allies (India over Pakistan, support of the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua over Samozia) weakened the American position in South West Asia i.e., Iran and Pakistan.⁴⁰ However it must be pointed out that as far as the Soviets were concerned two factors in the situation were vastly more important than mere weakening of the United States' position. (a) If the Khalq-Parchamite Party had not successfully seized power, and this they did without the active support of the Russians, a weakened Pakistan-US relations by itself was not enough of an invitation to invade Afghanistan; (b) similarly, the fall of the Shah had created a great deal of instability in South West Asia and although the present fundamentalist regime is not a gain for the Soviets it is often argued that the resulting turmoil may produce a leftist regime favourable to the Russians. But the reverse is true as well. It may also produce a pro-US leader of the Bakhtiar variety. In either case the Soviet presence in South West Asia could prove vitally important.

We wish to stress that Pakistan's move towards the non-aligned forum did not create a vacuum that the Soviets felt they must occupy. Pakistan-US ties have seen many vicissitudes in the recent past. In fact, as far back as 1971 during the Bangladesh crisis, Pakistan had felt justifiably upset about the lack of US support, although India felt equally angered by Nixon's gun boat diplomacy. This disillusionment with the United States was matched by its attempt to ease relations with the Soviet Union and build ties with the Islamic Middle East. None of this however led to any move by the Soviet Union to fill the "vacuum". Those who subscribe to this theory claim the existence of the vacuum only after the event. In other words, a vacuum is discovered only after it is filled, until such time we simply assume a balance of forces!

Whatever the underlying logic of the Soviet advance into Afghanistan, the White House began with the assumption that the Soviets were there and must be countered. Beginning with Carter (Zia rejected the offer of \$ 300 million as peanuts), and then Reagan, the United States is now committed to defending Pakistan. The latter has recently received F16 jets as part of the aid package.

The renewal of the US-Pakistan alliance is however not without problems. Pakistan does not wish to excessively provoke India although how it can balance the desire to acquire weapons and modernise its armed forces with its need to keep India from neutralizing this, remains a puzzle. The June 1981 overtures to New Delhi, with the invitation to India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao to visit Islamabad was an attempt to do just this. There is

yet another element in the situation that is certain to upset the equation between these two traditional enemies, i.e., Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan denies its military purpose and the United States justifies its \$ 3 billion aid as a way to persuade Pakistan from acquiring the nuclear capacity, the Indian Government has serious doubts about the latter's ability or inclination to restrain the former. If Pakistan becomes a nuclear power, India will abandon all its hesitations and move full swing into the active production of nuclear weapons. This option is under serious consideration judging from the recent statements and commentaries in the Indian Press.

India's Pre-eminence in South Asia

India's security policies have traditionally depended on three areas as buffers—the Indian Ocean, Tibet and Afghanistan. Over the years all three have ceased to be neutral zones. The Indian Ocean has become an area of intense rivalry between the two Super Powers; Tibet is lost to China and now Afghanistan is under Moscow's protection. Since Pakistan was within the perimeters of the three buffer zones, it occupied the central place in India's defence and foreign policy. The 1971 War and the emergence of India as the dominant power in Asia had considerably eased the Pakistan problem. However, once again, propped up by \$ 3 billion in arms and economic aid, Pakistan looms large on India's security horizon. If the former acquires nuclear capacity and if the United States is perceived as aiding and abetting this, India may not be so anxious for the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. So far, New Delhi has firmly declared its opposition to the continued Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but now it must accept as given the long term American commitment to Pakistan and cope with its possible implications for its own security. Even if the Soviets were to withdraw, there is no guarantee that the United States will. In fact it might step up its support of the rebel forces in order to destabilize any pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. This could only bring the Soviets back into Afghanistan. A strong Pakistan is not in Indian interests and if it needs to use the Soviets as a counter-weight to offset a US-Pakistan-China entente, then it is likely to do so.

China's Objectives in the Region

China's recent overtures to India, Huang's visit to New Delhi in July 1981 and the invitation to settle the India-China border problem is intended to (a) reassure India against encirclement. If the China-India front were to come alive in addition to India having to deter a newly strengthened Pakistan, it would certainly turn to the Soviet Union. (b) China believes that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a military step ultimately aimed at itself. A close China-US relationship (with the United States willing to sell

even lethal weapons to Peking), was meant to offset the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The extent of Beijing's anxiety concerning Soviet intentions is obvious from its attempt to reassure Pakistan and signal a real willingness to negotiate with New Delhi. Above all China does not want a Soviet-India alliance emerging in South Asia. For this reason it seeks to prevent any further upsets in the area since this could profoundly alter and even threaten its own position in the region. A peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis becomes all the more urgent for China since the leadership in Beijing has finally "liberated" China from all the Maoists and extremists and once again re-dedicated itself to the "Four Modernisations" programme. Since economic problems are paramount for China, military confrontation with India and particularly with the Soviet Union must be avoided at all costs.

Iran: The Unknown Factor

Last but not least, Iran is also profoundly affected by the Soviet intervention and the subsequent militarizations of the Persian Gulf and Pakistan. However, Iran remains an unknown factor in this highly complex regional situation. It is well nigh impossible to predict the course of the revolution or the likely shape of its external policy. Iran is thoroughly absorbed within. However, one thing is clear, the United States is unlikely to tolerate a real pro-Soviet swing in Iran. Nor is the USSR likely to involve itself. It is reasonable to assume that the present turmoil will be allowed to run its course unhindered.

It is also clear that the revolution in Iran, directly and indirectly, caused the Soviets to intervene. Therefore any further changes there are likely to produce far reaching changes in the global rivalry. As it is, all the powers of the region stand face to face with no buffers to cushion the changes that may originate from within. And the two Super Powers too stand pledged to common but hostile frontiers.

Thirty years after the beginning of the great rivalry in Europe and the frozen frontiers there, the United States and the USSR once again confront each other uncertainly, but the venue is different. The confrontation that is shaping up today is in the little known region of the South West Asia across the Himalayas.

July 1981.

NOTES

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- 2 See Alexander Haig's interview in *US News and World Report*, 18 May, 1981, p. 28.
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- 4 For a discussion of such internal conflicts in the Soviet Union see Seweryn Bailer, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s" *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Summer 1981, pp. 999-1020.
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- 8 Zalmay Khalilzad, n. 5, p. 43.
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- 10 For a detailed account of the period see L. Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton 1973), pp. 753-60.
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- 16 Ibid. p. 168.
- 17 L. Dupree, "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 1979," *American University Field Staff Reports* (Washington), No. 32, Asia 2.
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- 19 K. Wafadar, n. 12, p. 174.
- 20 David Chaffetz, "Afghanistan in Turmoil," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 56, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 21-22.
- 21 Selig Harrison, n. 15, p. 173.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
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- 32 Ibid. p. 129.
- 33 M. Leedeen and W. Lewis, n. 24, p. 56.
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40 Ledeen and Lewis, make this argument in *Debate: The American Failure in Iran*, n. 24, Also see S. Tahis-Kheli, "Proxies and Allies: The Case of Iran and Pakistan", *Orbis*. Vol. 24, no. 2, Summer, 1980, pp. 339-353.

MILITARY REGIMES IN BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN : STRATEGIES OF SUSTENANCE AND SURVIVAL

By JITENDRA MISHRA*

Scholastic output on Third World military regimes has been prodigious. However, not a single comparative study of any aspect of military role and rule in Pakistan (1958 to 1981, except for the Bhutto interregnum) and Bangladesh (1975-1981), has yet been attempted. Capturing power may not be problematic for the functionaries of the Armed Forces; the consolidation of their authority is infinitely more difficult. As for all other ruling groups, it is imperative for them to convert power into authority and legitimacy. Only in so doing can they ensure their sustenance and survival.

In the early stages of their tenure, South Asian military regimes sought legitimacy through the propagation of their self-image as a set of missionary, progressive, neutral and patriotic guardians of the nation. However, the popular will expected performance rather than platitudes. Aware that military solutions to social problems are counter-productive, and guided by practical common sense, South Asian military regimes, like their counterparts elsewhere, have sought "creative relationships with civilian political groups."¹ But such exercises are also expedient as they bring about a cosmetic "civilianisation" of what is essentially a military administration. This mixture of common sense and opportunism has, usually in combination, generated six strategies for the sustenance and survival of South Asian military regimes; co-option of civilians into the government, intimidation of political opponents, divide et empera, expansion of political participation, constitutional legitimation and populism. This paper would attempt to analyze as to how and why these strategies succeeded in fortifying the regimes of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Ziaur Rahman.

STRATEGIES OF SUSTENANCE : CO-OPTION OF CIVILIANS

It is obvious that "civilianized" military regimes cannot genuinely cater to the aroused aspirations of those whom they govern since an authentic expansion of political participation imperils their own future. What, in fact, results is a highly populist mode of political participation and economic welfare, with a lot of "civilian" touches.

Pakistan : The Ayub Era 1958-65

This is borne out by a comparison of the regimes of Ziaur Rahman and Zia-ul-Haq with those of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan for reasons of historical continuity. Even in 1958 the decision to impose martial law, "taken at

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the Army's insistence and initiative,"² was then communicated to Iskander Mirza, in whose name the move was made. Ayub repeatedly claimed that the martial law regime was there to aid the civilians. Aziz Ahmed, a civilian, was made Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator; an Advisory Council consisting of the permanent civil service—heads of the central ministries—was formed and the Army was asked to withdraw from the streets. Even after 1962, when Ayub's rule had stabilized, his key advisors like Manzur Qadir, Altaf Gauhar, Shoaib and Fida Hasan were civilians. Apart from that, only three out of the fourteen Cabinet Ministers were from the Armed Forces. To further "civilianize" the regime, fourteen military officers entered the Civil Service of Pakistan between 1960 and 1963. The Civil Service was changed from "an agency of law and order to an agency of socio-economic change."³ Far from being a military administration, Ayub's Government was in fact "a political entity that represented a number of powerful non-military interests."⁴ Even in the Presidential campaign of 1964-65, Ayub projected himself as a benign civilian ruler and warned of a "bloody revolution"⁵ in case he lost, while never allowing a party system in the representative sense of the term for fear that it would put his authority in peril.

Yahya Khan : 1969-71

Although Yahya Khan has been credited with having made arrangements for a return to civilian rule in Pakistan, he was never in favour of the complete withdrawal of the Armed Forces from politics. The Legal Framework Order of March 1970 provided a scheme for a democratic and federal constitution and Yahya believed that in the envisaged multiparty system, no party would get an absolute majority. Since the National Assembly would have only one hundred and twenty days to frame a constitution, the military would have an important role in its making. Yahya then courted the Islamic Pasand parties, which were expected to fare well. This shows that though there was no exact parallel with Ayub, Yahya was deeply concerned with giving the impression of "civilianization", while he hoped for a permanent constitutional role for the Armed Forces and acted as final arbitrator between the feuding parties.

Zia-ul-Haq : 1977-81

Once in power, Zia-ul-Haq to this day, has not risked elections because in it "he would have to allow criticism, and since he is in power, this would involve criticism of him. If he allows this...his men will think he is weak, but if he does not allow it, then there is no hope of regaining civilian rule."⁶ Ever since his *coup*, Zia's quest for a civilian face prompted him to seek a cabinet government without an electorate. The real power has naturally rested with "the Army, although *like before*...the bureaucracy has again

been required to play a role.”⁷ Initially Zia ruled with the help of a Council of Advisors—some military and the others civilian. Since this smacked of naked military rule he, after strenuous efforts, was able to form a government of politicians, technocrats and armymen on 5 July 1978, a full year after he came to power. On 23 August, the Pakistan National Alliance PNA (not the PPP naturally), helped form a 21-member cabinet; four parties of the PNA—the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Democratic Party—provided 13 members. The National Democratic Party (NDP), Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan and the PPP refused to join. In these developments, the parallel with Bangladesh is striking (although in Bangladesh the ruling party was partly rehabilitated), because Ziaur Rahman was also to form his own party and government from among forces which had opposed Mujib. Haq’s government was fundamentally unrepresentative since the NDP, the majority party in the smaller provinces, was not inducted into the government. He ambiguously said the cabinet would enjoy normal powers, while never disbanding the Military Council. Elections were promised in the “not distant future” but were linked with “positive results.”⁸

Interestingly, Zia sought this “national government” of “all parties” and “broad-based understanding”⁹ only after Bhutto had been sentenced on charges of murder. He even admitted that without a “popular” basis, the martial law government “cannot establish rapport with the people.”¹⁰ For his own safety he made it clear that the government would “still have the umbrella of martial law and [that it] wasn’t a political gimmick.”¹¹ In a striking parallel with Ayub Khan, Zia claimed he had been asked “to save Pakistan from politics and hold elections after putting the country on rails,”¹² and pointed, “there is a hand of providence in what I am doing.”¹³ Like Ayub, he showed his preference for a presidential system, and indicated his desire for becoming the President while making statements to the effect that he had not abrogated the Constitution and he would return to the barracks when a “stable” government, after fair elections, was established. All this shows that Zia shrewdly used the Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami to rope the PNA into his “national government” and released Wali Khan to appease the PNA. It is another thing that the Generals were rightly derisive of PNA opportunism and this scheme did not work for long.”

In the ensuing period, Zia’s frequent disparaging references to parliamentary democracy, his espousal of a system which “fits into the psyche of the people” and his plans for “constitutional amendments in due course,”¹⁴ ought to demolish any claim he made about returning to the barracks. But his disavowal of democracy, unfortunately, continued to be aided and abetted by civilian politicians like Abdul Qayyum Khan of the Qayyum League and Maulana Mufti Mahmud of the PNA, who supported Zia’s proposed presidential system.

After having failed on two occasions to build civilian sources of support for his rule, Zia talked of a new political system in which the Armed Forces,

apart from their external role, would also "protect the Pakistan ideology and safeguard it against internal disorder."¹⁵ In the meantime, Asghar Khan petitioned the Lahore High Court on Zia's repudiation of the promise of elections and accused him of illegally "changing the shape of Pakistan." Zia reported that democracy "was a luxury" for illiterate people who must be told by someone else that "this is good for you, this is bad for you."¹⁶ After having received a fresh lease of life owing to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Zia began to talk of a "National Consultative Council" of "good persons;" tried to create Panchayats, like Ayub's "Basic Democracies," in Sind, floated an "Advisory Council" and gave wide publicity to Maulana Mufti Mahmud's statement that without Zia Pakistan would have disintegrated.

Interestingly, the more Zia has tried to humanize the harsh martial law rule through a civilian clothing, the more has the military become wary of him. Once in 1979, Zia reportedly wanted to resign but the other generals prevented him from doing so on the plea that "you got us into this (Bhutto's hanging)." As an alternative, he wanted to nominate Asghar Khan of the Tehrik as President to "save the neck of the Military Council from Bhutto reprisals,"¹⁷ but this only heightened the divisions within the Council. Seething with discontent over Zia's role and rule, senior army officers like Major General Abbasi, Major General Saghir Hussain and Major General Tajammal Husain tried to replace Zia and instal Lieutenant General Iqbal Khan in his place. They apparently wanted the Army to return to the barracks; General Iqbal reportedly said: "I will have to take action"¹⁸ over the unhappy rejection by Zia of US military aid. However, happily for Zia, the *coup* was aborted.

Undaunted by this threat, Zia has continued to find as many civilian sources of legitimacy as possible. In October 1980 he failed to form a cabinet, but on as recent a date as 25 February 1981, he announced the plan to induct civilians into the Federal Cabinet, set up a nominated legislature (Federal Council) and appoint civilian ministers under military governors in the four provinces by 23 March 1981.¹⁹ This has however not solved his problem. In 1980 he had refused to delink his Presidentship from the post of Chief Martial Law Administrator because he derived the latter rank "by being the Chief of the Army Staff." But his tenure as army chief is about to expire. His dilemma is that by becoming a "civilian" President like Ziaur Rahman he would snap the only link with his ultimate source of authority, while his second extension as army chief may alienate the support of his fellow generals.

Zia's dilemma has been enhanced by the launching of the Pakistan Liberation Movement in London by Brigadier Usman Khalid, with a government-in-exile to "struggle against the military despot and liberate the nation,"²⁰ and the launching of the 9-Party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy with massive student support in February 1981. In the light of his troubles, Zia's attempt to give a civilian face to his regime ever since the

coup must be rated as a failure, but this does not negate the fact that like his namesake in Bangladesh and Ayub, as well as Yahya before him, and in fact like all military dictators everywhere, he tried to humanize his martial law regime by inducting civil servants and politicians into the Government, for reasons of necessity as well as expediency.

Bangladesh : The Civilian Face of Martial Law

The "civilianization" of the military regime of Bangladesh, where a *coup* occurred in August 1975, was brought about with striking alacrity. Ayub and Yaha had been subtle about their "civilian" antecedents, but the *coup-makers* of 1975, aware of the lack of public enthusiasm for the manner in which Sheikh Mujib had been liquidated, immediately turned to the civil bureaucracy and politicians. Mujib had been highly critical of the bureaucracy over the "collaboration" issue, and had politicized its ranks. Not surprisingly, the *coup* received immediate support from the Civil Service. The Council of Advisors, consisting of academicians, technocrats and civil servants, had a large proportion of the latter. The new President, Khondaker Mushtaq Ahmed, was hoisted under the oath of a judge of the Supreme Court to give the regime a civilian colour. Ahmed, an Awami League member and former Cabinet Minister, belonged to the anti-Mujib faction of the party. With the support of the civil-military bureaucracy he gave a silent nod to the November murder of pro-Mujib political leaders so that "there would never be a Mujibist restoration."²¹ Interestingly, he did not disband the National Council of 1973, retained Parliament and the Constitution in spite of martial law, formed a cabinet entirely of Awami Leaguers and after a month, summoned all Awami League MPs to a meeting to enlist support for the new dispensation. In September, he convened a meeting of the National Assembly in which a hundred and forty members turned up,²² only to rave and rant: the result was that the meeting came to a premature end. At any rate, Mushtaq Ahmed spared no efforts to "civilianize" his rule.

Similarly, after Khaled Mosharraf's counter-*coup*, a civilian, Justice A.S.M. Sayem, was made President and Chief Martial Law Administrator on 8 November with a Council of Advisers. On 22 January 1976 the regime, in a concerted bid to enlist political support, opened talks with politicians and in fact Maulana Bhasani (NAP) asked the "people to unite behind the Army."²³ On 16 April, the Government promised elections by February 1977, removed the ban on communal parties by deleting Article 38 of the Constitution and passed a Political Parties Regulation on 28 July which stipulated that politics would be "indoors", parties receiving foreign aid would be banned and the "name and field of activity" of each organization would have to be notified.

Significantly, the martial law regime cultivated civilian political groups which had opposed Mujib, with rich dividends. Maulana Bhashani's call

for a referendum before elections, his son Abu Naser Khan Bhashani's appeal on 20 November 1976 not to hold elections, the characterisation of the Union Parishad elections as "most timely and a wise step" by Bhashani and Mohammed Toaha of the Bangladesh Shammayabadi Dal (M-L) and the betrayal of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) by a faction led by M.A. Awwal, strengthened the hands of Ziaur Rahman's martial law regime when it was most needed. They not only drew attention away from martial law, but also clouded the fact that President Sayem was a figurehead, with Zia keeping the crucial Home, Defence and Finance portfolios.

In spite of the apparent move towards civilian rule, there was never any doubt about the basically military tenor of the administration. An order of 24 December 1975 called "Zonal Martial Law Administrators (functions) Order 1975" divided the country into seven zones where "the MLAs shall act as their representatives."²⁴ Interestingly, in a short span, martial law regulations had already been amended fourteen times.²⁵ On 13 July 1976, twenty seven martial law courts were established. The Martial Law (Twentieth Amendment) Regulation stipulated death sentence for spreading disaffection in the Armed Forces, and on 10 August 1976 eleven new martial law zones were carved out. To top it all, Ziaur Rahman became Chief Martial Law Administrator on 24 November 1976 and indefinitely postponed elections. Not surprisingly, Abdul Razzak, the Ambassador to five Nordic states, resigned because "at least three members of the present Advisory Council have directly served dictator Ayub Khan,"²⁶ and the four principles of Mujib had been betrayed. Farook Rahman, the exiled *coup-maker*, criticised martial law, claiming Zia "cannot come to terms with the forces of change."²⁷ The weekly *Haq Katha* accused the government of "force" and "secret trials" and former Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain termed Mujib's murder "an assault on progressive forces."²⁸

INTIMIDATION OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS

Another strategy of sustenance and survival adopted by both Zias of Bangladesh and Pakistan consisted of a witch-hunt and a concerted drive against those civilian groups which they had once overthrown. This, of course, is specially true of the liquidation of Bhutto in Pakistan, but even Ziaur Rahman, despite his occasional and *tactical* praise for Sheikh Mujib, did oppose the "Awami-Baksalites." If he tried to revive Mujib's memory, it was to consolidate his position, not because of any affection for the late Sheikh. This obviously cannot be done by Zia-ul-Haq in respect of Bhutto, who is today a martyr, and for whose liquidation Zia was primarily responsible.

Bangladesh : The Drive Against "Awami Baksalites"

Given the cold-blooded assassination of Sheikh Mujib, the Bangladesh

Military turned with alacrity towards the forces which had opposed the Bangladesh idea and hence Mujib. Accordingly, an ordinance on 1 January 1976 repealed the Collaborators Order of 1972, pro-Pakistani officials like Mahbub Alam Chashi, Shafiul Azam and Tabarak Hossain were reinstated, Mujib's mention was disallowed in political gatherings,²⁹ four of his Cabinet Ministers were murdered in Dacca Central Jail and Abu Taher of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), once a supporter of Mujib, and Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf were executed.

Zia's policy of persecuting the inheritors of Mujib's legacy continued unabated for reasons of his own survival. Immediately after becoming Chief Martial Law Administrator, he arrested 2,000 supporters of the previous regime,³⁰ allowed the meteoric rise of Air Vice-Marshal Towab, Vice-Admiral Mosharaff Hossain, Major General Khalilur Rahman and Major General Golam Dastgir, neither of whom had a record in the liberation struggle, gave five of the *coup-makers* diplomatic assignments, passed the Political Parties Ordinance in 1976 to keep Mujibist groups at bay and dropped "secularism" from the official objectives of the Republic in April 1977.

Interestingly, Zia's antipathy for Mujib's supporters remained intense even after 1978, when he had consolidated his rule. Abdul Malek Ukil's Awami League was accused of "foreign isms" and he "wouldn't tolerate such forces."³¹ After the election of February 1979, Zia charged Mujib for authoritarian rule that the latter had imposed on the country. He said: "Awami Baksalites...destroyed the country through killings...strangled democracy [indulged in] plundering and smuggling, and selling hard-earned independence."³² Malek was described as one of the "known enemies of the country"³³ and Shah Azizur Rahman, Zia's Prime Minister, charged that "none amongst you who were Moshtaque's ministers protested" Mujib's murder and there was "none to buy two yards of white cloth"³⁴ to give him a decent burial. Zia warned the Awami League against "armed politics"³⁵ and accused Mujib of "destruction and plunder which drove the country fifteen years back."³⁷ Above all, Zia gave a silent nod to the protection of Mujib's killers by not conceding the demand for their trial. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that after the election of Sheikh Mujib's daughter, Hasina Wajed, as President of the Awami League in February 1981, the party has pledged to conduct a trial for "the diabolical killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and four other eminent leaders," to which Mrs Wajed has added that "far from taking any action against them, the present government has given them diplomatic assignments."³⁷

All these examples show a parallel with Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, who not only called Bhutto a "cold-blooded murderer" even before his trial but in fact ensured his execution against the dominant world current. Ziaur Rahman's administration, like that of Zia-ul-Haq, had spared no effort to condemn the party of his former adversary.

Like Zia-ul-Haq, Ziaur Rahman deliberately encouraged the tirade of

those who had opposed the regime displaced by him. Just as the Pakistani leader encouraged the PNA to make anti-Bhutto statements to consolidate his own position, Ziaur Rahman did the same. For example, when Mommed Toaha of the Bangladesh Shammayabadi Dal (M-L) praised Zia for fighting "foreign-inspired assaults of expansionism" and "social imperialism," Zia welcomed the statement since it gave further legitimacy to him. The analogy with Zia-ul-Haq's acceptance of Wali Khan's demand for the liquidation of "Bhuttoism" was too obvious, as is discussed later.

Pakistan: The Drive Against the PPP, Bhutto and "Bhuttoism"

Just as Ziaur Rahman in Bangladesh had begun cultivating political forces opposed to the party overthrown by him, Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan followed the same strategy in 1977 in spite of initial hesitations. After the *coup*, Zia came out against Bhutto's "witch-hunt" and opined that Bhutto would have won the March election even without the "alleged" rigging.³⁸ But after 3 September he began to refer to Bhutto as "an evil genius" who ruled Pakistan on "gestapo lines." At this stage, he very cleverly used the excuse of Bhutto's *civil* trial (for reasons of credibility) to postpone the promised elections. This suited the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), Bhutto's apponent, very well since it feared a loss in the election owing to the deposed Bhutto's growing popularity. Zia also knew he was guilty of "high treason" for violating Article 8 of the Constitution of 1976.³⁹ Unable to reconcile his avowed objective of holding "fair" elections with the need for Bhutto's defeat, Zia steadily turned towards the PNA for his own survival.

While denying that he sought political office because "I do not think I am fit for that,"⁴⁰ he craftily encouraged PNA leaders like Begum Wali Khan to make statements about their willingness to accept office if offered.⁴¹ On 3 September, Bhutto was arrested under Martial Law Order No. 12; Zia admitted that Bhutto would be "finished only if he dies a political death, such as being defeated in a fair election."⁴² Simultaneously, he made an espousal of Islamic laws, "accountability" and a Presidential system, in the hope of isolating the PPP, securing a PNA electoral victory under the promise of a Presidential system and institutionalizing military rule under a civilian cover.

Bhutto's re-arrest under a special tribunal, the sacking of the impartial Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Yaqoob Ali Khan, in favour of the anti-Bhutto Anwar-ul-Haque, Benazir Bhutto's house arrest and A.K. Brohi's legal indictment of Zia as "usurper... and guilty of high treason,"⁴³ all underscored the growing challenge to Zia. In the event, his indefinite postponement of elections was justified by him in terms of the PNA's demand for "expeditious accountability before an early poll."⁴⁴ This attempt to civilianize his rule was "in the orthodox pattern followed by all military dictators."⁴⁴ Zia knew about the uncertain prospects of the PNA in

elections—hence the postponement to complete “accountability.”

While professing his desire to end military rule, Zia actually tightened the grip of the Military Council, promising “justice to the PNA leaders”⁴⁶ previously detained by Bhutto. On 31 October 1977 he promised elections six months after “accountability” had been completed but continued to thwart the necessary conditions for elections. To this end the Pir Pagaro was supported by Zia-ul-Haq in his call for the postponement of elections, convicted politicians were barred from contesting elections for seven years (Bhutto being the obvious target), the Bhutto family’s private mail was intercepted, Bhutto’s Federal Security Force (like Mujib’s *Rakkhi Bahini*), was disbanded on 3 November 1977, and Wali Khan was supported in his call to postpone elections until “Bhuttoism has been eliminated.”⁴⁷

Zia’s promise to “place the full facts before the public” was his tacit acceptance of the PNA demand to prosecute Bhutto before elections were to be held. The Zia-PNA consensus over the need to eliminate Bhutto having been achieved, the latter was arrested for the murder of Nawab Mohammed Khan Kasuri and a series of White Papers were issued to prove Bhutto’s destruction of civil institutions, politicisation of the services, use of public funds for private gain, rigging of elections and propagation of “class hatred.”⁴⁸ Masud Mahmud, former Director of the Federal Security Force, testified to confirm Bhutto’s order for the illegal detention of two former Punjab ministers and Rao Abdul Rashid. A former colleague, Amir Bhutt said that “Bhutto wanted me to kill Khar and S.N. Quraishi.” The former Inspector-General of Police accused Zia of putting pressure to give evidence against Bhutto.⁴⁹ Bhutto called the trial a “handle for political exploitation,” branded Masud Mahmud “dishonest and utterly unreliable,” and was not convinced when Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq assured him that “I do not have the slightest bias nor prejudice against the appellant.”⁵⁰

The truth was otherwise. Of course, Zia claimed that the 7-3 verdict on Bhutto’s murder case (and the unanimous rejection of his appeal for life) showed “how independent the Judiciary is,”⁵¹ but conveniently forgot the recommendation of clemency and the statement of Justice Safdar Shah that “while our hands are tied these are considerations for the Executive [it] means that they will always commute the sentence. There is not one occasion...in which they have been violated.”⁵²

This was no doubt a “personal view,” but in spite of many international appeals for Bhutto’s life, Zia, on the plea that no one was above the law, ordered Bhutto’s hanging, stated that “the higher you go, the harder you fall,”⁵³ and that “Bhutto could have made his own mercy plea if he was serious about life. He thought I was playing cat and mouse.”⁵⁴ Bitter, with a spirit of vengeance, Benazir accused Zia of “eliminating”⁵⁵ her father, Murtaza declared that “whoever is responsible for this murder is going to pay a heavy price for it,”⁵⁶ and Tikka Khan of the PPP accused Zia of “trying to annihilate the PPP.”⁵⁷ The comparison of Murtaza’s

statement on his father's murder with Hasina Wajed's recent call for the trial of her father's killers in Bangladesh cannot but be made.

Pakistan : The Drive Against Other Opponents

Zia-ul-Haq's basic problem was that neither his invitation to the PNA to join his government nor his policy of intimidating the PPP were enough to secure his authority. While these two strategies continued hand in hand, a policy of coercing all other dissenters was also let loose. This once again highlights the fact that the ultimate source of authority for a military regime is force.

Zia knew that the advice of Justice Shaukat Ali of the Muslim Liberal Party and General Azam Khan of the Jinnah League to ban parties for five years and run a government of "trusted brains"⁵⁸ could not be given practical shape owing to the active opposition to it. The alternative of holding elections being suicidal, Zia chose to prune the number of parties and ban regional parties outright. To this step the PNA retorted and likened Zia's attitude as one towards "commercial limited companies."⁵⁹ The PNA and pro-Bhutto bureaucracy, together, torpedoed the "national government" and when Abdul Gafoor Ahmed, General Secretary of the PNA, asked Zia to make a clear statement on political activity, Zia responded by banning party politics and justified it by "the indifferent response"⁶⁰ to the National Government.

Zia's espousal of proportional representation was ostensibly to reduce the "number of political parties"⁶¹ but since it would inevitably have delayed the poll, it was a good survival strategy. Accordingly, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hamoodur Rahman, was assigned the task of studying electoral practices in foreign countries. The compulsory registration of political parties literally forced them out of electoral politics and as controls tightened, Martial Law Regulation No. 49 was enforced "fully in accord."⁶² As a follow-up to the events of July 1977, Article 221-A was inserted in the 1973 Constitution to make provision for military courts, and parties "ceased to exist."⁶³ Alongwith, the Constitution (Second Amendment) Order was passed and military courts established under Martial Law Order No. 72. Zia justified this move as well as the imprisonment of 7,000 political dissidents in terms of "the stability of the economy" but was condemned as "isolated and despised by all but a handful of 'mad mullahs'... Zia is no longer a joke, he is a disaster."⁶⁴

In retrospect, Zia's true intentions speak for themselves. He used his harsh registration qualifications to bar most PPP leaders from elections for 7 years and devised proportional representation to ensure that no party would get a clear majority to form a stable government. When the PNA put pressure on him to hold elections after Bhutto's execution, he coolly dismissed the PNA from his cabinet and hence abandoned whatever

“civilian” colour he had built up for his regime. It was a return to the harsh rule of martial law.

DIVIDE ET EMPERA

Apart from the persecution of the two civilian political parties overthrown by them, the military regimes of Bangladesh and Pakistan have also followed the strategy of dividing both the supporters and the opposition. Not only have different parties and alliances been played against one another but even factions within parties/alliances have been encouraged to feud among themselves, usually through the tempting bait of power to factions and groups sympathetic to the two military regimes.

Ziaur Rahman and the Awami League

It is well known that the Political Parties Ordinance of 1976, stipulating a ban on parties having “foreign” links, was used by Zia to split the opposition. The branding of the Malek group of the Awami League as “Awami Baksalites,” and the tirades against it were clearly designed to isolate the group. Zia very shrewdly argued that he, not the Malek Awami League, was the “real successor” of Sheikh Mujib who “was a great national leader whose contribution will one day find its proper place in history.”⁶⁵ Further, he started trying to woo Dr Kamal Hossain, a member of the Presidium of the Awami League (Malek), and Abu Sayeed Choudhury, both of whom returned home after a long exile and upheld Mujib’s principles. Zia’s condemnation of the Abdul Malek Ukil faction of the Awami League furthered the rifts in it and gave encouragement to the faction of Mizanur Rahman Chaudhury, who unlike Ukil, opposed BAKSAL and even brought about a third faction under M.R. Siddiqi. Even the Malek faction split further to form two groups: one led by the General Secretary Abdur Razzak, and the other by the Organizing Secretary, Tofail Ahmed. However, the Awami League, having learnt its lessons from the defection of the Khondaker group to the Martial Law Government of August 1975 had decided to remain united under the Presidentship of Hasina Wajed in the National Council session of 17 February 1981, and re-dedicated itself to the trial of Mujib’s murderers and the revival of the party organization.

Ziaur Rahman and Other Parties

Ziaur Rahman not only tried to split the Awami League but also sought to thwart any such alliance which may emerge to oppose him from time to time, including that of parties which had supported the 1975 coup. The technique was the very same which had been used by Ayub to rope the Muslim League into the Government, and which was later to be used by Zia-ul-Haq—the temptation of office. After Bhashani’s death, the NAP

(B) split and the largest faction leader quickly joined Zia's Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Dal (BJD), in spite of the opposition of others like Nurur Rahman and Anwar Zahid. The party quickly broke into two other factions under Qazi Shahid-ullah and Abu Naser Khan Bhashani. The President of the United People's Party (UPP), Abdul Halim Chowdhury, was also persuaded to join the BJD, whereupon he was promptly expelled by the General Secretary, Kazi Zafar Ahmed. Rashed Khan Menon was so disillusioned with Chowdhury that he dissociated himself from the UPP when it joined Zia's front for the Presidential election of 1978, and launched his own Bangladesh Ganotantrik Andolan. Similarly, Shah Azizur Rahman, General Secretary of the Muslim League, was expelled by Khan A. Sabur for joining Zia, whereupon Gamiruddin Pradhan and Tofazzal Ali also joined him. The Bangladesh Jatiya League, Islamic Democratic League, Jatiya Janata Party and Bangladesh Labour Party were also ridden by dissensions. "Except for the Awami League, the break-ups in most of the other parties were very much related with the desire to *strengthen Zia's party, BJD.*"⁶⁶ Interestingly, though Kazi Zafar Ahmad of the UPP expelled Chowdhury, he himself continued to serve Ziaur Rahman's Cabinet.⁶⁷ In this case Zia had obviously killed two birds with one stone.

Zia-ul-Haq and the PPP

The Pakistani case is even more striking than that of Bangladesh. Zia-ul-Haq's move against "anti-Islamic" parties was a shrewd ploy to wean Kauser Niazi's moderate faction away from Bhutto, though Niazi's faction was not tempted by the offer to share power. Nusrat Bhutto accused Zia of "instigating henchmen...including Maulana Kauser Niazi."⁶⁸ In the meantime, Niazi criticized Bhutto for turning the PPP "into a personal estate of a particular family,"⁶⁹ called Mrs Bhutto "a tool in the hands of a communist and anarchist group,"⁷⁰ and declared that if the "PPP had not adopted the policy of confrontation after July 1977...the general elections would have been held."⁷¹ He also opposed Mrs Bhutto's "unlawful and unconstitutional agitation"⁷² and formed his own Progressive People's Party. However, it was to his credit that he did not assume office.

Zia-ul-Haq and the PNA

Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq also formed his cabinet of August 1980 with PNA support and with the clear goal of disrupting its unity. Asghar Khan and Wali Khan having refused to join his government, Zia was able to persuade the other six PNA constituents to do so. In the Cabinet itself there were 13 members from 4 PNA parties—namely Jammat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulemai-Pakistan (JUP), the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Democratic Party. The NDP and the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal having refused to join, the PNA had split. To keep the defectors in good cheer, Zia continued

to maintain that he would have handed over power to the PNA but for its divisions.

The divisions can easily be exemplified. Zia encouraged Ashgar Khan to believe that he was a potential premier by sending him on a foreign trip, and thereby made the other PNA constituents suspicious of Ashgar's motives. He also cultivated the heavyweight Wali Khan as a counter to both Bhutto and Asghar and encouraged Mufti Mahmud of the PNA to declare that there was "more freedom" now than during "Bhutto's so-called democracy"⁷³ to embarrass Asghar who had dissuaded himself from Zia's government. Similarly, Wali was played against Asghar, and was released only when Zia ceased to perceive a threat from him. Wali then made the "PNA synonymous with Pakistan,"⁷⁴ condemned "those who betray"⁷⁵ it (Asghar being the obvious target), and made pro-Zia statements to the effect that "martial law came about because of Bhutto's policies."⁷⁶ The NAP recorded a "note of dissent" in the PNA meeting on the National Government while the Secretary-General opined that the National Government would "create a congenial atmosphere for elections."⁷⁷ While the JUI remained ambiguous, the Jamaat-i-Islami strongly objected to the idea of sharing power with Kauser Niazi and the Muslim League was not averse to the idea. Venting his understandable distress over the defections, Z.H. Bhopali, the Central Information Secretary of the JUP, openly complained that the PNA "sacrificed unity for ministerial chairs and we dissociated from the PNA when it deviated" from the cause.⁷⁸

But the exercise of power within the overall framework of "civilianization" and "*divide et impera*" was only a short-term tactical manoeuvre for the two regimes. Given the truism that in all modern political systems ruling groups must respond to the rising appetite for political participation in some way—be it authentic or populist—the new rulers felt the need for at least some symbolic democratic devices and institutions. In this the myths and symbols invented by Ayub Khan to "democratize" his regime were an important source of inspiration. In fact, the analogy of the two Zias with Ayub is too obvious to escape notice. All the three military leaders showed a preference for the Presidential system to brighten their chances of victory in prospective elections. Like Ayub, Ziaur Rahman held a referendum and Presidential elections, apart from forming his own party and resigning his army post. Zia-ul-Haq too, has mooted a referendum, although not the other devices, perhaps owing to the lack of political acumen and the shorter period at his disposal. It must be remembered that Ayub and Ziaur introduced the new trappings about four years after assuming office. If speculation is possible, Zia-ul-Haq may consider the time ripe to follow in their footsteps.

EXPANSION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Basic Democracies

Huntington observes, institutional links between the country and city are essential for political survival in developing societies. It was to Ayub's credit that "he was the first Pakistani leader who realised that no political system could strike roots... unless it provided for institutional links between the government and the rural sector,"⁷⁹ and hence devised Basic Democracies. These, however, "were to function in a society without politics,"⁸⁰ and merely "enfranchise a part of the traditional rural elite"⁸¹ because "stability", according to Ayub, "required limited participation."⁸² The 50,000 to 80,000 Basic Democrats had the task of creating a rural support base for Ayub through the distribution of favours among the rural elite.⁸³ Right from the start, as Muneer Ahmed points out, the co-called scheme of local self-government was placed under bureaucratic supervision from above.⁸⁴ Government officials invariably became chairmen of the local councils and, according to Zuhra Waheed, the attitude of villagers to this was "very bad;" 46 per cent felt the scheme had failed.⁸⁵ This analysis ought clearly to dispel the notion that the system was truly democratic in spirit. In fact it was a political symbol.

Local Councils

Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, too, held elections for local councils in Pakistan as a prelude to general elections. Zia wanted the polls on a "non-political basis,"⁸⁶ an idea like that of Ayub, and to enable this he amended the Political Parties Act through the Political Parties Amendment Ordinance. He also called the election, proposed for December 1978, "a cornerstone of the political edifice."⁸⁷ This attempt to "build grassroot democracy"⁸⁸ before the November poll was supported by the Progressive People's Party (Niazi) and Jamaat-i-Islami. However, its non-party orientation led to the condemnation of Zahoor-ul-Hassan Bhopali of the JUP and Maulana Mufti Mahmud of the PNA who rightly expressed the fear that it would only lead to Zia's strong hold.⁸⁹

On 20 March 1979, Zia openly floated the idea of local bodies' election, one that was rejected by Asghar Khan of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and Mufti Mahmud who retorted that Zia had no authority to compel the whole nation to participate in such a poll. This was obviously a device to create a rural constituency for Zia and build an electoral college which would elect a national assembly without direct general elections as laid down in the Constitution. The parallel with Ayub's Basic Democracies and Ziaur Rahman's Union Parishad elections was exact.

When the election was held, Zia claimed a 60-65 per cent voting while the NDP charged "blatant" rigging and held that only 15-20 per cent of the

electorate had voted.⁹⁰ Zia declared that "in my scheme of things, *for the time being*"⁹¹ no parliament would emerge from the poll, implying clearly that in future such a thing may happen. Provincial Councils and Panchayats were established in Sind, and it could not escape the notice of observers that structurally they were very similar to Ayub's Basic Democracies. All this shows that Zia has been trying to create a constituency for himself in the event of his turning into an "elected civilian" leader.⁹²

Union Parishad and Municipal Elections

Significantly, Ziaur Rahman, like Ayub before him and Zia-ul-Haq later (who held local council elections), followed the safe strategy of establishing a local base *before* holding Presidential or parliamentary elections. To this end, he organized Union Parishad Elections in January 1977, in which the Awami League triumphed. In this scheme resembling Basic Democracies, Ziaur Rahman drew a detailed programme of training for the chairman and members. 4,335 Union Parishads, each having 12 members, were established at the grassroots level.⁹³ Municipal elections were held on 14 August 1977; the Awami League, NAP (Muzaaffar), NAP (Bhashani), the Communist Party and the JSD (Constitutional Group) formed a front to oppose the officially-sponsored candidates. The Awami League secured 27 seats, the Muslim League got 24, the NAP (B) got 5, the NAP (M) got 3, the UPP got 3 and the Democratic League, the Islamic Democratic League and the JSD(C) secured one each.⁹⁴ Although not successful in the Union Parishad Elections, Zia successfully wooed the local bodies through subsidised inputs to land, gave incentives and patronage to local landlords and operated in much the same way as Ayub had done through the Rural Works Programme.

Presidential Elections

Presidential elections were the culmination of the expansion of political participation in both the cases of Ayub and Ziaur Rahman. Ayub held Presidential elections on 2 January 1965 securing 49,951 votes against Miss Fatima Jinnah's 28,691.⁹⁵ The Combined Opposition Parties (COP) lost under questionable circumstances because all agreed that had there been a direct popular vote, rather than one by the Basic Democrats, Miss Jinnah would almost certainly have won.⁹⁶ The purpose behind the move was to "link the Basic Democrats in the lower echelons with the national hierarchy of his political party...and develop a second pillar apart from the bureaucracy in the leadership pattern."⁹⁷ Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh introduced electoral politics soon after the referendum, just like Ayub. In June 1978 a Presidential election was held, in which he secured 76.63 per cent of the popular vote. To seal his survival, Zia went a step further and held parliamentary elections in February 1979. Anxious to ensure the participation of

the opposition, he promised "absolutely fair elections." 2,125 candidates participated, 50.94 per cent voters cast their vote and Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party secured 207 out of 300 seats.⁹⁸ The victory was secured through 400 defections from the JSD to Zia's BNP.⁹⁹ An allegation of rigging and partiality on the part of the Election Commission was also made by the Awami League.¹⁰⁰ However, Zia, more secure than ever before, paid tributes to Mujib, the "great personality and upholder of Bangladeshi nationalism,"¹⁰¹ announced a 42-member Council of Ministers with 29 of cabinet rank and lifted martial law on 6 April only after all the martial law promulgations had been incorporated into the fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Shah Azizur Rahman, his Prime Minister, lauded the step saying that "there is no single instance in the world that a military commander has ever handed over power to the people."¹⁰² Zia described the election a "historic event,"¹⁰³ took credit for lifting martial law "for which I am not responsible,"¹⁰⁴ and promised that parliament would not be a "rubber stamp." In the euphoria of victory, it was forgotten that it was he who had ruled by *ordinances* with the help of martial law for four years and had it not been for his electoral victory, martial law would have continued. Under the circumstances, Zia, like Ayub, resigned from the Army and became a "civilian" President.

However, Zia-ul-Haq still remains Chief of the Army Staff for the simple reason that he has no electoral constituency. Under such circumstances, withdrawal of martial law would be suicidal. But having paved the way with his municipal councils (created by Ayub Khan and reactivated after 16 years), and local council elections, Zia will probably follow in the footsteps of his predecessors.

Party-Building

Party politics has become an important ingredient of modern political systems. Holding a referendum without a party is possible, but fighting an election requires the instrument of a political party; non-party elections however do occur. The imperative of survival makes military rulers turn towards party building, and they get embroiled in it, exploding the myth of their "non-political" outlook. In the process they "legitimise their power base by either taking over the existing political party or floating a new party. This... is... hastened and helped by leaders of some political parties and a few political adventurers who can be termed as political neophytes."¹⁰⁵

Military rulers are greatly aided in party formation by the civiliam politicians' appetite for office, a point already discussed. Neither the civil nor the military bureaucracy can form parties by itself owing to the very nature of its socialization. Revealing this, Ghulam Faruque, Ayub's Governor of East Pakistan wrote in his letter of resignation that "I have been all my life a government official. My experience is therefore confined to... economic development... I cannot lay a claim to any ability to organize a party."

Ayub Khan

Considering this, it is not difficult to understand why Ayub the General had initially detested political parties. But Ayub's Presidential system, which was designed to control political participation from above and his Basic Democracies, aimed at expanding power from below, had to be linked—hence the party system. The logic of Ayub's "guided democracy" was impeccable. Basic Democracies would act as a catalyst to a new constitution and the lifting of martial law. This in turn would increase the demand for political participation hence the party system which would result in a representative system.¹⁰⁶ Since Basic Democracies had given a very narrow basis for participation, Ayub reluctantly joined the Pakistan Muslim League in May 1963, and with the support of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Council Muslim League and the NAP (Bhashani), he fought the COP in the 1965 elections.

Ziaur Rahman

To a considerable extent Ziaur Rahman followed the same logic, presumably in view of the fact that the sequence of events in Bangladesh were roughly the same. The unique feature of Zia's strategy was the gradual evolution of his *own* party, engineered through the ploy of splitting the opposition. On 15 December 1977, he formed a "Political Front," a civil-military alliance, and Air Vice-Marshal M.G. Mehmood resigned his post to become its Secretary. On 28 January 1978 Zamaluddin, the Industrial Adviser to Zia, announced that the latter would form the Jatiyobadi Front in which all recognized political parties must merge. However, owing to fierce opposition, Zia altered his strategy. Before the Presidential elections of June, he secretly "blessed" the formation of "a grand alliance with opportunist political parties"¹⁰⁷ called Jatiyobadi Ganotantrik Dal (JAGODAL), which was dissolved after the elections. Ultimately, he formed his own Bangladesh Nationalist Party with himself as President for five years by uniting the JAGODAL the NAP, UPP, Muslim League and the Minority Party. It was this party which emerged victorious in the parliamentary elections of February 1979.

However, the BNP has no grassroots base, nor is it homogenous. Shah Azizur Rahman, an Islamicist, is balanced by Moudud Ahmed, the leftist Deputy Prime Minister. The pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions are a further source of rift. Four of the six components of the BNP split over the merger issue and within weeks of its formation, two leftist ministers resigned. Zia tried to create grassroots support for this party by selecting a 12-man standing committee and a 120 member National Executive from local ranks. However, 452 members of the councils were incensed by the fact that members of these bodies were nominated, not elected. There is no inner party democracy, a fact once again indicating Zia's basically authoritarian bent and his untiring quest for a "civilian" face, even without grassroots

support structures.

At any rate, the BNP has little power. Not surprisingly, 6 Cabinet Ministers were former functionaries of the Armed Forces. Ziaur Rahman's Cabinet, in fact, "is a queer conglomeration of persons with military, bureaucratic or technocratic backgrounds. Only a few can be termed career politicians."¹⁰⁸ The unusually large Council of Ministers can only be explained in terms of satisfying all the factions within the BNP. The BNP is in fact a heterogeneous body of political opportunists united by individual charisma. It claims to have "guaranteed a peaceful transfer of power"¹⁰⁹ and to have established "Bangladeshi nationalism"¹¹⁰ beyond doubt, but owing to organizational weaknesses, these must remain a cover for a state that is essentially ruled by the civil-military bureaucracy.

As regards Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, for reasons already noted, he has just about entered the first stage of building institutions to prolong his rule.

CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMATION

Among all the three military regimes under discussion, more often than not, elections and party-building have been a prelude to forms of constitutional legitimation—be they instances of referendum or retrospective constitutional amendments.

Referendum

The referendum is an important technique of legitimacy adopted by Ayub and Ziaur Rahman, and recently also proposed by Zia-ul-Haq. Interestingly, both Ayub and Ziaur Rahman first proposed a Presidential system, then secured their personal authority through referendums and finally held Presidential (in Ziaur Rahman's case parliamentary elections after that) elections—all in a neat sequence. Hence, legitimacy was sought step-by-step; Zia-ul-Haq, now seeking a referendum, is likely to follow the other two steps.

Ayub held a referendum on 15 February 1960, after the Basic Democracies order of October 1959, in a ballot paper simply marked "yes" or "no" through the device of a white versus a black box. Each ballot was numbered and registered against a specific voter so that the government could identify defaulters. Without a choice of candidates, Ayub overwhelmingly won 75,282 of the 78,720 votes,¹¹¹ and on 17 February declared himself the first "elected" President of Pakistan. Ziaur Rahman did exactly the same, except that he first became President in April 1977 on the basis of the Presidential Proclamation of August 1975, and subsequently held the referendum in May 1977, in which he once again without a rival, secured an overwhelming majority (98.87 per cent) of the vote. Both held the referendums about two years after assuming power. Interestingly, Zia-ul-Haq had hinted at a referendum on 24 September 1979, a day before holding the local council elections. In other words, just as Ayub had used the Basic Democracies as a base for

his success in the referendum, Zia was trying to use the local councillors for the same purpose in future. If Zia-ul-Haq has not held a referendum yet, it is perhaps a measure of his own lack of skill in securing the acceptance of the idea among his opponents.

Retrospective Constitutional Amendments

All of South Asia's military rulers, including Yahya Khan, have tried to find a constitutional basis for their rule through constitutional amendments when possible and new constitutions when necessary.

About the *coup* of 1958, Ayub has written that he wanted to "rehabilitate the civil and constitutional organs of the State and bring about reforms which would culminate in the introduction of a proper constitution and restoration of constitutional life."¹¹² Knowing fully well that constitutional sanction is the ultimate source of legitimacy, Ayub gave Pakistan a new constitution in 1962. There was never any doubt that Ayub wanted to rationalize his arbitrary rule under the new dispensation.

With the introduction of an all-powerful Presidential system... [no safeguards against] arbitrary government existed... the Constitution is based on the theory that the President is finally responsible to the country for administration while members of the National Assembly can represent only the feelings of the people.¹¹³

Designed to formalize the power of "non-representative elite groups,"¹¹⁴ this constitution was "of the President, by the President and for the President,"¹¹⁵ and was basically a response to perceived "secessionism" in East Pakistan, which could be thwarted only by a strong central government, preferably unitary.¹¹⁶ According to another author—

Ayub's Constitution, running the country with the assistance of the civil service and the armed forces[s]—mutually distrustful of each other—introduces an authoritarian regime of the old British colonial type.¹¹⁷

All this firmly dispels the notion about Ayub's "democratic" rule and reinforces the argument that the Constitution was devised to enhance his legitimacy.

It may also be remembered that the regime of Yahya Khan passed the Legal Framework Order of March 1970, which gave a future constitutional framework of democracy and federalism, and since the National Assembly had only 120 days to frame a constitution, the military regime of Yahya hoped to play an important role in framing it. Apart from that, he had repeatedly mooted an institutionalized role for the Armed Forces, an idea to be repeated by Zia-ul-Haq later on many occasions. Although events overtook Yahya

in 1971 there is little doubt that he sought constitutional decrees to consolidate his regime.

Zia-ul-Haq's first constitutional act was to pass a Supreme Court verdict in his favour under the plea that "an extra-constitutional" step had been necessitated by the complete breakdown and erosion of constitutional and moral authority" and have the *coup* justified under "the doctrine of necessity."¹¹⁸

We have already quoted several statements by Zia-ul-Haq indicating that he considered democracy unsuitable for Pakistanis, just as Ayub had done earlier. We have also seen how he wanted constitutional sanction for a *internal* political role namely—to "protect Pakistani ideology and safeguard it against internal disorder." In this context, how he visualized this sanction is worth quoting :

The Military is the only institution which is stable... If politicians are pulling in different directions, then it should be the President... who, with the help of the Armed Forces... [should] run the country for few months, hold elections, and hand over power to the civilian politicians.¹¹⁹

Zia's constitutional projections were given formal sanction by the "Provisional Constitution Order 1981" (PCO), which provided for "real" martial law for an "interim" period. Article 2 of the PCO said the 1973 Constitution "shall be deemed to form part of this order," thus making the earlier Constitution a dead letter. According to Article 16 of the PCO the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) President could make/unmake any law. Article 3 provided that the senior Vice-President would hold office at the pleasure of the CMLA. Another indication of the absolute power of the executive was that the *Majlis-i-Shura* (Federal Council) would function at the convenience of the President. As regards the Judiciary, Article 15 (1) validated all orders since 5 July 1977, and said that "notwithstanding any judgement of any court" these orders "shall not be called in question in any court." Article 14 provided that only the nineteen registered parties would participate in politics after the lifting of the ban on them. Any party "operating in a manner prejudicial to the Islamic ideology" could be dissolved.

Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Anwarul Haq, who had once favoured Zia, stated that the balance between the individual and the state had gone overboard, and along with sixteen other judges, resigned in protest. In sum, after this "constitutional *coup*," "the 1973 Constitution was superceded, fundamental rights were scrapped, court judgements on the legality of martial law were invalidated, the powers of civilian courts were curtailed, political parties were proscribed, the rule of law was liquidated and judges were made subservient to one man."¹²⁰

Like Ayub, in Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman also tried to severely curtail the powers of Parliament in relation to the President. As in the case of Ayub, he took four years to introduce this constitutional principle. Zia's victory

in the Presidential election of June 1978 was seen by him as a "mandate" to introduce the Presidential system. A mid-December proclamation declared that the President had the power to "appoint" the Prime Minister, who may not "necessarily" be the leader of the majority party in Parliament. The Deputy Prime Minister and other Cabinet ministers (up to 20 per cent of the Council of Ministers), could similarly be nominated and need not necessarily be MPs, although subsequently they ought to seek election. The Council of Ministers would merely "aid and advise" the President and international treaties would not necessarily require Parliament's ratification. The President's veto power could be curbed only through a referendum and Parliament had no power to impeach the President. It is not surprising, therefore, that the opposition called this system the "mere replacement of tweedledum with tweedledee" and General Osmani said the President would be "a virtual dictator."¹²¹ In such a system ministers were to hold office at the "pleasure" of the President and the Prime Minister was to be the "link" between the President and the Parliament. This reaffirmation of the Ayubian system was condemned by the Bangladesh opposition as "martial democracy."¹²²

POPULISM

An appeal to the popular sentiments of the people is a time-honoured method of securing legitimacy and support. In the case of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, an appeal to Islam mobilised opinion to a considerable extent. Ayub had paid lip service to it but Ziaur Rahman re-asserted the Islamic identity of Bangladesh and asserted "Bangladeshi Nationalism." Official secularism was rejected as also extreme Islamic orthodoxy. He declared 7 November as "Jatiya Biplab Divas," talked of his Sepahi Janata Revolution¹²³ and tried to build a moderate consensus above the extremes of Left and Right as shown by his silence in declaring 15 August as "Najaat" (Deliverance Day), as demanded by the Right, or National Mourning Day, as demanded by the Awami League. However, it cannot but be noted that all the three military rulers aligned themselves with parties of religious orthodoxy and at least Ayub and Ziaur Rahman tried to use the bogey of India to enhance their own positions.

Zia-ul-Haq's "Islamisation", of course, is without precedent. To this end, a Council of Islamic Ideology was set up, a referendum is planned over the Islamic versus secular question, liquor has been banned on PIA flights, Shariat benches in courts, an Islamic Penal Code and 500 government mosque schools have been established, *Zakat* has been enforced, interest-free banking has been introduced and finally, an Islamic Court to determine whether laws are Islamic has been set up. All this is Zia's gambit to woo orthodox elements and since Pakistan was established to safeguard Islam, "to revive the issue is a ruse."¹²⁴ Another author calls Zia's moves an "example of the fossilized version of Islam, in its political manifestation."¹²⁵ As if he is the sole arbiter

of the destiny of his country, Zia has declared that "no government could reverse Islamization."¹²⁶

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we note that the strategies of sustenance and survival adopted by the three military regimes have been strikingly similar; the tactical differences such as exist are obviously occasioned by the exigencies of the immediate situation. What is important is that the regimes always followed a mix of the six strategies—namely, co-option of civilians into the government, intimidation of political opponents, divide *et empera*, expansion of political participation, constitutional legitimation and populism. The emphasis on a particular strategy/mix of strategies to the exclusion of others was determined by the specific problems of a given regime at a particular point of time. But if the situation warranted a change in strategy, a new mix was adopted.

This analysis indicates the broad parameters only; the actual operation of the strategies was always flexible and adaptive to the changing nature of the threats to the three regimes. For them, the long-term goal of aggregating their power was of utmost importance. Their success would ultimately rest on their ability to balance the short-term imperatives of survival with the long-term ones.

The extent to which each leader was successful in his strategic mix would provide interesting reading in the future. At first Ayub's and Ziaur Rahman's successful consolidation of their hold through Presidential elections has been attributed to their political acumen and Zia-ul-Haq's inability to do so had been explained in reference to his lack of political skill. However, this is debatable, Ayub got himself elected as President not less than four years after he assumed power. Zia-ul-Haq, whose penchant for survival and political experience has greatly increased over time, may well follow that important strategy soon, and hence seal his authority. What he needs is time!

Given the common heritage of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the "demonstration effect" of earlier precedents, Rahman's and Haq's emulation of Ayub's strategies, broadly speaking, would be entirely understandable. Yet Ayub was overthrown, and Ziaur Rahman was assassinated. This once again is a reminder of the fact that the ultimate source for the authority of a regime is genuine popular sanction, coupled with performance.

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FOREIGN REMITTANCES—NEED FOR RATIONALISATION AND CHANNELISATION

By TARANATH BHAT*

Since times immemorial, man has ventured to unknown and distant lands to seek economic emancipation. The indentured labour employed by the then British Government were the first Indian settlers in the African colonies. With de-colonization, the imported labour fanned out to other parts of the world. Then again, the oil find in the Gulf and Arab countries and the resultant economic boom resulted in the exodus of peoples from every part of the world to man technical and non-technical positions. Since then there has been no looking back. This also started the process of inward remittances.

Migrant workers' remittances have increased dramatically during the last decade. It is estimated that in 1979, these remittances amounted to \$ 10 billion. (Annexures I and II) It will be observed from Annexure I that Jordan, Pakistan and Egypt are remittance-oriented economies. This provides the much-required economic means to many developing countries to add to their aggregate savings and investment in national plans. Despite various restrictions on labour mobility the migration of technical and non-technical personnel gathered momentum in the 1970s. This was occasioned by the economic programmes and public utility services undertaken by the OPEC and OECD countries. Industrialisation programmes have resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for skilled and unskilled labour in these countries. Thus, there was an increased movement of labour from the developing countries of North Africa and South Asia to the OPEC countries, especially to those of the Persian Gulf region. This migratory flow, no doubt, has been of critical importance both to the recipient and the supplying countries of labour. The remittances of workers to their home countries have become an increasingly important source of foreign exchange to many developing countries. Equally, these labour imports have contributed to the tempo of development in the recipient countries.

The implications of the large and growing numbers of skilled and unskilled labour migrating from developing countries to the rest of the world has been studied in terms of their macro-economic growth, employment and balance of payments of labour-exporting and labour-importing countries. For the labour-exporting countries, the question is not only how best to maximise remittances but also, given their transitory character, how best to use these remittances so that they could make an appropriate contribution to the growth of their economies.

Labour-exporting countries have generally shown resourcefulness in designing policies to attract flows of remittances from their migrant workers,

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but they have not given adequate attention to the utilization of these remittances to foster their economic growth. In this context, what the developing countries need to do is to give particular attention to the type and scope of measures needed to ensure their optimal use in domestic savings and investment.

I

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN REMITTANCES

For many developing countries, foreign remittances constitute a substantial proportion and also one of the fastest growing components of foreign exchange earnings. In some cases, it is more than the merchandise exports. (For details, see Annexures I and II)

However, reports available on this issue indicate that the magnitude of foreign remittances is grossly under-estimated. This is because of two reasons:

- The figures cover only cash remittances through official channels. Several labour-exporting countries (India, Pakistan, Somalia), permit merchandise remittances, including consumer durables and capital goods, such as, commercial vehicles, tractors and so on. Although there is no separate data on merchandise remittances, they are estimated to be fairly substantial (about 17 per cent of total migrants' remittances to Pakistan);
- Cash remittances below specified limits (e.g. Rs. 10,000 and below in India) are not always reported.

For these and other reasons, there are unavoidable omissions and commissions in the balance of payments data on private remittances.

Removal of traditional foreign exchange constraints on growth and development should be the primary concern. Special incentives should be accorded by the labour-exporting countries to migrants' remittances in the form of importing consumer goods. On the other hand, labour-exporting countries may have to be equally vigilant to ensure that the grant of excessive incentives for migrants does not create the nucleus of a new privileged class in their society. Taking note of the socio-economic constraints of migrants' remittances, some countries have raised the question of taxing incomes of immigrants. Affirmative action in support of relatively affluent groups does, after all, require special justification and there is, therefore, a delicate trade-off involved in this policy area between economic efficiency, equity and expediency. In this context, it is useful to examine the scope and limitations of measures to maximise remittances and to allocate them to the most productive uses within the labour-exporting countries. This policy package, while comprising several common basic elements, has to be tailored to the specific requirements of each labour-exporting country as well as to the institutional frame-work of the host country.

Socio-Economic Constraints

The remittances of migrants are subject to a variety of socio-economic factors, namely: 1. The cost of settlement and living abroad; 2. Keeping a certain amount of savings abroad for emergency purposes; 3. The length of stay abroad; 4. The easy access to remittance facilities at the place of work; and 5. The educational level of migrants. For instance, Pakistani migrants' remittances appear to be inversely related to the level of education—the more educated an emigrant is the less he tends to remit home. In the case of Turkish workers abroad, it was estimated that their mean savings amounted to about 36 per cent, mean remittances to about 11 per cent of mean income abroad, and the non-basic expenditure totalled to about 10 per cent of earnings abroad. The proportion of remittances made for family maintenance in general was found to be relatively stable and consequently less responsive to incentives. Such studies have not been undertaken in the case of Indian emigrants.

Need for Incentives

The fact that host countries usually have liberal policies for transfers abroad allows labour-exporting countries to maximise remittances from the respective nationals. The question arises whether to make repatriation of remittances compulsory, or whether to offer incentives? In some countries, the non-resident nationals can repatriate a specific proportion of their earnings. For example, in the Philippines, construction workers and seamen can remit 70 per cent of their earnings, while others only 30 per cent. In other cases, returning workers are required to surrender a part, or all, of their foreign earnings. In general, labour-exporting countries have largely relied on incentives rather than on controls to encourage remittances. This appears to be the right policy.

In Somalia, a dual exchange rate system is prevalent. For remittances the exchange rate was recently revised from 6.35 to 12.72 Somalia shillings per dollar; for other purposes, the rate of exchange has been 6.2 Somalia shillings per dollar. Banking organisations in Somalia have also adopted a firm attitude to remittances by migrants. Further, when the workers return after completion of the contractual period, they would be obliged to leave a substantial part of their earnings behind. This policy has affected more than 1,000 Indian workers in Somalia. However, these are stray cases.

To some extent, incentives to repatriates are also affected by requirements in some countries for foreign assets to be paid in by the returning immigrants. One option is to wholly exempt migrants from such requirements, as Egypt does. Another alternative is to permit returning emigrants, as in India, to use their foreign currency balances for import of equipment for new industrial units or even for specific non-essential imports.

In addition to liberal transfer facilities at either end, the material

consideration in sustaining the flow of remittances is the confidence felt in the safety and liquidity of financial assets in labour-exporting countries. The importance of this factor is exemplified by the experience of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where contrary to the pattern elsewhere in the region, remittances declined following nationalization measures. However, this decline was arrested or partially reversed after the governments' assurances to the emigrants.

Given a congenial politico-legal milieu, clearly the most important macro-economic requisite for attracting remittances through official channels is the realistic unitary (single) rate of exchange for the currency of a labour-exporting country. Remittances are highly sensitive to any indications of currency over-valuation and are prone to slow down in such cases, leading to widespread resort to unofficial channels to transfer funds. The multiple currency practices are difficult to monitor, such as, special rates to migrant workers. It also provides scope for leakages through declaration of other categories of receipts as remittances, and so on. For example, some countries, such as Sudan and Turkey, had special rates for workers' remittances, but they have recently abolished them. However, a few countries like Algeria and Morocco still retain this practice. The multiple currency practices are contrary to the obligations of member-countries of the IMF, and are, at best, temporary expedients.

Concomitantly, with realistic rates of exchange, facilities for holding remittances in approved foreign currency account with banks in the countries of origin is another useful incentive that has been widely adopted for attracting migrants' funds. For instance, in November 1975, India introduced foreign currency (non-resident) account schemes, which allow both non-resident Indians, as well as persons of Indian origin residing abroad, to maintain Pound Sterling and US Dollar accounts in India in tax-free interest bearing term deposits for periods ranging from 91 days to 61 months. (Details are discussed later.)

The macro-economic policy framework in the labour-exporting countries appears to be adequate to induce large flows of private remittances as an alternative to their being saved or spent abroad. Appropriate macro-economic policies and measures are however necessary, but are not sufficient conditions for an optimal policy framework for remittances. Their ultimate net impact on the economies of the labour-exporting countries depends on their utilisation.

It is difficult to determine how revenues from remittances are used largely because of the paucity of systematic empirical evidence. An economic rationale suggests positive and coherent policies need to be formulated to ensure the optimal use, sectoral and regional, of cash remittances. It is this area that presents a choice between the consumption, savings and investment. In case of merchandise, their use in consumption (consumer goods), or in investment (commercial vehicles, tractors and so on), is largely predetermined.

II

DIMENSIONS OF THE INDIAN PROBLEM UTILIZATION OF INCREASED FLOW

India's foreign exchange reserves which were as low as Rs. 116 crores in 1964-65, have risen to more than Rs. 4,500 crores in recent years. Admittedly, a large part of this rise in foreign exchange reserves is due to the steady inflow of inward foreign remittances. In 1979-80, remittance inflows (net) as a percentage of our merchandise exports, were 29.2 per cent. The following table indicates the flow of "inward remittances."

Table I

Remittances from Indians Abroad

| Year | Remittances from Indians Abroad (Net) | Invisible Receipts (Net) | Total Exports | (Rs. Crores) |
|---------|---|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | | | | %age 1 to 3 |
| 1970-71 | + 123.2 | -79.9 | 1535.0 | 8.6 |
| 1971-72 | + 162.2 (31.7) | -37.8 | 1608.0 | 10.1 |
| 1972-73 | + 154.0 (-5.1) | -43.8 | 1971.0 | 7.8 |
| 1973-74 | + 191.3 (24.2) | -11.4 | 2523.0 | 7.6 |
| 1974-75 | + 273.7 (43.1) | + 325.1 | 3329.0 | 8.2 |
| 1975-76 | + 527.8 (92.8) | + 684.9 | 4036.0 | 13.1 |
| 1976-77 | + 738.8 (40.0) | + 987.9 | 5142.0 | 14.4 |
| 1977-78 | + 1,002.8 (38.4) | + 1,567.3 | 5408.0 | 18.5 |
| 1978-79 | + 1,608.2* (60.4) | + 2,255.5 | 5726.0 | 28.1 |
| 1979-80 | + 1,873.7* (16.5) | + 2,530.9 | 6427.0 | 29.2 |

*Estimates

Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentage variations over the previous year.
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, for concerned years.

It is estimated that there were about 1.7 million expatriate workers in 1975 in the Gulf countries and in North Africa; their numbers were 2.7 million in 1980 in the Gulf countries alone and is likely to be in the vicinity of 3.6 million by 1985. However, India's share is very small and there is scope for increasing the number of Indian workmen and technical personnel in the area.

Major Share of Remittances in Kerala for Consumption

The utilisation of remittances differs from state to state. In the case of Kerala, a major proportion of remittances during the last few years has gone for consumption, especially conspicuous consumption. The migrants are to an extent from poor families, so the major proportion of the remittances is spent to meet the daily needs of the households. A part of remittances is spent on the liquidation of old debts. Land, buildings and jewellery are major assets in which emigrant households make their investments. Expenditure on consumer durables, such as cars, refrigerators, radio sets, tape-recorders are also quite common. Certain financial investments, such as, life insurance policy, chit funds and bank deposits which are done directly by the migrants, are also evident. However, the investment in equity and bonds is very small.

It is now fairly well-recognized in Kerala that investment in human capital is a marketable commodity that fetches higher income and status. Emigrant parents generally spend large sums of money for the education of their children. Remittances from emigrants have also considerably accelerated construction activity. This has naturally exerted demands for the services of carpenters, masons, etc. The easy availability of foreign money has also led to sharp rise in wages. Indeed, labour drain, coupled with the pressure demand on certain categories of labour, has exerted some adverse effects on the price of labour throughout Kerala State.

Consumption-Oriented Expenditure in Punjab Rural Areas

The survey conducted in Punjab on the main use of remittances reveals that about 92 per cent is spent on consumption, namely, for ceremonies, food and clothing, housing and household goods. On the other hand, productive investment amounts to only six per cent and the rest is spent for children's education, debt payments, etc. The overall pattern of expenditure appears to be highly consumption-oriented in Punjab. A small proportion of remittances have gone for productive purposes, such as for cultivation, land improvement, purchase of implements, seeds, fertilizers, etc.

In contrast to Kerala, the remittances in Punjab have gone substantially to rural areas. The general picture that emerges from the observation is that remittances from migrants raises the income as well as levels of living in both urban and rural areas. Investment opportunities in rural areas are

limited. So purchase of land, implements, seeds and fertilizers have received high importance. In view of the large and growing volume of remittances and their positive effect on the economy, it appears that there is need to provide investment opportunities, particularly for those households which do not own any agricultural land or enterprise. Of course, these new investment opportunities will have to be accomplished within the framework of a national migration policy. This policy, in effect is an essential element in the overall economic development.

INCENTIVES

There are two main sources of inward remittances, namely: 1. Indians settled abroad; 2. Migrant labourers and executive officers on temporary assignments abroad. Of these two sources, it is the latter which is vital. Numerically, the major sector of labour export consists of the skilled and unskilled workers; executives and officers constitute a small proportion of the total. The major contribution to inward remittances comes from the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This is because the skilled person's awareness of the investment opportunities is superior and they utilize their savings in a more profitable way. Further, unskilled persons come from the poor sections of the society; they utilize remittances to maintain their families, to clear off family debts and so on. The incentives provided to attract remittances may be examined in the light of this background. The existing incentives can be broadly grouped into three categories:

- Investment incentives.
- Incentives for acquiring scarce real estates or consumer durables.
- Incentives for repatriation of capital invested abroad.

Investment Incentives

Investment incentives consist of facilities provided by two types of external accounts with banks:

- the Foreign Currency Non-Resident Accounts (FCNR);
- the Non-Residents (External) Accounts in Rupee—in order to facilitate investments in houses, properties and certain financial assets, such as, units of U.T.I., Government Securities, National Plan/Saving Certificates and shares and deposits of Indian companies.

The second type of incentive comprises schemes for priority allotment of cars, scooters, tractors, cement, and land for building houses.

The first group does not have an impact on the Current Account Balance of Payments. This is because the External Account Deposits of Non-Resident holding of Indian securities represents an external liability as far as the

country is concerned. As such, the inflow is recorded in the capital account where it is balanced by a corresponding increase under foreign liabilities.

A close scrutiny of the data pertaining to the holdings of these types of deposits does not show that they have been a resounding success. This is clear from the following table:

Table II

N.R. Rupee External Account — 1975-76 to 1979-80

| (Rupees Crores) | | | |
|-----------------|---------|--------------------|-------|
| Year | FCNR | NR (Rupee A/Cs) | Total |
| 1975-76 | 3.9 | 34.0 | 37.9 |
| 1976-77 | 50.1 | 121.0 | 171.1 |
| 1977-78 | 89.0 | 135.0 | 224.0 |
| 1978-79 | 17.7 | 163.0 | 189.7 |
| 1979-80 | (—) 5.0 | 171.0 | 166.0 |
| Total | 155.7 | 624.0 | 779.7 |

Source: *Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India*, For concerned years.

By and large, these deposit schemes are mainly of interest to the executive officer class of persons. The vast majority of unskilled and skilled workers who are working abroad are unlikely to show great interest in these schemes. Facilities to invest in certain other types of financial assets are also included in these groups. The Foreign Currency (Non-Resident) Accounts appear to be only a continuation of the facilities which the non-residents enjoy at home. The expatriate Indian does not consider the concessions under this group as an incentive. From his point of view, there exist some disadvantages, despite the facilities. Thus, for instance, the dividend on U.T.I. units is paid after deducting income-tax at rates applicable to non-resident individuals. In the case of investment in shares, not only permission is required from the RBI for purchase and sale, but in addition, dividends are paid after deducting income-tax at higher rates applicable to non-residents. This facility naturally cannot be considered an incentive.

Schemes for Priority Allotment of Consumer Durables

The other category of incentive is the priority allotment of certain consumer durables and real estate. This could be considered partly as an

incentive. During the year 1975-76, Rs. 49.49 crores were remitted for allotment of cars, scooters, cement and agricultural tractors as compared with a total inflow of remittances to the tune of Rs. 1,500 crores.

Incentives for Repatriation of Capital Investment Abroad

Facilities are also available for repatriation of capital by Indian citizens returning home to settle permanently. The incentives provided for them appear to be useful and must have contributed to the total inflow of remittances. However, because of the following reasons the scheme has failed to get off the ground:

- Repatriation facilities are of interest only to a small number of highly qualified Indians who would like to come home for various reasons. Over the years, the net inflow from persons of this type would be small, since it is well-known that many of them get frustrated with conditions in India and go back.
- Wealth tax concessions are applicable mainly to persons like retiring employees of UN and other international organisations. However, for the large majority of Indians working abroad, these incentives mean very little.

These facilities thus have not been adequate to induce the inflow of remittances from Indians abroad. Further, such incentives as these are not effective because there is very little effort at making them known to persons concerned. Moreover, there are the usual problems of procedures and form-filling, etc. The whole policy in this area appears to be halting, disjointed and inadequately publicized.

New Investment Facilities in Productive and Industrial Ventures

The Indian Government having realized these facts introduced recently a new policy package to attract remittances from abroad. According to this policy the Reserve Bank of India has authorised 60 banks to open "non-resident (external) accounts" designated in rupees. Indian nationals living abroad may transfer funds from the country of their residence, or any country other than the bilateral account group countries (the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania), to one of these 60 banks.

These accounts, to be opened through banking channels, could be operated without prior reference to the RBI. With a view to encouraging non-resident Indians to open such accounts, the RBI has offered several incentives. These are:

- Income accruing on the balance in the accounts is free of income tax;

- The balance held in the accounts is exempt from wealth-tax;
- Account-holders have the freedom to repatriate the balance along with the interest thereon outside India at any time without reference to the RBI;
- The interest accruing on the accounts, as also the interest dividend on Government securities units of the UTI purchased out of funds in the accounts may be credited to the accounts freely by authorised dealers.
- Debits to the accounts for local disbursement are freely permissible.
- Purchase of units of the Unit Trust, Government Securities (including securities issued by any State Government) and national plan/savings certificates from out of the balances in these accounts can be made freely.
- The sale/maturity proceeds/re-purchase price of the units, securities or certificates originally purchased out of funds in accounts can be freely credited to the external accounts by authorised dealers.

Similar facilities have also been extended to Government servants posted abroad on duty or deputation, on assignments with foreign governments, or regional or international agencies, etc.

According to the existing facilities, non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin are allowed to invest in equity issues of new companies in a wide range of select industries upto 20 per cent equity capital with full repatriation facilities in respect of their investment and income accruing thereon, provided the investment is made by remittances through banking channels or from non-resident (external) accounts. These investments can be made in all industries with the exception of coal, textiles, milk foods, oilseeds crushing, leather, matches, crimping and other processes for synthetic fibres and the yarn, steel manufactured from electric-arc furnaces based on scrap, iron and steel, pipes and tubes, bright bars, tin containers and metal containers, drums and barrels, steel wires, re-rolling of steel non-ferrous semis excluding aluminium semis forgings, AAC/ACSR conductors, plastic processed goods, industrial gases, distillation or brewing of alcoholic drinks and the items reserved for the small-scale sector, if the value of plant and machinery exceeds Rs. 5 lakhs.

Non-resident Indians are also allowed to make investments upto 74 per cent without any minimum limit. Besides, they are allowed to invest upto 74 per cent in any industry, with an undertaking to export at least 60 per cent of the total output or 75 per cent export obligation, in case of industries reserved for the small-scale sector.

For setting up such industries, import of capital equipment would be allowed without indigenous clearance upto the limit of foreign exchange brought in by the non-resident Indians. Remittances of profits under this scheme would also be freely allowed. Repatriation of capital after the unit was in commercial production and subject to adherence of export obligation, where applicable, was also permitted. These facilities would however

be applicable only to new investments, including expansion and diversification of existing industrial undertakings, but would not be extended to purchase of shares in existing companies in respect of existing activities.

In the case of rights without repatriation, non-resident Indians can invest their funds remitted from abroad through banking channels or balances lying to their credit in their external accounts, in any public or private limited company or in partnership or proprietorship concerns, irrespective of the nature of its activities on giving an undertaking to the Reserve Bank of India that they would not seek repatriated capital invested as well as the income accruing thereon.

They can also purchase shares on stock exchanges or of new issues of existing Indian companies after obtaining permission from the RBI on the condition that the dividend on the shares as well as the same proceeds on sale of shares would not be transferred out of India.

Non-resident Indians, or those of Indian origin returning home for permanent settlement have also been accorded special facilities for setting up industrial units in India. These include: import of capital goods upto the value limit of Rs. 2.5 million out of their own foreign exchange savings and resources abroad. Import of banned types of capital goods would however not be permitted under this facility. In exceptional cases rules could be relaxed. A limit of Rs. 2.5 million is applicable to a single person, implying that if two or more persons jointly set up an industry, they could import capital goods upto the value limit as would be worked out on the basis of a number of persons participating in the project. In appropriate cases, this limit may be relaxed by the government even for an individual.

In the case of new and used machinery, the value should not increase Rs. 1.5 million against Rs. 2.5 million. In the case of new machinery, capital goods imported under this facility cannot be sold for a period of five years. Thereafter, such sale may be made only with the prior permission of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.

The capital invested in profits earned in industrial units set up under this facility cannot be repatriated out of India. In addition to the capital goods imported, non-resident Indians can also import raw materials, components, consumables and spares for meeting the requirements of one year, subject to a maximum limit of Rs. 5 lakhs, provided, such imports are financed out of their own foreign exchange earnings abroad. This facility would also be available in cases where machinery is not imported, but indigenously purchased.

Non-resident Indian nationals or those who do not intend to return to India but are interested to invest in an enterprise in India without the right of repatriation, also avail the facilities for the import of capital goods, raw materials, components, consumables and spares without the right of repatriation of capital and dividend. However, import of secondhand and old machinery in this case would not be allowed.

These schemes appear to be relatively more attractive. However, it is too early to assess their impact on the flow of remittances.

POLICY OPTIONS TO AUGMENT FLOW

In the context of the adverse international trading environment and unfavourable foreign aid climate, the need for enhancing the flow of remittances from Indians abroad has come to the fore more urgently than ever before. Therefore, there is a case for evolving an integrated policy package covering the process of migration of Indian labour as well as the various possibilities of augmenting the flow of remittances to India. Such a policy should aim at not only sustaining the existing flow of remittances but also accelerating the pace of their accretion in the future.

It has been observed in the earlier section that the government offers various facilities and concessions to Indians residing abroad. The idea of providing such concessions is to attract the vast surplus of investable projects of Indians settled abroad who have a relatively higher capacity to save. In this direction, a number of tax concessions have been allowed to such persons intending to return to India for permanent domicile. Various incentives and concessions have also been provided to them with a view to encouraging the setting up of their own industrial units in India, either independently or in collaboration with other resident Indians.

The very purpose of offering various facilities or concessions to non-resident Indians is to encourage them to send their income savings to India. Before examining the question as to whether these concessions are adequate to encourage Indians abroad to send their savings to India, a distinction must be made between the two components of the savings of Indians residing abroad. The two main components are:

1. The amount repatriated for the purpose of family maintenance; and
2. The amount repatriated as savings.

In the strict sense of the term "savings," these two components are one and the same. That is to say, whether an expatriate sends his income for family maintenance or for savings, it amounts to income. However, the distinction between the two is, that while in the former case, an Indian abroad is compelled to send a part of his income for family maintenance, in regard to the latter, the motivation to send his income to India could be a function of the return he gets, apart from the risk elements involved in keeping his funds in a foreign country. Hence, when one speaks of the adequacy of the concessions and facilities offered to non-resident Indians, in fact this refers to the transfer of income by Indians abroad in the form of savings. In other words, any effort to encourage Indians abroad to transfer their savings to India must aim at offering them certain concessions that would induce them to keep their savings in India rather than elsewhere. It may be noted that Indians residing abroad have a significant capacity to save and the absence of any rewarding avenue of investment back in the home country can result in the diversion

of savings. Hence, the question is how to induce the immigrant workers to transfer their savings to India?

Premium on Foreign Exchange

India, like any other developing country, faces the problem of foreign exchange constraints owing to the lag between demand for foreign exchange and the supply of it. In other words, the availability of foreign exchange does not meet the demand for foreign exchange at any point of time. As such, a unit of foreign exchange would fetch a premium if allowed to be traded in the foreign exchange market (assuming that no foreign exchange controls exist).

The premium would vary depending on the demand pressure. Going by this logic, one unit of foreign exchange earned by an Indian abroad commands a value higher than what he could get if he converted it officially at the ruling exchange rate. This could be termed as "scarcity value" of foreign exchange. If an Indian working abroad were to send his income through the official banking channels, he would not get "scarcity value" of foreign exchange. Hence, the argument is that non-resident Indians must be given a portion of the "scarcity value" in order to induce them to transfer their savings to India.

In this context, the government could consider the introduction of a dual exchange rate system with a bias towards non-resident Indians. Under the dual exchange rate system, two sets of rates can be used, namely, (i) for merchandise trade, and (ii) other transactions.

The other transactions may be for the purpose of private transfer of non-residents abroad. The latter rate should be higher in terms of the Indian rupee than the former. As a result, non-residents when transferring income to India would get a higher value in terms of the Indian rupee. The dual exchange rate system is in vogue in many labour-exporting countries such as Egypt and Jordan, with a view to attracting remittances from their nationals abroad. However, it may be difficult to monitor the system because it offers scope for leakages. Other limitations have already been highlighted above.

Introduction of "Floating Interest" Rate

It is often said that non-resident Indians are keeping a substantial amount of their savings in banks abroad. One of the reasons attributed to this is the disparity in interest rates prevailing in India and abroad. The rates for different time deposits given in Table III.

Thus, the comparison of interest on bank deposits in India and abroad reveals that the rates in India are not in alignment with those in overseas money centres, particularly in West Asia which have a large number of non-resident Indians. This means that a higher return on deposits than the current rates offered by the Indian banks is necessary to induce non-resident

Table III

Rate of Interest in India and Arab Countries (in percentages)

| Countries | Less than 90 days | Deposits with a maturity more than 90 days but less than one year | Deposits with a maturity more than one year period |
|-----------|-------------------|---|--|
| India | 2.5 — 3.0 | 4.0 — 5.0 | 7.0 — 10.0 |
| UAE | 6.5 — 7.0 | 7.5 — 9.0 | 10.5 |
| Kuwait | 14.0 — 14.5 | 13.5 — 14.0 | 13.5 |
| Bahrain | 8.5 — 9.0 | 9.5 — 10.0 | 10.0 — 10.5 |

Indians to remit their savings to India. The question is, how much increase in interest rates on deposits is necessary to induce non-residents to keep their savings in India rather than elsewhere as interest rates abroad fluctuate widely and frequently. It is not possible to fix any rate of interest payable on deposits in external account once and for all. In order to induce non-residents abroad, what is required is a system of "floating interest rates" in which rates of interest applicable to non-resident accounts must be linked to the rates of interest prevailing in selected overseas money centres. The rates must be announced from time to time, depending on the movement of the rates prevailing in these markets. The advantage of the system is that deposit rates in India can be in alignment with those prevailing in foreign money markets. However, any mark-up in interest rates on deposits will impose an additional burden on the banks. This may be a disincentive to banks from obtaining deposits from non-resident Indians. Therefore, it is appropriate that some compensation may be accorded to banks for this additional cost.

Promotional Measures

The existing facilities for direct and portfolio investments available to non-residents suffer from the main handicap that Indians abroad are not well-versed in the intricacies of various investment procedures. The very fact that they are living away from the mainstream of national life, keeps them in the dark about the various developments in the homeland in matters of investment. Another problem is the lack of reliable first-hand information regarding the scope for the development of different industries that exist in India. As a result, Indians prefer to invest in land, buildings, and jewellery in which the appreciation of value is assured, as is evident from the past

trends. Thus, there is the case for the education of Indian workers about the benefits of various investment opportunities available to them in India. In other words, what is needed is an appropriate information system, where by it would be possible to give maximum information on various kinds of viable projects. This task can be undertaken by Indians residing abroad and the overseas offices of Indian banks. Besides, shares of certain projects can be floated in foreign countries exclusively for Indian nationals residing abroad. The projects which have a high foreign exchange component can be selected for this purpose. To augment investable funds, the UTI may also design a new unit scheme, whereby the investors get a higher return as well as substantial capital appreciation.

The shares of Indian companies can find a very good market abroad since many Indian nationals would like their savings to be utilized for development in India. A major consideration however is, as mentioned earlier, the rate of return. At the moment, Indian companies find it very difficult to match the return on shares, i.e. dividend plus capital appreciation, with the rate of interest that is prevalent in other countries. Further, the income from dividends is subject to tax at the normal income-tax rates. The recipient is taxed further in the host country according to the tax laws prevalent there. As such the income from dividend becomes subject to double taxation wherever the tax rates in the host country are less than in India which almost invariably is the case.

In the scheme announced recently the income from deposits in foreign currency accounts are exempt from tax. Going by the same logic, it would follow that income from dividends received from Indian companies should be totally exempt from taxation. This facility would act as a major incentive and attract large investments in our companies by non-resident Indians.

Export of Manpower

Augmentation of flow of remittances should also be promoted through export of manpower. No doubt, the export of manpower from India has assumed relatively greater importance after 1973. However, the total share of this labour is small in the active labour force of the country. There has been a substantial demand for Indian workers in the oil-exporting countries which have launched several construction projects. Many countries, such as Pakistan, Philippines, Jordan, Sri Lanka and South Korea have been making strenuous efforts to export manpower to these regions on a competitive basis. As such, sending out carpenters, brick layers, masons, civil engineers etc., as individuals may not give them adequate bargaining power to earn attractive remuneration. Therefore, it will be in the interest of these labourers and in the interest of the country to send them out as a team to work in civil engineering projects and construction contracts.

CONCLUSION

Empirical evidence on the utilization of remittances in some major labour-exporting countries, such as India, Pakistan, Portugal, Turkey, the Yemen Arab Republic and Yugoslavia is available. It indicates that only a small portion of the remittance is invested in productive activities; the bulk has contributed little to the long-term development potential of the respective countries. Some of the salient features of the remittances used in the labour-exporting countries have been illustrated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Yugoslavia, which permits its nationals to work abroad, typifies some of the problems of directly investing private remittances since the scope for private investment is very limited because of official policy. The outlets are only in areas, such as housing, trucks and taxis, tourist hotel catering and small-scale farming. The limited investment outlets were quickly saturated. In the process, investment in the form of migrants' remittances in small farms helped to improve productivity. However, it also resulted in uneconomic over-machinisation of farms which are subject to a ceiling of 10 hectares. In Turkey, official attempts to channelise migrants' savings into investment in agriculture through special loans and concessions for imported machinery is believed to have been hampered by, among other things, the lack of management expertise among returned migrants as well as their reluctance to put the savings into co-operative or community projects, financed by the workers abroad. The Turkish Village Co-operative Scheme was launched in 1963. However, it failed because it was not effectively integrated into a nationwide system of regional planning. Nevertheless, Turkey, which was the first labour-exporting country to try using immigrants' remittances for productive investment, appears to have been relatively more successful in channelising migrants' savings into investment than any other labour-exporting country.

In Portugal, remittances stimulated the banking habit under the impetus of fierce competition between banking net-works, but there is no evidence of investment in industry, trade and services. Also, savings accounts with banks were soon withdrawn to finance consumer products.

In the Yemen Arab Republic, remittances found outlets in urban and real estate, in commercial agencies, retail marketing and road transport. The reliance on the remittance income in the rural areas led to import of grains which in turn resulted in declining agricultural production.

A study of emigrant remittances into Pakistan found that the Pakistani emigrants consumed about 40 per cent of their income abroad, leaving the balance for savings abroad or remittance home. Most of the cash remittances were usually frittered away in personal consumption, social ceremonies, real estate and price-escalating trading.

The more pertinent policy issue is the disposal of the surplus after liquidating past indebtedness and meeting essential consumption requirements of the emigrants. Remittances undoubtedly, represent a considerable potential

source of saving and investment, since they are a very high multiple of the per capita income and average wealth of emigrant households. For instance, in 1977, the average Portuguese emigrant remitted home US \$ 2700 (Portugal per capita income—US \$ 1890); the average Yugoslav emigrant sent home US \$ 3400 (Yugoslav per capita income—US \$ 1960); the average Indian emigrant remitted US \$ 1500 (the Indian per capita income—US \$ 180). Consequently, the available evidence of uses of remittance in labour-exporting countries is perhaps disquieting, not so much because such data indicates that consumption absorbs the bulk of remittances but because they reflect the lack of a coherent policy to mobilize the savings from remittances into productive investment.

It is therefore essential to envisage and implement an integrated policy package covering the entire "migratory chain," that is, the process of migration, its overall socio-economic effects, and the optimal allocation of remittances in decentralised employment-generating projects. This needs appropriate institutions and incentives.

There are a number of possible lines of action within such a framework. In the first instance, a specialised institution or specialised unit within the existing banks is imperative to put the resources in productive use. A variety of proposals have been mooted; in India, for example, to start a multi-purpose Kerala International Development Bank to mobilize savings from remittances, underwrite the issue of shares, provide consultancy services for emigrant entrepreneurs and to issue special bonds in Gulf countries for specific projects in Kerala. In Pakistan, it has been proposed to create an Overseas Investment and Management Corporation, Emigrants' Foundation, and an Emigrants' Welfare Fund. Similarly, given the transitoriness of remittances, it is important to ensure that they are utilized to inculcate an enduring savings psychology among the recipients. This can be achieved through the creation of contractual savings schemes like provident fund schemes and annuities for the rural and self-employed sectors, and through linkages of savings to create facilities in the rural post offices and savings banks. All these measures, however, are contingent, among others, on an adequate spread of banking facilities in the rural areas, concomitantly with the development of an appropriate intermediate financial infrastructure. To be successful, institutional banking will have to adopt lending procedures to the viability of projects rather than to the availability of collateral. The labour-exporting countries need to supplement their macro-economic policies to maximise migrants' remittances by policies to ensure their optimal use in enlarging their income and employment-potential.

December 1981.

Annexure I

Remittance Inflows to Major Labour-exporting Countries : 1978

| Country | Amount (Million US Dollars) | Remittances as a percentage of merchandise exports |
|-------------|--------------------------------|---|
| Yugoslavia | 2,938.0 | 51.8 |
| Turkey | 1,011.6 | 44.5 |
| Portugal | 1,688.9 | 60.5 |
| Morocco | 762.5 | 51.3 |
| Egypt | 1,761.6 | 88.8 |
| Bangladesh | 115.1 | 21.0 |
| India | 1,238.6 | 17.8 |
| Pakistan | 1,303.3 | 92.9 |
| Jordan | 520.2 | 175.4 |
| Yemen, PDR | 257.7 | * |
| Yemen, AR | 1,277.0 | * |
| Upper Volta | 65.9 | 59.6 |
| Mali | 31.1 | 33.0 |

Source: World Bank Report, 1980.

Annexure II
Remittances of Selected Countries of Migrant Workers

(MILLION US DOLLARS)

| Country | Year | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|----------------------|------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| India | | 90 | 125 | 118 | 159 | 222 | 414 | 633 | 927 | 978* | 990* |
| Pakistan | | — | — | 129 | 147 | 177 | 275 | 434 | 885 | 1419 | 1556 |
| Jordan | | 3 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 7.6 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 11.3 | (3.8) | 12.8 | — |
| Morocco | | 36 | 74 | 107 | 211 | 299 | 482 | 499 | 545 | 702 | 892 |
| Democratic Yemen | | 52.1 | 43.8 | 27.1 | 32.9 | 42.9 | 58.8 | 119.3 | 187.3 | 254.8 | 311.5 |
| Yemen | | — | — | — | — | 135.5 | 270.2 | 675.8 | 987.1 | 946.2 | 1025.6 |
| Bangladesh | | — | — | — | 22.4 | 26.0 | 31.1 | 33.3 | 95.3 | 126.1 | — |
| Korea, Republic of | | 95 | 105 | 119 | 155 | 154 | 158 | 194 | 172 | 433 | 401 |
| Philippines | | 29 | 34 | 80 | 94 | 123 | 165 | 148 | 146 | 193 | 229 |
| Sri Lanka | | (0.9) | (3.4) | (4.3) | 0.2 | (0.2) | 2.7 | 6.7 | 10.4 | 22.0 | 48.2 |
| Tunisia | | 23 | 44 | 53 | 91 | 106 | 131 | 128 | 152 | 204 | 271 |
| Upper Volta | | 16 | 21.6 | 22.5 | 35.8 | 29.2 | 32.4 | 36.5 | 40.2 | 45.6 | — |
| Syrian Arab Republic | | 7 | 8 | 39 | 37 | 44 | 52 | 53 | 92 | 94 | 112 |
| Algeria | | 195 | 225 | 225 | 336 | 320 | 356 | 384 | 278 | 297 | 305 |
| Egypt | | 4 | 11 | 5 | 6 | 42 | 90 | 87 | 43 | 29 | 41 |
| Ethiopia | | (2.6) | (1.8) | 2.8 | 11.3 | 18.2 | 14.4 | 21.7 | 14.1 | 19.7 | 20.7 |
| Cyprus | | 14 | 16 | 16 | 12 | 17 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 22 | 25 |
| Malta | | 22 | 21 | 17 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 30 | 39 | 29 | 34 |
| TOTAL | | 587 | 725 | 959 | 1418 | 1780 | 2571 | 3354 | 7624 | 5827 | 6262 |

Source: Trade and Development, UNCTAD, 1981.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES : BACKGROUND FOR THE 1980's

By SELESHI SISAYE*

Since the beginnings of development assistance to Third World countries during the post-World War II period, there have been some philosophical changes in the theory and practice of development aid programmes. Western development aid (i.e., of the United States and West European countries), can be classified into two main conceptual types. These include economic growth as development objective and economic growth with an increased quality of life as development objective. The first two decades of development assistance 1950-1970 focused on economic growth objectives with increased production. The period, 1970-1980 concentrated on redistributive measures to improve the quality of life of the rural poor, the provision of basic needs, creation of employment opportunities, and the implementation of policy measures to reduce relative inequality and absolute poverty. The main purpose of this article is to discuss the changes in the theory and practice of Western aid programmes in Third World countries from 1945-1979. We will look into the underlying international causes that contributed to these changes. We will also review the evolution of aid to Third World countries for the last thirty years by examining the economic, political and social background for the changes in development assistance from urban to rural development programmes and from an emphasis in increasing production to that of redistribution with growth. These problems are discussed in the light of their relevance for policy-oriented research in Third World Countries.

DEVELOPMENT AS ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH INCREASED PRODUCTION

Economic Growth and Technical Assistance: The Point IV Programme

The underlying development theory for development assistance programmes was an "economic" theory derived from the success of the post-World War II Marshall Plan which restored the economy of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan, a massive transfer of American technology and funds, helped Europe surpass its pre-World War II economy within a short period of time. Without noting the difference in level of technological and infrastructural development between Western Europe and the underdeveloped Third World countries emerging from colonial rule, it was assumed that through the transfer of Western technology and finance, these countries would be enabled to modernize within a comparably short period of time.

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To this effect, the Point IV Programme was implemented in the newly independent countries to modernize their economy. The programme initiated by President Truman in 1949, focused on technical co-operation with the Less Developed Countries (LDC's), in an effort to promote economic development. Legislation was passed in 1950 which "...declared economic development to be an official objective of the foreign policy of the United States, and it was to be pursued with technical assistance."¹ In fact, "... technical assistance held the key to successful economic development."²

A primary policy objective of the Point IV Programme was the containment of Communism combined with the simultaneous promotion of economic development, a concern that had emerged between 1949-53:

American policy makers realized that the containment policy applied not only to Europe but to the under-developed lands as well, and they became concerned with the relationships, among democracy, communism, and economic development.³

These concerns were based on the realization that it was in the best political interest of the United States to promote economic development in the underdeveloped world to further the long range goals of democracy and unhampered international trade. Economic development of Third World countries was seen as the most effective means of minimizing the threat of communism. The Point IV Programme was promptly implemented in Asia and Latin America, and was initially perceived by development experts to be successful in countering Communism.

Since the development theory underlying the Point IV Programme was economic, its success was measured in increased production. Accordingly, the practical definition of development used by donor countries was phrased in terms of economic growth while the problems underlying LDC's, to be amenable to strategies promoting economic growth, were translated into a low rate of domestic savings and capital formation and/or investment. In order to reach the development level of advanced industrialized nations, each country had to go through a successive series of stages of economic growth.

Development Strategies: Industrialization as the Engine of Economic Growth

The major proponent of the stage model of development was Rostow, who postulated on the basis of Western development experience that all societies could be identified as belonging to the traditional, in the pre-conditions for take-off into economic growth, the "drive to maturity," and finally the stage of high mass consumption.⁴

The key factor in taking-off into self-sustaining development was the ability to mobilize domestic and foreign savings to generate enough investment to accelerate economic growth. A model purporting to explain economic

growth in terms of the rate of growth of Gross National Product (GNP) was the Harrod-Domar model. This model stated that the rate of growth of GNP is determined jointly by the domestic savings ratio and the national capital/output ratio (a measure indicating capital productivity). Quite simply, if an economy was to grow, it needed to save and invest a certain proportion of its GNP, since the higher the rate of savings and investment, the higher the rate of growth of GNP. And since industrialization was synonymous with modernization/development, investment was to take place in the industrial sector which was perceived as the dynamic sector. Agriculture was to play the passive role of providing necessary food supplies for the urban areas and was to be the surplus labour reservoir for the industrialization process.

However, since most Third World countries were presumed to lack either domestic savings or foreign exchange, foreign aid was seen as filling the "gap", an approach which came to be known as the two-gap model. External financing (both loans and grants) was to fill the gaps left by inadequate domestic savings or lack of foreign exchange.⁵ The function of aid, then, was to facilitate industrialization.

On the basis of the experiences of developed countries, the strategy advocated for the LDC's was to promote industrialization; development/modernization was equated with industrialization/urbanization. To this effect, the Lewis model identified two sectors, an urban industrial sector characterized by high productivity and dynamic growth; and a rural agricultural sector characterized by low productivity and surplus labour, and stressed the importance of industrialization in creating employment which would absorb rural surplus labour.⁶ Even though agriculture played a passive role in economic development, the Lewis model did recognize the transfer of labour from rural to urban areas as a link between agriculture and industry.

Until the mid-1960's, development programmes in LDC's stressed industrialization and the development plans formulated in the LDC's conformed to this approach by stressing import-substitution industrial development as a means of gaining foreign exchange. However, the massive industrialization programmes of the 1950's and 1960's did not result in the modernization predicted by the theory. The capital-intensive industries characteristic of Western industrialized nations concentrated in urban areas and were not able to absorb the growing rural labour force that migrated to the cities to escape rural unemployment and to look for better employment opportunities.⁷ Rising urban unemployment, food shortages and rapid population growth brought about a reconsideration of the industrial urban development theories and the strategies utilized to implement development programmes.

Shift to Agricultural Development: Increased Production as Economic Growth

The 1960's brought a shift from urban/industrial to rural/agricultural development programmes. It was then argued that since LDC's were predominately agrarian nations, agriculture needed to be developed before industrialization could take place.⁸ Various reform programmes—land tenure, marketing, storage facilities, or according to Mosher, a progressive rural structure, were suggested as a means of promoting agricultural development.⁹

However, despite the focus on agricultural development, the latter was considered as an intermediary stage in the national drive towards industrial development. Since the focus was on economic growth, with increased agricultural production as the ultimate objective, improved agricultural methods were to stimulate the LDC agricultural export industry and were to encourage an import-substitution policy designed to make the country economically self-sufficient, at least in the production of basic food-stuff. The programmes focused on the forward linkage between agricultural and industrial development, with increased agricultural production intended to generate development of local cottage industries.

The production orientation in agriculture was supported by the Green (or Seed) Revolution Technology where an array of divisible inputs such as fertilizers, high-yielding varieties of seeds, insecticides and pesticides were distributed to farmers in the effort to increase agricultural production on small scale farming. Since capital was a scarce resource while labour was in surplus supply, the initial strategy was to raise overall production through widespread distribution of the more labour intensive divisible inputs without the need for heavy capital investment in mechanized agriculture.¹⁰

The production approach to agricultural development emphasized increasing GNP, per capita income agricultural and industrial production as a means of promoting economic growth. Even though the wide disparity between the rich and the poor in terms of land holding and ownership of productive assets was recognized, measures for the distribution of the benefits of that growth were not considered necessary since the "trickle-down theory" was expected to diffuse or transfer the benefits of development gradually, and in an orderly manner, from the rich to the poor farmers in LDC's.¹¹

However, the unequal distribution of resources between landlords and tenants in many Third World countries enabled those farmers with control over a greater amount of resources to obtain more seed revolution inputs. This inequity, combined with a political system favouring the larger land-owners, led to the occurrence of increased production among those maintaining control over resources, a situation which led to agriculture becoming profitable in the larger holdings. Once agriculture was discovered to be profitable, expansion of mechanized, capital intensive agriculture took place, particularly among those with larger land holdings.¹²

The unequal distribution of the benefits from the seed technology programmes resulted in the eviction of tenants as landlords began to perceive the profitability of agriculture through mechanization. In order to protect tenants and to enable them to share the results from the new technology, development specialists suggested various reform programmes to improve the conditions of the tenants and small farmers as well as increase agricultural production.

Importance of Political Stability: Political Reforms in the Economic Development Process

These reforms centered on the economic, political and social structures that inhibited agricultural development. The economic reforms focused on agricultural production and distribution methods¹³ (e.g., marketing and storage facilities, formation of co-operatives to facilitate the availability of credit for small farmers and reforms in the banking and financial institutions to promote the small farmer), tenancy reforms¹⁴—fixation of rents, ceilings on land ownership, progressive tax systems (i.e., as a means of redistributing income), high taxes on unutilized land; and new land development programmes or settlement schemes in unsettled areas.¹⁵ In general, these measures would have regulated tenancy rather than abolish it. Since the understanding that the development of agriculture could not be accomplished by economic reforms alone began to evolve, political reforms¹⁶ were also suggested to provide the necessary organizational mechanisms for implementing such programmes. These reforms emphasized re-organization of central government institutions and promoted de-centralization of the local government system by allowing local authorities administrative control over routine daily activities and certain local development projects such as construction of roads, schools and clinics, projects to be initiated with the advice and consent of the appropriate central government ministries and popular participation,¹⁷ by improving the existing administration through building local institutions and creating more effective communication linkages between the central government ministries and local government structures.¹⁸

Since the concept of economic growth stressed quantitative changes in the economic, political and social institutions that would facilitate the reformation of the growth-inhibiting aspects of those institutions, the developmental programmes and the changes advocated tended to be reformist in substance and were directed towards maintaining the political stability and social order (or status quo) of the regime in power. Hence, the concept of stability was defined as the ability to adapt to change, but not to prevent it.¹⁹ This view is consistent with that of modernization where the concept of stability has been used to signify a sustained growth in the major institutions (e.g., legal, political and administrative systems), so that they are capable of absorbing changes with relatively few social disturbances.²⁰

The rationale behind these reforms was to improve the existing socio-economic structures (i.e., land tenure, local government, etc.) by restructuring institutions inhibiting the development of commercial agriculture in the small farmer sector. The small farmer was to be transformed into an innovative commercial farmer by instructing him in the use of improved varieties of seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, better known as "green revolution" inputs.²¹ The process was to create an agricultural surplus and encourage the formation of a "rural bourgeoisie," a development pattern consistent with the capitalist model of development.

Reformist Agricultural Development Strategies: The Package Approach

During the early 1969's the package approach became popular as the most effective means of disseminating "green revolution" inputs to a large number of farmers. The package approach was perceived as concentrating the relevant technological elements for agricultural development within a defined geographical area in a coordinated manner. Since earlier programmes stressed the organizational aspects of agricultural development, the package approach added a new technological dimension.²² While earlier approaches emphasized the necessity of local participation in development efforts within existing agricultural technology, the package programme focused on the dissemination and application of green revolution technology and the subsequent increased agricultural production. Increasing agricultural production was to alleviate food shortages and provide employment in the rural areas, thus absorbing surplus rural labour which would otherwise migrate to urban areas.²³

Since the package programme operated within the conceptual framework of gradual reform, it utilized existing local government structures in the distribution of green revolution inputs. In conjunction with the "trickle-down theory," it was assumed that the increased production benefits were to be diffused, over a period of time, through the entire population, and were to contribute to improved socio-economic conditions. The emphasis was on gradual reform so as to maintain a politically stable environment within which agricultural production increases could take place. While diffusion of benefits in a stable political setting was to be the package programme's mode of operation, actual programmes were implemented in a variety of political and economic settings and were modified to adapt to these settings.

These gradual improvements in agrarian institutions, accompanied by increases in agricultural production, were to promote stability and order (i.e., restore order in a conflict situation or equilibrate society) since all major socio-economic groups (i.e., landlords and tenants, capitalists and labourers, poor and rich) were to gain, although those controlling a greater amount of resources were to receive correspondingly greater benefits.²⁴ Although this disparity in the distribution of benefits was noted, it was assumed that society on the average would receive a positive sum gain in

the continual, gradual reforms, or agrarian institutions. This disparity in the distribution of benefits was expected to be gradually eliminated over time.

In general, the production-oriented package programmes did succeed in increasing agricultural production without regard to the allocation of that production by the social, political and economic structures of the country. This neglect of the socio-political structures controlling resource allocation not only reinforced those structures, but by causing greater inequalities in the distribution of resources among economic groups and regions affected by the programmes exacerbated social and political divisions within the society. In many instances, displaced rural residents migrated to urban areas creating a pool of urban unemployed.²⁵

Social inequality became a development issue after the progress of development programmes in LDC's, over two decades, was reviewed by development specialists. Examination of the structural problems, or "bottlenecks" in these countries highlighted the importance of redistribution in the development process and ushered in the second decade in development assistance programmes. It must be pointed out, however, that although the granting of aid during those periods generally reflected predominant development theories, aid was also given for primarily political, economic and humanitarian purposes in accordance with the interests of either the donor nation or the recipient country.

DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IMPROVED QUALITY OF LIFE THROUGH REDISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES

The focus of development theories in the Second Development Decade stressed redistribution of productive resources as a pre-condition for economic growth. This ushered in a new era in development assistance programmes, commonly known as the post-Pearson Commission and McNamara strategies.

Although the importance of redistribution in development programmes had long been acknowledged after examining the economic and social impact of foreign assisted projects, international aid programmes generally did not involve redistribution until 1969, the year the Pearson Commission issued its report on the impact of development aid. The Pearson Commission was set up by the World Bank to study the development efforts of the last two decades and to propose guidelines for international co-operation for economic development, to suggest recommendations for the future administration of aid programmes, to review the possibilities for private investment and to increase the role of multilateral organizations in development assistance programmes.²⁶ In general, the report outlined certain reform measures in the nature of aid programmes, measures that have become the guidelines for the present administration of aid programmes.

Among other conclusions, the Pearson Commission Report recommended

a resource transfer of at least 1 per cent of the GNP of the industrialized developed countries to the less developing countries,²⁷ an increase in multilateral development assistance, an annual growth rate of 6 per cent in LDC's, creation of a mutually beneficial atmosphere for the flows of private foreign investment from DC's to LDC's, improvement of the administration of aid programmes by reducing tied-aid and by increasing its continuity by providing aid over a longer period of time for the same programme, and the establishment of a New UN International Economic Order to reduce the trade barriers of the LDC by creating an atmosphere of free and equitable international trade.²⁸ The Report also focused on the reform programmes, e.g., family planning, control of population growth, priority for agricultural development needed in LDC's to lessen the growing gap between the rich and the poor both within the LDC and between the advanced industrialized DC and the LDC.

Proponents of gradual reform advocated the implementation of the Report by having "distributive or social justice" objectives built into development programmes, encouraging popular participation in an essentially top-town planning process and, through the UN's International Economic Order, transferring an "appropriate portion of income from the rich to the poor nations."²⁹

The recommendation, however, takes for granted a number of assumptions about the development process. It assumes that a conflict-free social structure exists within developing countries and that orderly change can evolve in this setting. Second, it regards the development process as primarily "an economic exercise for the allocation of scarce resources."³⁰ Third, development is perceived to be the problem of the lesser developed countries rather than their position with the world market system. And fourth, it is assumed that a consistent set of development policy packages can be formulated to deal with the entire range of development problems and that these policies can be imposed unilaterally from the top with the blessings of the international community.

Such development thinking has profoundly affected the planning and implementation of development projects in the developing countries and the case of Ethiopia exemplifies the extent to which this was expressed in its agricultural projects.³¹

Both the comprehensive (CADU) and minimum (MPP Phase 1) package programmes followed the reformist strategy of rural development by planning to improve peasant agriculture through the provision of improved agricultural inputs to small farmers, modernization of the existing land tenure system through tenancy reform³² and promotion of local government reforms to enable local authorities to respond to local needs. Even though the underlying development strategy of these programmes is the same, their implementation varied since the minimum package approach evolved from the comprehensive package programme.³³

After the Pearson Commission Report laid out the underlying strategy

for the Second Development Decade, it was enforced by pressures from the United Nations and members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).³⁴

Following publication of the Pearson Report, there appeared in rapid succession a series of others—that of the United Nations Committee for Development Planning setting out guidelines for the Second Development Decade, the Capacity Study of the United Nations by Sir Robert Jackson, and a spate of studies on the United States foreign aid programme, of which the most important was the report of the Presidential Task Force on International Development under the leadership of Rudolph A. Peterson. While each of the reports approaches the problem with a somewhat different emphasis, there [were] a number of common conclusions about foreign aid and the direction in which it should move in the future. There [was], for example, the unanimous view that total flows of assistance and the proportion going through multilateral channels should both be increased, that technical assistance should be emphasised, particularly in the development of human resources and institution-building, that aid tying should be eliminated or effectively reduced, and that developmental lending should be on easier terms. The reports also criticise administrative obstacles in the way of the more effective use of aid, and all suggest that some reorganization of the international framework for promoting development is called for.³⁵

These reports addressed the underlying problems of LDC's and called for a joint co-operative effort in the administration of aid programmes and transfer of resources from the DC's to the LDC's on the assumption that it was the moral obligation of the advanced countries to help the poor countries through some form of redistribution of resources. This recommendation was later articulated by McNamara in his 1973 Nairobi speech to the World Bank Board of Governors.³⁶ He stated that small farmer development programmes needed to be given priority and called for rural development programmes focusing on small farmers, a position later developed in a study conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University in 1974.³⁷ After noting the situation of small farmers and tenants in the rural areas of LDC's, the increasing income gap between rich and small farmers (40 per cent of the population accounted for 12.5 per cent of the national income),³⁸ the disparity between rural and urban areas, the structural problems surrounding rural development (for e.g., land tenure, local government system, agricultural marketing and co-operatives), the report emphasized the need for redistributive programmes as a means of both raising small farmer/tenant income levels and increasing agricultural production. These reform measures as articulated by the Pearson Commission and World Bank, laid out the

conceptual framework for the Second Development Decade when redistribution (or social justice) with economic growth became the focus of development programmes. While these strategies still emphasized economic growth, they now also stressed the need for equity-oriented programmes designed to improve the quality of life of greater number of people by building in distribution mechanisms with projects, e.g., small farmer development strategies, cottage industries, appropriate technology, etc.

However, while these strategies are designed to reach the "lower or bottom 40 per cent," or the poorest of the poor, they still funnel aid through existing national economic, political and social structures. Given past development experiences in these countries, the efforts of development assistance programmes will still be blocked from reaching the rural poor since there have been no fundamental changes in the socio-economic and political structures which continue to siphon development benefits for the national elites.

RATIONALE FOR AID GRANTS

The allocation of aid to Third World countries has been motivated by a variety of economic, political and strategic factors. Even though the allocation of aid during the 1950's and 1960's generally coincided with political (military interest due to the cold war strategy) and economic interests of the country,³⁹ aid was also granted in accordance with the dominant development philosophy. However, it must be noted that military interests were ultimately motivated by economic concerns since economic development could be promoted only within a stable political system able to absorb the social and political changes brought about by that growth.

With the change in focus from urban to rural development, and from production to equity, there also appeared a change in which countries were considered desirable aid recipients. Aid was to be given to those economically responsive countries that had initiated reform programmes, e.g., land reform, family planning, and other rural development programmes designed to improve the quality of life—level of living, access to social services, to reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality. These concerns were expressed after development planners and administrators working in LDC's noted the steadily worsening problems of poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, poor health conditions and other symptoms of the increasing rich-poor gap in the LDC.⁴⁰

The concern for improvement of the quality of life of Third World poor stressed the utility of foreign aid in minimizing the growing gap between the developed and the developing countries and between the rich and the poor in the LDC's. These concerns, first articulated as development objectives with the publication of the Pearson Report in 1969, were reiterated in McNamara's Nairobi speech to the Board of Governors in 1973, and were

followed by the publication of World Bank Study, *Redistribution With Growth* in 1974.

Although, foreign aid has been generously provided to LDC's since World War II, different aspects of those aid programmes have been stressed by development specialists according to the particular donor interest demonstrated in the programme, whether that interest was primarily strategic/political or whether it was economic. A brief review of the rationales for granting aid places Ethiopia within the international framework of development assistance.

After noting the problems of poverty, malnutrition, unemployment and inequality, Esman and Cheever approved the common aid efforts of OECD in the promotion of development programme in LDC's. They stressed the co-operative aspects of the industrialized non-Communist countries' development programmes in the achievement of the economic goals of the LDC, thereby also maintaining their political stability. They pointed out that the granting of aid, both technical and financial, could be used not only to respond to the "humanitarian considerations" but would also allow political measures since donors would be able "to exercise a considerable degree of control over their aid programmes."⁴¹ The common aid effort could be used to help LDC's promote development programmes and to tie them effectively with the West, because the establishment of OECD would provide an effective forum for member countries to plan their development programmes independently and implement them jointly with member nations. In general, they demonstrated how the "common aid effort" could be used to build a co-operative relationship between donors and recipient countries by designing foreign aid programmes to conform to the needs of a specific developing country.

On the other hand, others like Huntington have stressed political concerns and have emphasized a staged economic growth which promotes political stability goals as well as the point at which aid should be phased out.⁴² Under this framework, aid was to promote economic growth and political stability simultaneously, yet was not intended to transform the existing political structure or status quo, a framework largely shaped by the containment policy of the Cold War.

Although the underlying rationale for granting aid was subject to varying interpretations, it is important to point out that present economic aid programmes are guided largely by humanitarian goals and are attempting to redistribute benefits to the rural poor by using local development institutions and by creating mechanisms to involve local people in the development process.

This approach not only requires co-operation between the donor and the recipient countries, but also requires bridging the gap between the government and the people⁴³ by building local indigenous organizations⁴⁴ that encourage rural people to participate in development programmes affecting their interests.⁴⁵ Donor interest in involving poor people in local develop-

ment programmes has been expressed since the early 1970's and some donors have accordingly outlined strategies to involve the population in such programmes.⁴⁶

Development scholars like Guy Hunter have emphasized that with this approach, areas such as "Africa can in fact have the best of both worlds, by using her own natural advantages and by very highly selective borrowing from advanced technology."⁴⁷ The primary role of aid under these conditions is to find not only the appropriate institutions, technology, financial, educational and other resources needed by the aid recipient, but also assist in the building of local organizations and institutions,⁴⁸ as well as in planning development projects designed to address the problems of landlessness and near-landlessness⁴⁹ resulting from earlier programmes emphasizing agricultural production. These concerns have opened a new period in development aid programmes, a period in which aid is granted to encourage nations emphasizing equity goals. However, while the primary focus is equity, the political and economic interests of the donor country influence the type of aid granted to a specific recipient nation.

CONCLUSION

A longitudinal review of the theory and practice of development assistance programmes has shown that the emphasis of foreign aid has evolved from urban industrial development to agricultural and rural development. Agricultural development programmes have also changed from an emphasis on increased production to a focus on redistribution of both the benefits of programme intervention and economic resources, including land and other forms of productive assets, through the participation of local people through representative local organizations.

Important development assistance questions were raised during the 1970's which might be relevant for the 1980's. One of the most important questions has been that of redistribution and equal partnership in the development process. The question of redistribution would focus not only in narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor in Third World Countries, but also between the rich Developed Countries and the poor Less Developed Countries. The 1980's development assistance would stress on increasing aid to LDC's, and specifically technical and material aid through resource transfer, mutual co-operation and improved foreign trade reforms. Technical aid would continue to concentrate on small farmer agricultural development to promote self-sufficiency in food production.

August 1981.

NOTES

- 1 Andrew F. Westwood, *Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework* (Washington, D.C. 1966), p. 20. For a detailed discussion of the Point IV Programme, see David A. Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943-62* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 72-116.
- 2 Andrew F. Westwood, n. 1
- 3 Ibid., p. 74.
- 4 W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth : A Non-Communist Manifesto* (London, 1960), p. 3. Development through successive stages has been the accepted path of development within the international development organizations. The influence of such development thinking could be observed in the Report of the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which reads as follows: "What we must keep clearly before us is that development is a process in the course of which all countries, including our own, pass through various stages. We must be prepared to adapt our assistance flows flexibly to conform to the mix of needs at any one time resulting from the stages which the various countries have reached. And with a reasonable amount of luck and good sense we can anticipate between now and the ends of the century a steady shift to what we are accustomed to regard as relatively normal economic and financial relations among all the nations of the world." Report by Edwin M. Martin, Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee, *Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 1969), p. 131.
- 5 Michael P. Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World* (London, 1977), pp. 337-9. See also Hollis B. Chenery and Allan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development" (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, Office of Programme Co-ordination, Discussion Paper No. 7 (Revised), June 1965). By extending the Harrod-Domar model, Chenery and Strout argued that foreign assistance could facilitate or substitute for local resources that are necessary for economic growth. "The local resources that can be augmented through foreign assistance fall into three general categories: (i) the supply of skills and organizational ability; (ii) the supply of investable resources; (iii) the supply of imported commodities and services." (p. 6)
- 6 For details, see W.A. Lewis, "Economic Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labour," *The Manchester School*, 22, May 1954 : pp. 139-92. The theory was later articulated by Fei and Ranis. See G. Ranis and J.C.H. Fei, "A Theory of Economic Development," *American Economic Review* (Nashville, US), Vol. 51, September 1961, pp. 533-65.
- 7 For details, see Todaro, n. 5, pp. 186-200.
- 8 See John W. Mellor, *The Economics of Agricultural Development* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966). See also Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby, *Agriculture and Structural Transformation in Late-Developing Countries* (New York, 1975). The recognition of the importance of agricultural development with some of the background reasons has been explained by the 1966 Report of the Chairman of the DAC as follows: "Many elements have contributed to this trend, as varied as the dire neo-Malthusian predictions of population growth exceeding the rate of increase of food production, the gradual disappearance of rapidly available food surpluses, the heavy foreign exchange burden on some less-developed countries of importing large amounts of food, and the belief that a country's economic development will be greatly accelerated if greater progress can be made in rural development. The Indian famine crisis has demonstrated all too clearly how narrow the margin is between life and starvation. This emphasis on agriculture is evident in the activities of the IBRD, the new American food programme now before Congress and in recent pronouncements made by the French and British Governments. The problem involves both current food supply and the expansion of food production."

- Report by Willard L. Thorp, Chairman of the DAC, *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, September 1966), p. 68. For a detailed discussion of the problem of food production and distribution in LDC's and the kinds of capital and technical assistance needed to increase agricultural production, see pp. 77-85. However, the programme stressed the foreign exchange components of assistance programmes and the means of increasing agricultural production to provide sufficient foreign exchange to import goods and technical equipment from the Developed Countries.
- 9 See Arthur T. Mosher, *Getting Agriculture Moving* (New York, 1966), and his *Creating a Progressive Rural Structure* (New York, 1969).
 - 10 For details, see Carl Gotsch, "Economics, Institutions and Employment Generation in Rural Areas," in Edgar O. Edwards, (Ed.), *Employment in Developing Nations* (New York, 1974), pp. 136-8.
 - 11 For a critique, see James P. Grant, "Development: The End of Trickle-Down?" *Foreign Policy* (New York), Vol. 12, 1973, pp. 43-65; and his "Accelerating Progress Through Social Justice," *International Development Review* (Washington, D.C.) Vol. 14, no. 3, 1972: pp. 2-9.
 - 12 A critique of the neo-classical economists' approach to agricultural development in the Third World countries has been provided by Alain de Janvry, "The Political Economy of Rural Development in Latin America: An Interpretation," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* (Lexington, K.Y.), Vol. 57, no. 3, 1975, pp. 490-9.
 - 13 See Arthur T. Mosher, *Getting Agriculture Moving*, n. 9.
 - 14 For details see Hung-chao Tai, *Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis* (Berkeley, 1974); and Peter Dorner, *Land Reform and Economic Development* (Baltimore, 1972).
 - 15 See Michael Nelson, *The Development of Tropical Lands: Policy Issues in Latin America* (Baltimore, 1974).
 - 16 For the concept of political development, see Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston, 1966).
 - 17 See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, 1966). See also Henry Maddick, *Democracy, Decentralisation and Development* (Bombay, 1963).
 - 18 For the concept of institution-building as an important component in the local development administrative process see Milton J. Esman, "The Elements of Institution-Building," in Joseph W. Eaton (Ed.), *Institution-Building and Development: From Concepts to Application* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1972), pp. 19-40. See also his, "The Politics of Development Administration," in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin, (Eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York, 1966).
 - 19 See Lucian W. Pye, n. 16, p. 75.
 - 20 See S.N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago), Vol. 12, 1964, p. 375. These arguments are summarized in Tai, n. 14, pp. 424-5. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968), pp. 433-60.
 - 21 The green revolution strategy for agricultural development is derived basically from the Western (mainly American) model of development. See Harry M. Cleaver, Jr., "The Contradictions of the Green Revolution," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 62, May 1972, pp. 177-8. At present the transfer of this technology to agriculture has been institutionalized by Land Grant College Research Centres, private foundations (Rockefeller and Ford Foundations), and multinational corporations involved in what is loosely called agribusiness. The transfer is also assisted by bilateral and multilateral organizations such as the USAID, World Bank or the UNDP. For details, see Lester R. Brown, *Seeds of Changes: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970's* (New

York, 1970). For a critique, see Rene Dumont, "The 'Cultural Revolution' of Lester Brown," *FAO Review on Development* (Rome), July-August 1975.

In general, the approach emphasized the capitalist model of agricultural development and the adaptation of American farming techniques to less developing countries. Although it seems illogical to consider the increase in agricultural yields as a revolution, the "Green Revolution" has brought dramatic changes in a number of countries both in terms of increasing agricultural production and in achieving an acceptable balance between food production and population growth. In addition, the technological process has also required farmers to change production styles, government to change its attitudes towards rural areas and infrastructure to be built to exploit the rural areas and stimulate industrial development. In order to implement these programmes, green revolution strategies required that certain principles be followed. These included the selection of rich and agriculturally fertile areas where the limiting factors were minimal and the distribution of the whole set of technological packages (fertilizers, seeds, etc.) to selected regions on the basis of experimentation and demonstration in order to facilitate the adoption of new high-yielding varieties. In practice, this research and innovation was designed to preserve the stability of agriculture in that area and to maintain harmonious, co-operative relationships between landlords and tenants. For the theoretical analysis see Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution* (Cambridge, 1974).

- 22 For the theoretical treatment of this subject, see William F. Whyte, *Organizing for Agricultural Development* (New Brunswick, 1975).
- 23 See Uma J. Lele and John W. Mellor, "Jobs, Poverty and the Green Revolution," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 21, 1972, pp. 20-32.
- 24 For some of these explanations, see Pan. A. Yotopoulos and Jeffrey A. Nugent, *Economics of Development: Empirical Investigations* (New York, 1976).
- 25 For details, see Francine Frankel, *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs* (Princeton, N.J., 1971); Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change*, n. 21; D.J. Greenland, "Bringing the Green Revolution to the Shifting Cultivator," *Science* (Washington), Vol. 190, no. 28, 1975, pp. 841-44; Stanley Johnson, *The Green Revolution* (New York, 1972); Russell King, "Geographical Perspectives of the Green Revolution: Review Article," *Tijdschrift Voor Econ., en. Soc. Geografie*, Vol. 64, no. 4, 1973; pp. 237-44; and Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, no. 3, 1969, pp. 464-76.
- 26 For details, see Lester B. Pearson (Chairman), *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York, 1969). The problems surrounding aid allocation and implementation of the Pearson Commission's recommendations have been discussed by Michael Lipton, "Aid Allocation When Aid is Inadequate: Problems of the Non-Implementation of the Pearson Report," Reprinted from: *Foreign Resources and Economic Development: A Symposium on the Report of the Pearson Commission* by T.J. Byers, (Ed.) (London, 1972).
- 27 As stated by the Chairman of the DAC Report, development for the LDC was perceived as a moral obligation for the DC and the rationale for the 1 per cent target was based on this assumption. It was stated that "The 1 per cent target does not constitute a legally binding obligation. But it is a moral and political commitment on the part of the developed countries to make their best effort to reach it as soon as possible, though the degree to which this is accepted, or even known, throughout the political system varies from country to country." Report by Edwin M. Martin, Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee, December 1969, n. 4, p. 123.
- 28 See Lester B. Pearson, n. 26, pp. 14-22.
- 29 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, "A New Strategy for Development," *Commercial Bank of Ethiopia Market Report* (Addis Ababa, November-December 1976), p. 7.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

- 31 For a preliminary inquiry into this problem, see Seleshi Sisaye, "The Role of Social Sciences in Rural Development Planning: The Case of Ethiopia," *African Studies Review*, 21 December 1978, p. 75-85.
- 32 As explained by USAID, "The MPP Programme [Phase I] does not address the land tenure constraint directly, but relies on the 'model lease' concept in some areas to attempt to secure a modicum of security from eviction for tenant farmer participants in the programme. It is however, unclear to what extent 'model lease' arrangements have served to reduce the rate of, or deter, eviction in MP areas." United States Agency for International Development, "1974 Development Assistance Programme: Ethiopia" (Washington, D.C.; USAID, April 1974), p. 53. The policy of land reform from the Third Five Year Development Plan and later MPP I only concentrated on legislative regulation of the landlord/tenant relationship, land registration and progressive taxation of unutilized land, or in general, measures to regulate tenancy rather than enacting structural reforms that would have at least partially solved the land tenure difficulty. For details of the tenancy reform, see Ministry of Land Reforms and Administration (MLRA), "Draft Proclamation to provide for the Regulation of Agricultural Tenancy Relationships" 1970 (Internal Memorandum, presented to Parliament in 1971, Addis Ababa, 1971).
- 33 See Seleshi Sisaye, "Foreign Aid and Rural Development in Ethiopia: A Study of the Role of International Donor Organizations in Agricultural Development Programmes," *International Studies* (New Delhi), forthcoming.
- 34 For example, the members of the DAC at a "... High Level Meeting held in Tokyo... agreed that their contribution to multilateral institutions should not be tied and a large majority also agreed that regular bilateral development loans should be untied. They requested that the necessary technical arrangements be made to ensure that such funds were used by developing countries on the basis of truly competitive international trading." Report by Edwin M. Martin, Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee, *Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 1970), p. 15. For the rationale of untying aid, see pp. 52-6.
- 35 Ibid., p. 133. For the problems and action taken pursuant to the Pearson Commission recommendation, see Ibid., pp. 134-42.
- 36 See Robert McNamara, "Address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank," Nairobi, 24 September 1973.
- 37 See Hollis Chenery, et. al., (Eds.), *Redistribution With Growth* (London, 1974).
- 38 For details, see Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem," in Chenery, et. al., (Eds.), Ibid., pp. 7-37. He reported that in about half of the LDCs, the income share of the lowest 40 per cent averages 9 per cent of the total. With the exception of China, about 60 per cent of the population of these countries fall below the poverty line defined by US \$ 50 per capita and about half fall below US \$ 75 per capita (examples are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.), pp. 7-11.
- 39 For details, see Andrew Westwood, and David A. Baldwin, n. 1 and Goran Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered* (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Publications No. 19,649, February 1966).
- 40 The most persuasive discussion to date has been provided by Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," *International Development Review* (Washington D.C.), Vol. 11, December 1969, pp. 2-6. Seers challenged the conventional definition of economic growth in terms of an increase in the level of GNP and argued that the purpose of development is not to increase GNP but to directly reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality.
- 41 See Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever, *The Common Aid Effort* (Ohio, 1967). p. 7. They investigated how "... the 'development diplomacy' that is emerging in the DAC as a common aid forum is well attuned to a world in which national interests and international decision-making still predominate over global interests. The DAC's

development diplomacy assists both donors and recipients to achieve certain national objectives they hold in common. More particularly, it assists the donors by enabling them to perceive their national interests in terms of larger objectives and wider perspectives than would be the case if, there were no common aid forum. Because it has influenced donor governments to alter their foreign aid policies in certain significant respects, DAC diplomacy is becoming a factor in the revolutionary surge against poverty and backwardness." p. 6.

42 See Samuel P. Huntington, n. 20.

43 See Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, *Development Reconsidered: Bridging the Gap Between Government and People* (Lexington, Massachusetts; 1972). Owens and Shaw addressed themselves to the need to redirect US Aid programmes from a concentration on modern factories and large farms to a focus on small scale farmers, artisans and in general to the needs of the poor people in the LDC's. They stressed how US Aid through broad-based development strategies could establish "...institutions which would give the underprivileged person in the poor countries an opportunity to participate in decisions most important to his life." They added that, "...by mobilizing local energies in this way, the poor can be encouraged to invest more in their own futures, to raise their incomes through higher production, and to have a greater say in the distribution of that production. Development thus can become a process in which all the people in the poor countries participate as opposed to merely the elites who are at present monopolizing the economic, social, and political benefits of development." (p. 3) For the concept of institution-building as an important component in the local development process, see Esman, "Institution-Building;" and his, "Development Administration and Constituency Organization," *Public Administration Review* (Lahore), Vol. 38 March/April 1978, pp. 166-72.

44 For example, the importance of indigenous organization in irrigation programmes has been provided by E. Walter Coward, Jr., "Indigenous Irrigation, Bureaucracy and Development: The Case of Irrigation," *Journal of Development Studies* (London), Vol 13, no, 1 1976, pp. 92-105. The study shows how indigenous organizations if effectively used could be important in local development programmes.

45 The importance of small farmer involvement in local development programmes has been provided by Robert Chambers, *Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experiences from East Africa* (Uppsala, 1974); and William F. Whyte, "Toward a New Strategy for Research and Development in Agriculture: Helping Small Farmers in Developing Countries," prepared for the Summer Institute on Science and Technology for Developing Nations (Ithaca, 11 July-6 August 1976, mimeo.)

46 For example, USAID has prepared "Social Soundness Analysis" guidelines to study the impact of development on the target population and to devise the means to incorporate local inputs and knowledge into the development programme.

47 Guy Hunter, *The Best of Both Worlds: A Challenge on Development Policies in Africa* (London, 1967), p. 130. See also his, *Modernizing Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa* (London, 1969).

48 See Milton J. Esman, n. 18.

49 See Milton J. Esman, "Landlessness and Near-landlessness in Developing Countries" (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978, mimeo.)

CAN INDIA MAINTAIN EQUIDISTANCE FROM THE SUPER POWERS?

AN interesting statement made by Mrs. Indira Gandhi while inaugurating the first convention of the Friends of the Soviet Union (a society set up recently by elements in Congress (I) who had broken away from the CPI-sponsored Indo-Soviet Cultural Society), on 27 May 1981, deserves attention. She said that it was wrong to interpret non-alignment as equidistance from the Super Powers.¹ It may be pointed out that the policy of non-alignment was evolved to serve India's national interest; according to the National Interest Model, stability, security or strategic, economic, political and ideological or democratic interests constitute the main variables of national interest. One has to see as to how India's national interest has been served in the best way.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Scholars, academicians and specialists engaged in the study of India's relations with the United States and the USSR have often referred to "democracy" and "open society" as common and binding threads between India and the United States, and "Russia's totalitarian and communist system" as totally antagonistic to India's aspirations to develop as a free democratic society. But paradoxically, the reality is otherwise. The relations between India and the United States, the world's two largest democracies, have always been far from meeting each other's requirements. Although in the post-war era America pledged itself to make the world safe for democracy, yet the ideal, "democracy", could become one of the major elements of US foreign policy only outwardly in that very period. The protection of the business interests of the multinationals and monopoly houses all over the world, which became one of the major planks of American foreign policy, practically overshadowed the ideal "democracy," so much so, that America started supporting the military juntas engaged in crushing and vanquishing the democratic forces in the rest of the world. On the one hand, policy-makers at Capitol Hill forcefully pleaded that their policies were framed to uphold the principles of liberty and freedom at the global level, on the other, they emphatically advanced the concept of national security, which led them to engage in imperialistic adventures like those in Vietnam, Chile, El Salvador and Pakistan, as their primary objective. Thus the two objectives came to be so competitive and at times so conflicting that they threatened India's national interests.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Soviet foreign policy in the post-war period on the other hand, considered the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding as best subserving

its objectives. Its principle of peaceful co-existence has not only tried to avert war but also encouraged the third world countries to stand as a non-aligned but joint bulwark against the imperialistic and hegemonistic designs of the West in general and America in particular. In spite of being a socialist democracy it has never liked to interfere in the internal affairs of the liberal bourgeois democracies in the Third World. Not only in joint communiques, issued from time to time, but otherwise also it has respected the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of third world countries. It has also consistently fought against racialism, *apartheid* and neo-colonialism. Further, it has extended moral support to third world countries in the North-South Dialogue and encouraged them not to permit the capitalist West to buy their raw materials at a throwaway price and thus perpetuate their merciless exploitation. The Soviets have also helped them to establish a genuine egalitarian social structure by adopting progressive measures if they desired.

INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST MODEL

The Kashmir Question

All these national objectives of Soviet foreign policy have suited India's national interest. Moved by the idealism of the United Nations as a great centre of settling international disputes on the basis of merit, Jawaharlal Nehru took the Kashmir Question there in the hope that Pakistan would be condemned as an aggressor. But what resulted was quite contrary. The appellant for justice was put in the dock. In its approach on Kashmir the United States depended for some time on Britain which had fathered Pakistan in order to keep India weak. The Kashmir Question gave Britain a chance to keep India in perpetual confrontation with Pakistan to achieve its objective. Soon afterwards, America got a chance to mother Pakistan to serve its global national interest of containing communism and consequently supported the Ayub regime on Kashmir. The old ideal of keeping the world safe for democracy was thrown to the winds.

Although initially the Soviet Union remained indifferent to the Kashmir Question, after Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union, India gained recognition for the integrity of the Indian frontiers in Kashmir late in 1955. In the course of the Soviet leaders' visit to India in November 1955, Khrushchev supported India's position. "It was not necessary," he said, "to make any changes in the borders of India and Pakistan as some other countries wanted to do."² Khrushchev refused to comply with the Pakistani request that he and Bulganin should not visit Kashmir. His strongest pronouncement was made in Srinagar itself. His hosts were jubilant when Khrushchev declared: "The question of Kashmir as one of the states of India has been decided by the peoples of Kashmir."³ Again at a public meeting he stated: "Send us a call if you are in trouble. We are just across your border."⁴

Liberation of Goa

When India liberated Goa, the Americans were annoyed. They described it as an aggression against the territory of one of the NATO Power's. Such an approach on the part of the Americans was bound to hurt Indian sentiments but they were soon to be compensated by Moscow's approval. Soviet leaders gave full support to India's action appreciating it as a successful continuation of the struggles for national liberation from Western colonial domination. Actually speaking, it was their support of the Indian positions on emotionally charged Goa and Kashmir issues that endeared the two Soviet leaders, Khrushchev and Bulganin, to Indian hearts during their visit to the country. The timings of their statements on Goa were particularly opportune as they came directly before and after the meeting between American Secretary of State, Dulles, and the Portuguese Foreign Minister D'Cunha. It was rumoured that Dulles had publicly referred to Goa as a "Portuguese Province" and that the United States might even consider the defence of Goa as a part of its NATO obligations. In contrast, on 27 November, Bulganin declared that "there is no justification for the Portuguese colony of Goa to exist still on the ancient soil of India. It is a shame on civilized people."⁵ In his colourful idiom Khrushchev, three days later, compared the Portuguese reluctance to let go off Goa "to the reluctance of a leach to part from the body whose blood it is sucking."⁶

National Economic Interest

The problem of India maintaining equidistance between the two Super Powers becomes all the more impossible once one studies the issue purely in terms of the national economic interest. It is abundantly clear that India's national interest has been best served by fast developing economic co-operation between India and the Soviet Union in comparison to the progress made in the same field with the West in general, and the United States in particular. Besides the economic aid given by the USSR for the growth and development of the public sector that is gradually enabling India to be self-reliant, trade is a major thread in Indo-Soviet co-operation. It has increased many times over since India became independent. It is no exaggeration to say that such an impressive growth in trade is one of the greatest achievements of Indo-Soviet friendship and co-operation.

AMERICA TILTS TOWARDS PAKISTAN

Since the signing of the military pact between America and Pakistan in 1954 the former had not only involved the latter in the aggressive network of the MEDO (later known as CENTO), and the SEATO, but also poured at least \$ 4 billion worth of arms and sold dangerous hardware like the F-16 fighter aeroplanes on such a massive scale that India's national security and defence was threatened. At this juncture, the theory of equidistance between the two Super Powers became obsolete and defunct. Still further,

the newly emerging Pindi-Peking-Washington axis had tried to encircle and isolate India. At such a movement it was in the best interest of India's security to view its non-alignment in that context and sign the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Security and Friendship. Judged in the light of the later developments taking place across India's border, the Indo-Soviet Treaty has acquired more and more relevance to the serving of India's national interest. The concrete assistance rendered by the Soviet Union by putting its own naval fleet to confront the American Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pak War of 1970-71 has proved once for all the validity of the famous proverb: "A friend in need is a friend indeed." In future also, it is largely believed, the Soviets would stand true to their words if an armed conflict were to occur between India and Pakistan. Thus Indo-Soviet ties have acquired maturity, devoid of irrationalism.

On the other hand, the Americans have behaved in an unfriendly manner with India. It is true they have rendered substantial assistance to India on the food front and rural community development, yet they have always discouraged India from acquiring self-sufficiency on the industrial front, whether civil or military. Whenever India demanded any economic aid on this front, particularly the one related to the public sector, the multinationals and private bourgeois enterprises have tried to jump in with ulterior motives of exploitation or, whenever any aid came, it was tied with strings like devaluation of the rupee and import liberalisation.

On the occasion of an armed conflict taking place between India and Pakistan, Americans have never really tilted in favour of India. Whenever the Democrats were in power, they tried to mediate between India and Pakistan to bring the war to an end. But the Republicans, being in power, have openly sided with Pakistan both materially and morally.

Moreover, there has been a fundamental difference of approach by the leaders of the Super Powers towards their counterparts in India. Acheson found it difficult to work with Nehru, while Khrushchev took him as a sincere friend and one who was doing everything to achieve international brotherhood. Kissinger called Krishna Menon a dangerous, poisonous cobra; Gromyko regarded him as a great talented diplomat. Nixon hated Mrs. Indira Gandhi and described her as "that Lady," Brezhnev honoured her as a true patriot. Nixon and Kissinger threatened India's national sovereignty by sending the Seventh Fleet and arming Pakistan to the teeth during the war fought for the liberation of Bangladesh. The same thing Reagan and Haig are planning to do now when war clouds are hovering over India's horizon. The testing time of the Friendship Treaty has come and it is largely believed that the Soviets would honour it faithfully. In such a situation anybody pleading for equidistance between the United States and Russia would be considered foolhardy.

The last thing that could have helped maintain friendly links between India and the United States is also going to be over. The Reagan Administration has practically decided to end the eighteen-year old nuclear

cooperation accord with India by stopping the supply of nuclear fuel to the Tarapur Plant. The unfortunate decision has again exposed the selfish designs of the United States. While it agreed to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty only after acquiring near monopoly of nuclear arsenals, it has discouraged any effort made by the major non-aligned third world countries to have their own nuclear capability, so much so that it has secretly collaborated with Israel in its recent invasion and destruction of the Iraqi nuclear plant. Whatever one may say on such issues, one thing is certain that the latest United States decision would further embitter the two unfriendly friends.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union does not mind the acquisition of nuclear capability by third world countries. Rather it would try to help India come out of troubled waters.

EXPANSION OF DIEGO GARCIA ENDANGERS INDIA'S SECURITY

Still another factor that has widened the gulf between India and the United States is the building and expansion of the United States base on the Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. In disregard of international norms, the United States avers its divine right, so to say, to send special deployment forces there. It is said that in July 1980 seven ships had taken supplies there for a brigade of 12,000 US marines and several squadrons of the United States Air Force. By the end of the same year when Reagan was declared elected President, an amphibious brigade of US marines was stationed in the Indian Ocean. For the year ending in October 1981, the United States Defence Department has allocated \$850 billion for the ground forces and the ships and planes which would move them. B-52 bombers may also use the Diego Garcia base; \$39 million is likely to be spent by the United States for widening the runway which would permit them to take off from the Indian Ocean base.

The building of the Diego Garcia base has endangered India's security. Since it is only 1,200 miles from the Indian territory, any confrontation between the Super Powers around this island would seriously interfere with Indian shipping. Moreover, it revives the tragic memories of the past when in the 17th and 18th centuries, Western imperialist Powers began to anchor at Indian harbours or ports and gradually enslaved the entire country. India does not want a repetition of this.

Ever since the Lusaka Declaration of September 1970, India has never missed an opportunity to press for the Indian Ocean being made a zone of peace. The Soviet Union has consistently supported Indian statements. It has also deliberately kept a low profile. Speaking at a public meeting in the beginning of June 1981, organized by the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation in New Delhi, the Soviet Ambassador to India, Yuli Vorontsov, rightly said that "our country does not at all want the emergence of a situation of military confrontation of the USSR and the USA in the Indian Ocean." Dwelling on the threat to peace in and around the Indian Ocean,

he noted that the American military presence in the region was "unprecedented in peace time" and its naval concentration "the largest since the Second World War." Vorontsov said his country firmly stood for the implementation of the United Nations decision to hold an international conference on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka.

Non-alignment has been the pivotal principle of Indian foreign policy, but the leaders of some Western countries, including America, have never appreciated it. John Foster Dulles called it immoral and his successors, with minor exceptions, still persist with that stand. They also continue to accuse India for being insincere in its foreign policy approach.

Not only this, even some of Nehru's most bitter critics in opposition parties and also within the right-wing section of the Congress Party, used to accuse him for not following a policy of non-alignment but leaning towards some socialist countries. Therefore, when this section came to power in 1977, initially there was some apprehension in certain quarters that the Janata Government might, with its stress on "genuine" non-alignment, seek to move away from the "close" relationship with the Soviet Union. At a press conference held soon after Morarji Desai assumed office as Prime Minister on 24 March 1977, he said that the government would follow a policy of "proper" non-alignment. He also said that the government would not wish to have any special relationship with any one country. Obviously he had the Soviet Union in mind when he made this observation; for it is often asserted that the twenty years' Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation between India and the Soviet Union signed in August 1971 had established "special relations between the two countries." Commenting on this treaty the new Prime Minister said that if it meant that India should not have friendship with other countries, then it would have to change. "At least we will not act upon it in that manner." Again four days later, addressing the first joint session of the Sixth Parliament, the Acting President, B.D. Jatti, stated that the new government would follow a path of genuine non-alignment.

However, the Morarji Government was forced by circumstances to retreat from this oft-quoted stand for the sake of national interest. In a speech at Moscow during an official sojourn, Morarji Desai emphasized on 3 November 1977, that Indo-Soviet relations were "not based on personalities or ideologies but on equality, national interest and common purposes." Even his Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, ignored what the Soviet Press had been saying about the Jana Sangh till the beginnings of 1977 and gratefully recalled "the consistent and principled support given by the Soviet Union to India on matters of vital interest to us." In a Joint Indo-Soviet Declaration signed on 26 October 1977 it was admitted that India could not afford to give up its "special relationship" with the Soviet Union.

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NOTES

- 1 *Times of India* (New Delhi), 28 May 1981, p. 1.
- 2 *The Hindu* (Madras), 11 December 1955.
- 3 *Times of India*, 12 December 1955.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 *Times of India*, 28 November 1955.
- 6 Ibid., 1 December 1955.
- 7 *Patriot* (New Delhi).

APLOMB OR THE BOMB: OUTLOOK FOR INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

WITHIN the next few years a nuclear confrontation could occur between India and Pakistan. Each has a nuclear development programme and an animosity for the other which could lead to war. Their conflict stems from fear much more than anything else, as each nation competes for power and influence in South Asia and views the other as a threat to its own ambitions.

The conflict between India and Pakistan, based upon ancient differences between Hindus and Muslims, has a long history of exploitation and intensification by outsiders, beginning with the British Raj. For two hundred years the British played upon and intensified the differences until the Indian Empire came to be divided into two separate countries. The United States, the Soviet Union and China have also over the last thirty years heightened and inflamed tensions further, as India and Pakistan have allowed themselves, willingly or unwillingly, to become pawns in the Super Power global strategies. The conflict has become larger and more dangerous to global peace as a result of Super Power involvement as well as nuclear proliferation. It would benefit both countries to turn away from this threatening trend and pursue a course which would enable the realization of peace and security.

Further, the resolution of the Indo-Pakistani conflict would suit American interests, and the latter could play a major role in facilitating it. American influence, in at least one respect, has an edge over that of the Soviets and Chinese. Unlike the other two, the United States poses no threat of invasion to the sub-continent. Americans would do well to recognize their advantage and seize this opportunity, but do so only with purpose and commitment. Any peace proposals emanating from Washington must be founded on a firm understanding of the essential antagonism which separates India and Pakistan. If the basis of the conflict can be resolved, then the Super Power rivalry and nuclear proliferation which feed on it may be put to an end.

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

Religion is the likely source of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. One thousand years ago nearly all inhabitants of the sub-continent adhered to the Hindu faith. Over the following centuries, however, migrating Muslims from northwest Asia spread the Islamic creed across India, though they were then, and remain even today, a minority on the sub-continent. Most Muslims in India converted from Hinduism, the majority from the community of the "untouchables," because of a variety of social, economic and political, as well as religious reasons. By the 20th century the land was split by the disputes which developed between these two groups.

Beginning in the 18th century, the British conquest of India intensified

Hindu-Muslim differences and created others more deleterious. Recognizing opportunity in the differences, the British played off one group against the other for the benefit of the empire. In time they built all the principalities and states of the sub-continent into a colossal united India, but simultaneously heightened native controversies.

Generally and relatively, the British presence in India caused the Hindus to advance while the Muslims fell behind. Many Hindus benefited from direct contact with the British. By chance, they dominated the coasts where the British settled, resulting in their adoption of Western educational systems and institutions. Then again, most native middle-class professionals and civil servants in British India were Hindu.

In contrast, the large concentration of Muslims in the northwest lacked direct contact with the British, and thus retained traditional ways. These Muslims remained farmers or soldiers while a Hindu bourgeoisie developed. By the time of independence the Hindus were by far the dominant native force in the economy and the government.

It is imperative to realize that what originally had been a religious difference assumed with time overt economic and political significance. Under British tutelage the Hindus gained considerable economic and political advantages over the Muslims. The establishment of an Islamic homeland, Pakistan, was sought by most Muslims not nearly so much for religious freedom as for economic and political reasons.

Great Britain promised independence to India for the latter's role in World War II. Britain's haste to relinquish the Indian Empire was evident as the independence date, 15 August 1947, was set in June of the same year. By that time, however, Hindus and Muslims had grown so distant that the unity of the sub-continent was seemingly impossible to maintain.

A hastily and poorly conceived partition plan resulted from British anxiety to withdraw. Each principality and state comprising the former empire was allowed to cede either to India or Pakistan. Though most of the Indian Empire remained united, huge portions ceded to the new state of Pakistan. Separated by one thousand miles and joined by a single government, two large areas with Muslim majorities were forged into the new Islamic nation.

The partition plan created more problems than it solved. A direct outcome was that India and Pakistan became hovering threats to each other. This engendered mutual paranoia between the two, imported the Cold War into the subcontinent, and spawned three wars within the following 23 years.

From the beginning India and Pakistan suspected each other's intentions. This was largely because the British assets had not been fairly allocated. While India was larger, wealthier and stronger, Pakistan which was smaller in size tried to induce favourable cedings wherever it could, from areas which had not opted for India. Pakistanis feared Indian revenge for their dissent from the motherland, whereas Indians feared Pakistani encroachment on their predominance in South Asia.

The Cold War spread to the sub-continent as a result of the partition. American designs for containment of Communism following World War II brought the United States into South Asia in search of allies. India would have been the ideal adjunct for this cause, but the government embraced Prime Minister Nehru's fledgling doctrine of non-alignment. American efforts then focused on poorer and weaker Pakistan, whose government seized the alliance as an opportunity to enhance its strength and security. In response to this and the Sino-Indian border war some ten years later, India developed close relations with the Soviet Union, thus bringing to the sub-continent the confrontation of the two Super Powers.

The antagonisms created, rather than solved, by the partition led to the outbreak of three wars within a single generation. In 1948 Pakistani troops entered Kashmir to quash local violence, which was believed to have been instigated by Pakistan as a pretext for invasion. Kashmir, not yet ceded to either Pakistan or India, joined India only after the Pakistani invasion, in order to receive Indian military aid for defense. A United Nations Command was established in Kashmir shortly thereafter to solve this dispute, but was unable to prevent renewed combat in 1965. The third war erupted in 1971, when India aided East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in its struggle for independence.

The conflict between India and Pakistan, with religion as its source, was thus manipulated by the British until it assumed apparently insurmountable economic and political proportions. To a lesser degree such inequality between Hindus and Muslims had existed centuries before the British conquest, but the British intentionally and unintentionally intensified this disparity to the point where separation was demanded and enacted. The separation however, did not solve the differences, but created further menacing strife.

WHY THE CONFLICT CONTINUES

The ominous nature of the Indo-Pakistani conflict has not diminished over the past thirty years. Three wars have not yet purged the fear and furore from the sub-continent, as even more perilous threats have arisen. Rampant paranoia, heightened by nuclear proliferation and Super Power rivalry continues.

Pakistan fears India's strength, which outclasses it in nearly every comparison of power. To confront this threat, the former has placed a tremendous emphasis on developing its defense structure, and now seeks nuclear capability. Atomic power, Pakistan believes, can neutralize India's supremacy of size, military capability and levels of industrialization.

In contrast, India fears Pakistan's weakness. Under the direction of General Zia-ul-Haq the country's political climate has become increasingly volatile. In 1977 Zia seized power in a *coup d'etat* which ousted the heavily criticized, but popularly elected, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, founder

of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). In the four years since, Zia has postponed federal democratic elections twice, executed Bhutto, and sentenced Bhutto's widow and daughter to house arrest. Mrs. Bhutto and her daughter led the PPP, the party which won the maximum number of seats in the local elections held in September 1979. One month later, Zia banned all political activity in Pakistan, so that no effective organized opposition exists today. The severe lack of genuine support for, as well as real opposition to General Zia puts the government in a tenuous position.

Pakistan's instability threatens the security of India. Indians fear Zia; as an unpopular leader heading an exceedingly unpopular government confronted with massive economic and ethnic problems, he could start a war to keep himself in power. Then again, there are other destabilizing conditions caused by Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's northern neighbour. Pakistan is one of the poorest countries, yet billions of dollars are spent on both its military and nuclear development programmes. The impoverished nation is further strained by the presence of two million Afghan refugees. Ethnic problems culminated in civil strife from 1973 to 1977; the government fought separatist Baluchi tribes strung along the Iran and Afghan borders. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, however, has temporarily allied the anti-communist Baluchis with the Zia regime. Though the Soviet threat bolsters Zia's position, it increases the pressures upon his government. Confronted with such economic and political crises, Indians fear that Zia may externalize his country's internal problems upon the traditional enemy, India.

Then again, nuclear proliferation has spread to the sub-continent where arsenals of Armageddon may appear tomorrow. After India detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1974, Pakistan announced intentions to do the same; it today verges on that goal. India's oft-repeated statement that its nuclear power is solely for peaceful purposes is considered dubious despite apparent restraint on nuclear weapons' production. Pakistan likewise claims its intentions to be peaceful. Still it seems certain that nuclear weapons would appear shortly in both countries making the conflict all the more dangerous. The threat of nuclear weapons increases hostility between the two countries as it erodes what little faith each had in the other's "peaceful" intentions.

Super Power rivalry on the sub-continent continues; the pattern of outside interference retarding the prospects for peace in India and Pakistan. The United States, the Soviet Union and, more recently, the People's Republic of China have manipulated the Indo-Pakistani conflict to further their own interests, and in the process have created a loose but dangerous frame of alliances. For over thirty years the United States alternately has wooed, argued and reconciled with Pakistan. At the same time, the USSR has maintained close relations with India than with any other non-communist country. China has sent all forms of aid to Pakistan since the Sino-Indian border War in 1961. A facile interpretation leads to Sino-Pakistan-American

and Indo-Soviet alliances; such an interpretation, however, is not wholly accurate. The United States maintains reasonably friendly ties with India, the Soviet Union sends considerable amounts of aid to Pakistan to compete with Chinese influence, and any alliance which exists between China and the United States is only of a temporary nature. Nonetheless, if these perceived alliances were to become established, a dangerous position would emerge; Pakistan would become wedged between the Soviet Union and India and India between Pakistan and China. The Soviet Union would be surrounded by American allies Pakistan and China, and China by the Soviet Union and India. Each member fears encirclement, an indubitably threatening situation for all.

The alignment of India and Pakistan with the Super Powers thus has dangerous consequences. At first it may seem a beneficial arrangement; India and Pakistan get all forms of aid, and the Super Powers get additional spheres of influence and allies in their global struggle. But India and Pakistan are much more volatile than are the Super Powers directly, especially the United States and the USSR and any short term benefits of the alliances would be annihilated along with everything else if a nuclear war were to erupt.

PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

Reconciling Mutual Paranoia

The source of continuing conflict, mutual paranoia, fans its own fire as it promotes nuclear proliferation and Super Power rivalry on the sub-continent. Accordingly, Indians and Pakistanis can resolve their conflict peacefully if, and only if, this mutual paranoia is extinguished.

Reconciling this contention requires more than the bi-partisan effort of the two antagonists; only with the co-operation of the United States, the Soviet Union and China can India and Pakistan strive towards lasting peace on a non-aligned, non-nuclear sub-continent. This goal is desirable because it frees the region from the struggle of the Super Powers and the danger of nuclear annihilation which threaten to consume the sub-continent.

Mutual paranoia will subside if India and Pakistan realize common interests and demonstrate non-aggressive intentions. A good starting point for this endeavour is Kashmir. A settlement in this northern region, the subject of dispute and war since partition, is a prerequisite for peace on the sub-continent. Once accord is reached on this contentious issue the spirit of co-operation could move forward.

Economic co-operation which unites the fates of India and Pakistan would reduce the likelihood of the two going to war. Furthermore, peace between them would enable the use of much needed finance, currently spent on their militaries, to strengthen other sectors of their economies. Logical co-operative projects are those which seek to secure adequate supplies of energy and food, two major concerns of developing countries in the late 20th century. India, though poor and underdeveloped, has abundant natural

resources, in addition to the third largest pool of scientific and technical manpower in the world. It is able to compete to some extent with American, Soviet and Chinese aid to Pakistan. Of course, Super Power aid to both countries should continue, but for the sake of strengthening the sub-continent as a whole rather than dividing it.

If Pakistan were to establish peace with India, then the former would be saved much of the explosiveness which embroils it today. Super Power competition for influence in Pakistan may increase its status, but close relations with a non-aligned India would increase its security. In such a case, the Soviet Union would be far more unlikely to invade or subvert Pakistan for fear of alienating India. India, however, is unlikely to co-operate on any large-scale development programme until a more stable and democratic government is present in Pakistan.

Once mutual fear has been put to rest, measures may be taken to eliminate nuclear proliferation and Super Power rivalry from the sub-continent. There is little doubt, despite echoed peaceful intentions, that nuclear weapons would appear in India and Pakistan within two to three years. India already has exploded a nuclear device, and Pakistan is trying to do the same. Assuming both countries seek nuclear weapons production, the proliferation of such weapons on the sub-continent would not be halted by a ban on the sale of nuclear equipment and fuels, as such action could be circumvented by both India and Pakistan. Action must therefore be taken to nullify the reasons for which the two countries seek nuclear weapons.

In the case of both India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons thwart what they believe are their major threats. Most likely, Pakistan wants nuclear weapons either because it fears invasion by a vastly superior Indian army, or because of fear of nuclear destruction. India most likely wants nuclear weapons because of fear of invasion or destruction by the nuclear-equipped Chinese, and perhaps by the Soviets too.

If these assumptions are correct they add yet another link to a nuclear chain reaction: Pakistan wants nuclear weapons because India has them; India because China has them; China because the Soviet Union has them; and the Soviet Union because the United States has them. India, however, is unlikely to deploy nuclear weapons against Pakistan, because India considers China to be its major nuclear threat. Still, Pakistan is more likely to direct nuclear weapons against India than against any other country.

Should India and Pakistan eliminate their mutual fear, at least the latter may not feel it needs nuclear weapons if India is no longer a threat. The possibility that Pakistan may accept protection under India's nuclear umbrella should not be discounted as unlikely as it may seem at present. Ideally, both India and Pakistan should agree to a ban on nuclear weapons production, though such a promise would be difficult to keep as long as outside nuclear threats remain.

It is the responsibility of the United States to co-operate with the Soviet Union in establishing effective policies which limit production of nuclear

weapons, and enhance communication between themselves. The secrecy which enveloped nuclear weapons production in the 1960s caused the United States and the USSR to expect the worst from each other. The resulting acceleration of the arms race and sophistication of nuclear weapons was detrimental to the security of both parties.

To prevent a repetition of this tragic history between other nuclear antagonists it is worth considering arms agreements between the Soviet Union and China, China and India, and India and Pakistan. The ever-increasing production of nuclear weapons should be checked immediately, before irreparable destruction is effected. As these weapons spread to less stable countries the likelihood of their use approaches certainty.

Super Power Rivalry Should Be Eliminated

The other major threat to the sub-continent, Super Power rivalry, should also be eliminated. The dangerous pattern of alliances it kindles has been previously stated. The United States, the Soviet Union and China would do well to realize that their own security would be enhanced if they helped to develop a non-aligned sub-continent.

United States' Role

The United States should reassess its relationship with Pakistan. General Zia is notoriously unpopular and his government dangerously unstable. The alienation of Pakistanis from Zia's regime has reached dangerous levels among minority tribes, though some of them have become more loyal since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Baluchis fear US military aid to Pakistan would be used against them, as it has been in the past, should separatist fighting break out anew. In the circumstances, the United States should do all it can to direct aid to the Pakistani people, not the regime alienated from them.

The United States may also try to promote necessary changes in the Government of Pakistan, though its ability to pressure Zia for democratic reform is limited. Zia has postponed democratic elections twice because of fear that his overwhelming unpopularity would lead to defeat. Moreover, his execution of Bhutto would lead to similar treatment should he fall from power. Thus, if Zia will not willingly consent to democratic elections, then the United States should persuade Zia to grant whatever possible concessions to the minorities, as well as the Pakistani people at large. This may be difficult at present, as it seems the United States can influence Zia only by withholding arms sales, an unlikely position given the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Alternatively, the United States can lend moral support to Zia's democratic opposition, while continuing to work with Zia's regime. Perhaps the United States can similarly repeat in Pakistan its policies which helped to lessen the stringency of martial-law rule in South Korea and the Philippines. The United States must do all it can to build a stable

and popular government in Pakistan; only then would India reach an accord with Pakistan.

Second, the United States should reassess its relationship with India also. For too long it has squabbled with India. It is foolish for the world's two largest democracies, with all their common interests, to be constantly at odds. The United States must recognize India for what it is—the strongest and most influential country in South Asia; as such, India has an important role to play in the development of the region. If India is to aid the future development of Pakistan then the United States should discuss its plans towards Pakistan with India. Indian approval of American aid to Pakistan is not necessary, but the latter's present development by the United States should be co-ordinated with India as much as possible. Likewise, US intentions toward India should be discussed with Pakistan. Such co-ordination would help to create the necessary atmosphere of predictability and confidence between the two countries.

Third, the United States should reassure the Soviet Union and China that its co-operation with India and Pakistan is intended not only to serve American interests, but to develop on the sub-continent a healthy neutrality in the interest of all. American efforts must thus be co-ordinated with the Soviet Union and China to some extent, perhaps through a trilateral or United Nations-sponsored commission, because doubts and fears, such as those plaguing India and Pakistan, afflict the United States, the Soviet Union and China as well. If the Super Powers co-operate in establishing this neutrality, then the mutual suspicions which currently make South Asia a hotbed of Super Power rivalry may be diminished. Of course, this would require strong treaties. It is best to start with guarantees of neutrality for South Asian areas such as the Indian Ocean. In a speech in New Delhi in December 1980, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev proposed that the United States and the USSR avoid military build-up in the Indian Ocean. This proposal is unthinkable however, until the Soviet drive toward the Indian Ocean (if that is what it is) is halted, and peace in the Persian Gulf is secured.

Fourth, the United States should prepare itself for the inevitable changes. It should be prepared to take advantage of possible contentions between India and the Soviet Union; however close Indo-Soviet relations maybe now, they could change in the coming years as the two compete for markets and influence in Southwest Asia. Meanwhile, India may rectify its differences with China, whose East Asian interests do not directly conflict with its own. The Soviet Union may become desperate if it feels surrounded by China, India and the United States. Though this Soviet fear may be used to bargain in American favour, it would not serve American interests.

Soviet apprehensions may be allayed by normalization of relations with the United States. Perhaps more than anything in the world a stable relationship is needed between these two Super Powers. The United States can initiate this course by adopting a more cautious approach towards

China. Though an alliance between the United States and China disturbs the Soviet Union, the United States needs this threat in order to bargain with the latter. The delicacy of this situation, however, cannot be over-emphasized.

At the same time, the United States should do nothing which legitimizes Soviet or Chinese control in South Asia. Neither the Soviet-installed regime in Afghanistan, nor the Soviet-allied, Vietnamese-puppet Government in Kampuchea should be given recognition. The United States must also refrain from supporting any alternative Kampuchean government likely to fall under the control of the Chinese.

A non-aligned South Asia, promoted by the Super Powers in an atmosphere of peace, would not only make the Indo-Pakistani conflict less volatile, but would also relieve the fears of encirclement of all involved; Pakistan's by closer relations with India, India's by closer ties with Pakistan, and possible rectification of differences with China, that of China though pressure from the Soviet Union and Vietnam would persist, those of the Soviet Union by non-alignment on the sub-continent and normalization of relations with the United States. This would leave the Sino-Soviet conflict unresolved, but would at the same time try to remove it from South Asia and keep it confined to the common borders of the two antagonists, where it belongs.

Two hundred years of outside interference have exacerbated the bitter conflict between India and Pakistan; it cannot be resolved in a matter of months or a year. However, this enmity can be overcome, or at least a *modus vivendi* reached if proper efforts are undertaken by all concerned. History points to the examples of France and Germany, and Egypt and Israel. India and Pakistan can make peace too but only with co-operation, not interference from the outside. The United States, the Soviet Union and China must join in a monumental effort to build a strong, stable, non-aligned and non-nuclear South Asia. If they fail to do so, the consequences could be far-reaching and severe.

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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW

A Review Article

THE growing concern with environmental quality and conservation of resources has produced a pressing need for models, tools and techniques to be used in formulating public policy measures in this new field. Indeed, during the past decade or so, environmental problems have engaged the attention of political leaders, policy-makers, the intellectual community and concerned individuals at both the national and international levels.

*Trends in Environmental Policy and Law** is a volume that attempts to answer this need for policy instruments devoted to the environment. It is an anthology of essays the main purpose of which is to describe and analyze a number of political, economic and legal tools and techniques aimed at providing guidelines for coherent policy decisions for environmental protection. The anthology contains nineteen essays written by concerned university professors, and research scholars from Western Europe, the United States and India.

The first two essays deal with a fundamental problem in the realm of constitutional law; the authors seek to answer the question whether there should be an individual and justiciable right enforceable against the state, for a decent and healthy environment. The next two contributions focus on the economic dimensions of environmental protection with particular reference to the costs of pollution abatement and financial incentives. The essay by Professor Hansmeyer analyzes the merits and demerits of the polluter pays principle and the common burden principle for formulating a viable environmental policy. Susan de Koch examines the financial incentives provided by the state for environmental protection in the private sector.

The next three essays deal with basic issues of administrative decision-making and judicial review of environmental impact statements. Professor A. Kiss examines the process of notification and the issuance of licences as mechanisms of preventive control of projects with a potentially significant impact on the environment. Professor Wandesforde-Smith deals with the concept of environmental impact statement while Lothar Guendling discusses the role of public participation in environmental decision-making.

The essay by Professor Garner addresses the issue of land-use planning vis-a-vis environmental protection while Cyrille de Klemm devotes his contribution to an important strategy of preserving certain biotypes, i.e. the creation of eco-reserves. The essay by Professor Rehbinder deals with the regulation and marketing of environmental chemicals as well as the

*Michael Bothe, (Ed.) : *Trends in Environmental Policy and Law : Tendances Actuelles de la Politique et du Droit de L'Environnement* (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Gland, Switzerland, 1980), xxi, 404p.

international ramifications ensuing from such controls. Malcolm J. Forster deals with the problem of solid waste disposal on land as well as recycling. The problem of environmental damage is handled by two contributors: Ruediger Lummert focuses on civil liability while Professor Delmas-Marty on criminal liability.

The last six essays deal with the international dimensions of environmental management. The essay by Professor Rahmatullah Khan of Jawaharlal Nehru University debunks the misconception that redeployment of industries, which rests on the assumption of lower or non-existent environmental standards, offer a competitive advantage for industrial siting in the Third World. Peter Sand examines the criteria for the establishment of international environmental standards (referred to as "eco-standards") to govern environmental protection measures. Professors Fleischer and Riphagen critically assess two fundamental concepts of international environmental management: the idea of the "common heritage of mankind" and the notion of "shared natural resources." Professor Dupry grapples with the important international law issue of state liability for transfrontier pollution. The concluding chapter by Professor Bothe describes some of the procedural issues and private remedies in transfrontier environmental management.

On the whole the text has succeeded in its main aim, i.e. the description and analysis of the tools and techniques that have been adopted for dealing with environmental problems. Above all the book has four positive elements in its favour. First, it is a useful addition to the new field of environmental law. One of the greatest obstacles to the enactment of effective measures for the protection and enhancement of the environment is the dearth of authoritative texts and guidelines on environmental quality standards coupled with the complexity of environmental problems. This book will, therefore, fulfil a felt need in this area. The second virtue of the book is that it is comparative in its approach. In spite of the fact that societies differ in their political, cultural and legal traditions, policy-makers in our country may gain considerable insight by making an effort to learn from the experiences of other countries. This volume represents a timely attempt in that direction, notwithstanding the caveat that patterns of legal responses to societies' environmental concerns as described in this book are referred to as "trends" in environmental law and policy. The third strength of the anthology is its clarity of expression and logical rigour. It is free from the common obfuscations that are so frequently encountered in texts dealing with legal issues. For example, when discussing civil liability in environmental damage, Ruediger Lummert offers a lucid statement of the Law of Torts that can easily be understood even by laymen. He states: "In such cases, the Law of Torts has several tasks to perform. To begin with it must provide fair compensation for damage caused to individuals, i.e. it must eliminate the consequences of the damage to the extent that society does not expect its members to bear certain types of damage themselves. As a secondary element a preventive function is connected to the compensation

function. By means of the obligation to provide compensation, the originator of the damage should be deterred from allowing damage to occur at all. In addition, the Law of Torts, also has an economic function. The costs of rectifying the damage caused by productive economic activity should be charged to the originator of the damage, thereby favouring those producers in the market who have avoided causing damage (the polluter pays principle)." p.237

The last positive element of the volume is that it has great potential for the applicability of the trend concepts in different national jurisdictions. The most promising concept in this regard is the environmental impact statement which has its origins in the United States National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. This policy instrument has already been put to use in the UK, West Germany, Canada, Australia, Kenya, Tanzania and India.

The book does however, have some shortcomings which need to be borne in mind. The first weakness of the book is its failure to give the concept of cost-benefit analysis the attention it deserves in a work of this nature. This observation is predicated upon the contention that as developed and developing countries are increasingly compelled to reorient their national priorities with a view to incorporating the environmental dimension which has hitherto been neglected, the technique of cost-benefit analysis will play a crucial role in enabling policy-makers to make their policy options on a more rational basis. As such, the political, philosophical and ethical implications of the notion of cost-benefit analysis would have added a useful insight into the process of formulating effective environmental policies.

A further shortcommg becomes apparent when reading the essay on the role of public participation in environmental decision-making. For example, on p.147 Lothar Guendling writes: "The recent decision of the US Supreme Court in *Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Vs. Natural Resources Defense Council* (1978)... might be considered to indicate a trend towards more judicial restraint in reviewing administrative decisions at least as far as procedural questions are concerned." But what needs to be pointed out here is that judicial review is not restricted to matters of procedural law alone but encompasses substantive issues as well. In fact, a careful appraisal of enironmental law decisions by the US Supreme Court in such cases as the *Tennessee Valley Authority Vs. Hill* (1978); *State of California Vs. Sierra Club* (28 April 1981); *American Textile Manufacturing Institute Vs. Donovan* (17 June 1981) and *Middlesex Country Sewage Authority Vs. National Sea Clammers Association* (25 June 1981) would seem to indicate three important trends. First, the Supreme Court has strictly enforced public policy measures enacted by the US Congress. Second, the Supreme Court has strictly circumscribed judicial expansion of substantive duties and procedural rights in environmental cases. The third trend is that the Supreme Court has declined to permit Lower Federal Courts to become involved in substantive environmental rule-making. These trends show a decidedly conservative thinking on the part of the Court, but one that is not

necessarily hostile to the environmental cause. The net effect of the Court's declaratory judgements has been to shift to Congress the major responsibility in the resolution of environmental disputes.

A further surprising error of omission is the failure to mention, when discussing the fundamental right to a decent environment at the constitutional level, that India was the first country in the world to have amended its Constitution by inserting a specific provision, *vide* the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act of 1977. There are some grammatical mistakes which could have been eliminated by careful editing. Also, in a work of this nature an index and a list of cases and statutes cited would have been a welcome addition.

Be that as it may, the book will be useful to policy-makers, environmental managers and consultants, government officials, students of environmental affairs and the interested public.

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

A REVIEW ARTICLE

I

CONDUCTING structural-functional studies of village communities and tribal ethnic groups had become a kind of a formula for sociologists and social anthropologists during the '40s, '50s and the '60s. One could justify the amount of attention devoted to such studies on the ground that social sciences in India were still passing through the stage of development described by George Basala as the natural history phase. Collection of basic data and its classification was felt necessary before one could discern patterns of change. Since each one of these studies was conducted at one point (or band) of time, and usually significant structural changes do not occur on demand during the field workers' stay in the rural area, most of the studies carried pictures of static, well-knit, beautifully ordered structural wholes—each of the elements of whose structure and culture functionally tied up with the rest.

It would be wrong to say that sociologists were not concerned about social change. Those, like G.S. Ghurye, M.N. Srinivas and N.K. Bose, who had wider civilisational and comparative perspectives were indeed able to suggest conceptual frameworks for understanding "change and dynamism" inherent in traditional Hindu society. The influence of Srinivas' work was particularly evident in the village studies done during the '60s. His suggestion that one could understand the variation and change in Hindu social structure as a complex process whereby, the economically and politically mobile caste groups were able to reinterpret their own social and cultural status by imitating the culture of the higher caste group and have it legitimised through the Brahmins — the legitimising group — who were traditionally dependent on the power wielders, whoever they might have been, was well taken. Such an interpretation of social-change (known as sanskritisation) combined the theory of cultural diffusion with structural-functional analysis, and was no doubt a significant advance on the purely structural-functional approach associated with the work of Radcliffe-Brown and his students.

While the '60s are characterised by the dominance of structural-functional approach in field-oriented social-anthropology, this was also the period of an increasing pressure upon sociologists and anthropologists to help the political system in India to remove traditional barriers to acceptance of technological and organisational change necessary to achieve the economic and political objectives of the ruling elite. While Marxist influence was associated with straightforward demands for basic changes in the structure of society, a government committed to gradual change could only call upon the social sciences to provide models for conducting ordered change. The influential work of S.C. Dube and others was some kind of an answer to

this demand. Another, more theoretical, response to the Marxist challenge was in a burgeoning interest in political sociology and increased preparedness for segmental or problem-oriented, rather than "holistic", studies. The studies of "social movements"* were a part and parcel of this new response of the sociologist to explain social change.

II

What do we mean by a social movement? Rao in his Introduction to the above compendium of papers defines it as follows: "... a social movement ... (is) ... an organised effort on the part of a section of the population, involving collective mobilization based on an ideology, to bring about changes (either partial or total), in the social system."

Rao characterises the "mode" of achieving social change through social movement—as defined above—as fundamentally different from the mode of achieving change through "imitative or emulative process" as defined by the term sanskritization. While social movements focus on—"challenge, protest, confrontation, aggression and revolt," sanskritization focuses on "acquiescence, request, obedience and loyalty." In his attempt to present the "social movement" perspective as an alternative mode for explaining social change, Rao has, in my opinion mis-represented the perspective of social change suggested by Srinivas. Let us not forget that most of the sanskritic movements of "social reform" were also, (a) "organised efforts on the part of a section of the population." They were also (b) based on an ideological reinterpretation of social reality, and had the specific functions of—(c) mobilising the caste members to assert a new status in the reinterpreted scheme of hierarchy. Thus within the old culture idiom an assertion of a new social order was made, and was therefore a kind of a challenge to old established interpretation of the social structure. While the manifest function of sanskritizing had always been "inward directed change" the latent function had been the assertion of change of position for the castes or specific lineages in the wider inter-caste society. Such assertions could not have been characterized as "acquiescence, request, obedience and loyalty," even when these assertions were not couched in terms of revolt against the system. It would be a great pity if cultural movements are taken out of the purview of the sociology of movements, as implied in Rao's interpretation of the scope of the subject.

Sociologists recognize today the pitfalls associated with over-emphasis on conceptualising social systems as fully ordered functional unities. It is, I think, no longer a point for debate, that aspects of conflict and antagonism are as important within social systems as are the aspects of order. The sociology of social movements must, very correctly, concentrate on

*M.S.A. Rao, (Ed.): *Social Movements in India*. Vol. I : *Peasant and Backward Classes Movements* (Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1978), xxiv, 250p., Rs. 65.

understanding and recording those processes of "interaction" and "social activities" which are associated with social tensions and conflicts between groups and categories within a society. But the emergence of a mass movement is also the process of the creation of a cohesive object-oriented group with a capacity to effect mobilization of peoples' energies. Within the boundaries of the emergent group, one could study the processes of adaptation, integration—routinisation of ideology for creating group identity and an internal system of sanctions and control for pattern maintenance. The emergent groups are, therefore, likely to create counter cultures. The study of the structure of these cultures *vis-a-vis* the structure of the culture of the wider society, will also be a legitimate area of interest for the sociology of movements. Yet Rao would suggest that we stop considering an internally cohesive and organized objective-oriented group as representing a movement. He writes: "Thus when a movement with a defined ideology becomes a well established political party, it ceases to be a movement." I beg to disagree. The process of the internal "routinisation" does not contradict the processes of the groups' involvement in the "flux of norms and values in situational contexts"—where the group relates itself with its wider societal environment to effect mobilization for the goals of the movement.

III

The Editor has contributed two papers besides the Introduction; one of these is a theoretical piece constituting the first chapter. There are descriptive and analytical papers dealing with the peasant movements, viz—Naxalbari (Partha N. Mukherji); Uttar Pradesh (Rajendra Singh); Telengana Armed Revolt (K. Ranga Rao) and Backward Castes Movements, that is—Reform Movement of Waddars of Karnataka (C.S. Bhat) and a comparative study of Backward Classes and the United States' Black Movements (M.S.A. Rao).

Partha N. Mukherji's paper on the Naxalbari Movement makes a descriptive account of the peasant revolt in Naxalbari subdivision led by a group of leaders belonging to the CPI (M-L). Following Aberle, Mukherji adopts a three-fold system of classification of social movements, on the basis of the kind of social-structural change aimed by them. Thus movements aimed at changes within given structures (*cumulative changes*) are defined as quasi-movements, but movements directed towards the creation of new structures by effecting additional sub-structures or elimination of some existing sub-structures (*alternative changes*) are called social movements. The revolutionary movements are those which aim at basic transformation of (existing) social structures (*transformative*). Because of its aims, the Naxalbari Movement is described as a revolutionary movement aimed at substantial structural changes.

Partha Mukherji has very cogently described two aspects of the Naxalbari Movement—as a movement of small peasants against the lawless exploita-

tion by jotedars whose hold over the tenant farmers was further tightened by large scale practice of illegal usury and the link-up of the peasant movement, against the jotedari-adhiari system, with the ideological band-wagon of the Maoist section of the Communist Party of India through the leaders of the peasant movement.

The peasant revolt in Naxalbari was short-lived but the terrorist crusade of the CPI (M-L) activity continued in the cities of West Bengal until 1972, when it was crushed by the ruthless counter attack of the establishment. Today the CPI (ML) cadres are known as Naxalities all over India. Thus the Naxalbari peasant revolt was a short event in the leftist-led peasant struggles; the CPI (ML) movement, however, continues in various forms even today in many states of India.

Mukherji says: "There was a natural cognitive lag between the requirements of a revolt and the demands of a revolution. This resulted in a contradiction between the actual subjective preparation for a revolt and the expected subjective preparedness for a revolution." (p. 74) From Mukherji's analysis it is apparent that while the peasant leadership was ready for a revolt, it was not in harmony with the demand for participation in a *revolution*. However, the events described make it quite clear that the Maoist-led peasant revolt had limited reverberations within the peasantry and could not have succeeded given its limited reach.

The description of the Naxalite Movement in its agrarian and urban facets clearly shows that we are, in fact, confronting at least two separately rooted movements, united by a third para-movement. The peasant struggle in Naxalbari has its origins in the gradual growth of the jotedari-adhiari system that ranges a significant request of the tribal and peasantry within Naxalbari against its oppressors. The continued confrontation of CPI (M) cadres in the cities of West Bengal against "corrupt" and "exploiting" individuals is a terrorist movement rooted in the frustrated, romantic, visionary youth desperate with its middle-aged pragmatic "progressive-communist" leadership and the system in general. The top cadre of the CPI (ML) constitute the para-movement drawing inspiration from an alien ideology which provided a kind of ideological unity to both kinds of movements. Because of the unrealistic logic of the ideology the peasant movement could be easily isolated and crushed. The student youth movement took much longer and much greater effort to be crushed, but its eclipse could not be in doubt as terrorist movements without strong roots in class support cannot but fail.

Rajendra Singh's description and analysis of the Nijai Bol Movement brings into focus a very different dimension of peasant mobilisation. The immediate impulse of the movement is provided by the stated aim of the "nationalist government" in UP to carry through land reforms with the help of the peasantry through the legal machinery. The mobilisation of the peasantry was purely aimed at economic goals and there was no ideological orientation to the movement. Under these circumstances class and caste emerged in a garbled fashion, resulting in numerically stronger coalitions

whose unity was underpinned by traditional cultural affinities. This case study, again, brings into focus the importance of ideology in the social movements.

The Naxalbari Movement was led by ideologists who were blind to the realities of the inadequate subjective commitment on the part of the masses. In the Nijai Bol Movement there was no explicit ideology to unify the perspectives of the movement. In the case of the Telengana armed struggle discussed by K. Ranga Rao, the ideological leadership of the movement was capable enough to isolate the prime target of the movements' attack and widen its mass base. The leadership of the movement was, however, unable to effect an ordered retreat when political conditions changed. Isolated armed struggle in a small part of the country against a well organised and ascendant bourgeois democratic state could not succeed. This was realised by the ideologues only when the back of the revolt was broken by the armed might of the Central Government.

The study of the Waddar Movement is specially interesting for us because it discusses a social movement in which a "traditional" ideology (contained in myths), serves the purpose of identifying a group which essentially acts as an interest group within the context of the modern Indian political system. In this essay Chandrashekhar Bhat very pithily illustrates the process of emergent caste (ethnic) identity of a number of castes engaged in the same traditional occupation. The emergent caste is primarily an interest group fighting a political battle, viz., enlistment as a scheduled caste. The unity of the group is sustained by a cultural/ideological reform movement which is essentially sanskritic. The action-effectiveness is achieved through the caste associations.

M.S. Rao's essay on the homologies between the sources of identity in Black (USA) and Backward Class (India) movements is an interesting attempt at identifying principles on the basis of which the deprived groups achieve identity through praxis. Two types of praxis are identified "secular class conflict and religious-cultural" action. He writes: "The secular and the religious principles can be made to achieve the same end, namely, that of establishing a new identity for self-determination and for attacking the monopolies of first class citizens over religions, economic, educational and political goods and services." p. 213.

The book is theoretically provocative and empirically rich. Students of social movements will find it worth their while to acquire it for reference.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

NORMAN C. DAHL AND JEROME B. WIESNER, *Eds.*: *World Change and World Security*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1978, 174 p., \$14.95.

ELMER PLISCHKE: *Microstates in World Affairs : Policy Problems and Options*. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C., 1977, 153 p., \$3.00.

WESTERN text-book writers on international relations have generally divided the history of international relations since the end of the Second World War into various phases, mainly on the basis of the relations between the United States of America and the USSR. They have generally ignored the decolonization process which has led to the emergence of the new states which now constitute the great majority of the members of the United Nations. This is mainly due to the fact that International Relations as an academic discipline has grown up in the West in recent decades as a functional ideology which aims to rationalize not only the imperialistic history of the West, but also the oligarchical and neo-imperialistic structure of the contemporary international system. But in reality, decolonization far outweighs the relations between the United States and the USSR in terms of its significance as a historical process as well as its consequences for the international system. The gap between Western theory and the reality of the international empirical environment has led to a kind of confusion among Western scholars and intellectuals which resembles that of a defeated army whose calculations have proved to be completely wrong and is on the run, but firing a few shots before retreating. The two books under review here are examples of this intellectual confusion and retreat within the framework of neo-imperialist thought.

World Change and World Security is a collection of lectures delivered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during the winter and spring of 1976-1977 in connection with the United States Bi-centennial Celebrations. The lecturers included such champions of Western capitalism and the neo-imperialistic security systems of the North as Roy Jenkins, McGeorge Bundy, Willy Brandt, David A. Hamburg, Sigvard Elkund, Robert S. McNamara and Frank Church, as well as Roberto de Oliveira Campos, the then Brazilian Ambassador to Great Britain, Canon Burgess Carr, General Secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches, and Georgi A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, Moscow. They lectured on the basis of a background paper which had identified the relevant issues as North-South relations, East-West relations, resource constraints, institutional constraints, US-USSR strategic nuclear capabilities, and the escalation of violence. Jenkins, Bundy and Church are unable to get out of the usual shibboleth of USA-USSR relations and the usual platitudes about

the nuclear arms race. Hamburg advises the readers to study past human evolution in order to understand the present and the future. Brandt discourages on his usual concern for the Third World behind his thinly veiled support for Western neo-imperialism. Elkund is worried about potentially greater Third World demands for energy. McNamara is concerned about the population explosion in the Third World. Campo blames both the West and Third World for the failure of the New International Economic Order to materialize. Arbatov identifies himself and the Soviet Union with the aspirations of the Third World when he says that the new states cannot liberate themselves without delinking economically from the West. But at the same time he observes that Western private foreign capital has an important role to play in the development of the Third World under proper national control. He also champions the neo-imperialistic programme of nuclear non-proliferation. The only perceptive paper is that of Carr who has correctly analyzed the Western neo-imperialist strategy in Africa with special reference to the creation of pro-Western elites which have no roots in the African tradition.

The study does not have any focus, except the concern of the West in particular, and of the North in general, for security in the face of the perceived political and economic threats from the Third World. Even the concern over US-USSR relations reflects the overarching perception of a potential threat to the North arising out of the South. No conclusions emerge, not even a consensus.

Microstates in World Affairs is an even more blatant exercise in rationalizing the oligarchical character of contemporary international relations. The American author, who would presumably pay lip service to the principle of "one man, one vote" irrespective of personal wealth or power for a domestic political system, shares the common but perverse Western perception of the emergence of many small new states with the right to vote in the United Nations General Assembly as a definite threat to the stability and viability of the international system. In his own words: "National independence and status in the family of nations do not automatically qualify new states for, or accord them membership in, the United Nations and other international organizations. It is both practical and intellectually defensible to control organizational membership by standards other than mere nationhood In any case, the prospect of proliferation appears to require the development of controls, whether global, organizational, or both." (p. 105)

The import of such books into Third World countries serves no purpose except to siphon off their scarce resources into the coffers of the West and to subject their own populations to Western political propaganda at their own cost.

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JAYANTANUJA BANDYOPADHYAYA

Foreign Policy

AMERICA

LLOYD I. RUDOLPH, SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, *et al.*: *The Regional Imperative: The Administration of US Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States*. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 465p., Rs. 80.

IN 1973 an Act of Congress was passed, on the initiative of the United State's Foreign Relation Committee, establishing a Commission with instructions "to submit findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the nation's foreign policy." It was composed of twelve members equally chosen by the Senate, the House of Representatives and the President and included the Vice President, Senators, Congressmen, educationists, businessmen and professionals and was chaired by a retired officer of the Foreign Service.

The task was performed, with the thoroughness and meticulous attention to detail which characterises all American endeavour, through a number of studies authorised by the commission dealing with the various aspects of foreign policy. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, both professors of Political Science at the University of Chicago, undertook to co-ordinate the studies of eleven other academics, each of whom devoted himself to one particular facet of the problem. This book is the result.

It consists of three different sets of case studies divided into the categories of diplomatic strategy, economic policy and people to people diplomacy. Not surprisingly, by far the larger number of studies relate to India and some of them are of absorbing interest to Indian readers.

The most fascinating case studied is of the events before and after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, on which subject Dr. Haendel's book was recently reviewed in these columns. [India Quarterly, July-December 1980] Although two sets of students have studied this problem from different angles it is interesting that they came to almost exactly the same conclusions. It is evident, beyond doubt, from both studies, that there was no justification for the "tilt towards Pakistan" except Nixon's visceral hatred of India, ably supported by his Sancho Panza Dr. Kissinger.

What stands out very clearly from this case—and indeed from the others that have been studied—is that, at least when the subject is not seminal to the country, there is at the top a great deal of ignorance of the complexities of the problems that have to be dealt with and a total lack of appreciation of the way in which decisions taken in the particular case might affect other equally important interests of the country. When, as happened in this particular case, the expert advice available, of which there was no shortage, is disregarded, and often not even allowed to be given—for judgement had

already been delivered before the case was heard—the results can only be disastrous.

Another consequence of the system of decisions at the top, contrary to the objective advice given by those in an infinitely better position to give it than the decision-makers, is that the orders given are not carried out. Dr. Kissinger's sarcastic remark at one of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)—a subcommittee of the National Security Council—that, "The President is under the illusion that he is running the foreign policy of this country," was not wholly wide off the mark. There was undoubtedly in the State Department, possessed of a competence and sophistication far in excess of what the President could lay claim to, a spirit of resistance to the Presidential *ipse dixit* reflected in what can only be described as non-co-operative, passive resistance and a general go-slow which prevented the President's orders from having their full disastrous effects. The Chief Executive had forgotten that, no matter how powerful, he was himself part of an organization, that without the co-operation of the machine he was powerless and that unless the organization could, by persuasion and argument, be attuned to his wishes, his orders would remain ineffective.

The other case studies deal with crises of a comparatively minor order and the conclusion reached again and again is that, as long as the decisions are arrived at by a group which knows what it is talking about and dealing with, the crisis can be handled reasonably well in accordance with the national interest. It is only when there is interference at the "political" level for reasons extraneous to the national interest, whether it be the satisfaction of an ego or the desire to get re-elected, that the interests of the country get subordinated.

Of particular interest to Indian readers is the statement in one of the studies that "most Congressmen, Senators, and staff regard Indians as poor, inept and arrogant." The reviewer can, unfortunately, vouch for the correctness of this statement. It is this feeling that it is the task for the diplomat to change. Left to himself the professional Indian diplomat overcomes it over a period of time. But there are far too many visiting firemen, principally legislators of various kinds, whose efforts at educating what they regard as their ignorant foreign counterparts, are not unoften counter-productive.

Srinagar

B.K. NEHRU

YUNG-HWAN JO, *Ed.*: United States Foreign Policy in Asia : An Appraisal of America's Role in Asia. Clio Press, Oxford, 1978, 488 p., £ 14.50.

ONE strong impression left by Yung-Hwan Jo's edited volume is the inappropriateness of its title. We find no systematic analysis of the making, the content, or the conduct of US foreign policy. We look in vain for sections dealing with such important parts of Asia as Indonesia and

India, to say nothing of the Islamic states of West Asia; even China is barely mentioned. Far from *an* appraisal, there are a variety of opinions expressed about specific episodes in Vietnam and Korea, and American responsibility for them. Certainly, no coherent picture emerges of what the US "role" has been, is, or should be in Asia. One wonders if the intelligent men who contributed to this volume sincerely believe that the sinic cultures alone constitute Asia, or if the publishers were merely trying to sell a tome of details by using a comprehensive title. Neither explanation is complimentary.

Another problem with the book under review is more understandable. It is familiar to most conveners of conferences on current issues who later wish to publish the proceedings; there is an inevitable time lag between the conference itself, the revision and editing of the papers, and the eventual publication of a book. In these circumstances it is difficult for the final product both to convey the spontaneity of the participants and to sustain the topicality of the subject matter for the benefit of eventual readers. This particular volume originated with a symposium held at Arizona State University in February 1976, the year in which a United Democratic Republic of Vietnam was announced and refugees from the south were coming into the United States. Other contributions came from a symposium held at the University of Southern California in 1977, the year in which President Carter's proposal to withdraw some US ground forces from South Korea was being publicly debated and the scandals of South Korean activities in Washington were breaking into a "Koreagate". It is not surprising that the participants expressed strong views. They submitted papers which are specific, detailed, and based on long active and/or scholastic involvement with Vietnam and Korea. The discussions too grappled with the controversial issues of the day. To widen the scope of the book some papers on the perspectives from Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and East Germany were added. (Why the latter? One wonders.) But the concluding section does not, in fact, bring together the main strands from Part I on Vietnam and Part II on Korea to deal with the United States in Asia. And the date of publication precluded the authors from taking account of the decisive developments of 1978-79; namely, a spectacular improvement in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the conflict between China and Vietnam over the disposition of Kampuchea. Thus, I found it a tedious and unrewarding task to read the book from cover to cover.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, there are three general tributes which must be paid. One is to the participants for the high quality of their papers and their stimulating discussions. Those symposia must have been well worth attending! The second is to Professor Yung-Hwan Jo for having done a fine job of organizing and editing the material. It is possible that the actual proceedings were not as substantial as he makes out. The third is to the analytical qualities of American scholars and former officials who are not afraid to criticize their government's policies, such as Gregory Henderson, Scott McNall, and Gareth Porter. The world has become used

to getting the most cogent criticisms of the United States from its own nationals. The contributions of Douglas Pike and Robert Scalapino, who are better known and close to the State Department, are equally well argued and merit study.

As indicated above, it is difficult to pick out the main themes and arguments in a volume of this kind. S. Cho sets the general framework in "The Genesis of Tragedy : Division of Korea and Vietnam", (pp 17-40). He portrays US policies during and after World War II as being the major cause for the partition of—and consequent wars in—Korea and Vietnam. Though other participants vary in their evaluation of developments within these two countries, all agree that the United States' responsibility for past problems and future developments is great. Nobody pretends that with about 40,000 troops in South Korea the United States is not involved! But there are substantial differences of opinion expressed on whether the United States should withdraw those troops, as also on what attitude it should adopt towards negotiations envisaging eventual reunification of North and South Korea. Similarly, different explanations are offered as to why the United States fought such a long and sordid war in Vietnam, and there is no clear suggestion on what it should do to normalize relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Douglas Pike's listing of objectives and tactics to this end (pp. 87-90), are not fully discussed, and unfortunately do not appear to carry weight with Washington as yet.

One idea which does emerge from most of the essays is implicit US neglect of Asian nationalism. Gareth Porter's blistering account of American economic policy in Vietnam is based on the thesis that "the American Government pursued objectives in Vietnam which were essentially unattainable, because they put the US at odds with the needs and desires of the South Vietnamese people." (p. 63) T.C. Rhee castigates US support for the dictatorial regime of President Park in South Korea which not only violated human rights but put the country economically into the "unrestrained embrace" of Japan. (p. 216) Robert Youngblood shows how the United States has been reluctant to grant the Philippines, more than a "cosmetic form of sovereignty." (p. 399) The causes and results of America's failure to understand or support Asian nationalism is a big subject. The volume under review does not tackle it. (Selig Harrison did so in *The Widening Gulf*. The Free Press, New York, 1978). But *US Foreign Policy in Asia* does remind the US that without being able to greatly influence the directions of US policy, Asians have had to suffer the consequences of Americans erecting *cordon sanitaires*, or fighting wars, or talking of withdrawal to fortress America, or seeking *rapprochement* with former enemies. Asian states have adjusted to this unpleasant fact, as is clear from Donald Weatherbee's account of ASEAN's initial reactions to Vietnam's dominance in Indo-China. (p. 123-140) But it does not auger well for future relations between America and Asia. In the United States, "serious" discussions of policy focus on the security aspect. Robert Scalapino's essay (pp 421-436), illustrates

this point; it analyzes US policy in northeast and southeast Asia in the context of a changing quadrilateral relationship between the United States, the USSR, China and Japan. It is a pity that the US does not try to build a broader base of support among the nationalistic peoples of Asia.

Finally, one may direct interested students to this volume where particular papers will give them details on Korea and Vietnam hard to find in Delhi. Seminarists will probably enjoy the sections entitled "Discussion" which supplement the papers so well, but the general reader need not be seduced by the title into imagining easy enlightenment on US foreign policy in Asia.

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MITCHEL B. WALLERSTEIN : Food for War—Food for Peace : United States Food Aid in a Global Context. MIT Press, Mass., 1980, xxii, 312p.

D.N. PRASAD : Food for Peace : The Story of US Food Assistance to India. Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xvi, 172p., Rs. 32/-.

THE relationship between the donor of foreign aid and its recipient is a complex and fascinating subject. A number of studies have illuminated the inducement/threat tactics involved in the American strategy of using foreign aid in achieving its "security." Wallerstein's thorough and valuable research study is most welcome because it is fairly objective and gives us many insights into the American effort to use "food as a weapon" of foreign policy. Its effectiveness however, was not as great as Kissinger and Nixon fancied at first.

In a world besieged with shortages of food, the most basic of man's needs after air and water, Kissinger thought America could exercise a lot of leverage by deploying its agricultural surpluses in a reward/punishment scenario. But, the reality proved to be far more complex. Moreover, other nations can be smart too! In fact the Russians bought American grain and sold it to other nations making a neat and clever gain in the bargain. Wallerstein's study shows that food aid was relatively more effective when offered as an inducement rather than when it was withdrawn as a threat.

Food for War and Food for Peace is extremely useful because it does not confine itself to the narrow field of political leverage of the food "weapon." Its broad sweep includes a brilliant analysis of food aid in bilateral and multilateral contexts, as well as its impact on international trade interests of America. Wallerstein also examines in some detail the role of the United States in the international burden-sharing of food aid. The case studies of food aid as an instrument of foreign policy during the administration of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford make very interesting

reading indeed. Wallerstein concludes his study by examining the nature of multilateral food aid and the politics around them. He speculates on the future trends in this vital area and hopes that in the years to come the world would move towards global food security.

Food for Peace and Food for War is a must for all research and university libraries.

The second book—*Food for Peace : The Story of United States Food Assistance to India*—analyzes the issue of American food assistance to India with sympathy and without prejudice. Why does a nation assist another nation? Is it altruism or self-interest that is the motivating force? Are they mutually exclusive? Or, is reality a more complex blend of black and white? Prasad's first rate study not only raises these and related issues in the context of American food assistance to India, but also offers a number of informed bases for balanced judgement.

During a quarter century, from 1947 to 1971, India received from America 53 million tons of wheat and 8 million tons of other food grains. This indeed was a massive transaction in the annals of international relations. Such large-scale "aid" assumed added significance and research interest when recognising the fact that the "recipient" nation did not see eye to eye with the "donor" country on a number of key international issues during the long stretch of years studied. India's differences with the United States were not only fundamental, but the new nation was also unreservedly *vociferous* in airing them. It was its way of demonstrating to the world and to itself that it had not compromised its newly won independence at the altar of expediency, nor could it be cowed down to give up socialism for the sake of western economic assistance. The book under review also studies the factors and circumstances that compelled a non-aligned and proud India to ask for food aid and accept it.

Why did the US give food aid, for that matter economic aid and otherwise help India? Was altruism the motive force or was the United States only concerned with the fear of communist expansion? Dr. Prasad examines the record and offers us an informed assessment. With commendable dispassion and a high degree of objectivity he brings out the complex reality—the two nations did not have any real clash of interests and their shared commitment to democracy and freedom was an integral part of the favourable background to Indo-US co-operation. Without that one cannot explain the continuation of American economic assistance to India through the ups and downs of two decades of political relations between the two countries. American participation in India's struggle for economic development continued relatively unfettered despite the wide gulf between the two countries over key issues like colonialism, international communism and major crises and armed conflicts like those in Korea and Vietnam, etc. As Prasad rightly argues to accuse America of helping India solely or even primarily for cold war considerations will be uncharitable to America as well as unfair to the facts. He also brings out the nagging and endemic problems of mutual and

open criticism of each other in the legislatures, press, media and other public forums. This inevitably exacerbated the task of co-operation between the two democracies. Since both nations had expected too much from each other, there was disappointment, anger and even disillusionment on both sides. Such public mutual carping is inescapable in democracies and especially when the relations between the two countries are not only confined to government to government agreements and understandings, etc. Now that we have come out of the extreme dependence on the United States for food, the study under review comes out at the right time and it deserves wide reading. Research scholars, teachers and knowledgeable general readers will find it useful and informative.

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B. RAMESH BABU

RUSSIA

NIKOLAI V. SIVACHEV AND NIKOLAI N. YAKOVLEV: *Russia and the United States*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, xv, 301p., \$ 12.95.

AMONG the benign fruits of *detente* is (or was) a genre of studies that sought to build bridges across the great perceptual divide between the Soviet Union and the United States. In a relaxed climate, Americans were in a mood to learn how the Soviets looked at their nation; similarly, the Soviets were in a mood to listen to what Americans had to say about them. Sometimes, US and Soviet scholars jointly engaged to go back to the early history of the two nations' relationship in order to understand better and more objectively the roots of animosity as well as accord. Thus, two teams of Soviet and American historians, headed by Prof. S.L. Tikhvinsky and Prof. David F. Trask, heads of the historical divisions of the respective foreign offices, jointly produced *The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations 1765-1815*, and the volume has just been published simultaneously in Moscow and Washington. The Sivachev-Yakovlev volume, which surveys the entire historical relationship from the Soviet point of view, is however, the result of a Chicago University Press proposal to the University of Moscow in 1971. It ranks with several other recent publications such as Morton Schwartz's *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* (1978), *American Appraisals of Soviet Russia 1917-1977*, edited by Eugene Anschel (1978) and US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union*, (1978), among others. The Sivachev-Yakovlev study is different from the others on two counts. It gives in 300 pages a Soviet overview of 200 years

of US-Russian interactions; and it is not an analysis of Soviet perceptions of the United States or of American perceptions of the Soviet Union.

It is, in fact, an *authorised* history of the United States. The prose is mild; the two Soviet historians dipped their pens in the milk of *detente* to write their volume. Not once do they fault the Soviet Union for all that has soured the Moscow-Washington relationship since 1917. In Morton Schwartz's book, a Soviet analyst is quoted for the view that "decades of enmity and confrontation created in the West *as well as in the East* tenacious stereotyped views of the other side." (Schwartz's emphasis). Georgey Arbatov, the Soviet Union's number one specialist on the United States, would at times ascribe some of the Soviet views of the United States to intellectual dogmatism of Soviet scholars or analysts. But Professors Sivachev and Yakovlev yield not an inch of ground. They start with the hypothesis that relations between Russia and America upto 1917 were determined by their positions within the system of international relations. In other words, the relationship was influenced by the policies and actions of other international actors like Britain, Prussia, Austria and France rather than by bilateral issues or problems. The pattern changed with the Bolshevik Revolution and the birth of the USSR. From then on the Soviet Union and the United States coupled in a highly emotional and volatile relationship, first without diplomatic recognition, then without much attempt to understand each other even in the years of World War II, when they became allies. With peace came the Cold War, then *detente*, and, now, again a cold war.

The two Soviet historians confirm the adage that history is what historians say it is. Their account of the great events of the last 60 years differs deeply from the American and British accounts with which we in India are familiar. (Brainwashed?) For instance, they offer an entirely different account of the Cuban Missile Crisis, its genesis and consequences. Americans have told us that in that eyeball-to-eyeball, it was Moscow that blinked. The Soviet historians say the man who learnt the proper lesson was John F. Kennedy, who had been pushed into the confrontation by an aroused American right. "Only after the hard shock in October 1962 did Kennedy begin to reflect seriously on the wisdom of realism in international affairs, first of all in relations with the Soviet Union." (p. 245) As for the Soviet Union: "The efforts of the USSR in the matter of ensuring international peace were crowned with success. The United States announced that it would not itself carry out an armed intervention against Cuba, and would not permit any country that was a member of the Organisation of American States to do so. The Soviet Union removed from Cuba the rockets and bombers that had been placed there. The test of strength that Washington had attempted led to the guarantee of a peaceful life for the Cuban people." (p. 244)

The Soviet historians find themselves broadly in sympathy with the American "revisionists" of the *detente* period, who blamed the United States for much of the Cold War. "Often people find that their arguments coincide with the Soviet point of view. Without question, this is correct ... the

'revisionists', somewhat tardily, have agreed with Soviet historians regarding who bears the responsibility for the cold war and who is to blame that the reasonable possibilities in American-Soviet relations were not realised." (p. 274) The Soviet version of the tale of the two Super Powers is at times refreshing and never without interest; a little self-criticism would have made it more convincing.

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BHABANI SEN GUPTA

LAOS

PERALA RATNAM: *Laos and The Super Powers*. Tulsi Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, vii, 166p., Rs. 65.

"WE can do nothing about geography, gentlemen," Stalin is reported to have told leaders of Finland in the course of certain political parleys. This statement can, in many ways, be applied to Laos. Bordering on Vietnam, Kampuchea, Thailand, Burma and China, Laos has survived as a state "by diplomatic courtesy." Political instability and disunity which has characterized the history of Laos since the end of the Second World War are due to its peculiar geographic location and nearness to centres of power and population far larger and greater than its own.

The book under review seeks to answer some of the more important questions raised by political scientists regarding Laos and the involvement of Super Powers. The struggle for independence from the French, the Geneva Agreement of 1954, the working of the International Control Commission, attempts to neutralize Laos in 1962, the interplay of domestic and external forces, the differing perceptions of great powers, consequences of the escalation of Vietnamese conflict and the final victory of the Pathet Lao—all these momentous events are described in graphic detail by the author.

The chief merit of the book consists in the fact that it is a personal account by an experienced diplomat who was Indian Ambassador in Vientiane during the most crucial years of Laos' political evolution. His eyewitness account of men and matters will be of great interest to all those interested in the developments in Indo-China.

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V. SURYANARAYAN

Internal Developments

BANGLADESH

LAWRENCE LIFSCHULTZ: *Bangladesh : The Unfinished Revolution*. Zed Press, London, 1979, ix, 211p., \$ 7.95, £ 3.50.

THE book under review is divided into two parts : I. Taher's Last Testament and II. The Murder of Mujib, preceded by a short introduction. "Taher's Last Testament" originally appeared in a special issue of the *Economic and Political Weekly* in August 1977. This part deals with successive *coups* staged by different army groups in order to capture power in the wake of the 15 August 1975 *coup d'etat* which wiped out the entire nationalist leadership of the country. Many important developments—the formation of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), the role of the Maoist political groups in the War of Independence in 1971, the Chinese attitude towards the war and so on—are extensively dealt with revealing many hitherto unknown facts.

But the whole section suffers from a subjective approach. It appears that the author was more eager to establish the credentials of the JSD than to discuss and analyze Bangladesh politics in a proper perspective. He writes about the formation of the JSD and glorifies its role in the War of Independence and in the post-independence period without even properly mentioning the sacrifices of other political parties and personalities. Further, the author is critical of the Awami League (AL); he has neither tried to probe into the various allegations against the AL raised by different interested quarters nor attempted to evaluate the policies initiated by the AL Government in a proper perspective. Considerable importance is given to details concerning the JSD though the basic object was to discuss Bangladesh politics as a whole. It is in fact futile to study Bangladesh belittling the role of the AL! Also, Lifschultz mentions the mass movements so far launched by the JSD, but no where does he analyze any of these movements. The JSD's Twelve Point Charter of demands with which it intended to introduce revolutionary change in the country is also given considerable prominence by the author, but it is hardly understandable how this Charter would introduce any change at all without a definite socio-economic programme of its own.

Part II of the book is more interesting and significant. It seeks to study the involvement of the United States in the *coup d'etat* of August 1975. This part was written along with the assistance of another scholar—Kai Bird. The two have achieved much success in establishing the fact that the United States was deeply involved in organising and staging the *coup*. Various arguments and facts in support of this contention are presented; Khondakar Mustaque Ahmad and his close associates, Taheruddin and Chashi's

links with the United States Administration have been highlighted. Mustaque tried indeed for a negotiated settlement with Pakistan during the War of Independence in 1971, through the "good offices" of the United States.

Lifschultz has tried in this section to establish that the Mustaque faction of the AL in fact staged the *coup* in collaboration with the CIA. Through a series of interviews with personalities who mattered in the then American Administration, he has authenticated that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was listed as one of the main enemies of the United States. The Sheikh's name appeared along with such world personalities who were dislodged and killed through the conspiracies of the CIA.

This part of the study is also important because it throws light on different organs of the United States Administration which are engaged in different ways in subversive activities in countries of the Third World. Mentioned are the various schemes to impart training to the police and intelligence personnel sent by the Third World countries for training. They are trained in such a way that after returning to their respective countries they serve as link-men of the CIA; Pakistan has a number of such trained persons and Bangladesh inherited a good number of them from Pakistan. In the post-Independence period they were placed in subordinate positions, in the post-*coup* period they were elevated.

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PAKISTAN

SHAHID JAVED BURKI : Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-77. The Macmillan Press, London, 1980, 245p., Rs. 55.

THIS is the first book to have attempted a socio-economic analysis of the political developments in Pakistan, with special emphasis on the period of Bhutto's rule. The only other book which had attempted a similar analysis earlier was by Robert Laporte, *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan* (Berkeley, 1975). Laporte however had not been able to do justice to the subject because of the inadequacy of data, although he had relied heavily on some earlier writings of Shahid Javed Burki. The book under review is a fuller treatment of the subject and is therefore a welcome addition to serious literature on Pakistan.

Burki begins by tracing the hold of refugee population, i.e., migrants from India, on the politics of Pakistan in the initial phase of its existence. Eight million Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan from India at the time of the partition of the sub-continent came mostly from the urban areas. In 1951, they constituted nearly a quarter of the population of Pakistan; in the 19 largest cities 46 per cent of the population of 4 million consisted of

refugees from India. They soon acquired a dominant role in the politics of Pakistan. The refugees represented the urban-industrial middle class culture as against the older and established rural-agricultural feudal outlook of the indigenous elites of the provinces of Punjab, Sind and Northwestern Frontier. The Muslim League too, though dominated by pro-British landlords since its inception came to be controlled by the industrial and middle class representatives after the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940. Therefore, the first Pakistani regime headed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan gave priority to the development of the industrial sector. The urban-industrial bias of the regime was reflected in the 1948 industrial policy too.

The influence wielded by the refugees began to diminish after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and the assumption of Governor-Generalship by Ghulam Mohammed in the same year. Ghulam Mohammed was not a politician but a kind of civil servant whom Liaquat Ali had brought into the Cabinet as a technician in charge of finance. Once in that position, he accumulated considerable political power by aligning himself with the Punjab landlords. By training and background, he had no affinity with the Muslim League politicians nor any respect for the political institutions that Pakistan was trying to develop. His summary dismissal in 1953 of the Cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin, and his dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a year later were the first assaults on the democratic development processes in Pakistan. They correspondingly represented the beginnings of a process of the suppression of the urban-industrial middle class, and re-assertion of the interests of big landed classes. This was manifested in the replacement of Mumtaz Daultana by Sir Feroze Khan Noon as the Chief Minister of Punjab, of Abdul Qayyum Khan by Sardar Abdur Rashid as the Chief Minister of NWFP, and of M.A. Khushro by Pirzada Abdul Sattar as Chief Minister of Sind.

Iskander Mirza who succeeded Ghulam Mohammed as Governor General became the country's first constitutional President in 1956; he organized his Republican Party of landlords on the feudal pattern with one central figure and no organization. Under him, the alliance between the civil bureaucracy and the landed interests was further strengthened, and the dominance of the landed classes was perpetuated.

Ayub Khan, who came to power in 1958, was a Pathan from the Hazara district of NWFP and did not own much land. His family members were either in the army or in the professions. Being himself a representative of the rural middle class, he tried to promote their interests by imposing land ceilings in 1959. But he could not do much; only 2.3 million out of 49 million acres of farmland was directly affected by his reforms. Between 1959 and 1969, only one-fifth of the land under control of the landed aristocracy passed out of their hands. Under Ayub's rule, the economic condition of rural and urban middle classes tended to improve, but they did not have

enough participation in the political processes. That explains their anti-Ayub revolt during the years 1967-69. In 1964, at the time of the second elections to the Basic Democracies system, President Ayub too in an effort to broaden his base admitted the landed aristocracy and Karachi based merchant-industrialists into his political party.

Z.A. Bhutto, who owed his success in the 1970 elections to the support of the urban middle and rural poor classes, devised his policies to help them from 1971 to 1974. This was also the period when his Peoples' Party was dominated by left intellectuals who had helped him found the party and give it a radical image. By 1974, most of these intellectuals, e.g., Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Ahmed Raza Kasuri, Mirag Mohammed Khan, had left the party. The disillusionment of these intellectuals was both the result as well as the cause of Bhutto veering towards more pragmatic upper-class-oriented policies. As the post-1974 period saw a gradual erosion of Bhutto's middle class base, he started inducting landed interests into his party. For evidence, the author points to the selection of PPP candidates for the 1977 elections: the Noons and Tiwanas of Sargodha, the Maliks of Mianwali, the Qureshis of Multan, the Hayats of Rawalpindi and Campbellpur and the Legharis and Mazaris of Dera Ghazi Khan.

Burki gives a detailed account of the policies followed by Bhutto in the two phases of his rule, i.e., pro-middle class (1971-74), and anti-middle class (1974-77). This, alongwith the socio-economic analysis of the policies of earlier rulers of Pakistan given by Burki in Part I of the book, make it somewhat easier to understand why the democratic development of Pakistan has been so much obstructed. And yet, the book does not adequately explain the linkages that Pakistan's military bureaucracy has developed over the years with its landed and industrial-commercial elite, which enables it to perpetuate itself in power with impunity. However, the book is indispensable reading for serious students of Pakistan and gives useful leads to scholars on South Asia.

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THE GULF

SURENDRA BHUTANI, *Ed.* : Contemporary Gulf. The Academic Press, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 148p., Rs. 45.

IT is heartening to note that Indian scholars are taking increasing interest in understanding the fast changing developments in the Gulf region. The Persian/Arabian Gulf is a strategically important area in the world. Its importance has further increased with the discovery and production of oil in the region. The major part of the world's known deposits

of oil is in this area. Oil money has accelerated the economic and social development in the area having its own effect on the position of the region in global politics. The strategic location of its rich natural resources has inevitably attracted the Super Powers. For these reasons and because of its proximity, the region is of great importance to India as well.

The book under review is an attempt to understand these developments in the region. It is the result of an all India Seminar organized by the Arab Cultural Centre, New Delhi, and is edited by its Executive Director Dr. Surendra Bhutani, a well known scholar who has written extensively on contemporary West Asia. By its very nature the book does not cover all the aspects of politics and mainly concentrates on problems of security, inter-state relations and of course, India and the Gulf.

The Foreword is by the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates, Mohamed Abdul Lateef Rasheed. Commenting on the nature of its contents, the Ambassador states: "It should be evident to any serious student of contemporary history that most of the papers... are (vitiating) by want of critical and personal knowledge on the part of the authors concerned. Nobody in fact has attempted to make a serious effort to know the Gulf intimately." A strange foreword indeed! He has also tried to explode many popular and scholarly myths (?) about the region. In his view the region can hardly be described as rich because the budget of OPEC nations does not exceed the GNP of Italy; that the arms purchases of the nations there should be considered normal; that the Iranian Revolution would have no impact on the Gulf and that Shia-Sunni differences are not of such dimensions as the papers seek to project. In view of this one would like to know His Excellency's analysis of the Iran-Iraq War. Unfortunately the war took place after the publication of this book. Anyway, since the role of Ambassadors abroad is really to project their own countries' image these reflections need not be taken seriously in judging the merit of the book.

The first two articles by K.R. Singh and B.K. Narayan discuss the question of arms and security in the region. The problem of security in the Gulf has three dimensions—threats to security emanating from i) within the nations, ii) the rivalries of the nations in the Gulf, iii) conflicting ambitions of super powers. However, the two papers have not paid adequate attention to these aspects. Thus, to B.K. Narayan, the threat of Israel's economic penetration appears grave! K.R. Singh has rightly argued that regional peace and security cannot be achieved through any accelerated and competitive arms acquisition programmes, but his recommended solution—effective conflict resolution mechanism—is rather easy to prescribe but difficult to practise.

Two articles examine the perceptions of Arab countries to the Iranian revolution. A.H.H. Abidi has made a thorough and systematic investigation. He rightly points out that these perceptions are neither uniform nor constant and are determined mainly by Egypt-Israel *rapprochement* and by

Palestinian-Iranian friendship. The Iranian Revolution, in B.K.Narayan's essay, appears larger than its real self.

In a useful essay on Saudi-US relations, Saleem Khan delineates the four different aspects of these relations: areas of conflict, co-operation, parallel operations and bargaining. He shows how Saudi Arabia has skillfully used its influence in moderating the OPEC price policy. He also provides a lot of relevant oil data.

Z. M. Quraishi and Dewan Birendranath write about the general characteristics of India's relations with the Gulf. Though they point out the complementarity and potentiality of India-Gulf relations, both these essays look wistfully on the mutual relations in the hoary past and lack any rigorous analysis.

In the lone essay on domestic politics in the Gulf States, Surendra Bhutani depicts the changes that are taking place in the power structure of the tribal societies of the Gulf countries as a result of unprecedented flow of petro-dollars in the region. Taking Abu Dhabi as a case study, he observes that political stability in Abu Dhabi is dependent on the maintenance of close ties between the ruling family and the major segment of population represented by interest groups.

The performance of the Arab countries of the Gulf as an emerging source of foreign aid in global perspective has been assessed by Arif Hussain Rizvi. He points out that in terms of ratio that concessional assistance bears to the GNP, the record of the Arab countries of the Gulf has been commendably high. However, its geographical distribution shows that it has overriding political motives.

The book, thus, reflects on some important aspects of development in the Gulf. Unfortunately the papers included in the book are of uneven quality. Besides this, some of them not only overlap but almost duplicate the content (e.g. papers on Arab perceptions of the Iranian Revolution). Some authors, instead of analyzing the problems resort to wishful thinking on certain problems (India-Gulf Relations). Some prescribe normative institutional solutions to the problems they visualize in the Gulf countries and advise them for or against certain measures. Since the book does not cover all the major aspects of life in the contemporary gulf, "Some Aspects of Contemporary Gulf" would have been a more appropriate title for it.

Notwithstanding the above limitations, the book is a useful addition to the studies on the Gulf, particularly as an Indian reflection on some aspects of contemporary gulf.

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E. BURKE INLOW: *Shahanshah: A Study of the Monarchy of Iran*. Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1979, xxi, 279p., Rs. 60.

THE title of this book, published on the heels of the current cataclysmic events in Iran, leads one automatically to presume that it is about the late Shahanshah. The author however declares: "This book is not, to use the vulgar modern terminology either 'pro-Shah' or 'anti-Shah.' It is a study of the Royal tradition and the exercise of its power." Its contents include: 1. Throne of Jamshed—a synopsis of Firdausi's *Shahnamah*, the national epic, as an essential component of Iranian monarchical tradition; 2. Throne of Cyrus—dealing with aspects of Achaemenid history related to the establishment of Monarchy; 3. The Aristocracy—monarchy's traditional supporting structure; 4. The Imamate—historic relationship between politics and religion; 5. The Security Forces; 6. The Government; and 7. The Law of the Monarch.

The author avers that "Shahanshah as the highest principle—the *grund-norm*—does not... exist in the personal sense, a party sense, or even—except in abstract form—a political sense. Perhaps... it is fiction, a legal fiction.... For this reason it is important that the principle be not identified with an individual incumbent, whether the...(late) Shah or the great conqueror Nadir Shah. The fall from power is a fact of life and not a negation of principle."

Inevitably however, an estimate of the late Shah's performance in the light of this principle cannot be avoided. It is distinctly "pro-Shah;" e.g. "History will assess his role as the architect of modernization in Iran. The risks he has taken have been very great, and he has chosen the more difficult course of direct administration." "Within Iran an aura developed known as the Royal Splendour. It is still present today...." "The Shahanshah is second in this... dynastic line and this has caused some embarrassment in circles of Western royalty. There has also been a certain amount of condescension expressed... about... (his) background and/or pretensions, but clearly his historic position is in a much more ancient and royal tradition than in the English who were still climbing out of reeds during the Achaemenid period." "...the... Shah is too wise to stake a claim regarding the Imamate. But his actions are those of a ruler who is assuming this." "The Hidden Imam remains hidden... it is unlikely that he will appear in recognisable form. Meanwhile, his agent or his regent rules. That the Shahanshah is the *locum tenens* of the Hidden Imam would seem evident...." "The Shahanshah intends to keep his throne. Outside a major upheaval involving the major powers of the world, the Security Forces of Iran should be able to manage that." "If the Shah wants to exercise his prerogative to a certain end—for example... granting exclusive monopolies to members of his family—there are no guidelines that apply.... It is possible that studies were made after the Fundamental Laws were adopted, but if so, they are now locked up."

Obviously the author has been completely be-dazzled by the "Royal Splendour." He thus becomes an almost besotted guide on current Iranian affairs. On the historical role of the Shahanshah however, he has much to impart. It enables one to understand why and how the institution has lasted so long and even to speculate under what circumstances it might again be resurrected. As the author says: "Shahanshah is not a book for light reading." Its style too, is apt at times to go awry; but it contains a lot of meat, sometimes quite well-spiced. For instance he does not miss the point that the Greeks' acknowledgement of Darius, and *not* Hammurabi as "the Law-giver" belies the thesis that their repulsion of the Persian invasion saved Western civilization from Asiatic barbarism. He quotes Aristotle's advice to Alexander against destroying the Persian elite as they constituted "one of the mightiest tools of Empire and instrument of power." He draws freely on the Vedas, Manu, the Satapatha Brahmana, and a host of other religious and secular sources to illustrate and illumine his theme.

Altogether, this is a book that those interested in Iran and Aryan history should read, if only because it delves into such diverse and fascinating primary sources of information, access to which for a normal reader is not easy.

New Delhi

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CHINA

GOVIND KELKAR : *China After Mao: A Report on Socialist Development*. Usha Publications, New Delhi, 1979, x, 172p., Rs. 55.

FREDERICK C. TEIWES: *Politics and Purges in China : Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-65*. M.E. Sharpe Inc., New York, 1979, xiii, 729p.

At the outset we believe that it is necessary to keep in mind, that though both books deal with China they vary widely in subject matter, content, style and depth of analysis. This follows rather naturally from the fact that while Kelkar's slim volume is in the nature of a travelogue, Teiwes's 633 page work is a seriously researched academic piece which has grown out of his doctoral dissertation.

The observations made by Kelkar in her book, as already suggested, are based on a visit that she made to China, for a period of one month during April-May 1978. Understandably therefore she does not presume to provide us with a comprehensive and detailed account of China's socialist development after the death of Mao Zedong, but instead seeks to supplement her own understanding of China's economy and society through personal observations and interviews. In the process we are presented with some little known facts about the role of women in China in the production process, the dynamics of the credit system in operation in the Chinese

countryside, as well as some glimpses of the so-called "havoc" wrought by the "Gang of Four."

Kelkar fails however to present to us in any depth the extent of the changes in China's economy and society since the death of Mao. Consequently we are left with the impression that things in China are pretty much what they were, except for a few minor changes. In view of the information that is now forthcoming from China and the pronouncements being made by its policy makers this is clearly an unacceptable proposition. This may in some part be due to the fact that Kelkar's visit to China was undertaken soon after Mao's death, at a time when priorities were still being worked out and an alternative line in concrete terms had yet to be formulated. It is difficult to imagine that Kelkar would today get the kind of answer she got from a member of the Dazhai brigade: "Unless people change their (traditional) ideas and follow Chairman Mao's thought, there could not be a new China, or a Dazhai and Dazhai people." Not only is China's present line inimical to the very basis on which Dazhai was upheld as a model worthy of emulation—namely the line of "putting politics in command"—but the utility of the late Chairman's thought for fostering socialist development is itself under critical scrutiny.

Kelkar's work therefore, we feel, is best appreciated if situated in the period when it was written. A period during which tentative strivings were underway for repairing the Sino-Indian bridge of friendship by correcting many of the distorted impressions that each side had of the other. Seen from this perspective the warmth and understanding that informs Kelkar's observations are indeed commendable and will undoubtedly go a long way towards achieving this end.

Teiwes's work quite clearly announces itself as the outcome of several years of painstaking and assiduous research. The quality of its research in terms of both the vast sweep of the material presented and the depth of analysis undertaken further testify to this. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to say, that it is a decided contribution for those scholars who seek to understand the nature of China's politics during the period under study.

As Teiwes himself states at the outset, the study looks at the history of politics of post-1949 China until the Cultural Revolution in terms of the organisational norms that have defined acceptable behaviour within the elite, with rectification occupying a primary place as a distinctive approach of the Chinese Communist Party to elite discipline. The main plank on which rectification stands, as the author explains, is the belief that the vast majority of the officials are "basically good" and that their mistakes can be corrected by applying "gentle breeze and mild rain methods" which seek to "cure the sickness and save the patient." Rectification, therefore, as it originated in Yen-an and continued to be applied thereafter, generally sought to correct, through persuasive means, the shortcomings in the "work style" of cadres and officials as they interacted with the masses. This included charges of corruption, nepotism, bureaucratism and "commandism."

Moreover it was stipulated, that administration of discipline would essentially be an inter-party affair with little if any outside interference.

As the author however shows, the aims and instrumentalities of rectification have varied with the distinctive overall objectives of each major period since 1949. Of these the years 1957-58 appear to be the most significant with far reaching effects for rectification and organisational norms. It may be recalled, that in launching the Great Leap Forward in late 1957, Mao Zedong initiated an alternative developmental strategy which clearly broke with the Soviet model which had till then enjoyed the almost unanimous confidence of a united leadership. By launching the Great Leap Forward, the author contends that consensus on the general policy line among the top leadership broke down, with leaders such as Peng Dehuai challenging the new developmental strategy. Rectification was now to be applied for the first time to the proponents of a policy contrary to the official line rather than to cadres who functioned in a high-handed manner with the masses or indulged in conspiratorial activity against the state. The methods used to carry out rectification were also more severe with increasing resort to purges, i.e., the expulsion of leading party cadres from the party.

During the course of his presentation, Teiwes also seeks to correct many of the distorted perceptions that people have of leading actors on the China scene. Thus he shows that in fact it was Mao Zedong, rather than Liu Shaoqi, who stressed as early as the 1942-44 Rectification Campaign the need to maintain proper rectification procedures and limit the participation of outsiders. Ironically, it was the Rectification Campaign initiated by Liu Shaoqi in 1947-48 which sought to broaden the norms of party rectification so as to enable active participation by the ordinary peasants. In light of the fact that most Cultural Revolution accounts have sought to depict Liu as an out and out reactionary who resisted most strongly examination of the Party's shortcomings by the masses, this is an interesting fact to note. It also bears reiteration, that in launching the Great Leap Forward and dismissing Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Plenum, Mao derived his most crucial support from both Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi. In doing so, it is the author's contention that they were instrumental in breaching traditional party norms that had stressed the right to air minority views openly in official party forums. This initiated a process which was to culminate in the Cultural Revolution and which refused to tolerate the expression of any contrary views.

Eventually however, it seems to us that Teiwes refuses to follow the logic of his own argument and instead succumbs to the temptation of placing the blame for the erosion of traditional party norms and the change in the focus of rectification on the shoulders of Mao. In this regard Mao's increasingly erratic and unpredictable interventions in the policy-making process are especially singled out for censure. However, Teiwes fails to realize that Mao's responses were, as he himself suggests at one point, those of a leader groping for new directions, uncertain as to how to reconcile the growing

contradiction he saw between the ideological and economic objectives of a socialist China. Thus what appears as erratic and unpredictable behaviour must be seen in the context of the tensions that arise in a post-capitalist society which continues to carry with it the backlog of an earlier socio-economic formation which at the same time strives to break with it. Accordingly, we are less prone to share the author's optimism that with the assumption of power of a post-Mao leadership led by Deng Xiao-ping, the old line which placed emphasis on inner-party democracy, is likely to be restored. Besides the fact that we have as yet seen no signs of it, we base our reservations on the belief that given the exigencies of a post-capitalist situation the right to dissent is inevitably eroded. It does not matter much in this regard whether we have a Mao, a Deng or a Liu in charge of running the state.

New Delhi.

HARMALA GUPTA

NEPAL

LEO E. ROSE AND JOHN T. SCHOLZ: *Nepal : Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1980, ix, 144p., \$ 16.50.

THE book under review, published in a series "Nations of Contemporary Asia," is meant to provide a short introduction to Nepal. It presents an analytical overview of Nepal's history, culture and society, economy, government and politics and international relations in a single short volume. The authors indeed have done a commendable service to those general readers who cannot afford to go into details but are nevertheless interested knowing the main currents of development in various fields of this geo-strategically important Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal. In fact, until now there was hardly any book of this type on this country, although specialized studies are available in plenty.

Nevertheless, it will be too naive to mark this book exclusively for the general readers and would-be specialists. As one of the co-authors of this volume Professor Leo E. Rose, is a doyen of Himalayan Studies, the book may be stimulating for the Nepal specialists too. In fact, the authors themselves claim—and rightly so—to have presented "a synthesis of material designed to fill the gaps among current research efforts and to suggest a series of working hypothesis from a more comprehensive perspective than can be expected from more specialised studies." (p. viii)

One such hypothesis—if according to the authors it is so and not their conclusive finding—is that the Rana regime was neither feudal nor reactionary. According to the authors:

The Ranas have usually been denounced as feudalistic, reactionary,

and authoritarian by their many critics, but this is not a very fair assessment of their regime. Authoritarian it was, and blatantly exploitative, without any apologies. But the system was not feudalistic at least in the European or Marxist definition of this term. Nor was it reactionary for its time—the Ranas probably introduced more *programmes of change, and with greater effect, than any Nepali Government before or since.* (p. 30)

In the light of the available research findings on the Rana regime this is apparently a startling proposition on which many Nepal specialists might like to join issue with the authors. When I posed this problem to a Nepali sociologist colleague of mine who is also a specialist on Nepal, he reacted sharply and controverted it. Other young Nepal watchers were also considerably provoked. This in itself vindicates the claim of the authors about one of the purposes of writing the book, notwithstanding the truth or otherwise of their observations.

Now coming to the author's observations, one must first be clear about the connotation of feudalism. The Random House Dictionary defines it "as the social and economic system in Europe during the Middle Ages based on the holding of lands in fief or fee and on the resulting relations between lord and vassals." In the same vein, but with a subtle difference, Webster's New International Dictionary explains it as "the system of polity which prevailed in Europe in the Middle Ages, based upon the relation of lord to vassal, with the holding of land in feud [fee]." If we strictly stick to the dictionary meaning of feudalism, this term is exclusively meant to depict the socio-economic structure and the resultant polity in Europe in the Middle Ages only and therefore, no other society could be described as feudalistic. But the term "feudalism" has acquired a broader meaning in the writings of social scientists, both western and non-western, to include socio-economic structures obtaining in different parts of the world at different times which bear some fundamental resemblances to the European system of the Middle Ages.

If the modern western taxonomy of traditional political systems and its theory of feudalism could be accepted as the measuring rod, the authors, to my mind, seem to be on firm footing in calling the Rana polity as non-feudalistic. "The Kingdoms known to history," writes Machiavelli, "have been governed in two ways; either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince and by barons, who hold their positions not by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood." (*The Prince and the Discourses*, N.Y. 1940, p. 15) Later on, Mosca made a similar distinction and termed them bureaucratic and feudal states. According to him, the feudal state is "that type of political organisation in which all the executive functions of society—the economic, the judicial, the administrative, the military—are exercised simultaneously by the same individuals while at the same time the state is made up of small

social aggregates, each of which possesses all the organs that are required for self sufficiency." On the contrary, in the bureaucratic state, "the central power conscripts a considerable portion of the social wealth by taxation and uses it first to maintain a military establishment and then to support a more or less extensive number of public services." (Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*. N.Y., 1939, pp. 80ff) In recent years, David Apter has christened these two forms as "hierarchical" and "pyramidal authority structures." (David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*. Chicago, 1965, pp. 81 ff) The key element in all these distinctions as Samuel P. Huntington has rightly pointed out is the extent to which power is concentrated or dispersed. Further elucidating the distinctions between bureaucratic and feudal states he writes:

The bureaucratic state thus tends towards the separation of functions and the concentration of power while the feudal state tends toward the fusion of functions and the division of power. In the bureaucratic state all land is often in theory owned by the King and in practise he exercises primary control over its disposition. In the feudal state land ownership is usually dispersed and hereditary; its control is in large part beyond the influence of the monarch. In the bureaucratic polity the King or emperor is the sole source of legitimacy, authority; in the feudal polity this legitimacy rests with the mobility whose source of authority over their subjects are independent of the monarch's authority over them. The essence of the bureaucratic state is the one way flow of authority from superior to subordinate; the essence of the feudal state is the two-way system of reciprocal rights and the socio-political military structure. (Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, 1968, p. 149)

While analyzing the nature of the Rana polity in Nepal, the authors of the present volume have perhaps the above tradition of thought in mind. The Rana Administration symbolised the extreme concentration of power and the Rana ruler was the sole source of authority and legitimacy. Moreover, the land in Nepal under the Rana System and even traditionally was considered to be the property of the state and as such the rulers alone possessed the right to sale, mortgage or bequest land. The private rights in land were thus contingent upon governmental initiative and decisions. Probably on account of these basic traits the Rana polity, according to the authors, does not fit in the category of the feudal system and comes nearer to the second one, i.e., the bureaucratic system. However, the authors do not specifically pronounce it as a bureaucratic state.

The chief difficulty with the Western or European theory of feudalism, it appears, is that feudalism is considered both as a form of polity as well as a socio-economic system. Feudalism is essentially the characteristic of a society and the mode of its economy, which of course, determines the character and complexion of its polity. A feudal society presupposes the

existence of a subservient and exploited class of peasantry and a minority class of landed aristocracy which exploits them and holds them in subjection. Moreover, agriculture is the main plank of the economy of such a society. The Marxist approach to feudalism supports this line of thinking. Feudalism has been defined on the basis of Marxist literature as "a socio-economic formation which came into being after the disintegration and fall of the slave-owning or primitive communal system and existed almost in all countries." (M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, Ed., *A Dictionary of Philosophy*. Moscow, 1967, p. 160) "The feudal lords and peasants were the main classes of feudal society. The prevailing production relations were based on the feudal lords' ownership of the means of production, on the land in the first place, and the workers' incomplete ownership expressed in different forms or personal dependence of the peasants on the lord . . . The feudal mode of production was characterised by three successive forms of ground rent : labour, service, natural rent and money rent. The feudal system was marked by natural economy and a stagnant low-level of technology." (*Ibid*)

The Rana Nepal, to my mind, comes very near to this socio-economic structure of society. This is also supported by the researches of an eminent Nepali scholar who maintained that through liberal *Birta*, land grants the Rana regime enriched and expanded the nobility, which in fact, included many of the Ranas themselves. Under the *Birta* system peasants worked on behalf of the *Birta* owner in conditions over which the government exercised no control. Police and judicial functions were discharged by the *Bitra* owner and every local inhabitant was under obligation to provide unpaid labour services to them. Exempt from the regular land tax due to the government, *Birta* owners were entitled to appropriate not only agricultural rents but also revenue from non-agricultural sources such as customs and market duties, judicial fines etc. "In many respects he resembled the lord of the manor in England during the Middle Ages. Vested with the proprietorship of an estate, *Birta* owners enjoyed a miscellany of conventional rights and the proceeds of numerous personal servitudes and exactions . . . *Birta* owners usually enjoyed full rights to possess, occupy, hold, transfer, mortgage, subdivide and bequeath their lands." (Mahesh C. Regmi, *Landownership in Nepal*. Berkeley, 1976, pp. 33-37) This clearly demonstrates the feudalistic traits of the socio-economic system in Nepal during the Rana rule. However, I must congratulate the authors for raising a very pertinent issue which might provoke specialists to make further studies.

Certain other points raised by the authors might also intrigue Nepal specialists. Rose and Scholz maintain that the Ranas were not reactionary. Although it is not possible to dwell on this theme in detail here it would not be out of place to state that the authors have lost sight of what one enlightened Rana Prime Minister, Chandra Shumshere said while laying the foundation stone of the first degree college in the country in 1918. He was reported to have stated that he was digging the grave of his dynastic rule.

Again the authors maintain that the "Ranas probably introduced more programmes of change and with greater effect than any Nepali Government before or since." Such a conclusion certainly gives too much credit to the Ranas and is unfair to the post-Rana governments in Nepal. In fact, what the Ranas had introduced should be aptly termed as programmes of consolidation and perpetuation of their rule rather than programmes of change, because such programmes were completely devoid of the interest and welfare of the people of Nepal. One of the co-authors of this volume, Professor Leo E. Rose, in his earlier collaborative work with Bhuwanlal Joshi had himself maintained:

As a system accountable neither to the King nor to the people the Rana regime functioned as an autonomous system, divorced from the needs of the people and even from the historical tradition of the country and served only the interests of a handful of Ranas and their ubiquitous non-Rana adherents... *The few changes* that occurred during its more than a hundred years were changes not in its aims and method, but merely in leadership, the consequence of the endless struggle for power within the Rana family itself. (*Democratic Innovations in Nepal*. Berkeley, 1966, p. 39)

Finally, with due regard to the scholarship and style of writing of the authors, especially of Professor Rose, one feels constrained to add that in the present volume one hears the echo of the despatches of the American journalists, Robert Trumbull and C.L. Sulzberger on Nepal in the early fifties. In fact, its undercurrent is present in Professor Rose's earlier works also but in the present volume this has become all the more prominent. The authors should not be oblivious of the fact that they are dealing with a very sensitive area. The book on the whole is a highly welcome addition to the list of literature on Nepal. It will educate the general readers and stimulate and provoke the Nepal specialist.

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SHREE KRISHNA JHA

INDIA

Social and Political Thought

R.C. DUTT : *Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru*. Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1981, xxiv, 284p., Rs. 80.

WE have here, within less than 300 pages, much of Nehru's musings and utterances on socialism as they unfolded over a period of forty

years. The thirties marked the high water-mark of Nehru's allegiance to what the author calls "orthodox socialism." The fifties witnessed Nehru's hesitations and vacillations in implementing his ideas. The overall picture that emerges from the author's account is that of a Hamlet-like character; the explanation offered is, "this trait displayed by Nehru so early after assuming power, not to force his personal views on a dissenting minority, characterises, and explains much of his subsequent action." (p. 184) Is socialism to be considered as "personal views" or as a policy anchor? How far does one carry consideration for "a dissenting minority" in a democracy?

The author is a retired senior civil servant of wide and varied experience; one expected from him a more mature, incisive study. His weakness lies in his obsession with "orthodox socialism." That fascination makes him observe: "Socialists are not nationalists in the orthodox sense of the term. . . . As a socialist Jawaharlal was essentially not a nationalist!" (pp. 37, 96) The same obsession makes him write: "Jawaharlal could have succeeded with the Muslims also if the Congress had fully shared his economic outlook and popularised it among the Muslim masses." Can one, even after hindsight wisdom, write in 1980 in such naive terms about the tumultuous texture of policies in the thirties and forties?

The author simplifies his task by equating socialism with wholesale nationalisation: "Mixed economy was undoubtedly a deviation from the orthodox socialist line . . . Nehru rationalized mixed economy, for instance, on the ground that in a democratic society it was inevitable." (p. 200) How does the author reconcile the rival tensions of "orthodox socialism" and democracy? How sensitive is he to Nehru's intellectual evolution described by him [Nehru] to Tibor Mende as follows: "The Russian experiment made me think of policies much more in terms of social change. It was not merely a nationalist upsurge, or one against autocracy like the Czar's rule, but a social change coming up in the people. It meant more equality. The precise problem of democracy and authoritarianism did not trouble me, they did not come up before me. They developed in later years."

Sources of inspiration for socialism are far wider than those provided by "orthodox socialism." Rightly did *Le Monde* recently remind readers, "Socialism was born out of generosity, the rejection of injustice, the assumption of responsibility for the weak and those for whom no place has been provided at the feast of life." (24 March 1981) Nehru remained responsive to these moral sources; for him the generosity of spirit was always vital.

Nehru's crucial failure occurred in 1952. In 1947 freedom came to India through the travails of partition and floods of refugees. Drastic socio-economic changes could not be contemplated in such a situation. The real opportunity came with the first General Elections. That moment could have been made the hinge of history. In that election over two thirds of the votes were in favour of the Congress, Socialists and Communists, that is, in favour of change. Less than fifteen per cent had voted for *status quo*, (20 per cent vote had been cast in favour of independent nondescript candidates).

"The move," Jayaparkash had told Nehru while putting forward his 14-Point Programme for collaborating with his Government, "must be more rapid and drastic at the beginning, when a new departure has to be made, than at the middle or at the end of the process." Nehru's mind worked differently. A sad contrast is to be found in the approaches provided by the First Five Year Plan and the detailed election platform of the Socialist Party.

That apart, Nehru was justified in disfavoured nationalisation of what he called, old junk, by paying compensation. Once the Socialists' proposal for once-for-all capital levy was rejected in 1952 there was no sense in squandering scarce capital resources in taking over concerns of "static technology." Nehru's priority was proper in directing scarce resources to the development of facilities of "changing technology." He further made a valid differentiation between "up-stream" and "down-stream" production capacities, and concentrating state efforts on the former. Dutt bemoans, "The public sector did indeed grow absolutely and perhaps relatively to the private sector too, but it failed to occupy the commanding heights from which it could set the tone of the economy." (p. 243) Is that true? Apart from the growth of the public sector in industry, power, transport and trade, the nationalisation of financial institutions—banking and insurance—put in the hands of the government crucial directing powers. It is not that the government has lacked instruments to steer the economy, the tragedy is that it has not known how to use them. More nationalisation would not have overcome that short-coming.

While the nationalist movement had been inspired by Gandhian ethic, Nehru's administration was not infused with any socialist ethic. In fact the reverse had occurred—the corrupting greed ethic began to spill over from the private sector not only to the public sector but to the government itself. The resulting cynicism and apathy threatened to discredit socialism itself. That eventuality could have been arrested, if not avoided, if Nehru had not ignored the lesson that he himself had drawn in 1938. After a spell of power by the Congress Ministries in the provinces, Nehru had noted, "We are sinking to the level of ordinary politicians who have no principles to stand by and whose work is governed by day-to-day opportunism. The Congress has now attracted to its fold thousands who are not eager to achieve Swaraj, or to join the fight, but are merely seeking personal gains." (pp 122-23) If that was the case in 1938, it was many times more dangerous after 1948. It was failure to provide checks against these developments—organisational and ethico-ideological—that grievously distorted Nehru's efforts for development and change.

New Delhi.

ASOKA MEHTA

S.S MITAL: *The Social and Political Ideas of Swami Vivekananda*. Metropolitan Book Co., New Delhi, 1979, xxiv, 338p., Rs. 80.

WHEN Vivekananda said that "the voice of Asia has been the voice of religion" while "the voice of Europe is the voice of politics," he obviously realized that an opinion such as this would expose him to the criticism that he was but an oriental mystic who had no notion of politics as an instrument of reform or of revolution. He said this in the United States in 1900 when the Indian National Congress was fifteen years old and when Sri Aurobindo's radical articles in *Indu Prakash* had urged Congress to shed its politics of petition and prayer and adopt a programme of revolutionary political action. Nor was Vivekananda unaware of the tremendous significance of the political movements in the West since the French Revolution. Actually he called himself a socialist and a revolutionary and predicted the rise of the masses to political power. It is therefore not an easy task to spell out the political ideas of one who seemed to repudiate politics as an instrument of human good and even thought that it was foreign to the genius of the Indian people. Mital, the author of this book, has undertaken that task and has done it well.

When Karl Jaspers exalted Mahatma Gandhi for what the German existentialist called the Mahatma's non-political approach to political questions, he implied a spiritual and moral approach to national and international problems which Vivekananda valued more than anything else as a means of improving the human condition. In the post-war world, the message of Vivekananda has assumed a new dimension and a new depth because in that world politics even in its apparently noblest manifestations—in liberal or revolutionary ideology—has only brought us very close to a nuclear disaster. The world is now in need of new values in politics, or a transformation of politics into a philosophy of humanism if only to make the nations of the world realize that Machiavellianism has no place in a new international order.

Vivekananda saw this at the turn of the last century when he discovered that the highest ideals of the French Revolution and of the American War of Independence had been blurred by the self-seeking politics of the colonial powers. There is nothing in the eight volumes of his *Complete Works* to establish that he watched the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party founded in 1898. He had no occasion to mention either Marx or Engels in his speeches, writings and letters. But his observations on socialism prove beyond doubt that he was acquainted with the ideas which worked behind the radical movements of his times. He made it one of the missions of his life to give a new direction to those movements and he began that work by saying that "politics is not enough." And when he looked to the politics of the West he even thought that politics was disastrous.

What Vivekananda wanted was that a new humanism rooted in the Vedantic conception of human unity and human dignity, which he claimed offered

a firm foundation for a civil order where the individual could meet the demands of corporate life without surrendering his own freedom, should take the place of politics. If such an integration of freedom and order was to be possible at the national level it could also sustain an international community. That our political scientists do not normally concern themselves with these ideas of Vivekananda is obviously due to the fact that he never put them in a work which could be mentioned as a work on the subject and he did not put them in the idiom of a political thinker.

Mital has made a very careful study of Vivekananda's religious, moral and philosophical ideas in their bearing on the problems of government and society in the legitimate conviction that what we may call his political and social ideas are imbedded in his philosophy of life as a whole. In the first 39 pages of this large work the author deals with the emergence of Vivekananda on the social and political scene of India and the world. While it is true that Sri Aurobindo and Subhash Chandra Bose found their political guru in Vivekananda, and even Jawaharlal Nehru loved to quote his words, it may not be proper to say that he made an appearance on the Indian political scene. The author must have thought that he really did because of his profound influence on Indian patriotism in the first half of the twentieth century. The second part of the work is devoted to a study of the fundamental concepts of Vivekananda's thought, the main thesis of the chapter being that Vedantic philosophy is the keynote of Vivekananda's social and political ideas. Mital has quoted copiously and appropriately from Vivekananda's works but those readers of the book who are not acquainted with the basic ideas of the Vedanta would have been benefited by some apt references to a few Upanishadic texts, Vādrayana's *Brahma-Sutra* and Shankara's *Shariraka Mimamsavashya* by way of acquainting themselves with the fountainhead of Vivekananda's philosophy.

Three chapters of Part III of the work deal with the social ideas of Vivekananda including his ideas on education. In presenting the essence of Vivekananda's ideas on society, Mital refers to the ideas of other thinkers and sometimes these references do not add much to his main argument which is always remarkably clear. In some cases these references appear to have cluttered up the pages with quotations. They have however never obscured the meaning. The five chapters of Part IV are a very lucid presentation of Vivekananda's political ideas and here the author has put together in a neat order his ideas on the individual, society, and state, on freedom, democracy and government, on socialism, nationalism and internationalism. In the tenth and last chapter Mital sums up his views on Vivekananda's political and social ideas to show how the great sanyasi developed his idealistic concept of freedom which is the very foundation of his philosophy of society, government and law. Mital has shown with remarkable intellectual ability how Vivekananda presented his Vedantic view of life as his solution for the political and social problems of the modern man. Serious

students of political science and sociology will find the book immensely useful. Our legislators and politicians may find it uplifting.

Calcutta.

R.K. DASGUPTA

HUGH TINKER: *The Ordeal of Love: C.F. Andrews and India*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, xxi, 334p., Rs. 90.

C. F. Andrews was one of the most distinguished among the select band of Englishmen who, during the period of British rule, made India their home and identified themselves wholly with the aspirations of its people, even though this brought them into disagreement and conflict with the representatives of the country of their birth. Beginning his career in India as a Christian missionary and a college teacher, Andrews became a close friend of such diverse and distinguished Indian personalities as Swami Sradhdhananda, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi, travelled long distances to champion the cause of Indians overseas, and worked strenuously to establish friendship between Britain and India on the basis of equality and shared values of freedom, brotherhood of man and social justice. Absolutely free from religious bigotry he was an intensely religious person. He wrote a large number of books on political and religious themes. Naturally he has attracted a fair number of authors since his death in 1940. Among their products the most well known have been the works of John S. Hoyland, Nicol Macnicol and Banarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjorie Sykes. The biography jointly authored by the last two—*Charles Freer Andrews: a Narrative*, (London 1949)—has been particularly recognised for long as a standard work. It was, therefore, not easy to write another biography of Andrews which would hold the attention of serious readers and win their regard by making a contribution to knowledge.

It is to the credit of Hugh Tinker that he has successfully accomplished this task. Although he has written a number of books, there is no doubt that this is his most significant literary production and will last as long as interest in Andrews lasts. He has consulted a wide variety of sources, some of which he had encountered earlier while writing one of his monumental volumes on Indians overseas—*Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-50* which provided a kind of preparation for writing this book—and presented his narrative in a very readable language. But what makes his narrative really click is the fact that he has treated Andrews not as a saint or a leader, but as an extraordinarily sensitive human being with all the contradictions and tensions and sorrows which such a human being has to undergo. This really makes this book a model biography. It throws light not only on the innermost feelings of Andrews himself but also on those of some others with whom he came into close con-

tact, particularly Tagore and Agatha Harrison. At the same time, the book will also be found useful by students of the Indian nationalist movement under Gandhi's leadership and the struggles of Indians in South Africa, East Africa and Fiji. It is a pity that out of consideration for space and regard for the work of Chaturvedi and Sykes, Tinker has not written as fully of the last ten years of the life of Andrews as he has done on the earlier period. Yet this modesty and regard for his predecessors adds further to the attraction of the author. This book deserves a place in every library containing books on modern Indian history and biography.

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BIMAL PRASAD

History of Modern India

SADANANDA CHOUDHURY: *Economic History of Colonialism: A Study of British Salt Policy in Orissa*. Inter-India Publications, Delhi, 1979, xv, 229p., Rs. 60.

FEW subjects in recent decades have inspired as many monographs as the economic history of India and the socio-economic roots of Indian nationalism. The book under review is one such monograph which fetched Sadananda Choudhury a Ph.D. from Berhampur University. His study of the salt policy of the British Government in India between 1803 and 1930 and its consequences in Orissa, which was one of the major producers of salt, extends our knowledge of the exciting times. A comprehensive survey of the processes of salt manufacture and administration, the nature and extent of salt trade, the monopoly tax levied on salt by the ruling power, and the agitation it produced owing to its oppressiveness has been attempted with some competence. Choudhury contends that the revenue acquired from salt far outstripped the revenue derived from land, that the levy on salt was a major factor in the Khurda Rebellion in 1817, and long before Mahatma Gandhi launched the salt satyagraha, Orissa had given a lead in "salt agitation." Any study which illuminates facets of the salt satyagraha and the civil disobedience movement launched under the aegis of the Indian National Congress, the principal mass organization of the time, with Mahatma Gandhi as its supreme leader, should be welcome.

Unfortunately, the effect of the study is marred owing to a lack of analysis of data, and unsubstantiated generalisations. Nevertheless, the usefulness of such a regional study is undoubted. While attempting a regional study, it may be worthwhile remembering that the unique element discovered in a region may not after all be so unique. More often than not, it was inextricably intertwined with the universal element pervading the all-India movement.

Gandhiji chose salt as a symbol, to illustrate the social reality obtaining in colonial India. He sought to show the utter callousness and exploitative nature of British rule in India, when he said, "Even the salt he [an Indian] must use to live is so taxed as to make the burden fall heaviest on him, if only because of the heartless impartiality of this incidence." In saying so, he was not advancing merely an economic argument. His argument that salt like air, water and sunshine were gifts of nature, which should be freely accessible to every Indian as his inalienable right had an inevitable moral ring. The salt tax was no doubt "the most iniquitous tax," but more important, it was an "immoral" levy. The British Government in India was a "satanic" Government against which Mahatma Gandhi called upon the Indian people to wage what he termed a "moral battle." "It has," he said, "reduced us politically to serfdom. It has sapped the foundations of our culture.... I regard this rule as a curse. I am out to destroy this system of Government." As a result of the salt satyagraha and the consequent civil disobedience movement, a mass upsurge of gigantic proportions was witnessed in 1930-31, which shook the foundations of British rule in India. Had Sadananda Choudhury taken care to glance through the writings and speeches of Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru, most of which are in print, he would have rid himself of regional chauvinism.

If we look at the history of salt tax it would be observed that the salt tax was not an unusual form of taxation imposed in India. It did not originate with British rule. It is understood that the tax, however light it may have been, was levied in some form or the other throughout Indian history. It is well-known that one of the main issues of dispute between Nawab Mir Qasim and the East India Company related to the salt duty. In European countries, France exacted a salt tax during the Napoleonic period; Italy maintained a salt monopoly and the Austrian Empire followed suit. Around this point of time, Germany obtained a large revenue from a tax on salt. China earned as much as 20 million dollars a year out of its salt monopoly. Japan maintained a state monopoly extending not only to the manufacture but also to the import and sale of salt. Hence salt monopoly or salt tax was by no means a unique phenomenon. It was probable that Orissa suffered from over-taxation on salt. This state of affairs existed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but no movement as such had occurred. The salt tax became a burning issue and a major plank of the nationalist ethic and logic in the 1930s, which was to prove that the capacity for innovation and creativity of Gandhiji was indeed immense, the Congress providing the organizational basis of social action as envisaged by Gandhiji.

Valuable insights would have been gained by interviewing eminent leaders of Orissa, such as Dr. Harekrishna Mahatab, Radhanath Rath, Biswanath Das, Manmohan Chowdhuri and others. Private papers of Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatab, Gopbandhu Chowdhuri and several others, available in Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, could have been utilized with

profit. No doubt, a peep into the regional newspapers such as *Samaj*, the files of which are still extant, would have lent colour and life to the story of the epic struggle launched in 1930-31. Mere reliance of official records for a study of modern Indian history is not likely to be rewarding as is evident from the book under review.

Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
New Delhi

D.N. PANIGRAHI

KARNI SINGH: *The Relations of the House of Bikaner with the Central Powers, 1465-1949*. Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1974, xvii, 432 p., Rs. 65.

THIS book has grown out of a Ph. D. thesis of the Bombay University and is concerned with the mediæval and modern period of Indian history dealing specifically with the relations of the House of Bikaner with the Mughals and the British, who constituted the Central Powers for Bikaner. This is a scholarly study based on the use of original, untapped source-material, and is well-documented throughout. The period covered is the whole history of Bikaner since its foundation in 1469 by Rao Bika, the first Rathor ruler of Bikaner to the merger of the state with the Indian Union in 1949. The study is not merely in the nature of a narration of events arranged chronologically but is an attempt to interpret the changing relationship at every stage and to explain the causes and consequences thereof.

The Rathor rulers of Bikaner acknowledged Mughal suzerainty in the period of the rule of Rao Kalyanmal (1524-71). Akbar was the Mughal ruler at that time. The considerations which weighed with the rulers of Bikaner in taking this step were: 1. to seek protection against the rural State of Jodhpur, 2. the brigandage of the tribal chiefs and other unruly elements among the nobles and jagirdars. The result was a happy one for Bikaner and its people. It enjoyed peace from internal as well as external dangers and its position got stabilized thereby. The author has also briefly touched upon the impact of the Mughals on the life and culture of the people and also on the administrative system of Bikaner but this is rather sketchy and does not show any deep insight. (pages 116-120)

Karni Singh, justifiably, devotes more space to the relations of Bikaner State with the British Government of India. In the 18th century, as central control was lacking, troubles erupted for the State. The turbulent and near anarchical situation, created by the unruly jagirdars was further aggravated by the raids of the neighbouring states of Marwar and Jaisalmer. Maharaja Surat Singh saw no way out except to conclude a subsidiary alliance treaty with the British in 1818. This helped the state rulers in ensuring peace and security in the state. Karni Singh compares this treaty with treaties signed

with other states of Rajputana. The Maharaja had been no doubt assigned a position of "subordinate co-operation," but the State of Bikaner had not been made a tributary state. Thus the relationship of the British with the ruler of Bikaner was based upon "perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interests." (page 130)

Later on, British paramountcy gradually acquired greater hold over the state, particularly from the time of Lord Curzon; British interference in internal administration had become so marked that even in matters of granting permission to jagirdars to leave the state, a reference had to be made to the Political Agent. Karni Singh justifies all this on grounds of peace and stability.

One important theme of the book is the glorious rule and the outstanding character and personality of Maharaja Ganga Singh (1898-1943). He became an influential figure, not only internally but also in the wider sphere of princely and all India politics. He was invited to attend the League of Nations as an Indian delegate and was appointed a member of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. Later he was also appointed a delegate to the Round Table Conference of 1930-32. In all these capacities Ganga Singh made a distinctive contribution. His period was also marked out for internal reforms—administrative, social and educational. Throughout his life he remained devoted to the ideal of self-government for India as a member of the British Empire; he was confident of the benefits to India of its membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

While all this is alright, Karni Singh is not critical either of the role of the Princely Order as a whole and his father Maharaja Ganga Singh in particular. When the question of the accession of states to a federated Indian Union under the Act of 1935 arose, his father's reply dated 27 January 1939 to Lord Linlithgow stated that adequate protection had not been afforded to the states in respect of their rights arising out of their treaties, agreements and *sanads*, which they were not prepared to waive. In a specific reference to Bikaner, he argued that entry into the federation under the conditions when encroachments on rights were involved, would be tantamount to encouraging subversive movements whose objectives were to wean away the people of the states from the loyalty they owed to their rulers. (page 251) Thus the fear of the growing struggle for freedom in British India and in the states was dominant in the mind of Maharaja Ganga Singh as well. How internal autonomy would have ensured greater security is left unanswered by the author of this study.

The last phase reveals the story of the integration of Bikaner state with an independent and democratic India. Karni Singh maintains and supports the thesis with facts and figures, that the rulers of Bikaner had always upheld the just aspirations of Indians for attainment of independence and that they considered themselves as Indians first and last. The last ruler, Maharaja Sardul Singh played a useful and patriotic part in the politics of India during 1946-47. How he broke "Bhopal's game" of evolving a third force is a

monument to his statesmanship. Sardar Patel recognised this and Bikaner opted for integration at an early stage.

There are a number of appendices, which have enhanced the value of the work and some of them are documents not easily available. In the end one can say, that Karni Singh has produced a scholarly, analytical and balanced account of the relationship of a premier state with the central authority in India.

New Delhi.

AMBA PRASAD

Pressure Groups

BABULAL FADIA: *Pressure Groups in Indian Politics*. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 295p., Rs.90.

DR. Fadia has equated the functioning of a democratic political system with the operation of pressure groups and political decision-making a vector of the interaction of conflicting demands of pressure groups. No doubt, there have been numerous writers, for example Arthur E. Beutley, who have tried assiduously to demonstrate the viability of the group theory of politics for understanding any political system; Fadia quotes extensively from these writers to support his own assertions but conveniently ignores a substantial body of literature given to prove the hollowness of the claim of Group Theory.

If the functioning of a democratic political system is consequent upon the emergence of pressure groups and their activities, what happens to those interests which lack the amenities of a pressure group or are weak enough to compete for articulation, recognition and control? Are not they likely to remain suppressed and unrepresented? If so, to what extent will the cause of democracy be served. Fadia does not concern himself with these questions. But when the social order becomes coterminus with pressure groups, this question does not arise. The author has defined pressure groups in such a way that nothing remains outside the ken of pressure groups. Different castes, different components of political parties, even committees of Parliament are pressure groups according to Fadia. When this definitional gimmick turns everything into pressure groups, the concept itself loses all its salience and becomes unserviceable. By making pressure groups coterminus with social order, Fadia has robbed his study of analytical rigour and empirical usefulness.

He forgets the fact that there are two words in pressure groups, each with defined and fixed properties in social science writing. Since he has ignored this, he had become vulnerable to sense error in conceptualizing and classifying pressure groups. He has unthinkingly adopted the classificatory scheme developed by Gabriel Almond and his followers. One would

have expected a factual study of pressure groups in Indian politics and the way they function. However, this hope is dashed when Fadia describes what he calls various pressure groups without going into how they exert pressure, how they are countered by other conflicting pressures and how decisions are finally made. What he does is to assert that pressure groups have a great role to play in decision making.

Pressure Groups in Indian Politics is an improved version of the author's Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Bhopal University. While the author claims that the "present work represents the final outcome" of his earlier dissertation, it basically remains a Ph. D. dissertation with all its hall-marks of unripeness. In all, the study under review is disappointing.

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RAMASHRAY ROY

Panchayati Raj Strategies

K.K. SINHA AND UMA SINHA: *Panchayat Strategy*. Vora Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1979, ix, 135p., Rs. 30.

THE concept of local self-government has long been recognized as an important element in the process of rural development in India. The scheme of democratic decentralization suggested by the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee and implemented by the Government of India is based on the assumption that democratically elected panchayats would be better agents to identify the local needs and to mobilise local resources and popular support for programmes of development essentially local in nature. However, actual experience has revealed that the functioning of these institutions leaves much to be desired.

The authors in their study on "Panchayat Strategy" have examined the effectiveness of the Panchayats as agents of development from the point of view of their financial and structural viability. The main assumption is that elected bodies could be efficient organizers of local affairs and be made responsible for developmental tasks provided their structuring and finances were to be designed so as to enable them to meet their developmental role.

Part I of the study deals with the evolution of the Panchayat concept in India. Part II examines the rationale behind the various direct and indirect rural taxes and the effectiveness of the Panchayat tax structure in mobilizing the requisite quantum of financial resources for local development. It has been argued that taxes such as house tax based on rental values and profession tax are primarily urban taxes with little rural content. In cases where the rural taxes are linked to the almost stagnant land revenue of the state they failed to generate adequate funds for development. The authors suggest

the Ugandan type of poll tax to the present system of direct taxes based on the income concept.

In the case of indirect taxation, the authors argue that the scope for such taxation is limited and that the method of sharing and surcharge is preferable to a full fledged and purely local tax. They suggest that taxes like octroi, theatre tax, taxes on vehicles etc. may be merged with state taxes such as sales tax, entertainment tax, road tax etc., with provision for sharing on an agreed upon criteria.

In view of the limited scope for panchayat revenues from non-tax sources such as income from village property, it is necessary for the Panchayats to receive grants and loans from higher echelons of government. However, in view of the emphasis placed on the concept of local self government, such sources of funds to the Panchayats need to be limited in nature and be based on rationally evolved criteria.

The functioning of the existing three tier Panchayat structure has been examined in Part III from the point of view of raising adequate financial resources for administering the various developmental programmes and delivering the needed civic services. The choice of an optimum tier which could fulfil both these criteria should be based on the size of the area and population. Village panchayats are found to be too small to levy and administer the taxes efficiently though they may be able to deliver local civic services effectively. The authors feel that the existing middle tier, namely block, is in a better position to administer the taxes whereas a panchayat for every two or three villages will be in a better position to plan for and deliver the civic services. However, the authors also are of the opinion that the district authority has a greater role to play in sectors such as transportation and secondary education.

The book is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on rural local government and more particularly on panchayat finance.

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New Delhi.

A.P. BARNABAS

M. SHIVIAH, K.B. SRIVASTAVA and A.C. JENA: *Panchayati Raj Elections in West Bengal 1978: A Study in Institution-Building for Rural Development*. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1980, vii, 145p., Rs. 35.

ONE of the classic arguments advanced in favour of local self-government institutions is the need to identify and promote the growth of local leadership which can in course of time assume governmental responsibilities at a higher level. It is in this sense that local self-government becomes the nursery of democracy.

After the attainment of freedom the process of increasing social, political

and economic fervour accelerated the pace of the emergence of a leadership from even comparatively less affluent sections of society. The social character of the leadership has a decisive impact on the nature, the temper and the tone of the programme undertaken. This underlines the importance of the scientific studies of the nature, source, base and orientation of leadership in panchayat and local government.

The introduction of Panchayati Raj or the system of grass-roots democracy in India's highly traditional and stratified society has created various layers of formal institutions. This has led, on the one hand, to the proliferation of political elites at each of these levels, and, on the other, to an intense power struggle between the traditional power holders and the newly emerging forces which had hitherto no share in the power structure.

In recent years, political scientists like Rajni Kothari and others have laid much emphasis on "nation-building" and "institution-building." So far as rural development is concerned, Panchayati Raj has to go a long way in the area of institution-building at the grass-roots level. The magnitude of the task of rural development (poverty, unemployment, low productivity, consumption and literacy levels, etc.), demands organisational and educational efforts on the widest possible scale, geared to location-specific planning and intensive (but ecologically sensible) utilisation of local resources. And there is the problem of more efficient implementation of development programmes. In all these respects Panchayati Raj institutions have a significant contribution to make.

In this context Panchayati Raj elections have an important bearing on the process of "institution-building" for rural development as all elections—national, state and local—are a therapeutic exercise in "nation-building."

The aims of the study under review are to throw light on the dynamics of "institution-building" for rural development *vis-a-vis* the process of recruitment through Panchayati Raj elections, relevant dimensions of political behaviour, the linkages between the political processes at the local, state and national levels and aspects of politico-administrative culture and development, with reference to the wider canvas of modernisation.

Though the survey research method has been followed for the present study, it goes to the credit of the authors that they have made successful use of secondary source materials, informal discussions and observations to make the study more authentic and meaningful. The authors have in fact with a sound research methodology provided a sophisticated analysis of data.

The findings of the study are: the leadership which is emerging is comparatively young, better educated and having its way in local political processes. Taking into account the aggregate data in respect of this study one finds that those in the age group of 21-35 account for 51 per cent and 36-45, 31 per cent, making a total of 82 per cent. The other two age groups 46-55 and 56 and above—together claimed 18 per cent and the latter just 4 per cent. Educational levels too are high enough to justify appreciation of the

voters' judgement as there are no illiterates. As many as 47 per cent belong to "upto higher secondary category," with the graduates and post-graduates accounting for a tidy 22 per cent. Those with primary education constitute 11 per cent. Occupation-wise, the major categories are farming (47 per cent), professionals (24 per cent) and business (22 per cent); considering the trend as the authors say, one may be tempted to guess that a good percentage of them might be social workers. However, this is not substantiated by the support of data as the authors have themselves admitted that the data on this point was not at their command and as such guess work does not find any place in such studies. The most disappointing feature of our rural political system is the lack of women workers in formal leadership positions.

Moreover the findings of the study simply confirm the findings of earlier works done in this field in different states—like C.R. Bada's study of Karnataka, Iqbal Narayan's study of Rajasthan, S.N. Mishra's study of Bihar and others—that the pattern of Panchayati Raj politics is almost the same all over the country. What is more interesting with regard to this study is that it has successfully depicted the role of political parties in the election process at the grassroots level; this is only because a lot has been heard about the penetration of political parties in rural West Bengal. A.K. Mukherjee's work suggests that even the local elections in West Bengal are fought on party lines but, of course, not formally. The present study further supports this point with the help of latest data.

To conclude, there is a dearth of empirical works dealing with the dysfunctional and pathological aspects of local government. The present work of Panchayati Raj Elections in West Bengal is a welcome attempt in this direction. This is an interesting study and covers new ground. It will be welcomed by the students of public administration, local political processes as well as public men interested in the betterment of local politics and government, for, for long we have accepted as the axiomatic truth that a good government is no substitute for self-government. Legitimately, the question does arise, whether self-government in the long run is either possible—or stable unless it is backed by a good government?

Indian Institute of Public Administration,
New Delhi.

S.N. MISHRA

Law

C.K.N. RAJA: Freedom of Speech and Expression Under the Constitutions of India and the United States. Karnataka University, Dharwad, 1979, xii, 317p., Rs. 24.

C. K.N. Raja's research study of freedom of speech and expression is a welcome addition to the literature on comparative constitutional

studies. It is primarily a study in perspective of the American and Indian democracies; it is broadly indicative and inclusive rather than comprehensive or exhaustive.

Raja tells us the extraordinary story of the glory and the crises of that most preferred of all freedoms, historically and philosophically. The author approaches the theme as a comparative lawyer and concentrates on the case law on the subject in India and the United States. Seen in comparative juxtaposition, the developments in the United States and India show a measure of doctrinal identity as well as situational similarity.

In his approach and analysis also the author shows a wider inter-disciplinary awareness of the central issues of contemporary political thought and constitutional discourse. Discussing the changing content of freedom in history, he points out the social and economic nodal points of stress and strain for the concept of individual liberty in the remaining two decades of the twentieth century.

Further, he deals with the evolution of the Bill of Rights in the United States and that of the Fundamental Rights chapter in the Indian Constitution with particular reference to the freedom of speech and expression. Separated by nearly two centuries of freedom in the United States and of foreign colonial domination in India, the evolution of freedom in the two countries has naturally been quite different. It is remarkable that when India became free, it took the experience of the United States' as an example.

The author attempts a comparative study of basic principles involved in the determination of "the reasonableness of restrictions" in USA and India and deals with parallel case law applications of the principles. He also discusses freedom of speech and expression in the context of legislative privileges in the two countries. The treatment of the subject is largely narrative and descriptive.

Dwelling on the content and scope of the right of freedom of speech and expression in the United States and India, Raja covers a wide range of topical problems. He discusses freedom of the press, distribution of different kinds of literature, publication by way of radio, television, motion pictures and dramatic performances, commercial advertisements and demonstrations. On these topics, the author tends to rely only on vintage case law and has omitted to deal with many interesting and recent developments in Indian constitutional and administrative law. These omissions are to be regretted because not only are they quite significant but also because they provide a distinctive Indian flavour and content to constitutional controversies.

Raja's study is an extension service publication of Karnataka University and would be useful to students of constitutional law as a ready reference and a digest to more or less comparable developments in the United States and India. The Table of Statutes and Ordinances, Select Bibliography, and some US and Indian legislation, appended to the book, will also prove to be very useful.

The present reviewer hopes that as a sequel to this study, the author will venture more analytically into the critical areas and interstices of freedom of speech and expression.

New Delhi.

L.M. SINGHVI

T.K. MANN: Administration of Justice in India: A Case Study of Punjab. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979. 211p., Rs. 60.

BASED on the doctoral thesis of the author, Mann's book covers familiar and common ground found in other works. While the title suggests that it was to be a work predominantly on Punjab, out of 211 pages (including the title, bibliography and index pages), the author's contribution on Punjab deserving any attention is contained in chapter 2—not more than twelve pages. The Preface states that the book is an attempt to present the *evolution* of the judicial system in Punjab till the present day, but here again one feels somewhat disappointed in the author's extremely sketchy contribution to legal history, particularly in the context of Punjab. It is a 1979 publication but no attempt has been made to update the materials and the manuscript appears to have gone to the press as was prepared by the author a few years back. Just to give a few illustrations, the author refers at p. 85, only to the 1862 Code of Criminal Procedure,* but not the 1973 Code which supplanted the former. At p. 54, the author speaks of the 1967 *Golak Nath* case as the "recent" decision, while mentioning the point about the power of the Supreme Court to overrule its decision, but there were several cases on the subject subsequent to *Golak Nath*. Reference to the provisions of the 42nd Amendment 1976, and 44th Amendment 1978, of the Constitution in relation to the administration of justice is completely missing from the book. It is again a serious omission not to mention the 1973 Cr. P.C. while discussing the separation of the judiciary from the executive.

The material in the book is elementary and commonplace. No attempt has been made to examine anything in depth. The writing at places is quite slipshod; sweeping generalisations have been made without any substantiation or documentation. Thus, speaking about the administration of justice during the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the author says: "The judicial system under him was very simple and crude and was based on the Mughal system. Yet it suited the temperament of the people and its simplicity appealed to the peasantry." (p. 27) This is immediately followed by such statements as "whims of judges also played their part sometime," jagirdars enjoyed autocratic rights "within their jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases and ordinarily the subjects of jagirdars could not even bring their

*She also states that the Code was amended in 1868, 1872 and 1882, ignoring completely the Cr. P.C. of 1898.

appeals to the regular courts of the State," the Maharaja himself was the prosecutor, the judge and the jury, and that justice was essentially a source of income. One is left to wonder how these apparently unjust propositions suited the temperament of the people.

There is hardly any discussion on the independence of the subordinate judiciary. Administrative tribunals, which are important adjuncts to the administration of justice, find absolutely no mention in the book. Twenty-two pages (over 10 per cent of the space) have been devoted to mentioning the administrative functions and ministerial services of courts; such a work may be suitable as a government manual but is not a scholarly contribution.

The book is likely to be useful to a layman or a LL.B. student but not a serious-minded student of law. However, by pricing it at Rs. 60/- the publishers have kept it just out of the reach of those for whom the book was perhaps meant.

Indian Law Institute,
New Delhi.

S.N. JAIN

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—Managing Editor).

DAS, Bina. *The Second Chamber of Indian Parliament (Rajya Sabha)*. Vivek Publications, Aligarh, 1982, 91p., Rs. 30.

Discusses the nature, composition and functions of the Rajya Sabha.

DIWAKAR, R.R. *Bhagawan Buddha* (Bhawan's Book University, 67), 3rd Edn. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980, x, 191p., Rs. 13. Paper.

Life and teachings of the Apostle of Peace by the former Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the Government of India and Governor of Bihar.

DWIVEDI, Ramji. *Nepal Mein Panchayati Loktantra*. Vivek Publications, Aligarh, 1978, 141p., Rs. 15.

Revised version of the author's Ph.D. thesis in Hindi.

FURTADO, A.D. *Goa: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*. Furtado Enterprises, Goa, 1981, xxxiv, 254p., Rs. 32.50. Paper.

Traces the history of Goa from the time of early rulers to the present. The author deals with the various socio-economic and political issues in Goan life and presents a re-interpretation of historical facts. Two chapters are devoted to freedom movements in Goa and "Operation Vijay." The last chapter lists eminent personalities who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of Goa.

GUPTA, Shanti S. *AMU: The National Context*. Vivek Publications, Aligarh, 1980, v, 168p., Rs. 40.

Besides dealing with Muslim grievances, minority character, AMU acts, and the evolution of communal politics in India, the author discusses the various alternatives and the need of a National University at Aligarh and its role, documented by the internal reactions, press comments and public opinion reflecting a sectarian approach to the AMU problem.

HANDA, D.N. *Concept of Hinduism*. Embassy Book Company, New Delhi, 1979, 147p., Rs. 27.

Attempts to define and explain the terms Hindu and Hinduism.

KHAN, Bakher Ali. *Islam-Shiah Point of View*. The author, Madras, 1981, x, 161p., Rs. 7.

Explains the fundamental principles which according to the Shiah are the very foundations of Islam; for the purpose the author has taken help of quotations from the Arabic to English translations of the holy Quran and verbatim English translations of the sermons of Hazrath Ali compiled by late Maulana Syed Muhammad Askary Jaffery in the book. *Nahjul Balagah*.

LALA, R.M. *The Creation of Wealth: The Tata Story*. IBH Publishing Company Bombay, 1981, xv, 213p., Rs. 25. Paper.

Record of the growth of the House of Tata and the part played by the leadership of pre-independent India—Mahatma Gandhi, C.F. Andrews and Motilal Nehru whose initiative in the Central Assembly saved Tata Steel at its most critical stage of development; Subhash Chandra Bose who took on the leadership of the Tata workers when a major strike had hit the steel plant in 1929; and later Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Rajendra Prasad. It also narrates Lord Curzon's attempts to keep in check what

he called the "ambitions" of Tata to give India higher scientific and technological education. The book contains delightful illustrations by Mario Miranda.

LALA, R.M. *Encounters with the Eminent*. IBH Publishing Company, Bombay, 1981, 160p., Rs. 20. Paper.

The author, former editor of *Himmat*, gives a glimpse into the lives and careers of some of the leaders in the field of politics, sport, music and industry, with whom he had a chance to meet face to face.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh a Patron of the Arts. Marg Publications, Bombay, 1981, 138p.

In this beautifully produced book with colour illustrations and photographs, the contributors—Mulk Raj Anand, Gainda Singh, Kanwarjit Singh Kang, Man Mohan Singh, F.S. Aijazuddin, B.N. Goswamy and Lance Dane describe the spectacular achievements of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in his patronage of the arts in a manner unique for a practical genius. It includes the use of portraiture in Sikh diplomacy, Mughal style *baradaris* and palaces, forts for security, structures added to the Golden Temple at Amritsar, creation of Rambagh Gardens and encouragement to all the traditional crafts. The volume also contains two separate chapters on Medals of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and coinage of the Sikh Empire.

MEHTA, Usha etc. *Women and Men Voters: The 1977-80 Experiment*. The Election Archives, New Delhi, 1981, 119p., Rs. 48.

Study based on the survey conducted in Bombay city to assess the attitude of the Bombay electorate *vis-a-vis* the policy and performance of the Janata Government and the consequent crisis. Deals with the electoral behaviour of women, emphasizing the various promises made by the Janata Party or the Congress (I) Party with regard to the amelioration of the lot of women. It also gives a comparative picture of the voting behaviour in 1977 and 1980 in the four constituencies of Bombay city, and also gives in its purview the post 1977 government performance (or non-performance) and the extent to which the President was responsible for breaking the Janata Government.

The study was undertaken jointly by the SNTD Women's University and Department of Civics and Politics of the University of Bombay.

MURTHY, Chaganti, Suryanarayana. *Sri Lalita Trisati Bhasya of Sri Samkara Bhagavatpada*. 2nd Edn. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, xxviii, 125p., Rs. 30. Paper.

NAMBOODRIPAD, E.M.S. *Crisis into Chaos: Political India* 1981. Sangam Books (A division of Orient Longman Ltd.), Bombay, 1981, x, 162p., Rs. 12. Paper.

Former Chief Minister of Kerala and General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in his earlier book entitled *Conflicts and Crisis* published in 1974 recorded his assessment of India's political developments. In this book, the author has rewritten many portions of the earlier book and added new chapters which present an analysis of events in the perspective of 1981.

NAZARETH, J.M. *Brown Man Black Country: A Peep into Kenya's Freedom Struggle*. Tidings Publications, New Delhi, 1981, 540p.

An autobiographical and historical-political account presents the role of the Indian community in Kenya's independence and against the British attempts in planting a wedge between Indians and Africans. The author was the President of the East African Indian National Congress (1950-52), Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court (1953) and member of the Kenya Legislative Council (1956-60).

NIRMAL KUMAR, R.T.A. *Psychology Beyond Freud*. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, xiv, 288p., Rs. 45. Paper.

The author provides a scientific alternative to the gloomy study of Freud and proves that the latter's study was an exaggeration as it was based on the psychology of a frightened and shell-shocked Europe.

RAHUL SINGH, Ed. *Khushwant Singh's Editor's Page*. IBH Publishing Company, Bombay, 1981, 195p., Rs. 12. Paper.

Contains a wide cross-section of Khushwant Singh's writings in *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, chronologically arranged. These writings reflect views on well-known

personalities of India, kissing in films, the death penalty, bureaucracy, communal riots, prohibition, Indo-Pak relations, his support of Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi during the emergency and after. The editor has included his own article which he wrote for *Sunday* magazine in defence of the role of Khushwant Singh just when he was removed from *The Illustrated Weekly of India*.

SUBRAHMANYA, K.N. *India—The Turbulent Half Decade*. Southern Economist Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore, 1981, vi, 200p., Rs. 65.

Collection of editorials taken from *Southern Economist* of which the author is the editor. Covers a period from 1975 to 1980. Arranged in a chronological sequence, the editorial surveys present mainly an analysis of the political happenings during the brief period of Janata rule and of the break-up of the Janata Party leading to the formation of the care-taker Government of Charan Singh and finally to general elections. The book concludes with an assessment of Indira Gandhi's Government.

SWAMINARAYAN, (Pseud.) *The Cup of Love: (Fifty Four Poems of Swaminarayan Saint-Poets)* Tr. by Harindra Dave. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan (on behalf of Bochasanwasi Shree Akshar Purushottam Charitable Trust, Ahmedabad), Bombay, 1981, 111p., Rs. 25. Paper.

English translation of poems originally written in Gujarati by Swaminarayan saint-poets of early nineteenth century; brought out on the occasion of the bi-centennial celebrations of Lord Swaminarayan, 1781-1981.

TANDON, Vishwanath. *Selections from Vinoba*. Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, Varanasi, 1981, xiii, 356p., Rs. 50.

Culled from available writings and speeches of Vinoba—on practically all important matters relating to social and political aspects. Material available in English was not much and therefore the author depended more on Hindi materials and translated it for inclusion. The book acquaints a reader with the ideas and thought of Vinoba.

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
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